185 A. 227 | Pa. | 1936
Argued April 15, 1936. An award having been made by viewers for the taking of part of plaintiffs' land in connection with the widening of Nazareth Pike, the City of Bethlehem appealed, an issue was framed, and trial by jury had in the court below to determine the amount of damages to which plaintiffs were entitled.
In examining his expert witnesses counsel for plaintiffs asked them what in their opinion was the difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before and the fair market value immediately after the road construction took place. Defendant's counsel objected to this form of questioning on the ground that, instead of being asked what they considered the difference in value to be, they should first be asked their opinion regarding the fair market value of the property before the taking, and then the fair market value after the taking. The court overruled the objections. When it came to the presentation of defendant's side of the case, defendant's counsel asked his witnesses for their opinion as to the fair market value of the property before the exercise of the right of eminent domain and unaffected by it, and the fair market value after the exercise of such right. Counsel for the plaintiffs objected to these questions and the objections were sustained. The result was that two real estate experts for defendant were prevented from giving any valuations whatever, defendant's counsel refusing to avail himself of the permission of the court to ask the one question as to the difference in values before and after the taking.
While it is true that there are some early authorities to the effect that expert witnesses in condemnation or similar proceedings may be asked their opinion directly as to the amount of damage caused to the property (White Deer Creek Imp.Co. v. Sassaman,
Defendant complains that plaintiff was allowed to introduce in evidence estimates as to the cost of moving the house and certain trees on the property, and also the cost of laying a sidewalk in front of the premises. All of this testimony, however, was offered subject to the express limitation that it was being presented, not as an independent element of damage, but as a matter to be *132
taken into consideration in arriving at the difference in the fair market value of the property before and after the taking, and the learned trial judge charged the jury to the same effect. There was therefore no violation of the well-established principle expressed in Westinghouse AirbrakeCo. v. Pittsburgh,
The judgment is reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded.