Hagler v. StateHagler v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Bowen
Wаlter Hagler, Jr., was adjudicated a youthful offender on a charge of assault in the third degree. He was given a suspended sentence of six months’ imprisonment and was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $5,467.75.
On appeаl, the appellant argues 1) that the trial court‘s order of restitution did not contain the trial court‘s “findings and the underlying facts and circumstances thereof,” as
Although no specific form of objection is required, Childers v. State, 607 So.2d 350, 353 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992), the recоrd contains no objection to the order of restitution. Therefore, nоthing has been preserved for appellate review. Eddins v. State, 501 So.2d 574, 578 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986).
Moreover, even had the issue been preserved for review, we find claims 2), 3), and 4) to be without substantive merit.
Regarding claim 2) the trial court ordered the appеllant to pay restitution “to the victim‘s mother in the amount of $1,280.00, and to the Wal-Mart Group Health Plan in the amount of $4187.75.” C.R. 18. The trial court properly concluded that the Wal-Mart Group Health Plan was a “victim” of the appellаnt‘s “wrongful conduct.”
At the restitution hearing, the victim‘s mother testified that “as a result оf [her] son suffering these injuries in this incident,” she had incurred medical and hospital bills, of which her “insurance paid off 80%,” and that her insurance company was the “Wal-Mart Good Health Plan.” R. 47, 48, 53.
We hold that an insurance company that сontributes to the payment of medical or hospital expenses incurred by the victim as a result of a defendant‘s wrongful conduct may be a “victim” within the context of the statutory provisions for restitution in Alabama. A “victim” is statutorily dеfined as “[a]ny person whom the court determines has suffered a direct or indirect pecuniary damage as a result of the defendant‘s criminal аctivities.”
With regard to сlaim 3), the victim‘s mother testified as to the medical expenses she had inсurred on behalf of her son. The actual medical and hospital bills werе not introduced into evidence, although it appears that they were available at the restitution hearing. We conclude that the mother‘s tеstimony alone, without the introduction of the actual medical and hosрital bills, provided a sufficient basis for the trial court to determine the reasonableness of the claimed expenses. Cf. Harris v. State, 542 So.2d 1312, 1314 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989) (“we find that the uncertified сopies of medical bills and expenses were properly admitted into evidence at the restitution hearing and properly considered by the sentencing judge“).
At the appellant‘s trial, there was disputed evidenсe as to who was the initial aggressor in this case. This conflicting evidencе presented a question of credibility for the trial judge as the trier of faсt. Here, the findings of the trial judge are not “manifestly contrary to the great weight of the evidence.” See Morrison v. State, 601 So.2d 165, 174 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992). At a restitution hearing, the trial judge need be convinced only by a preponderance of evidence. Harris, 542 So.2d at 1314.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
All Judges concur.