*1
Hagerman
Gencorp
19
v
(ON REMAND)
HAGERMANv GENCORP AUTOMOTIVE
May 10, 1996, Lansing.
July 26,
Docket No. 194743.Submitted
at
Decided
1996, at 9:30 A.M.
Hagerman
Keith
sustained a work-related back
for which his
employer, Gencorp Automotive, voluntarily paid
compen-
worker’s
disabled, Hagerman overhydrated
sation benefits. While still
him-
myelogram
ultimately
compli-
self before and after a
and
died from
resulting
overhydration
cations
from
while on diuretics.
pay
compensation
Hager-
refused to
worker’s
death benefits to
widow,
Hagerman.
hearing
man’s
Marian
After a
before a worker’s
compensation magistrate,
Mrs.
was awarded benefits
Disability Compensation Act,
under
375 of the Worker’s
MCL
418.375;
17.237(375).
Compensation Appellate
The Worker’s
magistrate,
Commission reversed
concluding
the decisiоn of the
by any
that Mr.
death was not
Sawyer, P.J.,
Appeals,
work-related
The Court of
and Band-
JJ,
App
stra and R. B.
affirmed. 209 Mich
667
Burns,
Supreme Court,
granting
appeal,
in lieu of
leave to
remanded the
Appeals
matter
to the Court of
for recоnsideration in
of Dedes
On the Court of held: 1. “proximate As decided in the use of “the” before cause” governmental immunity recovery statute does not limit governmental employee cases where the conduct of the was the injury; reсovery may sole cause of the be had even where there are causes of the other than the con- governmental employee. duct of a When a number of factors con- produce negligence tribute to onе actor’s will not be con- sidered a cause of harm unless it was a substantial fac- producing injury. Among tor in the factors to be considered is whether the actor’s conduct created a force or series of forces that oрeration up were in continuous and active to the time of the harm, upon by or created a situation harmless in itself unless acted responsible. Here, other Hag- forces for which the actor is not Mr. myelogram erman’s back were harmless in themselves. only Death resulted because of the unfortunate coincidence of overhydration and diuretics. The back and the ii\jury, producing factor in a substantial did not constitute proximately cause the so did not Gencоip Although have been liable for foreseeable would complications could have resulted from additional *2 proce- medical Hagerman’s to a or other Mr. submission against dures, Gencoip unfore- not be held to be an insurer should seeable events. when, as in as a matter of law Proximate causation is decided dispute. case, if the facts were in dis- are not in Even this the facts appellate pute, in decid- commission this Court would defer to ing matter of fаct. causation as a Affirmed. J., concurring, stated that because it was concluded Bandstra, proximately cause his back did not that Mr. proxi- necessary meaning death, of “the it was not to consider legisla- cause,” 375(2) whether the § as usеd in or to consider mate history require a result similar to that tive of this section would reached in Dedes. & Paul
Williams, KLukowski, Szczytko (by Fotieo plaintiff. A. for the Williams), R. Roegge (by Rice & Lance Smith, Haughey, defendant. Mather), for the REMAND
ON
Bandstra,
Sawyer, P.J.,
JJ.
Before:
and Griffin
April 4,
In an
released on
Per Curiam.
affirmed
Worker’s Com-
the decision of the
this Court
denying
pensation Appellate
Commission
(wcac)
this Court
particular,
claim for benefits. In
plaintiff’s
contained in
cause standard
held that
Disability Compensation Act,
of the Worker’s
375(2)
applies in this
17.237(375)(2),
MCL
418.375(2);
adjudication
there was no
case,
though
even
liability
the death of
compensation
worker’s
before
with the
agreed
This Court also
plaintiff’s husband.
that her
had failed to demonstrate
plaintiff
WCAC husband’s death was
by any
work-related
667;
i Supreme In Court reversed a decision by this Court holding that the use of the word “the” “proximate before the words cause” in the govern- immunity statute, mental MCL 691.1407(2)(c); MSA 3.996(107)(2)(c), recovery limited to cases where the conduct of the governmental employee was the solе cause of the *3 recovery may held that be had even where there are proximate causes of other than the conduct of a governmental employee.
Although 375(2) phrase uses the “the cause,” nothing this Court’s earlier turns on question plaintiff’s whether husband’s was “the” proximate cause of his death. Instead, we1 agreed with the plaintiff wcac had prove failed to that her husband’s death proximately was by caused employment. his However, any to avoid misunder- standing comply spirit to with the as well as the letter of the Court’s remand order, we now provide analysis a more detailed of the cause issue. 1 Judge assigned place Griffin has been to this case on remand in of Burns,
Judge signed opinion. R. B. who the earlier
Opinion of the Court n injured After his bаck at work. Plaintiffs husband day 1989, in December he received his last of work resolve his treatment that failed to conservative mye- symptoms. 7, 1990, March he underwent On opinion, plain- According magistrate’s logram. to plenty of water to tiff’s husband was advised to drink possible myelogram. He did reduce side effects of the procedure. According and after the so both before physician spe- as an Dotson, Dr. described academic disciplines cializing medicine, of internal occu- pational toxicology, plaintiff’s medicine, and husband inadvertently overhydrated doing himself. His so had consequences mye- because at the time of his fatal logram undergoing longstand-
he was treatment for high pressure problem, ing blood not found to be work, related to with medications that included a diu- fluids, retic. The diuretic eliminated the excess result- ing depletion depleted in a his The sodium level. seizure, sodium caused a convulsive disorder or resulting aspiration gastriс contents. That in turn aspiration pneumonia, set off which turn caused syndrome. syndrome respiratory adult distress by combined with low sodium level resulted in death cardiac arrest on March plaintiff’s
The wcac held that death did husband’s sequence not flow in a natural and continuous from i.e., his back was not his back but rather was the result of the use of pressure high blood medication. We hold that the WCAC reached the correct result. *4 employer
An
is liable for additional
or com-
plications
employée
that result when an
submits to
inju-
procedures
medical
necessitated work-related
23
Opinion
Co,
Ford Motor
217 Mich
186 NW
318;
ries. Oleszekv
consequential injuries
(1922).
do not
Such
estab-
injury date, but rather relate back to the
lish a new
Corp,
original
Sanders v Gеneral Motors
date.
App
456, 459, 463;
“Unlike the fact of with which it is often lessly confused, primarily problem this is of law. It is depend sometimes said to on whether the conduct has been significant important so a cause that the defendant responsible. legally significance should be But both importance upon legal policy, turn conclusions in of terms they essentially depend policy so that on whether the of the responsibility law will extend the for the conduct to the сonsequences which have in fact occurred.
[*] [*] [*] quite possible every question “It is to state which arises ‘proximate in single connection with cause’ the form of a question: duty protect was the defendant under a to plaintiff against thе event which did in fact occur?” [McMil- Comm, Hwy lan v 51-52; State (1986), quoting Keeton, (5th ed), 42, pp Prosser & Torts 272-274.]
We hold that policy as matter of defendant should not be duty protect held to have a plaintiffs to hus- band from the harm that he suffered the instant case. Although defendant would have been liable for foreseeable additional complications that could have resulted from decedent submitting to a myelogram or other medical procedures, defendant should not be held to be an insurer against unforesee- able events.
Finally, we note that in McMillan, supra at 63, 8,n again quoted approval with following from Prosser & Keeton: bearing upon
“If
aspects
‘proximate
the facts
other
of
(that is, aspects
cause’
other
fact)
than cаusation in
are not
dispute
persons
and reasonable
could not differ about
Rem)
(On
by Bandstra,
J.
Concurrence
concept
‘proxi-
legal
application
those facts of the
cause,’
issue. But if reasona-
the court determines that
mate
persons
differ,
are in
either because relevant facts
ble
could
concept
application
legal
dispute,
of the
or because
‘proximate
deter-
cause’ to the case at hand is
evаluative
persons might differ,
which reasonable
mination as to
jury
‘proximate
is submitted to the
with
issue of
cause’
appropriate
law.”
instructions on the
did
reach the correct result as a
Even if the wcac
not
*6
proximate
law, we believe the issue of
matter of
per-
in this case is one about which reasonable
cause
sons could differ. We would therefore be constrained
defer-
to affirm the decision of the wcac
the
performance
encе due the wcac of its adminis-
appellate
Co,
review. Holden v Ford Motor
trative
269;
that we (1994), 99; of Dedes v applies to the statute at issue in this case. In majority justices dissenting disagreed over proximate meaning of “the cause” the statute immunity liability, creating governmental from tort 691.1407(2)(c); 3.996(107)(2)(c). Dedes, MCL supra majority
at 104. The concluded that use of the Lеgislature article “the” did not indicate that government would be immune from intended that the liability employee’s gross negligence tort unless an damage cause of or was the sole liability imposed but, instead, concluded that could be employee’s gross negligence government if a was one damage. of a number of causes of by Concurrence J. Bandstra, majority came to this conclusion as a largely legislative history result of the of the statute under at today cоnsideration. Id. 113-119. Because we have concluded that Keith back did not proximately cause his we death, have not had to con- sider the meaning of “the cause” in the rel- evant Disability section of the Worker’s Compensation Act, MCL 418.375(2); MSA 17.237(375)(2), or consider history whether the legislative of this section would require a similar major- result to that reached ity in Dedes.