125 Wash. 635 | Wash. | 1923
By this suit plaintiffs sought to rescind the purchase of a restaurant because of fraudulent representations and to recover the purchase price paid.
The complaint, in substance, alleged that the defendants Agnes Scott and Elmer F. Scott were husband and wife, and that the defendant Moran was the mother of Mrs. Scott; that the defendants owned, and operated a restaurant in the city of Seattle, called the Patricia Inn; that they first solicited the plaintiffs to purchase the undivided one-half interest of Scott
The defendant Agnes Scott answered, denying that she had any interest whatsoever in the Inn, or that she sold, or undertook to sell, any interest therein to the plaintiffs, and denied that she had made any of the alleged representations; Elmer F. Scott was not served
The only question, therefore, is whether, under the testimony, the court should have awarded a judgment against Mrs. Scott. The testimony shows that she furnished, either directly or indirectly, a large portion of the money which went into the Inn and its operation. It appears that neither her mother nor husband had any considerable sums, while she had valuable property in her own right. All the defendants testified that Mrs. Scott had no financial interest whatsoever in the Inn, and that whatever money she furnished for it was in the nature of loans to her mother and husband. It would not serve any useful purpose to go farther into the detail of the testimony on this question. It must suffice for us to say that, after a careful examination of it, we agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court that, at the time of the sale, Mrs. Scott had no financial interest in the Inn and owned no part of it.
Having so concluded, it is our view that it is unnecessary to here discuss the other question involved, to wit; did Mrs. Scott make the false and fraudulent representations as charged. If it be conceded that she personally represented to the respondents that the Inn had been making and was, at the time of the sale, making a net profit of $600 and more per month, that appellants had a right to rely on these representations, and that they were made by respondent knowing them to be untrue; yet, it seems to us, no relief can be had
Appellants might have brought either one of two actions: one for the rescission and recovery of the purchase price, and the other, a suit for damages because of the false representations and the deceit resulting from them, retaining the property. They have brought the first kind of action. It is entirely in equity. The other, to wit, retaining the property and suing for damages, would have been one in law. Since we have concluded that Mrs. Scott did not own or sell any interest in the property, the only action that was maintainable against her was one, not for rescission, but for deceit. It is true, as often stated by the books, that, in an action to rescind, a plaintiff may recover not only the purchase price paid, but also such damages as are incidental to the rescission, such as the loss plaintiffs may have suffered in undertaking to hold or operate the property; but only incidental damages can be recovered in such an action. Equity, having obtained jurisdiction, will give complete relief by not only placing the parties in statu quo, but giving to the party defrauded such damages as incidentally and necessarily flow from the transaction. But such damages
Having reached this conclusion, it necessarily follows that the judgment must be affirmed, whether respondent made the false representations or not. Judgment affirmed.
Main, C. J., Mackintosh, Holcomb, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.