Affirming.
The State of Kentucky owns a lot of land in Louisville on which is situated the Kentucky Institute for the Blind. The institute was originally located outside of the city boundary, but as the city has grown its limits have been extended until the сity takes in the property, and streets have been opened adjoining it. The city council оrdained that these streets should be improved at the cost of the adjoining owners. Appellеe, Gosnell, was the contractor who did the work under the ordinance of the city and the contract made with him by it. Section 2833a, Kentucky Statutes, 1903, is as follows: “That when any public way, or other public improvement of any city of the first class in this Commonwealth, is ordered or directed, by ordinancе of .the general council of said city to be constructed, which, according to the prоvisions of the act for the government of that class of cities, may be lawfully constructed at the cost of .the owners of the lots of ground adjacent to such improvement, or within the taxablе limits therefor, defined as provided in such act, and any such real estate within such taxable limits is owned by the State of Kentucky, or is held in trust for the public use of the State, the proportionate рart of the cost of making such public way or other public improvement shall be apportioned against the real estate of the State in like manner as against other lots of ground within such taxable limits, and apportionment warrant or statement thereof shall be certified by the board of public works of such city to the Auditor of Public Accounts, who shall thereupon draw on the State treasurer for the amount of such apportionment warrant or certified statement in fаvor of the person named therein as entitled to the amount thereof, and the State treasurer
It is insisted that the statute is unconstitutional, because it is local or special legislation, as it applies only to the city of Louisville, and is in conflict with sections 59 and 60 of the Constitution. The act is a part of\ the law governing cities of the first class. It is true, Louisville is the only city of the first class in the Commonwealth; but this is immaterial. Section 156 of the Constitution provides that the cities and towns of the Commonwealth shall be divided into six classes, and thаt the organization and powers of each class shall be defined and jmovided for by generаl laws. The power of the Legislature to provide for the government of cities of the first class are the same as they would be if there were a hundred cities of the first class instead of one; for, if any other city, by an increase of its population, comes to be placed in the first class, it will be governed by the act; otherwise the Legislature would be powerless to carry оut section 156 of the Constitution. Richardson v. Mehler,
It is also insisted that the act is in conflict with section 170 оf the Constitution, by which it is provided that public property used for public purposes shall be exеmpt from taxation. But it is well settled that the sections of the
' Lastly, it is urged that the act is in conflict with sections 49, 50 of the Constitution whiсh forbid the General Assembly authorizing any debt to be contracted on behalf of the Commonwealth except for certain specified purposes. But these sections of the Constitution hаve been the organic law of the State since 1851 (see sections 35, 36, art. 2, of former Constitution), аnd under it this court sustained such legislation. Lindsey v. Auditor,
Judgment affirmed.