88 Pa. 21 | Pa. | 1879
delivered the opinion of the court, January 6th 1879.
This contention arises in the distribution of the estate of Conrad Schad. It is whether the assignee of a judgment recovered on a municipal lien, acquires all the substantial rights of lien as fully as the same were held by the assignor.
The city of Pittsburgh held two judgments against Schad. They were based on municipal claim's filed under the Act of 6th January 1864, Pamph. L. 1131; scire facias had issued thereon, judgments had been obtained, executions had issued, and the property of Schad was advertised to be sold. On the day preceding the sale Schad went to the appellant and besought him to advance the money, and prevent a sacrifice of his property. In pursuance of this urgent request, and as a favor to Schad, the appellant paid the money to the attorney of the plaintiff, in the judgments, who was also city solicitor, and took from him an assignment thereof. The Act of Assembly referred to expressly directs these claims to be placed in the hands of the city solicitor, for him to collect and pay damages. In this case it is conceded that the city solicitor paid over the money in pursuance of law. The city makes no complaint. The cbnten
This presents the question for consideration.
The act provides, inter alia, for the widening, extending, grading and paving of streets in the city of Pittsburgh, and for assessing the costs and expenses thereof on the property, benefited thereby. It also declared the assessments thus made should be liens on the properties charged therewith from the commencement of the improvement for which they were made. The court thought the power to make and collect these assessments was an attribute of sovereignty, and could not be .delegated or exercised by any other than the city ; and as it had received the money, it mattered not. in what manner the priority of lien was extinguished. It thought to hold the full claim of the city in these judgments could be assigned would be hazardous to the person against whose property the claim was assessed, and to the public. It will, however, be observed that this was not an ordinary tax imposed for. a public .purpose. It was- a municipal charge for the benefit of lot-holders on. the particular street. The assessment was intended as an equivalent from the owner, for tho improvement made to the value of his property. They were not to be collected like public taxes. The act directed the liens to be filed in the District Court of the county, in the same manner as mechanic’s liens are filed, and that writs of scire facias and levari facias be issued thereon, in like manner. Hence the mode of assessment to' pay some persons damaged by .the improvement, as well as the manner of their collection, distinguish these assessments from public taxes generally: The Northern Liberties v. St. John’s Church, 1 Harris 104. Conceding, however,, in a broad sense, that in their inception, these assessments may be considered as taxes, how stands the case ? When the assignment was made the claim had changed its form. It had not only become a judgment in rent ripe for execution; but the latter had actually issued. The collection of the judgment was to. be enforced like other judgments in rein. Nf> unusual powers of sale attached to the judgment. Its only preference over a mechanic’s lien was its. priority.
The facts show -this is not. the-, case of one buying a tax. against a tax-payer, without the knowledge or consent of the latter, and with a-view to enforce unusual remedies against him ; but it was the purchase of judgments with restricted remedies, at the earnest solicitation of the defendant therein.
Decree reversed, with instructions that distribution be made conformably with this opinion ; and it is ordered that the appellees pay the costs of this appeal.