Hagar v. StateHagar v. State
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At issue in this case is stice. lawfully imposed a ten-year prison sentence for the crime of manslaughter. Appellant, Elizabeth Diane Hagar, was charged with first degree murder following
At the conclusion of the first stage of a bifurcated trial in this case, the jury found Mrs. Hagar guilty of manslaughter, a Class C felony, and further found that she used a firearm in the commission of the offense. During the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury was given the following standard AMCI 2d 9304 verdict form on which to fix a sentence:
We, the jury, having found Elizabeth Diane .Hagar GUILTY OF MANSLAUGHTER, FIX HIS [sic] SENTENCE AT:
(A) A TERM OF (NOT LESS THAN 3 NOR MORE THAN 10 YEARS) IN THE ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION.
(B) A FINE OF (NOT EXCEEDING $10,000) DOLLARS; OR
(C) BOTH A TERM OF (NOT LESS THAN 3 NOR MORE THAN 10 YEARS) IN THE ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION AND A FINE OF (NOT EXCEEDING $10,000) DOLLARS.
In closing argument, Mrs. Hagar’s attorney told the jury that they were allowed to consider and recommend to the judge that Mrs. Hagar be placed on probation. The jury deliberated and returned a verdict form to the trial court which left all of the blanks on thе form empty, although the handwritten words “5 years probation” and “$5,000 fine” appeared at the bottom of the form below the jury foreman’s signature. The jury was then dismissed without objection, at which point the State advisеd the trial judge that, notwithstanding the jury’s recommendation of five years’ probation,
For her sole point on appeal, Mrs. Hagar argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced her to ten years in the Arkansas Department of Correction pursuant to
Any person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty to a felony involving the use of a deadly weapon, whether or not an element of the crime, shall be sentenced to serve a minimum of ten (10) years in the state prison without parole but subject to reduction by meritorious good-time credit.
(Emphasis added.) Arkansas Code Annotated
(a) any person convicted of any offense which is classified by the laws of this state as a felony who employed any firearm of any character as a means of committing or escaping from the felony, in the discretion of the sentencing court, may be subjected to an additionаl period of confinement in the state penitentiary for a period not to exceed fifteen (15) years.
(b) The period of confinement, if any, imposed pursuant to this section shall be in addition to any fine or penalty provided by law as punishment for the felony itself Any additional prison sentence imposed under the provisions of this section, if any, shall run consecutively and not concurrently with any period of сonfinement imposed for conviction of the felony itself.
(Emphasis added.) We strictly construe criminal statutes and resolve any doubts in favor of the defendant. Graham v. State, 314 Ark. 152, 861 S.W.2d 299 (1993). However, we also adhere tо the basic rule of statutory construction, which is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Havens, 337 Ark. 161, 987 S.W.2d 686 (1999). The first rule of statutory construction is to construe the statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. If the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion to resort to rules of statutory interpretation. Id. Additionally, in construing any statute, we place it beside other statutes relevant to the subject matter in question and ascribe meaning and effect to be derived from the whole. Bush v. State, 338 Ark. 772, 2 S.W.3d 761 (1999). Statutes rеlating to the same subject must be construed together and in harmony, if possible. Id.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-1-102(4) (Repl. 1997) defines the term “deadly weapon:”
(4) “Deadly weapon” means:
(A) A firearm or anything manifesdy designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious physical injury; or
(B) Anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious physical injury.
(Emphasis added.) When this statute is read in conjunction with
Mrs. Hagar next argues that the trial court erred in failing to sentence her according to the sentencing guidelines promulgated in Ark. Code. Ann. § 16-90-803 (Supp. 1997). Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-803 (a)(1) provides that:
When a person charged with a felony enters a plea of guilty or no contest, enters a negotiated plea, or is found guilty in a trial before the judge, or when the trial judge is authorized to fix punishment following an adjudication of guilt by a jury pursuant to § 5-4-103, sentencing shall follow the procedures provided in this chapter.
(Emphasis added.) Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-103(b) (Repl. 1997) provides that:
(b) Except as provided by §§ 5-4-601‘— 5-4-605, 5-4-607, and 5-4-608, the court shall fix punishment as authоrized by this chapter in any case where:
(1) The defendant pleads guilty to an offense; or
(2) The defendant’s guilt is tried by the court; or
(3) The jury fails to agree on punishment; or
(4) The prosecution and the defense agree that the court may fix punishment; or
(5) A jury sentence is found by the trial court or an appellate court to be in excess of the punishment authorized by law.
(Emphasis added.) Mrs. Hagar argues that the sentencing guidelines apply because the jury failed to agree on punishment. We disagree. The jury in this case unanimously recommended a sentence that included five years’ probation and a fine of $5,000. The jury’s recommended sentence fell clearly within the statutory range for a Class C felony, such as manslaughter.
Mrs. Hagar also cites the cases of Higgins v. State, 326 Ark. 1030, 936 S.W.2d 740 (1996), and Slaughter v. State, 69 Ark. App. 65, 12 S.W.3d 240 (2000), for the proposition that the jury “completely failed to render any verdict within compliance with Arkansas law” and “once the trial сourt dismissed the jury, the trial court had no discretion but to resort to the sentencing guidelines ... [.]” Those cases, however, are inapposite. In Higgins v. State, the jury initially fixed a sentence of zero imprisonment and a zero fine and suggested one year of probation. Higgins v. State, 326 ark. 1030, 936 S.W.2d 740 (1996). The trial court concluded that this was not a legal sentence and sent the jury back to deliberate once more. Id. The jury returned with a sentence of a $3,000 fine and no imprisonment, along with a suggestion of five years’ probation. Id. We held that the trial court did not err in sending the jury back to reconsider the matter because the jury’s first sentence fell outside the statutory range for the crime; that is, “the jury could have given a term of imprisonment or a fine or both, but instead, it seized none of these options.” Higgins v. State, 326 Ark. at 1038, 936 S.W.2d at 744. The jury’s sentence in this case is clearly distinguishable from thе jury’s first sentence in Higgins v. State. As previously stated, the sentence recommended by the jury fell within the statutory range for manslaughter. In fact, the jury’s recommendation of a $5,000 fine and five years’ probation is virtually identical to the second jury verdict in Higgins v. State — a $3,000 fine and five years’ probation. In Slaughter v. State, the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that the trial court
For her final argument, Mrs. Hagar contends that the trial court “failed to correct an illegal sentence when the opportunity was provided to it.” This contention is also without merit for the reasons previously stated in connection with Mrs. Hagar’s penultimate argument.
Affirmed.