47 Cal. 222 | Cal. | 1874
This is a proceeding by certiorari to review.the action of the Board of Supervisors of Yolo County, in organizing “ Reclamation District No. 108,” and in including therein certain lands of the petitioner, held under title derived from the Mexican government, and which are alleged to be upland, not subject to overflow, and for that reason not subject to be included in a swamp land district. It is claimed: First, that the petition to the Board for the formation of
On the former hearing we were of the opinion that the petition was substantially defective in Both of these particulars. But at the last hearing it appeared from an amended return to the writ, that the petition did, in fact, state, with sufficient particularity, the number of acres in each tract sold, with the name of the owner thereof, if known. But amongst the owners specified in the petition “ The Sacramento Valley Beclamation Company” is stated to be the owner of a large portion of the land sought to be reclaimed, and there is no averment that this company is a corporation: or if it be, that it is capable in law of taking and holding lands. The precise question arose in Myers v. Croft, 13 Wall. 291, whether, under similar circumstances, a company described in the same manner would be presumed to be capable in law of acquiring and holding real estate. In that case a conveyance of land was made to “The Sulphur Springs Land Company,” which was not otherwise described in the instrument, and there being nothing in the proofs to show whether the grantee was a corporation and capable of taking lands, or an unincorporated company. On this point the Court said: “It is sufficient to say, in the absence of any proof whatever on the subject, that it will be presumed the land company was capable in law to take a conveyance in real estate.” This is a direct adjudication of the point, by the Court of the highest authoritjr, and must be deemed conclusive.
The other alleged defect in the petition presents a question of more difficulty. There is in the petition no direct averment of the quantity of land sold and of the quantity remaining unsold, in the proposed district, but the argument for the respondent is, that the schedule annexed to and forming a part of the petition, is averred on the face of the petition, to contain a complete list, by Government subdivisions, of all the lands in the district, with the names of the owners when known, and when the owners were unknown, that fact is stated. It is said, this was equivalent to an averment that all the lands in the district were held in private ownership, and had, therefore, been sold, and that none remained unsold 'by the State. If the petition was subjected to the test of a special demurrer, we would have no hesitation in holding that it is defective in this particular. But, possibly, it is capable of the interpretation placed upon it by the respondents, and in view of the serious consequences which would probably result from setting aside the proceedings of the Supervisors, we are inclined to give to the petition the most favorable interpretation of which it is fairly susceptible. " In Rutland v. County Commissioners of Worcester, 20 Pick. 79, Chief Justice Shaw, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said that the application for a writ of certiorari is addressed to the discretion of the Court “ and ought not to be granted, even if the record, when returned on certiorari, would appear to be defective or informal, where substantial justice has been done, or where, if the proceedings are quashed, ruinous or very mischievous consequences would ensue, and where, upon such reversal of proceedings, parties cannot be placed in statu quo.” The same views, substantially, were announced by this Court in Keys v. Supervisors of Marin, 42 Cal. 252. In the case at bar, the petitioner appeared before the Supervisors, when the proceedings for organizing the district were in fieri, and interposed no objection to the insufficiency of the petition, except that it proposed to include in .the district his lands, which were held under a Mexican grant. Instead
The next objections urged against the validity of these proceedings are, first, that the lands of the petitioner, which are included in the district, are not swamp and overflowed lands; and, second, that they are held under title derived from the Mexican Government; and that, for each of these reasons, they are not subject to be included within a reclamation district. We shall examine these points in their order. The act of March 28th, 1868, under which these proceedings were had, establishes what was intended to be a complete system for the reclamation of swamp and overflowed lands in this State. Whether it was designed to apply to all the swamp land in the State, or only to that portion ceded to this State by the act of Congress of September 28th, 1850, known as the Arkansas Act, will be more appropriately considered in discussing the next point. Section 30 of the act of March 28th, 1868, provides that “whenever the holders of certificates of purchase, patents, or other evidences of title representing one half or more of any body of swamp and - overflowed, salt, marsh, or tide lands, susceptible of one mode of reclamation, desire to reclaim the. same, they shall present to the Board of Supervisors of the county in which the said lands or the greater
The only remaining question is, whether swamp and overflowed lands held under title derived from the Mexican Government were properly included in the reclamation district. It is insisted they were not, because first, the Act of March 28, 1868, was not intended to apply to the reclamation of any lands, except those acquired under the Arkansas Act; and second, that if it was intended to include other swamp and overflowed lands, the Act was, pro tanto, unconstitutional and void. It is not claimed that there is any express provision in the Act limiting its operation to a particular class of swamp and overflowed lands. But it is inferred by counsel, from the title of the Act, and from certain of its provisions, that the scheme of reclamation which it inaugurated, was intended to apply exclusively to lands acquired under the Arkansas Act. The title is “an Act to provide for the management and sale of the lands belonging to the State.” The statute is very comprehensive in its-provisions, and contains minute directions respecting the sale and disposal of all classes of land belonging to the State.
There is nothing in the title having special reference to
It is said, however, that it is not within the constitutional power of the Legislature to compel the petitioner to reclaim his lands at his own expense, and against his consent. But we think zthe power of the Legislature to compel local improvements, which, in its judgment, will promote the health of the people, and advance the public good, is unquestionable. In the exercise of this power it may abate nuisances, construct and repair highways, open canals for irrigating arid districts, and perform many other similar acts for the public good, and all at the expense of those who are to be chiefly and more immediately benefited by the improvement. The Constitution of the State is not a grant, but a limitation of power; and when an Act of the Legislature is called in question as repugnant to the Constitution, those who assail it on this ground must specify the particular provision of that instrument which is violated. The clauses of the Constitution which, or some of which, are alleged to have been violated by the act under consideration, are: 1st. That which secures to the-citizen the right “to acquire,
But we need not rest our decision on the narrow ground that this is strictly a local improvement. On the contrary, the reclamation of the vast bodies of swamp and overflowed land in this State may justly be regarded as a public improvement of great magnitude, and of the utmost importance to the community. If left wholly to individual enter
Writ dismissed.
Mr. Justice Bhodes, concurring specially: I concur in the judgment.
Mr. Justice Niles did not express an opinion.