Hagan v. StateHagan v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Baker
OPINION
BAKER, Judge.Aрpellant-defendant Clayton Hagan appeals his convictions for two counts of Burglary,1 both Class B felonies, and two counts of Theft,2 both Class D felonies. Hagan presents two issues for review, which we combine and restate as: whether the Marion County Superior Court — Juvenile Division’s waiver of jurisdiction is supported by the evidence.
FACTS
On June 26, 1993, Hagan and John Guerin decided to break into two homes. In order to gain entry into the homes, they kicked open the doors and cut the screens. Thereafter, bоth Hagan and Guerin removed property from the homes.
On June 28, 1993, the State questioned Hagan regarding the crimes. After consulting with his parents, Hagan signed a waiver of his rights and confessed to the crimes. Further, Hagan agreed to return the stolen property. Thereafter, the State filed a delinquency petition against Hagan alleging that he had committed acts, which, had they been committed by an adult, would have constituted two counts of burglary, both Class B felonies, аnd two counts of theft, both Class D felonies. Hagan was subsequently placed on home detention pending the disposition of the proceedings.
On August 12, 1993, the State filed a motion requesting the trial court to waive juve
Thereafter, on December 20, 1993, the court granted the State’s motion to waive jurisdictiоn, finding that the State had proved that Hagan was sixteen years of age or older, the charged crimes would be Class B felonies if committed by an adult, and there was probable cause to believe Hagan committed the charged crimes. In addition, the court stated:
The Court heard sufficient testimony regarding Clayton’s position that he should remain in the Juvenile Justice System, but there is nothing at this point that the Juvenile Justice System can do to assist this young man in his rehabilitativе efforts and considering the nature of the charges that the State has pointed out in its portion of the case the Court will grant the State’s Motion to Waive Juvenile Court Jurisdiction.
Record at 136. After jurisdiction was waived, Hagan was tried and convicted of two counts of burglary, as Class B felonies, and two counts of theft, as Class D felonies. On November 18,1994, Hagan was sentenced to six years imprisonment for each burglary conviction and one and one-half yeаrs for each theft conviction, all of which were to run concurrently and all of which were suspended.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION3
This case presents us with a question regarding the legislature’s revision of the juvenile court system. Specifically, we must considеr the extent of a juvenile judge’s discretion to waive a juvenile into adult court and the extent to which this court may review such a waiver.
The waiver statute,
... [T]he court shall upon motion of the prosecutor and after full investigation and hearing, waive jurisdiction if it finds that:
(1) the child is charged with an act that, if committed by an adult, would be:
(A) a Class A or Class B felony, ...
(2) there is probable cause to believe that the child has committed the act; and
(3) the child was sixteen (16) years of age or older when the aсt charged was allegedly committed;
unless it would be in the best interests of the child and of the safety and welfare of the community for the child to remain within the juvenile justice system.4
According to the State, because
We agree with Soward that a juvenile judge’s decision to waive jurisdiction over a juvenile accused of committing а crime should not be beyond the review of this court. To accept the State’s position, that waiver is mandatory and not subject to review once the first three factors of the waiver statute are met, would render meaningless the final portion of the statute, which provides that the juvenile shall be waived “unless it would be in the best interests of the child and of the safety and welfare of the community for the child to remain within the juvenile justice system.”
Initially, we note that we do not agree with Hagan’s contention that once he presents evidence demonstrating that it would be in his best interests and the best interests of the safety and welfare of the community for him to remain in juvenile court, the burden shifts to the State to present evidence in opposition. Rather, we believe that the burden to present evidence that waiver is not in the best interests of the juvenile or of the safety and welfare of the community remains at all times оn the juvenile seeking to avoid waiver. However, should the State decide not to refute the juvenile’s evidence on the final portion of the statute, the State risks that the juvenile court or this court will find the juvenile’s evidence рersuasive and deem waiver inappropriate.
Nor do we believe, as Hagan suggests, that the juvenile court is required, pursuant to IND.CODE
Having determined that we have the authority to review a juvenile court’s waiver determination, we now turn to the specific facts of this case. Here, the State presented evidence that Hagan was at least sixteen years of age, was charged with an act that would be a Class B felony if committed by an adult, and that there was probable cause to believe that Hagan committed the act. Thus, a presumption was created that Hagan should be waived to adult court. Hagan then presented evidence that it would be in his best interests and that of the safety and welfare of the community for him to remain in juvenile court. On thе basis of this evidence, the juvenile court found that “there is nothing at this point that the Juvenile Justice System can do to assist this young man in his rehabilitative efforts ...” R. at 136. According to Hagan, the trial court abused its discretion in making this finding in light of his undisputed evidеnce that it was in his
Hagan was over seventeen years old at the time the offenses were committed. As a result, by the time hе could have been adjudicated a delinquent and the juvenile court could have taken remedial actions, Hagan would presumably have been eighteen years old.5 Having reached that age, the juvenile court wоuld have been foreclosed from using the sanction of the Department of Correction, as children over eighteen years old may not be sent to the Department by a juvenile court. IND.CODE § 31-6-4-15.6. Furthermore, even if Hagan were nоt yet eighteen at the time he was adjudicated a delinquent, the juvenile court’s remedies would nonetheless have been limited because it could not incarcerate him beyond his eighteenth birthday under this statute. Thus, although the juvenilе court would retain jurisdiction over Ha-gan until he reached the age of twenty-one years,6 the court would be without the threat of the sanction of incarceration to further Hagan’s rehabilitation. This is a “catch-22”7 which faсes all juvenile courts that adjudicate children who are approaching their eighteenth birthday when they commit crimes, and one to which this juvenile court was undoubtedly referring when it stated that there was nothing the juvenile system could do for Hagan. As a result, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in waiving its jurisdiction over Hagan.
In sum, we find that this court has the authority to review for an abuse of discretion the decision of a juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction over a juvenile pursuant to
Judgment affirmed.
NAJAM and FRIEDLANDER, JJ., concur.
Notes
. IND.CODE§ 35-43-2-1.
. IND.CODE § 35-43-4-2.
. Oral argument was held at Eastern High School, Greene County, Indiana, on May 1, 1996, Law Day.
. Although the legislature amended I.C. § 31—6— 2-4 in 1995, section (e), formerly
. In fact, Hagan turned eighteen years of age on October 17, 1993, and the waiver hearing was conducted on November 17 and December 14, 1993.
. IND.CODE § 31-6-2-3.
.Catch-22 is a paradoxical rule found in the novel Catch-22 by Joseph Heller (1963), which refers to a problematic situation for which the only solution is denied by a circumstance inherent in the problem. Websters Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1991).