Micah L. Haffner filed this action to quiet title to a parcel of land in Haralson County that he claims to have purchased from his mother’s estate. The trial court granted summary judgment to James and Regina Davis and Community аnd Southern Bank and denied Haffner’s motion for summary judgment. Because Haffner has been in possession of the property known as 116 Golden Lane Road for less than 20 years and failed to exercise reasonаble diligence, we affirm.
Haffner’s parents, Eric J. Haffner and Cheryl A. Haffner, purchased two tracts of land on Golden Lane Road in 1979. They built a house known as 128 Golden Lane Road, where they lived, and later built a smaller, one-story house known as 116 Golden Lane Road, where a relative resided. Haffner testified at his deposition that his parents and siblings understood that 128 Golden Lane Road was located on Tract 1 and 116 Golden Lane Road was located on Tract 2. In fact, both were built on Tract 1.
In 1994, Haffner’s parents divorced in Carroll County. Their settlement agreement, which was incorporated in the divorce decree, *754 required the husband to quitclaim his interest in the property known as 116 Golden Lane Road to the wife and required the wife to quitclaim her interest in the property known as 128 Golden Lane Road to the husband. The decree did not contаin a legal description of the properties. The couple exchanged quitclaim deeds. In the deed received by the wife, the metes-and-bounds description conveyed only Tract 2 and did not include the residence at 116 Golden Lane Road. The deed the husband received stated that it was “being made as provided by” the parties’ divorce decree, but the metes-and-bounds description included both 128 Golden Lаne Road and 116 Golden Lane Road.
In 1997, Haffner purchased his mother’s property from her estate. He contends that the estate administrator sold him what they thought was 116 Golden Lane Road. However, the deed Hаffner received did not mention 116 Golden Lane Road or make reference to the divorce decree. Instead, the deed refers to a survey dated March 24, 1997, that shows the one-story house is located on Tract 1, north of the property conveyed to him.
In 2004, the bank’s predecessor-in-interest foreclosed on Eric Haffner’s property and sold it to James and Regina Davis. The deed conveyed Tract 1 and contains a metes-and-bounds description that places both 116 and 128 Golden Lane Road within the boundaries of the property. In 2007, the Davises commissioned a survey that confirmed that both houses were locаted on their property and filed a dispossessory action involving the smaller house.
Later that year, Haffner filed this petition to quiet title to 116 Golden Lane Road. A special master determined that Haffner could not prevail on his adverse possession claim, but recommended denying summary judgment because the parties never intended to convey title to 116 Golden Lane Road to the Davises. Rejecting the spеcial master’s recommendation, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Davises and the bank. Haffner appeals.
1. In reviewing a trial court’s order granting summary judgment, this Court views the evidence and all reasоnable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Kaplan v. City of Sandy Springs,
Haffner first contends that he is entitled to 116 Golden Lane Road through adverse possession and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment without ruling on the claim. Constru
*755
ing the evidence in the light most favorable to Haffner, the undisputеd facts show that he did not gain title to the house at 116 Golden Lane Road through adverse possession. He cannot establish title by prescription because he has not adversely possessed the proрerty for the requisite 20 years. See OCGA §§ 44-5-161 to 44-5-163. The earliest date that he can claim adverse possession is in 1994, when his parents divorced and divided their property into two tracts. He cannot claim adverse possession under color of title, which reduces the required period of possession to seven years, because his deed does not provide written evidence of title. See
Luttrell v. Whitehead,
2. Haffner next contends that his parents’ divorce decree constituted a muniment of title and the trial court should have enforced the decree by specific performance. “A decree for specific performance shall operate as a deed to convey land or other property without any conveyance being executed by the vendor.” OCGA § 9-11-70. Because it operates as a deed, a decree for specific performance must contain a description as definite as that required to support a deed.
Scheinfeld v. Murray,
In this case, the divorce settlement decree does not contain a specific description of the property to be conveyed. It refers to the property solely as 116 Golden Lane Road and fails to identify its actual size, shape, or location. Without clear identification of the land to be conveyed, Haffner is not entitled to a decree of specific performance. See
Bennett v. Young,
3. Finally, Haffner contends that the trial court erred in construing this quiet title action as an equitable action to rеform, a written instrument based on mutual mistake. The trial court concluded that the statute of limitations on Haffner’s claim expired in 2004, more than three years before he filed this lawsuit, and that Haffner was not entitled to equitable relief because he failed to exercise due diligence. Haffner challenges the trial court’s ruling as inapplicable to a claimant in possession of the property.
An action to reform a written document may be brought within seven years from the time the cause of action accrues.
Whittle v. Nottingham,
In this cаse, Haffner seeks to reform the warranty deed dated March 25, 1997, that he received from his mother’s estate. The deed refers to a boundary survey prepared for him by Armstrong Land Surveying, Inc., on March 24, 1997. The survey shows that thе one-story house is located on Tract 1, which Haffner’s father owned, not Tract 2, which Haffner was purchasing from the estate. Although Haffner testified that he was not aware that 116 Golden Lane Road was not within the property described in his deed, he has not shown any impediment that prevented him from reviewing the survey and discovering the mistake. “If a party, by reasonable diligence, could have had knowledge of the truth, equity shall nоt grant relief.” OCGA § 23-2-29. See also
Parker v. Fisher,
There is an exception that permits the grant of relief even in cases of negligence when the other party has not been prejudiced. See OCGA § 23-2-32 (b);
Curry v. Curry,
Judgment affirmed.