61 Mo. App. 390 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1895
—The plaintiff’s alleged cause of action is stated in three counts. The -first declares on a bill of exchange or order for $1,582, dated January 24, 1893, in which it is alleged that one W. S. Farmer is the drawer, the plaintiff the payee, and the defendant
In the second count it is averred that on the twenty-fourth day of January, 1893, Farmer was indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $1,582, and that the defendant owed Farmer a like sum, and that it was then agreed by all parties that plaintiff should release Farmer from his debt and that defendant should become liable to plaintiff for that amount; in other words, that there was a contract of novation.
In the third count it is stated that -on the day above named Farmer owed the plaintiff $632; that defendant held certain mortgages on Farmer’s property; that, at the time, the plaintiff was the owner of a certain house and lot in the city of Springfield; that defendant promised and agreed with the plaintiff that if he, plaintiff, would convey the house and lot to the wife of Farmer, he (defendant) would pay upon the order of Farmer all sums due by Farmer and wife to plaintiff, including $950, the consideration for the house and lot; that, relying on the promise, the plaintiff subsequently conveyed the house and lot as agreed by a sufficient deed, and turned over the possession thereof to Mrs. Farmer; and that he afterwards procured from Farmer the order above mentioned, which the defendant on demand refused to pay.
The answer of the defendant specifically denied all of the allegations in each count.
The cause was submitted to a jury. The defendant objected to the reading of the order in support of the cause of action stated in the first count, because there was no evidence to show that it had been accepted in writing by him. The order was read, subject to objection and the further ruling of the court. The evidence introduced by the plaintiff in support of the second and third counts was entirely oral. The de
It is evident that there can be no recovery on the first count. The statute on the subject is plain. It provides that no person “shall be charged as an accept- or of a bill of exchange, unless his acceptance shall be in writing, signed by himself or his' lawful agent.” Revised Statutes, 1889, section 719. It is not claimed that the defendant accepted the bill in writing. An oral promise, only, to pay it is relied on, which is insufficient. Flato v. Mulhall, 72 Mo. 522.
It is conceded that the evidence fails to make out' a case of novation under the second count; but counsel for plaintiff urges that there was some competent and substantial evidence to support the cause of action stated in the third.
The case as made by the plaintiff’s evidence is substantially as follows: In January, 1893, the plaintiff held the note of ~W. S. Farmer for $632, which he had pledged as collateral to the Exchange Bank of Springfield. W. S. Farmer was also indebted to the defendant in the sum of $3,100, to secure which the defendant held a deed of trust on a tract of land containing seventy-seven acres. Farmer also owed other parties' $19,000 or $20,000, the bulk of which was secured by mortgages and judgment liens. Farmer and his wife were negotiating with the defendant for a new loan of $8,000. The program was to sell the seventy-seven acres under the defendant’s deed of trust, thereby cutting off certain judgment liens; the
The language of the statute of frauds, which is pertinent to this ease, is: “No action shall be
Concerning the note for $632, the alleged agreement of O’Day to pay it was clearly within the provisions of the statute. The question should always be whether the promise is one which assumes to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another. If so, then to have any validity whatever the promise must be in writing and be signed by the promisor. The cases make an exception where the promisor for an adequate consideration moving to himself assumes the debt, and the original debtor is released from all liability. Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N. Y. 412. The exception-can not prevail here, for the reason that at the time the alleged agreement was entered into the plaintiff was not the owner of Farmer’s note. He had' passed it to the Exchange Bank, and the bank was not a party to the contract. Therefore, Farmer could not have been released from the indebtedness, and the defendant substituted in his place.
It is equally clear that the agreement by the defendant to pay the additional sum of $950 for the house and lot falls likewise within the inhibition of the statute. The agreement was to pay for the house and lot which Farmer was about to buy for his wife. Now, the object of the statute of frauds is to prevent frauds and perjuries, and to that end all contracts for the sale of or concerning lands, to be enforceable, are required to .be in writing. The reasonableness of the applica
Neither can an action of assumpsit be maintained against the defendant for the purchase price of the land as upon an agreement fully executed by the plaintiff, for the reason that the debt - is that of Mrs. Farmer. The conveyance was to her and not to the defendant, which takes the case out of that class of eases which hold that an action of contract or assumpsit will lie to enforce an oral promise to pay a sum of money in consideration of a conveyance of land by the plaintiff to defendant, which has been fully executed by the plaintiff. Basford v. Pearson, 9 Allen, 387.
It follows that the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed. It is so ordered.