Hadix v. JohnsonHadix v. Johnson
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Schriro [v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348], 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) is highly instructive as to whether Booker‘s is a watershed procedural rule. Schriro held that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that prоvisions of Arizona‘s sentencing scheme that allowed a judge to find those aggravating factors authorizing the death penalty violate the Sixth Amendment) did not announce a “watershed rule[] of criminal procedure” that would apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. Schriro, 124 S.Ct. at 2524-26. The Court framed the issue as “whether judicial factfinding so seriously diminishe[s] accuracy that there is an impermissibly large risk of punishing conduct the law does not reach.” Id. at 2525 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Citing DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633-34 (1968) (holding that procedural rule applying the Sixth Amendment‘s jury-trial guarantee to the states has no retroactive effect), the Schriro Cоurt observed that “[i]f a trial held entirely without a jury was not impermissibly inaccurate, it is hard to see how a trial in which a judge finds only aggravating factors could be.” 124 S.Ct. at 2526.
Schriro‘s reasoning applies with equal force to Booker. Both Ring and Booker found unconstitutional particular aspects of sentencing schemes allowing a judge to impose punishment on the basis of judge-found facts. We see no basis for concluding that the judicial factfinding addressed in Booker is either less accurate or creates a greater risk of punishing conduct the law does not reach than did the judicial factfinding addressed in Ring. The Supreme Court has never held that a new rule of criminal procedure falls within Teague‘s second exception. Beard [v. Banks], 124 S.Ct. [2504,] 2513-14 [(2004)]. We hold that Booker‘s rule does not either. Accord McReynolds [v. United States], 397 F.3d [479,] 481 [(7th Cir. 2005)].
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court dismissing Humphress‘s
Notes
ARGUED: Elizabeth R. Alexander, National Prison Project, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Leo H. Friedman, Office of the Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Elizabeth R. Alexander, National Prison Project, Washington, D.C., Patricia A. Streeter, Ann Arbor, Michigаn, Michael J. Barnhart, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellants. Leo H. Friedman, A. Peter Govorchin, Office of the Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees.
Before: KRUPANSKY,* RYAN, and COLE, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
RYAN, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiffs appeal the district court‘s calculation of attorney fees under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA),
I.
The facts are not in dispute. In 1980, inmates at a Michigan prison filed suit under
In 1996, Congress enacted the PLRA, which, among other things, places a cap on attorney fees in prisoner civil rights litigation. Under the PLRA, attorney fees in such cases may not be “greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under
In September 2000, the Judicial Conference‘s Committee on Defender Services proposed to increase the hourly rate for court-appointed counsel from $75 to $113 for fiscal year 2002. The Judicial Conference approved the committee‘s recommendаtion and submitted a budget request to Congress based on the new rate. However, due to budget constraints, the hourly rate of $113 was never implemented. Based on available funds, the hourly rate actually paid to appointed counsel was $75 for work performed up to May 1, 2002, and $90, thereafter.
The plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney fees and costs incurred from January 1 to June 30, 2002. The plaintiffs’ attorneys calculated their fees at a rate of $169.50 per hour, or 150 percent of $113, which was the rate authorized by the Judicial Conference and requested of Congress in the Conferencе‘s 2002 budget proposal. The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the rate should be based not on the amount authorized by the Judicial Conference, but on the lower amount actually being paid to court-appointed counsel at the time. Specifically, the defendants claimed that the maximum allowable fee for work performed prior to May 1, 2002, was $112.50, or 150 percent of $75, and for work performed after May 1, 2002, the maximum allowable fee was $135, or 150 percent of $90.
The district court ruled in favor of the defendants, calculating the plaintiffs’ attorney fees at a rate of $112.50 per hour for work performed prior to May 1, 2002, and $135 per hour for work performed thereafter. The plaintiffs appealed.
II.
We review a district court‘s interpretation of a statute de novo. Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 910-11 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816, 125 S.Ct. 169, 160 L.Ed.2d 156 (2004).
III.
The plaintiffs argue that attorney fees under the PLRA should be calculated using the hourly rate authorized by the Judicial Conference for court-appointed counsel under
The defendants maintain that attorney fees under the PLRA should be calculated using the hourly rate as it has been “implemented,” that is, the rate supported by congressional appropriations to the federal courts and actually paid to court-appointed counsel. The defendants concede that the Judicial Conference has the authority to establish the hourly rate of compensation for court-appointed counsel under
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation, the first сanon of which is that we begin with the language of the statute itself. Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 666 (6th Cir.2001). If we can discern an unambiguous and plain meaning from the language of the statute, we must enforce it according to its terms. Id. at 667.
The PLRA places the following cap on attorney fees:
No award of attorney‘s fees in [prisoner civil rights litigation] shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 pеrcent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of Title 18 for payment of court-appointed counsel.
Hourly rate.—Any attorney appointed pursuant to this section or a bar association or legal aid agency or community defender organization which has provided the appointed attorney shall, at the conclusion of the representation or any segment thereof, be compensated at a rate not exceeding $60 per hour for time expended in court or before a United States magistrate judge and $40 per hour for time reasonably expended out of court, unless the Judicial Conference determines that a higher rate of not in excess of $75 pеr hour is justified for a circuit or for particular districts within a circuit, for time expended in court or before a United States magistrate judge and for time expended out of court. The Judicial Conference shall develop guidelines for determining the maximum hourly rates for each circuit in accordance with the preceding sentence, with variations by district, where appropriate, taking into account such factors as the minimum range of the prevailing hourly rates for qualified attorneys in the district in which the representation is provided and the recommendations of the judicial councils of the circuits. Not less than 3 years after the effective date of the Criminal Justice Act Revision of 1986, the Judicial Conference is authorized to raise the maximum hourly rates specified in this paragraph up to the aggregate of the overall average percentages of the adjustments in the rates of pay under the General Schedule made pursuant to section 5305 of title 5 on or after such effective date. After the rates are raised under the preceding sentence, such maximum hourly rates may be raised at intervals of not less than 1 year eaсh, up to the aggregate of the overall average percentages of such adjustments made since the last raise was made under this paragraph.
We find no ambiguity in these provisions and hold that attorney fees under the PLRA should be based on the hourly rate for court-appointed counsel that is authorized by the Judicial Conference, rather than on the rate that is actually paid to such counsel. The language of
Moreover, in the absence of express statutory language, there is no inherent reason why attorney fees under the PLRA should be limitеd by the amount budgeted to pay court-appointed counsel under the CJA. Attorney fee awards in prisoner civil rights litigation are paid from the pockets of unsuccessful defendants whether they be private individuals or government entities; such fees are not paid from funds set aside by Congress to compensate court-appointed counsel under the CJA. There is no logical reason to limit fee awards in such cases to the amount of money set aside to fund the CJA.
Even if the language of
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the maximum allowable attorney fees under the PLRA should be based on the amount authorized by the Judicial Conference, not the amount actually paid to court-appointed counsel under the CJA. Accordingly, the maximum allowable hourly rаte for attorney fees under the PLRA is $169.50, or 150% of $113. The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the case REMANDED so that the district court may award attorney fees to the plaintiffs based on an hourly rate no greater than $169.50.
JAMES L. RYAN
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE