49 Ind. App. 551 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1912
This suit was brought by appellee against appellants and numerous other defendants in the Sullivan Circuit Court. Its nature and character can best be pre
The complaint alleges, in substance, that Jesse Haddon died in Sullivan county, Indiana, on November 26, 1906, in possession of and the owner in fee of numerous tracts of real estate located in said county and particularly described; that on October 11, 1876, said decedent then and theretofore unmarried, and the father of no legitimate child or children, executed his last will, a copy of which is filed with and made a part of said complaint; that said decedent in said will attempted to dispose of his entire estate in the manner, and to the legatees, beneficiaries and trustees mentioned in, and particularly set out and made defendants to, said complaint; that said legatees and beneficiaries have possession of said last will, and are threatening to have it probated; that on January 1,1861, said Jesse Haddon, then unmarried, became engaged to Mary Caroline Wortman; that during the existence of said marriage contract, to wit, on January 2, 1871, there was bom to Mary Caroline Wortman a son, appellee Prank Crawford, and that said Haddon was his father; that subsequently appellee’s said father and mother, viz., Jesse Haddon and Mary Caroline Wortman, vrere duly married, and lived and cohabited together as husband and wife in said county until the death of said Mary Caroline on the 10th day of-, 1899; that at numerous times before and after said marriage said Jesse acknowledged that appellee was the son of said Mary Caroline and that he, Jesse Had-don, was plaintiff’s father; that after the death of appellee’s mother, to wit, on February 1,1901, said Jesse Had-don was married to appellant Flora A. Haddon, and they lived and cohabited together as husband and wife up to the time of the death of said Jesse Haddon on November 26, 1906; that on January 20, 1902, there was born to said Flora A. and Jesse Haddon a daughter, who is appellant Jessie Helen Haddon; that appellee and appellants Flora A. Had-
It is further alleged that the defendants other than Flora A. and Jessie Helen Haddon, assert, claim and pretend to have and to hold some interest in the real estate adverse to plaintiff’s claim. The prayer asks that the will be revoked, that the beneficiaries thereunder be decreed to have no interest in the real estate, that the real estate be partitioned and the interest of the owners be set off in severalty, that plaintiff’s title be quieted as against the claims of all defendants, that plaintiff be permitted to take the name of Frank Had-d.on, and hereafter to be known and recognized as the legitimate son of Jesse Haddon, deceased.
Separate demurrers by appellant Flora A. Haddon and by the guardian ad liiem of Jessie Helen Haddon were filed to said complaint, which were by the court overruled and exceptions saved. A cross-complaint was filed by said appellants, seeking to quiet title in them to the real estate in controversy. A denial to the complaint and cross-complaint closed the issues. There was a trial by jury and a verdict returned for appellee “on the issues joined against each and all the defendants.” A motion for a new trial was overruled, to which appellants excepted, and a decree was entered on the verdict, adjudging that Flora A. Haddon and Jessie Helen Haddon take nothing on their cross-complaint,
Appellants either misinterpret the theory of appellee’s complaint, or are in error as to the section of the statute governing it. If appellee’s mother and Jesse Haddon had not married after the birth of appellee, and he were seeking to recover as the illegitimate child of Jesse Haddon, on the theory that Jesse Haddon had during his lifetime acknowledged appellee as his son, then appellants’ contention would be correct. But the theory of the complaint is that appellee, son of Mary O. Workman, born out of wedlock, and the
Section 3000, supra, provides as follows: “That the illegitimate child or children of any man dying intestate and having acknowledged such child or children during his lifetime as his own, shall inherit his estate, both real and personal, and shall be deemed and taken to be the heir or heirs of such intestate in the same manner and to the same extent as if such child or children had been legitimate. Provided, that the testimony of the mother of such child or children shall in no case be received to establish the fact of such acknowledgment: And be it provided, that the provisions of this act shall not apply where the father of the illegitimate child, at his death, had surviving legitimate children or descendants of legitimate children.”
Section 3001, supra, is as follows: “If a man shall marry the mother of an illegitimate child, and acknowledge it as his own, such child shall be deemed legitimate.”
Finally, it is contended by appellants that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence. . This ground of the motion will be considered on the assumption that §3001, supra, applies to and controls the facts of the case without further reference to appellants’ contention on this phase of the case. According to the letter and terms of the provisions of this section of the statute, appellee was required to aver and prove only the following facts: That Jesse Had-don married Mary Caroline Wortman, that said Mary Caroline Wortman was the mother of appellee, that appellee was her illegitimate child, and that' Jesse Haddon acknowledged such child as his own. It is insisted by appellants that under this section appellee was required to “unquestionably prove” that appellee is the natural son of Jesse Haddon and Mary Caroline Wortman, that Jesse Haddon and Mary Caroline Wortman were married, and that Jesse Haddon acknowdedged appellee as his son after the alleged marriage.
A more difficult question would be presented by appellants’ contention, that the proof must show that the acknowledgment of the child occurred after the marriage to the mother, if the question came to us in a way to require us to determine whether the trial court should so limit the evidence on this question. Under a former statute (R. S. 1843 p. 438) this evidence was clearly so limited. But the language of that statute differed from the present statute, in that it expressly provided that the acknowledgment should be “after marriage.” It was as follows: “If any man shall marry a woman who has, previous to the marriage, borne any illegitimate child, and after marriage shall acknowledge such child as his own, such child shall be deemed legitimate to all intents and purposes.” See Harvey v. Ball (1869), 32 Ind. 98, 101. The present law, enacted in 1853, omits the words “after marriage”. This omission seems significant, and, taken in connection with the decisions of the Supreme Court and this court, holding that such laws are remedial and should be given a liberal construction, “so as to carry out the manifest intention of the legislature” (Townsend v. Meneley [1906], 37 Ind. App. 127, 134, and authorities cited) furnishes strong ground for appellee’s contention that the acknowledgment may be either before or after the marriage. However, anything we may say upon this question would be mere dictum, because its decision, as before indicated, is not involved in the determination of the questions presented by this appeal. We therefore leave the question to be determined when properly presented. The question is not before us, because the court below excluded not only all the offered evidence of actual
We think the proof in this ease is sufficient to justify the jury in inferring a ceremonial marriage. A copy of a record was introduced in evidence, showing that a marriage license was issued to Jesse Haddon and Mary Caroline Wort-man. There was evidence that the certificate of marriage was in the possession of Jesse Haddon and his wife Mary Caroline, at least up to the date of her death in 1899. A newspaper containing an announcement of the marriage Avas given in evidence, and it was also shown that shortly after the appearance of such announcement in the paper Jesse Haddon introduced said Mary Caroline to his neighbors and friends as his wife. Afterwards,' in a conversation at the table on their wedding anniversary, the wife and Jesse talked of the occasion of their wedding, and of some of the incidents of that day. In any event, the proof conclusively shoAvs that immediately after the issuing of said license and
On this subject our Supreme Court, in the case of Teter v. Teter (1885), 101 Ind. 129, 134, 51 Am. Rep. 742, said: “We said when this case was last here, that little, if any, formality was required in the marriage ceremony, and we now say that no formal ceremony is necessary, and that if the motives are good, the intention to effect an immediate marriage is present, and the purpose to unite as husband and wife exists in the minds of both parties, mutual consent is all that is required. ’ ’
This question is thoroughly discussed and authorities cited and quoted from in the case of Franklin v. Lee (1902), 30 Ind. App. 31, 41, 43, which is a case based on the section of the statute involved in this ease. See, also, in this connection, Boulden v. McIntire, supra; Bowers v. VanWinkle (1872), 41 Ind. 432, 435, and Trimble v. Trimble (1850), 2 Ind. 76, 78.
Under these authorities the proof was entirely sufficient to prove the marriage of appellee’s alleged parents.
Counsel for appellants have filed an elaborate brief in the case, and have collected and cited many authorities on the several questions herein considered, which we deem unnecessary to discuss or distinguish from those which we follow in
The conclusion reached in this case, and the law as herein declared, are in perfect harmony with the former decisions of the Supreme Court and this court, as well as with the laws of all the states, which, like our own, have by legislative enactment sought to mitigate the hardship of the lot of those unfortunate persons born into the world out of wedlock, and to make easier the removal of the “bar sinister” in such cases.
This ease has been twice submitted to a jury for trial, first in Sullivan county and then in Knox county. In each trial the jury returned a verdict in'favor of appellee, appellants after the first verdict having been granted a new trial as a matter of right.
A careful examination of the record and the evidence in this case convinces us that appellants had a fair trial, with no intervening error of law that could possibly have prejudiced their case, but that on the contrary, where doubt might have existed in the mind of the trial court as to the admission or exclusion of evidence or the law applicable to the facts, such doubt was resolved in favor of appellants.
Judgment affirmed.