Appellant Gary Haddock, Jr. appeals from the judgment and sentence which was entered after he pleaded guilty tо one count of credit card fraud and one count of forgery.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Appellant presents a single issue on appeal:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in not allowing withdrawal оf Appellant’s guilty plea prior to sentencing?
FACTS
On September 23, 1994, Appellant was charged with credit card fraud for unlawfully using a credit card which belonged to his mother and father. He was also charged with forgery for unlawfully endorsing and cashing a chеck which belonged to his mother.
Appellant appeared pro se at his arraignment and pleaded guilty to both counts. The district court appointed an attоrney to represent Appellant and postponed the sentencing hearing in order to give Appellant’s newly aрpointed counsel an opportunity to review the case. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The district court denied Appellant’s motion and passed sentence against him. Appellant appealed tо this Court.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Pleas of guilty or nolo contendere may be withdrawn pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 32(d):
(d) Plea withdrawal. — If a motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo con-tendere is made before sentence is imposеd, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason. At any later time, a plea may be set aside only to correct manifest injustice.
The district court has discretion in deciding whether to permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.
Jackson v. State,
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea prior to being sentenced.
McCarty v. State,
“[A]n abuse of discretion is not demonstrated even if a ‘plausible’ or а ‘just and fair’ reason for withdrawal is presented if the requirements of Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., [now W.R.Cr.P. 11] have been met and the record is clear that the defendant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered into his plea of guilty.”
Id.
(quoting
Triplett v. State,
Appellant contends that he presented a fair and just reason for the withdrawal of his guilty pleas. He argues that, because of the emotional state he was in when he еntered his pleas, he was not able to understand the plea process or the consequences of his guilty pleas.
Appellant maintains that the presentence investigation report supported his claim that he was emotionally unstable. The presen-tence investigation report indicated that Appellant was suffering from extreme stress and that he may have been experiencing psychological difficulties at the time when the probation agent interviewed him. The report stated that Appellant believed that he was being harassed by law enforcement officials and that, while he was previously incarcerated at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, a monitoring device had been placed in his leg during а surgical procedure. The report further stated that Appellant believed that the monitoring device was being used to track him and was causing unusual magnetic occurrences. Appellant also claims that his testimony which he gave when hе entered his guilty pleas reflected his emotional instability. He testified that he took the credit cards and the check so that he could force his parents to give him certain family information.
In
Schmidt v. State,
Appellant did not present any such reliable evidence in this ease. The probation agent’s observations which were included in the presentence investigation report described Appellant’s mental state at the time when the presentence investigation interview was being conducted and did not pertain to Apрellant’s state of mind when he committed the crimes or when he pleaded guilty. Similarly, although Appellant’s testimony may have shоwn that he harbored unusual motives for his crimes, the testimony was not the type of evidence which would sustain a mental illness or deficiency defense. Appellant did not offer any other evidence to support his contention that he did not understаnd the plea proceedings or the consequences of his guilty pleas, nor did he state that he would enter a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency if the district court were to allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas. The district cоurt, therefore, properly denied Appellant’s presen-tence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because Appellant failed to present a fair and just reason for withdrawing his pleas.
The record also reveals that the requiremеnts of W.R.Cr.P. 11 were satisfied.
See Dichard,
CONCLUSION
We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Affirmed.
