263 Pa. 120 | Pa. | 1919
Opinion- by
Edwin J. Haddock, an engineer by profession, employed on a salary, with no fixed hours of service, by the
After finding the material facts just stated, the referee concluded that, at the time Haddock sustained the injury which caused his death, “He was in the course of his employment with the defendant company within the meaning of Section 301, Article III of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of June 2, 1915 (P. L. 738),” and awarded compensation to his widow, the claimant.
The defendant, and the Maryland Casualty Company, insurance carrier, both appealed to the Workmen’s Compensation Board, which affirmed the referee; from this decision an appeal was taken to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which affirmed the board; the present appeal followed.
As correctly stated by Chairman Mackey of the compensation board, in his opinion sustaining the award, “The deceased was not an ordinary day laborer, whose duties ceased upon the blowing of a whistle and leaving the employer’s premises; but was a skilled and'teehnical employee receiving sufficient compensation to enable-the employer to call for his contribution of expert knowledge during any hour of the day or night. He was commissioned to go to another city to transact business of
This is not the case of an employee injured, after regular working hours, on the way to his home; and we agree with' the court below that there is nothing upon the record to show Haddock had, at the time of the accident, “ceased to be active in the furtherance of his employer’s business.” True, thejEacts as found indicate that plaintiff’s husband intended stopping at his own residence, to sleep for the night, before reporting the results of his trip of investigation to the president of the defendant corporation; but, none the less, he was still upon his employer’s errand and, in that sense, actually engaged in the furtherance of the latter’s business or affairs. Since deceased was compelled to return to the city at an hour when he could not at once communicate with his superior, and had to stay somewhere until he could report, he cannot be charged with a departure from his employer’s service because, when hurt, he was going to his home, for a lodging, rather than to an hotel; hence the findings of the referee are ample to sustain the ultimate conclusion upon which the award of compensation rests, to the effect that plaintiff’s husband met his death by accident during the course of his employment with the defendant company.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.