164 Iowa 417 | Iowa | 1914
The proceedings in contempt against the plaintiff were had December 17 and 18, 1913. The preceding history, upon which the contempt proceeding rested, was as follows: Haddick was administrator of the Hans Bohstedt estate pending in Polk county. He became involved in more or less controversy with alleged foreign heirs. His due administration of his office as administrator was also hampered by the fact that his father was a claimant against the estate, and that himself and wife were also claimants against the same. He was at one time peremptorily removed from office by one of the judges of the district court. ' That order was subsequently annulled by this court as having been made in excess of power, and in disregard of the statute. Haddick v. District Court, 160 Iowa, 487. In August, 1913, the plaintiff presented to the court his resignation, and filed therewith his final report. His report was approved in all respects except as to certain specific items of expense incurred by him in the prosecution of the case above cited, and amounting to a total of $393. These items of expense were not allowed by the district court, and the amount thereof was charged against him. The sum total in his hands, concerning which there was no dispute, amounted to over $9,000. A new administrator was appointed, and Haddick was ordered to turn over to such person the full amount in his hands, including the disputed items. Thereupon Haddick appealed to this court from the order of the district court refusing the allowance of the dis
As to what is and what is not a self-executing order, see the following authorities: Jayne v. Drorbaugh, 63 Iowa, 711; Lindsay v. Clay District Court, 75 Iowa, 509; Foster v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. 282 (47 Pac. 58) ; Ex parte Queirolo, 119 Cal. 635 (51 Pac. 956); Dulin v. Pacific Co., 98 Cal. 304 (33 Pac. 123); Randles v. Randles, 67 Ind. 434; Walls v. Palmer, 64 Ind. 496.
The conclusion is unavoidable that the plaintiff herein was within his statutory rights in appealing from the order complained of, and in superseding the enforcement thereof by proper bond. If so, he could not be deemed guilty of contempt for failure to perform the order appealed from pending the appeal.