Facts
- Bill and Angela Sharpe filed a comparative negligence case against Rocky Rutherford and others after a collision between a pickup truck and an eighteen-wheeler. [lines="22-24"]
- The circuit court granted summary judgment on liability, stating the eighteen-wheeler driver was responsible for the collision. [lines="25-27"]
- Rutherford claimed he cleared oncoming traffic before turning left, while the Sharpe's asserted he provided no evidence for their comparative negligence. [lines="71-73"]
- Both parties provided conflicting deposition testimonies regarding the circumstances leading to the accident. [lines="123-124"]
- The trial court's summary judgment was appealed due to disputed material facts surrounding the accident's cause. [lines="32"]
Issues
- Whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on liability, claiming no genuine dispute over material facts existed. [lines="28-29"]
- Whether the evidence presented by Rutherford was sufficient to counter Sharpe's motion for summary judgment in a comparative negligence context. [lines="71-73"]
Holdings
- The appellate court reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact persisted in the case. [lines="31"]
- The court concluded that summary judgment should not have been granted due to conflicting testimonies and the nature of comparative negligence requiring fact-finder determination. [lines="142-143"]
OPINION
Case Information
*2 Before GREGORY and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Hadassah Feinberg, Appellant Pro Se. John J. Hare, MARSHALL DENNEHEY, P.C., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Hadassah Feinberg filed a civil action and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court denied the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and afforded Feinberg 21 days to pay the filing fee for the action. Before the 21-day period elapsed, the district court concluded that venue was not proper in the District of Maryland and sua sponte transferred Feinberg’s action to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Feinberg now seeks to appeal the venue transfer and in forma pauperis denial orders.
This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949). The district court’s venue transfer order is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. See TechnoSteel, LLC v. Beers Constr. Co. , 271 F.3d 151, 160-61 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review transfer order once case file is transferred to court outside circuit and nonappealable interlocutory or collateral decisions also transfer with case).
A district court order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis is an appealable order. Roberts v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal ., 339 U.S. 844, 845 (1950). Feinberg’s action, however, is no longer pending before the district court. Additionally, following the transfer of venue, the Middle District of Pennsylvania adjudicated Feinberg’s motion seeking reconsideration of the denial of in forma pauperis status, ordered that she pay the filing fee for her action or file an in forma pauperis application, and dismissed her *4 action when she failed to comply in October 2024. Accordingly, our resolution of this issue would be without effect, and therefore, advisory. We thus lack jurisdiction to consider Feinberg’s appeal of the district court’s denial of her motion to proceed in forma pauperis. See Holloway v. City of Va. Beach , 42 F.4th 266, 273 (4th Cir. 2022) (“A dispute is moot, depriving federal courts of jurisdiction to decide it, when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. City of Alexandria , 608 F.3d 150, 161 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that parties lack legally cognizable interest in outcome where “resolution of an issue could not possibly have any practical effect on the outcome of the matter”).
Accordingly, we deny Feinberg’s motion to redact and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED