101 Ga. 512 | Ga. | 1897
Hackney was indicted, in the superior court of Taliaferro county, for the offense of misdemeanor, in that, being the lawful tenant of Rebecca M. Daniel, he secured from her guano to the amount of $18.10, to be applied to the crops to
Section 671 of the Penal Code, which is a revision of section 4600 of the Code of 1882, makes it a misdemeanor for any person, after having made a mortgage on personal property, to sell or otherwise dispose of that property before the payment of the mortgage debt, etc. By the acts of 1875 (Acts 1875, p. 26) and 1876 (Acts 1876, p. 114) the provisions embodied in this section of the Penal Code were “extended to include liens for rent and advances made upon crops by landlords, employers or others, as authorized by law”; and by those acts it was made a misdemeanor for any person to sell any part of the crops on which a lien for rent and advances existed in favor of landlords, employers or others, as authorized by law. It is further material to consider what were the provisions of law which created these liens in favor of landlords, employers and others, at the date of these acts, violations of which by sale of the encumbered property were made misdemeanors. By the act of 1873 (Acts 1873, p. 42) the law of liens in this State was regulated, and certain liens were declared to exist in favor of landlords and others; this law of liens was codified in sections 1977 and 1978 of the Code of 1882. By the act of 1873, liens were created in favor of factors, merchants, landlords, dealers in fertilizers, and all other persons furnishing supplies, money, farming-utensils, or other articles of necessity to make crops; and also all persons furnishing clothing and medicines, supplies or provisions for the support of families, or medical services, tuition or schoolbooks, were given the right to secure themselves from the
It may be well here to note that there is another provision of law, found in section 680 of the Penal Code, which makes a sale of any part of the crop a misdemeanor where such sale is made without the consent of the landlord and before he has received his part of the crop and payment for all advances made in the year the crop was raised. This section is codified from the act of 1889 (Acts of 1889, p. 113), and applies exclusively to croppers. A cropper and a tenant do not, in law, belong to the same class, and do not possess the same rights in relation to the crops raised, and are not the subject of the same remedies. The rights of the cropper are subject to the paramount title of the landlord to all the crops raised,
In the case under consideration, the defendant was indicted because as the tenant of Mrs. Daniel he secured from her guano of a certain value to be applied in raising the crops on the rented premises during the year of the tenancy, and did sell and dispose of a bale of cotton so raised, without her consent and to her injury. There are several grounds set out in the motion for new trial, the refusal to grant which is the error assigned. It is alleged that the verdict is contrary to law.
Another of the grounds of the motion for new trial is, because the court charged: “It is wholly immaterial who the rent contract in this case was made with, and whether Mr. Daniel or Mrs. Daniel was the landlord, or who was or who wasn’t the landowner. I- charge you, if the defendant procured credit for supplies and guano or fertilizers and got the credit through Mrs. Daniel or Mr. Daniel, it is wholly immaterial which, and the produce upon the land upon which the guano or fertilizer was used' was misappropriated or was applied otherwise than in discharge of the debt incident to the purchase of the guano, I charge you he was guilty,” etc. By this charge the jury was instructed that a conviction for the offense with which the defendant was charged would be sustained even if the fertilizer was procured on the credit of the defendant through either the landowner or another person. Such is not the law as we understand it. This court ruled in the case of Scott v. Pound, 61 Ga. 579, and reaffirmed the same
Prior to the act of 1874 the right of the accused in criminal cases to make a statement was restricted. By that act, which is codified in section 1010 of the Penal Code, the right was given to an accused in all criminal cases to make such statement in the case as he or she may deem proper in his or her defense. The accused is not under oath; the statement is not the foundation for impeachment by showing general bad character. Doyle v. The State, 77 Ga. 513; Vaughn v. The State, 88 Ga. 735. The defendant incurs no penalty for not speaking the truth. Poppell v. The State, 71 Ga. 277. The statement can not be restricted to such facts as would be admissible in evidence. Coxwell v. The State, 66 Ga. 310.
It is clear that the effect of this legislation so interpreted was to give the prisoner the right in his own way to make such statement in his defense as he may deem proper, and, exercising this right, he is entitled to do so in the. freest manner. No one but he is to judge what he shall say or not say in relation to the facts. The object is accomplished when he has had an, opportunity of stating such or all of the facts as he wishes
Judgment reversed.