16 N.Y.S. 170 | New York Court of Common Pleas | 1891
The facts-that the defendant the safe-deposit company, by answer, offered to abide by the judgment of the court, and did not appeal from that judgment, enable us to dispose of this appeal upon the sole consideration of the rights of the other parties to this action respecting the use of the safe in the vaults of the safe-deposit company, and the right of access-thereto, freed from any embarrassment which might have arisen if the defendant the safe-deposit company had asserted the right to control the use of the safe and access to the vault upon its premises, against the desires of the-plaintiffs. So, also, does the fact that George W. Patterson, upon the death-of plaintiffs’ testator, assented to a lease of the safe to himself and plaintiffs jointly, dispose of any question as to what his rights were prior to that lease-by reason of his survivorship, and renders a discussion of such rights futile. Admitting that upon the death of John Patterson the defendant George W. Patterson became vested with the exclusive right to the use of the safe, it was nevertheless competent for him to surrender his interest, and this was-effectually accomplished by his assent to and acceptance of a lease inconsistent with his rights as sole surviving lessee under the former lease. The new lease constituted the plaintiffs and defendant Patterson joint lessees, and whether their relation thereunder was that of joint tenants or tenants in common is equally immaterial in disposing of the question presented for adjudication,, since either relation involves the application of the same principles of .equity jurisprudence. “Equality is equity, ” and, steadily adhering to the application of this familiar maxim, courts of equity have ever regarded the rights of joint tenants and tenants in common respecting their common estate to be reciprocal, neither being permitted during the continuance of the co-tenancy furtively to acquire and hold any advantage which would not also inure to the other’s benefit, provided the latter manifests a willingness to assume his just proportion of any burdens attending its acquisition and maintenance. Washb. Beal Prop. p. 680, *411; Id. p. 690, *418. So one of several co-tenants-will not be permitted to purchase and retain for his exclusive benefit, and for the purpose of disseising and expelling the others, any outstanding adverse-title, but will be deemed in equity to hold such title in trust for the benefit of such of the co-tenants as will contribute towards the expense incurred.. Van Horne v. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. 388,406; Swinburne v. Swinburne, 28 N. Y. 568; Fallon v. Chidester, 46 Iowa, 588; Weave v. Van Meter, 42 Iowa, 128; Armour v. Alexander, 10 Paige, 571. And this principle is extended-to others jointly interested in the maintenance of an estate, such as life-tenant and reversioner or remainder-man. Dickinson v. Codwise, 1 Sandf. Ch. 214, 226; Whitney v. Salter, (Minn.) 30 N. W. Rep. 755.
The constructive trust for the benefit oí all the co-tenants growing out of' the purchase, with' intent thereby to secure unfair advantage by one of any interest in the common estate by means whereof the rights of the others will: become jeopardized, lessened, or impaired, and which finds its incipiency in the unity of interest of all, seems to subject the present ease to the influence of fjliose equitable principles upon which a partner is deemed to hold a renewal to himself of the lease of the copartnership premises, in trust for the-benefit of the copartnership, and all the members thereof, as interpreted by the court of appeals in the leading case of Mitchell v. Reed, reported in 61 N. Y. 123. Approving of many similar cases adjudged in this state and elsewhere, the court in Mitchell v. Reed firmly declares it to be the law of this-
The judgment appealed from is not invalidated because, in express terms, it authorizes the plaintiffs to take possession of such of the contents of the safe as belonged to them in their representative capacities or as individuals. The clause is wholly immaterial, for without it the effect of the judgment awarding plaintiffs access to and egress from the safe would have been the same. No particular item of property is awarded to the plaintiffs, and having obtained access to the safe it was their right, by virtue of their ownership as executors or individuals, to remove whatever belonged to them in either capacity. No greater right is given by the judgment, and defendant is in no manner prevented from having like access to the safe, and from removing therefrom so much of the contents as he is entitled to possession of. Thus, if any controversy should arise between the plaintiffs and the defendant Patterson concerning the right to the possession of any specific item of property, it would be left to be determined in subsequent proceedings. The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.