112 N.C. 513 | N.C. | 1893
Lead Opinion
The sole question presented in the appeal is iliis: Does the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?
In White v. Jones et al., 88 N. C., 166, in which case the plaintiffs here were defendants, Ruffin, J., states one of the questions presented by that appeal as follows: “ Whether the sums clue from the defendant Bledsoe for rents during his occupation of the land are to be appropriated to the satisfaction of the amount ascertained to be due him, or to the debt still duo the estate of Mrs. Stokes for the balance of the purchase-money thereof? ” And, discussing that, in a subsequent part of his opinion, he says: “Virtually the relation subsisting between the plaintiff and the heirs at law of Mrs. Stokes since his purchase of the equitable interest is that of mortgagor and mortgagee, and having by their action evicted him and put the defendant Bledsoe in possession, they are accountable to him for the rents and must look to their tenant Bledsoe for the same.” And, announcing the conclusion to which he had come, ho says: “ It is also declared that the plaintiff is entitled to credit upon the debt due the defendant Neal as the administrator of Mrs. Stokes for the balance of the purchase-money for the rents ascertained to have been received by the defendant Bledsoe.”
The allegations of the complaint are to the effect that in the action, called by Justice Ruffin the action of the heirs of Airs. Stokes, by which Gray was evicted from the land
If two or more persons combine and agree to do a wrongful act, they are liable to the person injured by that act for such damages as result. To make a person a part}7 plaintiff to an action, without proper authority so to do, is a wrongful act, for which an action will lie if injury comes thereby to the person whose name was thus improperly used. Blk. Com., Vol. III, p. 166 ; Metcalf v. Alley, 2 Ired., 38. In the case last cited the injury complained of was the being compelled to pay costs. Here the injury alleged to have resulted from the unwarranted use of plaintiffs’ names was this: they lost a great part of what Justice Ruffin, speaking for the Court, said was virtually a mortgage debt due in effect to them, though payable immediately to the administrator of Mrs. Stokes for their benefit. They were estopped to hold him responsible for this loss, for it was caused by their act, and the rents were paid to one who was their tenant, as the law adjudged. For the most potent reasons it is held that an innocent person is protected by the judgment of a Court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties. Appearance by counsel gives jurisdiction of the persons thus appearing (England v. Garner, 90 N. C., 197), though counsel have no authority so to appear. And therefore it comes about that the persons thus estopped and thus injured by an adjudication binding upon them, though made without their knowledge or consent, are driven to seek redress from those who combined and agreed to procure such adjudication.
Error. Reversed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring : I concur in the opinion. As the loss was money in this case, there is probably no other remedy, and the plaintiffs could in any event elect to take this recourse. But if the property whose possession is lost, is in esse, as real estate, for instance, I am of opinion that-the owners who are deprived of it by the judgment of the Court made in a cause in which- their names appear as parties without their knowledge or consent, and without process served on them, are not denied the right of recovery of the specific property, when not barred by the statute of limitations or any act amounting to an estoppel. Certainly this is so when there is no other remedy by reason of those perpetrating the wrong of entering them as parties without authority being insolvent. They cannot be deprived of their property without compensation or due process of lawn This is forbidden by both the ¡State and Federal Constitutions.