310 Mass. 754 | Mass. | 1942
In this action for personal injuries the sole question is whether there was any evidence to warrant the verdict of the jury for the plaintiff.
The defendant, the owner of a newly completed cottage at Salisbury Beach, rented it, furnished, to the plaintiff for
From this evidence it could be found that when the cottage was rented the ladder was defective and unfit for use in the manner in which it was designed to be used, because of the danger of the four short screws pulling out of the ends of the soft wooden stringers, and that while the plaintiff was properly using the ladder in the manner in which it was obviously intended to be used she was injured in consequence
Commonly the landlord is not hable to the tenant for defects existing in the premises and their appurtenances when he lets them, unless they are hidden defects and the landlord knows of their existence and fails to warn the tenant. Stumpf v. Leland, 242 Mass. 168, 171. Pittsley v. Acushnet Saw Mills Co. 299 Mass. 252. There was no evidence that the defendant knew of the defect and although it appeared that the house and the ladder had been constructed by the defendant’s husband, who was a builder, it is doubtful whether, on^this record, a finding would have been warranted that he was the defendant’s agent as to the details of construction so as to charge her with any knowledge he may have had.
But the plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury upon another ground. In Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, it was held that one, who lets for a short term of a few days, weeks, or months a fully furnished house supposedly equipped for immediate occupancy as a dwelling without the necessity of any fitting up or furnishing by the tenant, impliedly agrees that the house and its appointments are suitable for occupation in their condition at the time. This is a departure from the general rule and should be confined within narrow limits. But Ingalls v. Hobbs has been cited in more recent cases and so far as we are aware has not been doubted in this Commonwealth. Littlehale v. Osgood, 161 Mass. 340, 343. Bolieau v. Traiser, 253 Mass. 346, 349. Chelefou v. Springfield Institution for Savings, 297 Mass. 236, 239. See Dutton v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. 89, 94. The case at bar falls within the principle of Ingalls v. Hobbs and is not taken out of that principle because the plaintiff brought with her some bed linen, knives and forks, two chairs for her little girl, and a few other articles of personal convenience. Nor does the fact that the plaintiff was shown through the house before she hired it prevent the application of this principle, at least as to such defects as it could be found an ordinary examination of the house would fail to reveal. See Ingalls
The plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury on the basis of breach of contract. Her rights did not depend upon proof of any negligence of the defendant. The writ refers to the action as in tort, and the first and third counts of the declaration as amended allege negligence. But the second count does not allege negligence. It alleges the letting on or about July 1 of the fully furnished house for four weeks in that same month, the existence of the defect, and the consequent injury to the plaintiff. This count is a sufficient count in contract. It alleges the facts upon which an implied contract arose, and the facts constituting a breach of that contract. Daddario v. Pittsfield, 301 Mass. 552, 556, 557. By G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, § 7, Sixth, as appearing in St. 1939, c. 67, § 1,
The exceptions are sustained. The verdict returned by the jury is to stand and judgment for the plaintiff is to be entered thereon.
So ordered.
The effective date of St. 1939, c. 67, § 1, was August 1,1939. The amendment to the declaration was allowed on January 6, 1941. — Reporter.