Hacker v. HoweHacker v. Howe
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Holcomb
The court is unanimously of the opinion
that the judgment of the trial court is erroneous and should he reversed, which is accordingly done. An opinion will he hereafter filed.
Judgment reversed and action dismissed. Mandate to issue forthwith.
Reversed.
The following opinion was filed November 2,1904:
The state board of equalization and assessment, acting under the provisions and by the authority of section 130, article T, chapter 77, Compiled Statutes, 1903 (Annotated Statutes, 10529), being a part of the general revenue act, increased the aggregate assessment of several of the counties of the state, including’ that of the county of Nemaha, which was raised 5 per cent, above the amount as *388assessed and equalized by the county authorities. The action thus taken being certified to the county clerk of said county, it became his duty under said section to add to the assessment of each piece or parcel of property assessed in said county an amount equal to the per cent, of increase so directed as aforesaid. The plaintiff in this action brought i.n the district court for said county an injunction suit for the purpose of restraining the county clerk and his deputy from extending on the tax rolls of said county the percentage of increase to the assessed valuation as certified by the state board of equalization. After joinder of issues and a hearing to the court, the injunction was made perpetual, and the defendants prosecute error proceedings in this court.
The substance of the allegations of the plaintiff’s petition on which is. grounded his right to the relief prayed for is to the effect that: (a) The state board of equalization, in ordering the increase complained of, acted arbitrarily, capriciously and fraudulently; (b) that all property, both real and personal, in Nemaha county, had been valued at its true, full and actual cash value, and assessed at one-fifth thereof as provided by law, by the local authorities, and that the proposed per centum of increase would operate to raise the value of all property above its actual cash value, discriminate against the taxpayers of Nemaha county and- violate the provisions of the fundamental law which require that all property shall be assessed so that each person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property; (c) that no notice of any kind was given to the taxpayers of Nemaha county of the proposed increase, and that no way is provided by which the action of the board can be reviewed in a court of last resort; (d) that the action of the state board of equalization was null and void, because the increase of the aggregate valuation of the several counties as ordered was, in effect, a reassessment of property, and not an equalization thereof, and that said board exceeded its powers and jurisdiction; (e) there are also allegations to be found in the *389petition to the effect that two certain taxpayers of the county, who are named, listed and returned for assessment certain sums of money on hand and in hank, which were valued and assessed at their full legal value, and that there was returned for assessment and assessed in said county the aggregate sum of $306,505 in money at its full face value; and that the state hoard of equalization, knowing such facts, without authority, and in excess of its powers, by said order of increase raised the valuation of such property above its legal and face value, in violation of the provisions of the fundamental law requiring uniformity and equality in the valuation of property taxed for the purpose of raising needful revenues.
The constitutionality of the section under which the state board acted is specially challenged in the petition, but the grounds advanced are substantially the same as those above mentioned as the foundation for maintaining the injunction suit, and ay ill be covered, without particularly referring thereto, in the general discussion to folloAV.
“In assessing property for taxation purposes the board is clothed with quasi judicial powers as to the valuation of such property, and when it has once acted on sufficient information, and expressed an honest judgment as to such value, its judgment cannot be controlled by the writ of mandamus.” Also “The presumption is that, when an officer or assessing body values property for assessment purposes, he or it acts fairly and impartially in fixing such valuation.”
In 1 Cooley, Taxation (3d ed.), 784, it is said:
“Equalization of assessments has for its general purpose to bring the assessments of different parts of a taxing district to the same relative standard, so that no one of the parts may be compelled to pay a disproportionate part of the tax. To accomplish this purpose assessment rolls are equalized by county courts, boards .of supervisors or commissioners, and the aggregate of the county assessments by a state board established for the purpose. This is not done by changing individual assessments, but by fixing the aggregate sums for the several districts at what, *394in the opinion of the board, they should be, so that general taxes may be levied according to this determination, instead of on the assessor’s footings. Those boards act judicially in equalizing, and their decision is conclusive. * * * In raising or reducing the assessment of a district, it is sufficient for the board to designate a percentage of increase or reduction.”
Under a revenue statute essentially similar to ours in respect of the matter now under consideration, it is said by the appellate court of the state of Indiana:
“County boards of review and the state board of tax commissioners are clothed with quasi judicial powers in bringing about uniformity and equality of taxation. The acts of these boards are judicial in their character, and their judgments are not open to collateral attack. If errors or irregularities are committed, they must be corrected in the mode pointed out by the statute; and if not so corrected, they are conclusive; for courts have not the power to control their discretion.” Biggs v. Board of Commissioners, 7 Ind. App. 142. See also Jones v. Rushville National Gas Co., 135 Ind. 595. Other authorities might be cited without number, but the above are believed sufficient to set at rest the contention that the action of the state board, in regard to the order complained of, can be impeached by an attempt to show that the property in Nemaha county had been by the assessors valued at its full and actual cash value. As well might an issue be raised as to the value placed by the county assessor on the property of each individual taxpayer, and an attempt made to annul the assessment on the ground of overvaluation, which the authorities are all agreed cannot be done. In the absence of fraud, or other misconduct, or arbitrary exercise of power equivalent thereto, the rule is universal to the effect that the discretion of assessing officers and boards of equalization cannot be controlled by the courts in collateral proceedings, nor can errors of judgment and overvaluation in the assessment of property be rightfully reviewed by them in the absence of statutes authorizing *395such proceedings. Loewenthal v. People, 192 Ill. 222; New Haren Clock Co. v. Kochersperger, 175 Ill. 383; State v. Sarage, supra; 1 High, Injunctions (4th ed.), secs. 490, 493.
Whether or not the action of the state board of equalization in ordering a per centum of increase to the aggregate valuation of the property in the different counties affected by the order may be reviewed by proceedings in error in the courts need not here be determined. In either event, the plaintiff must fail in this action on the merits of the case as disclosed by the pleadings and the evidence. Judgment must go against him regardless of the question. He bases his right to an appeal to the courts, for the purpose of testing the legality of the proceedings of the state board of equalization, on the ground that its action is not review-
*396able in a direct proceeding, and at the same time complains that Ms property is being taken without due process of law. These are inconsistent positions. He certainly is not denied due process of law if the courts are open to him in which he may try the question of the scope of action and the power of the state board to equalize the valuation of properties as between the different counties so as to bring about uniformity and equality of taxation. It is not essential, in order to constitute due process of law, that a taxpayer shall have the right to a direct proceeding in the courts to review the action of persons, boards and tribunals empowered to assess property and levy taxes for the purpose of raising revenues for expenses of government. It is not required that judicial proceedings be resorted to in enforcing the levying and payment of taxes. The right to an appeal is purely statutory. 2 Cooley, Taxation (3d ed.), 1393. These are special officers and tribunals within themselves empowered to do and perform all acts necessary and essential in the accomplishment of the collection of the public revenues. Due process of law is observed if, in the different steps taken by tin-officers and tribunals created by statute, an opportunity is given to an individual taxpayer who may feel aggrieved to be heard with reference thereto, and power is given to redress such grievance as may be right and just. Personal notice is not always essential. Notice given by statute or by publication may be sufficient. An owner is not deprived of his property without due process of law if he has an opportunity to question its validity or the amount of such tax or assessment at some stage of the proceedings, either before that amount is finally determined or in subsequent proceedings for its collection. 1 Cooley, Taxation (3d ed.), 60.
“It is the duty of the board to find this medium — that is, the mean between the lower and the higher values— adopt it as the true standard, and raise the one extreme and lower the other to it and thus leave the general result or common aggregate of valuation of the property of the whole county neither raised nor lowered, ‘except in such an amount as may be actually necessary and incidental to a proper and just equalization.’ ” See also Bardrick v. Dillon, 7 Okla. 535, where it is held that a county board of equalization may adopt as the basis for equalization the assessment of a township which, in their judgment, most nearly represents the true cash valuation, and add to or deduct from other townships such per cent, as will cause them to conform in valuation to the one adopted as a basis, and this notwithstanding such action may either increase or decrease the aggregate valuation as shown by all the township returns. The rule as thus announced in the opinion cit‘ed is probably stated too broadly. The opinion apparently overlooks the fact that the valuation of property assessed for taxation is primarily for assessing *399officers, and that hoards of equalization except as conferred by statutes are not authorized to change the result, and then only in order to effectuate an adjustment of values so as- to bring about uniformity. Our statute, we think, contemplates that the state board of equalization may equalize valuations as between the different counties in the sense the word is usually and ordinarily understood. That is, the state board is empowered to correct and adjust inequalities in valuation to the end that all property shall relatively be valued on the same basis for purposes of taxation, as near as the same is practicable. In either view of the subject, however, the action taken by the state board was within the scope of its powers, and the increase in the aggregate valuation of the equalized assessments resulted only incidentally to the main object sought to be accomplished.
Reversed.