History
  • No items yet
midpage
Hac v. University of Hawai'i
73 P.3d 46
Haw.
2003
Check Treatment

*1 As in the same fashion. stated earli- tained 73 P.3d 46 er, coiyms hearing during the habeas HAC, Plaintiff-Appellant, Anna prac- prosecutor observed that the standard po- was that the tice for misdemeanor cases regarding proba- would submit evidence lice HAWAI'I; Yuen; Paul UNIVERSITY OF only requested by the defendant. ble cause Kinariwala; Lin; Bharat N. Thom Shu Thus, likely question will it is that the same Gaarder; Holm-Kennedy; James Morever, again. illegal detain- be raised Kuh; Koide; Anthony David Yun Frank likely to As the ments are evade review. Najita, Defendant-Appel and Kazutoshi pretrial explained, question de- Court lees. moot of its tention is not treated as because No. 22357. temporary nature: Supreme of Hawai'i. Court temporary, Pretrial detention is nature unlikely any given and it is most July 2003. [or her] individual could have his constitu- appeal he tional decided before or convicted.

[or she] is either released

The individual could nonetheless suffer re-

peated deprivations, and it is certain that similarly will persons situated allegedly under the unconstitu-

detained short, claim, procedures.

tional is distinctly “capable repeti-

one that is tion, yet evading review. (em-

Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 95 S.Ct. 854 added);29 Schall,

phases see also 467 U.S at 3,n. S.Ct.

Thus, juveniles pretrial detention of public

matter of substantial interest

presents that would review be- issues evade temporary nature of such custo-

cause violations,

dy. prevent order detention types

this court must be these able review

of cases.

X. respectfully

Accordingly, I must dissent analysis majority’s disposition and

from the

in this case. moot, impact of unlawful detain- It be observed that both Gerstein and have been should McLaughlin distinguishable present from the presented a live ment on the class members still they civil actions. case in that involved class controversy. Accordingly, although ihe individual cases *3 Yun, Najita (collectively

David and Kazutoshi Defendants) regarding to exclude evidence performance persons who reviewed promotion application. Plaintiffs But we hold the court di- erred recting a as to Plaintiffs of in- verdict tentional infliction emotional distress. However, harmless, in- the court’s error was jury expressly asmuch as the found for the regarding Defendants claims, all of which *4 on formulations turned Osaki, Honolulu, briefs, H. Carl on for the entailing stringent thresholds less than the plaintiff-appellant. “outrageous requisite conduct” standard Kathleen N.A. and R. Watanabe Sarah an intentional infliction of emotional distress Hirakami, General, Deputy Attorneys State addition, clarify claim. In we that the ele- Hawai'i, briefs, on the for defendants- ments of an action for intentional infliction appellees. 1) of emotional distress are that conduct the causing allegedly the harm was intentional ACOBA, HIFO, J. Judge and Circuit 2) reckless, or that outra- the conduct was by Assigned Vacancy, Joining Reason in 4) 3) geous, and conduct the caused I-V, Concurring Parts VII-VIII and Ac- extreme distress another. VI; LEVINSON, Separately as to Part With cordingly, affirm March final we J., Concurring Separately parts toas IV and in judgment favor of Defendants and VI-VIII; Joining V and In Parts I—III and Plaintiff. MOON, C.J., and Concurring in Part and NAKAYAMA, Part, joined Dissenting in I. J. August Plaintiff was hired as On ACOBA, Opinion posi- as to in professor Court J. an associate a tenure-track I, II, III, VII, and in Department Engi- Parts VIII and of Electrical tion Announcing Judgment neering Engi- (Department) College of the Court as in the V, IV, neering and (College) University Parts VI. of Hawai'i (University). ap- In October hold that We the circuit court the first plied granted for and was tenure effective (the court)1 circuit did not its abuse discre- 1,1994. July (1) denying compel tion in a motion to discov- (Plain- ery by Plaintiff-Appellant appli- Anna Hae In October Plaintiff filed an tiff) prejudice providing promotion an “for rank of as- without and her cation from the opportunity discovery request professor professor.” to full re- tailor her sociate motion, viewing promotion,’ granting application her and mo- for re-file Defendants-Appellees Department personnel tion in limine of Uni- committee evaluates Hawai'i, Lin, Yuen, application versity according Paul Shu Bha- to the candidate’s Kinariwala, Gaarder, rat Department’s N. Thomas James and for “Procedures Criteria Koide, Kuh, Holm-Kennedy, Anthony Frank Promotion”2 and writes a recommendation presided quires rating 1. The Honorable Steven M. Nakashima teaching or re- an "excellent" search, trial "good" remaining over the herein. areas. and in the two According Department’s to the "Procedures upon will Each candidate be evaluated based Promotion," personnel and Criteria for com- accomplishments following in the ar- his/her applies following mittee standard in review- eas: ing application promotion. a candidate's for teaching Each candidate's Teaching. accomplishments evaluated on based teaching, Each candidate will evaluated effectiveness, research, teaching course [or her] his rating poor, with scale sendee laboratory developments. fair, adequate, positive evalua- good, The or excellent. A promotion professor teaching re- tion is based recommendation effectiveness for obtaining teaching, poor Department and a record findings to the Chair- tive of its Thus, Chairperson Department funding. according to the person. external personnel committee, reviews committee’s then Plaintiff did not meet personnel and issues a decision requirements professor recommendation sta- to obtain application. Although not clarified tus. record, appears Dean it 1995, Plaintiff submitted a sec- In October College Department’s may review profes- application promotion to full ond if the dis- candidate recommendations Again, request her sor status. Department’s and Col- agrees with the personnel committee. was denied determination, may appeal lege’s he she Lin, Yuen, agreed review committee University’s Tenure and Promotion to the with decision. committee) (review Review Committee Depart- application and the review Plaintiff filed On November College’s decisions. From ment’s Equal Em- charge of discrimination ease, transpired present ap- it in the what (EEOC), Opportunity ployment Commission may pears the review committee stating application that her October determination, make final promotion was and that denied June 1995 College’s Department’s and overturn the dis- [she] been “[she] believe[d] ha[d] *5 reject promotion. decisions sex, against of criminated because Fe- [her] male[,] Polish[,] origin, ap- and in viola- in November Plaintiffs national Sometime of professor Rights Title VII of the Act plication position for a full tion of Civil 5, 1996, At personnel August Plaintiff filed' 1964[.]” denied committee.3 On time, discrimination, personnel members substantially charge the committee similar Gaarder, Kinariwala, chairperson, claiming promotion that her October 1995 Koide, Kuh, Kennedy, Yun.4 Lin Holm and May in for the application was denied Department before was the Chair of the from reasons. aforementioned August 1991to December 1995. Plaintiff, third for the October personnel De- applied The committee time, applied promotion profes- for and for Pro- partment’s “Procedures Criteria Lin, committee, personnel and sor. The evaluating application in Plaintiffs motion” promotion. again objected to the The Yuen promotion on the against and voted her however, committee, recommended review she, alia, ground that not met “ha[d] inter promotion. pro- departmental requirements for charge Plaintiff third of discrimina- filed a Lin, Department at motion that level.” 19, 1996. tion with the on November EEOC application at the chair time (1) alia, stated, charge inter that: “[o]n The time, Yuen, promotion, and at the Dean 4, 1996, met with [she] October Chairman as- agreed personnel with committee’s Najita placed on requested and be [she] unani- review committee also sessment. The Committees”; Department Professional personnel mously agreed with the commit- (2) committee, because, placed any on “[she wa]s had although action tee’s articles, though professionally quali- journal was] published [she had unfavora- even she (3) committee”; evaluations, every on and student low score effec- fied ble 3.Sendee. The candidate’s service is evaluat- lecture student evaluation candidate’s following [Department, ed in College, University, levels: die organization, teaching and attitude his/her State, National, and contact, and on the student's overall student International.] rating the instructor. (Some emphases original emphases and some added.) The accom- 2.Research. candidate's research plishments [ot- are evaluated based on his rejection specific is not denot- 3. date of activity, significance of his or her] research ined the record. research, publication her work or research considered) (quality quantity and Najita Department both from Chair of the January Yuen was the Dean of the grants. research College from to 1995.

Q7 College been terms ber Engineering “[she] ha[s] denied same their (3) students”; employment colleagues, “any complaints conditions of as [her] student about (4) [Defendants]”', “any complaints having [her] retaliation filed student any person about other EEOC.” who served as a faculty College Engineer- member of promoted Plaintiff was professor to full ing time that also so [Plaintiff] July 1997. served”; (5) “any application promotion July complaint On Plaintiff filed a (6) ”; made “any tenure [Defendants] the court Defendants. Plaintiff application or tenure made (1) asserted: sexual harassment under Title present by any person 1987 to from Rights VII of Civil Act of U.S.C. who faculty served as a member of Col- (1994) (Title (2) seq. VII);5 § gen 2000e et (7) lege Engineering”; “each and der, ethnic, origin and national discrimination every post-tenure review conducted (3) VII; under Title retaliation under Title College Engineering!.]”8 member of [the] (4) VII; unlawful discrimination under Ha added.) (Emphases (HRS) 378;6 wai'i chapter Revised Statutes The court heard motion on December (5) deprivation rights under U.S.C. January 1998 and issued an (1996);7 negligence; defama denying grounds order the motion on the tion; intentional infliction of emotion request narrowly was not tailored al distress. it did not “establish sufficient simi- scope larities between herself and the A. subject discovery[.]” matter On November Plaintiff filed a B. (motion Compel Discovery Motion to to com- *6 pel). In compel, February during her motion to Plaintiff pre-trial pro- re- On quested relating “any ceedings, all documents to: Defendants filed motion limine performance plan appraisal comparing perfor- to [De- exclude evidence the and/or for ”; (2) “any any persons evaluation of mem- of the who mance had reviewed fendants] 2000e-2, statute, relating § who, any 5. 42 U.S.C to unlawful em- [ejvery person under color of ordinance, custom, ployment practices, part pertinent regulation, usage, any states or Columbia, Territory follows: State or or the District of subjects, any subjected, or causes to be citizen practice It an employment shall be unlawful person the United States within the or employer— an jurisdiction deprivation any to the discharge to fail or to hire or thereof refuse to rights, privileges, or immunities secured individual, any or otherwise to discriminate laws, arid Constitution shall to the be liable any respect against with to his individual com- law, equity, party injured suit terms, in an action conditions, pensation, privileges or proper proceeding redress[.] or other race, employment, such because individual’s added.) color, (Emphases sex, religion, origin[.] or national added.) (Emphases they produce note Defendants did docu- (1993 Supp.1994), relating § 6. HRS 378-2 & to Kuh, pertaining who ments to Professor was discriminatory employment practices, unlawful promotion profes- considered for from associate provides part following: in relevant professor Department during sor to full in the year. 1996-97 academic discriminatory practice: It shall be unlawful orientation, (1) Because race, sex, sexual color, age, religion, ancestry, disability, following: 9. The order court’s stated status, marital arrest or and court record: ORDERED, HEREBY IT IS ADJUDGED (A) any employer to hire or refuse For to be AND DECREED that Plaintiff’s motion and employ discharge or or to bar from em- hereby DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to ployment, or otherwise to discriminate request discovery allow Plaintiff to tailor or compensation against individual complete her motion with more eviden- terms, conditions, re-file in the privileges tiary record to establish sufficient employment[.] sufficient scope similarities between herself and the and added.) (Emphases discovery subject which is in matter of the depriva- dispute tire 7. 42 on civil action in motion. USC added.) rights, (Emphasis tion of states that court pro- the issues.” The also ex- promotion dossiers confuse Plaintiffs applied to Plaintiff pressed motion criteria were that Plaintiff had “a lot of the view exclude). (motion In the motion to ex- to to discrimination.” other avenues show the clude, that Plaintiff asserted Defendants A order that effect issued written seeking prevented pre- and should be from March testimony “concerning senting evidence evaluations, public teaching research C. records, funding extramural records and/or person- [Department members At close of Plaintiffs case-in-chief on (who Department Chair committee] nel orally February moved Defendants full professors) all who eval- tenured verdict10 on several directed promotion uated Plaintiffs dossier/files claims, including relating Count to in- VIII negative promotion made recommenda- infliction tentional of emotional distress.11 tions[.]” claim, argued Plaintiffs counsel On this certain incidents a hostile work envi- created hearing At on the motion held Febru- resulting in 5,1999, ronment emotional distress. ary argued request- Plaintiff that the information would demonstrate that the ed trial, alleged At Plaintiff testified Lin’s professors personnel committee on the them- sexual advances. See discussion infra. promotion not meet criteria selves did addition, alleged Plaintiff that Holm-Kenne Defendants, on applied to Plaintiff. dy racial slurs and Gaarder made hand, that such the other maintained evi- evidence, her. discussion On See infra. person- Department applied dence as question inten asserted that the Department nel committee members tional infliction of should emotional distress irrelevant and confuse “[wa]s [would] Chairs jury alleged because the decided issues, waste the court’s and [and] and “discrimination” conduct of “harassment” jury’s professors on because the full time” beyond “outrageous and ... bounds personnel un- committee were admitted decency.” Defendants contended that applied than those der criteria different actions ... attributed to [Defen “none of the Plaintiff. Defendants maintained the “real to that dants] rose level.” applied issue [was] [Defendants] whether properly [P]lain- criteria arguments, hearing parties’ After *7 tiff[,]” professors not whether on the separate court that a cause action ruled of committee met the criteria themselves. “necessary” was not because the statements “part parcel involved and of actions orally granted mo- The court Defendants’ and, claim,” thus, [HRS 378[-2] there ] tion, reasoning that issue was “whether separate for a no “basis emotional dis- go not to from [P]lamtiff [the] met criteria 12 suggested tress court that claim[.]” The professor professor to and ... not associate certainly “[P]laintiff [could] claim the emo- any professors of whether or not and, thus, as a of that tional distress the claims doing job professor” of a full result defendantsf.]”13, against remain all of In of such would “tend to admission evidence part, Hawai'i Civil stated in relevant the ab- 10. Pursuant to Rules of Procedure The court on 50, (HRCP) separate a need for a sence of intentional distress is now Rule directed verdict titled claim, as follows: "Judgment January effective as a Matter of Law” Well, 1, my view of on ... emotional distress is parties tire court die 2000. As utilized know, that, you type ... of verdict,” relief is—is similarly term "directed we use it here- basically part really parcel a 378 of in, longer technically although die term no I don't títere be a claim.... think that should correct. separate for a emotional because basis distress mean, nothing there to there is no-there’s to—I ruling appeal court’s Plaintiff does not have emotional distress from. verdicts, the other directed and these claims are portions court’s appeal. 13. The relevant statements not See Hawai'i Rules of addressed on the alternative means available to Plaintiff on 28(b)(7) (HRAP) Appellate Rule Procedure her claim are as emotional distress follows: waived.”). ("Points argued may be deemed distress, know, you The emotional I know provides the statute that there can be such

99 addition, court, explained the court duty every dismissal of “[t]he as of tribunal, judicial having was warranted is to actual because decide contro- separate judgment might jury distress claim lead versies which can car- effect, give opinions ried into and not recovery.14 Finally, confusion and double upon questions moot proposi- or abstract opined court that “there is noth- no—there’s tions, mean, principles or to declare ing rules there to —I to have the emotional law which cannot affect the matter issue distress from” and that there is no “basis for it.” the case before nothing distress because there’s says people the labor laws that have to be Thomas, 223, Application In re 73 Haw. people.” nice The court then 226, (1992) dismissed 253, 832 P.2d (quoting Wong the intentional infliction of emotional distress Regents, Hawai'i, v. Board Univ. claim. 201, (1980)). Haw. A case is moot when “events have so affect jury instructed, alia, inter that “if parties ed relations between the that the jury] [the find[s] favor of Plaintiff on justiciability two conditions for relevant on claims,” pay her compensatory back appeal interest and reme —adverse effective damages may be awarded and “[t]he award dy compromised.” been Okada —have compensatory damages compen- includes ’ Trucking Supply, Co. Board Water pain, inconvenience, sation for suffering, 191, 195-96, Hawai'i 803-04 anguish, mental enjoyment and loss of (2002) (citations omitted) added); (emphasis jury life.” The returned verdict in favor of Assocs., Hodges see Sports also v. Schlinkert Defendants and Plaintiff on all of her Inc., (6th Cir.1996) (cases 89 F.3d claims, judgment and a was entered on “ presented are moot ‘when the issues are no March 1999. Plaintiff filed a notice longer parties legally “live” or the lack a 16,1999. appeal on March cognizable (quoting interest in the outcome’ United Geraghty, States Parole Comm’n v. II. U.S. S.Ct. 63 L.Ed.2d (1980))). appeal, On Plaintiff points raises three complaint, requested her error. She contends the court erred in: general, special, compensatory, “award of denying her November 1998 motion to statutory, punitive damages amounts compel; granting February Defendants’ proven “[i]njunctive to be at trial” and exclude; 1999 motion to and/or granting declaratory ordering pro relief that her February Defendants’ oral motion on motion to full Professor be deemed retroac direct a verdict on Plaintiffs claim 1995[.]” tive June of Inasmuch as Plain for emotional distress. requested tiffs can remedies be effectuated parties cognizable and all a legally have in III. *8 outcome, “live,” in terest this case is still Initially, briefly jurisdiction. we observe that and this court has See Garcia moot, Plaintiffs despite Hosp., claims are not v. Kaiser Found. 90 Hawai'i promoted 863, fact that professor. she was to full (noting 978 P.2d 875 that where Generally, remedy, there was an available the claim was really any a claim. But I think that to make it distress could of [the] result from claims any remaining against

clear so that we don’t have [ ][D]efendants. confusion on claim, certainly [PJlaintiff can claim the issue, pertinent 14. On in court stated emotional distress as a result of the claims that part against remain all of the defendants].] there’s no basis for emotional distress and having separate But far confusion, know, as as cause of you there could be a basis for action, necessary. I don’t think that that is gave that somehow an emotional distress claim really confusing potential- And that is more a separate gave, you award for a know, then — ly confusing anything the issues than general damages else. So 378 claim. going go I’m having to ahead and dismiss that be- I That’s concern that have really unnecessary. Any separate cause it's emotional distress. brought chapter (citing not Kuestner v. Health & Wel under Title VII and HRS moot (E.D.Pa. Fund, F.Supp. 378.16 fare 1997))); Department also West v. see (9th Cir.2000) n. 4 Transp., 206 F.3d B. (“The question prob of all central mootness forth in The matters set in changes whether the circum lems is if, discovery requests were discoverable prevailed beginning at stances 26(b) indicates, matters HRCP Rule any litigation have forestalled occasion subject sought to were “relevant matter meaningful [C]ourts relief.... must be care pending involved action.” The rule appraise range op ful to remedial states, part as follows: relevant portunities.” (Quoting Wright, 13A Miller & (b) Discovery Scope and Limits. Unless Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: Jur otherwise limited of the court in order 3533.3, Matters isdiction Related rules, scope accordance with these (2d ed.1984))); Neshaminy District Sch. discovery is as follows: (E.D.Pa. B., v. Karla 1997 WL *6 1997) (“In moot, litigation, civil not case is Parties obtain General. plaintiffs primary injury is even re matter, regarding discovery any privi- solved, long plaintiff so to as the continues leged, subject which is relevant to the mat- harm that a court suffer some favorable deci action, pending ter involved in the wheth- (Quoting would E. sion resolve.” Chemerin claim or er relates to the defense (2d ed.1994).)). sky, Federal Jurisdiction party seeking discovery or claim or to the ... party[.]

defense of It is not objection ground for that the information IV. sought will be inadmissible at the trial if A. sought appears reason- information ably discovery calculated to lead to the respect point With to her first admissible evidence. error, Plaintiff contends that the court “erred added). compel ... denying (Emphases regard, [her] motion to In that [be philosophy cause] such information was crucial to estab HRCP a basic that a “reflect lishing proffered party that the excuses Defen to a civil action should to be entitled pretexts[15] dants mere to conceal all the disclosure of relevant information wrongful According possession person prior discrimination.” of another Plaintiff, trial, privileged[.]” these materials were relevant unless the information is Wakabayashi Corp., refute assertion that Plaintiff Haw. Defendants’ Hertz (1983) (citations failed to meet the criteria for omitted). However, to demonstrate Defendants discrimi extent to which “[t]he discovery permitted nated her. Because Plaintiff main is under Rule 26 is compel discovery subject tains she moved to considerable latitude and dis- [the] (internal discrimination, illegal [of court].” order establish cretion the trial Id. ethnic, omitted). only pertinent gender, quotation claims marks citation “Thus[,] origin and national discrimination claims the exercise of such will discretion employer’s employment explanation unworthy 15. An reason for adverse fered is of credence.’ unworthy Am., Inc., prelextual, when "it Shoppe action is v. Gucci 94 Hawai'i Corrections, Dept. English v. (2000) (citations omitted). belief." Colorado *9 1002, (10th Cir.2001) (citing 248 F.3d 1008 Green, 792, 804, Douglas v. 411 U.S. McDonnell pertinent While the issue could be to Plain- 1817, (1973)). 93 S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d 668 See also VII, tiff’s retaliation claim under Title Ass'n., v. 224 Kulumani Blue Cross Blue Shield does not mention retaliation claim her 681, 684, (7th Cir.2000) (stating F.3d 685 Thus, opening brief. we do not consider that pretext explanation” "a means dishonest determining claim in whether the court erred in Hawai'i, tracks"). "deceit used to cover one’s denying compel. her motion to See HRAP Rule may pretext directly plaintiff ”[a] establish 'either 28(b)(7) ("Points may argued be deemed discriminatory by persuading the that a court waived.”). likely employer reason more motivated the indirectly by showing employer’s prof that the 101 not be absence of a an ].17 disturbed clear Practice “To limit examination to abuse of discretion that results in only substantial precise matters relevant issues prejudice party.” Accordingly, to a Id. presented by pleadings only would not be applicable standard of review on a trial contrary express purposes 26, to the of rule ruling compel court's a motion discov- might complete but also result in failure to ery, 26, brought pursuant to HRCP Rule is plaintiff adequate afford opportunity an abuse of Acoba discretion. v. General See obtain that would information be useful at Tire, Inc., 11, 1, 288, 92 Hawai'i 986 P.2d 298 Practice, 2008, trial.” supra, § 8 Federal at (1999) (holding “that circuit court did not (footnote omitted). 102 denying plain- abuse its discretion in [the compel [interrogatories] motion to pur- tiffl’s C. 26”). suant to HRCP “An Rule abuse of arguments are based the bur discretion occurs the trial court when has den-shifting analysis for a Title VII discrimi clearly exceeded the bounds reason or nation claim set forth United States disregarded principles rules or of law or Supreme Douglas Corp. Court McDonnell practice to the substantial detriment of a Green, 792, 802-03, 1817, v. 411 U.S. 93 S.Ct. Motors, party litigant.” Davis v. Wholesale (1973). 36 L.Ed.2d 668 Whereas Plaintiff Inc., 405, 418, 1026, 86 949 Hawai'i P.2d 1039 argues that intentionally Defendants discrim (App.1998) (quoting Sport Richardson v. against gender, inated her on the basis of (Waikiki 494, 504, Corp.), 76 Shinko Hawai'i ethnicity, origin, or national her claims 169, (1994)); P.2d 880 179 see also State ‘disparate be as “individual characterized Sacoco, 293, 288, 11, 45 Haw. 367 P.2d is, treatment’ “inten discrimination^]” (1961). against tional discrimination an individual language Inasmuch as Federal belongs who protected Shoppe to a class.”18 (FRCP) 26(b) Rules of Civil Procedure Rule Am., Inc., 368, 377-78, 14 Hawai'i Gucci 26(b) substantially and HRCP Rule are simi 1049, (2000). Hence, P.3d 1058-59 she must lar, 26(b) interpretations of FRCP Rule adduce circumstantial evidence discrimina Harrison, persuasive. See Gold v. 88 Ha tion to establish her discrimination claims 94, 105, (1998), wai'i 962 P.2d cert. applying Douglas McDonnell so-called denied, U.S. S.Ct. 143 burden-shifting analysis. (1999) (“Where pat L.Ed.2d 351 we have adopted This court has procedure equiva terned rule after analysis Douglas § McDonnell in HRS 378-2 FRCP, interpretations rule within the lent discrimination cases. See v. Reliable the rule the federal courts are deemed Schefke Ltd., Agency, Collection 96 Hawai'i highly persuasive reasoning in the (Internal (adopting three-prong P.3d quotation marks and court.” cita omitted.)). noting test for claim and “is consistent 26(b), tions Under FRCP Rule Douglas with the McDonnell framework this question relevancy “the is to be more Shoppe, Teague, court has followed Sam loosely discovery stage construed at the than Furukawa”); trial, Shoppe, also see Ha question at the where the relevance 378-81, 1059-62; wai'i at governed by 14 P.3d Sam purposes admissibility is Teague, Wright, Rights Ltd. v. Hawai'i Civil Federal Rules of 8 C. A. Evidence.” Miller, Comm’n, Marcus, and R. Federal Practice and 89 Hawai'i (1999); Zoologi Procedure: at 99-100 v. Honolulu Civil Furukawa (footnotes omitted) 7, 12-14, [hereinafter, Soc’y, cal Federal 85 Hawai'i trial, (HRE) At Hawai'i of Evidence 18. Two other of discrimination include Rules theories discrimination,” 'pattern-or-practice' which apply, Rule 401 would and states that " protected "intentional discrimination any having ‘relevant evidence' means evidence " belongs[,]” plaintiff class to which the and 'dis- tendency to make fact the existence that is discrimination," parate impact’ which is "unin- consequence to the determination of the action tentional based on a neutral em- discrimination probable probable more than or less it would be ployment policy disparate impact on a that has without the evidence.” *10 plaintiff belongs.” protected which the class to 377, Shoppe, 94 Hawai'i at 14 P.3d at 1058.

102 (1997). unworthy (Citing Ingels of credence.” v. prevail To under the McDon 648-50 616, (10th test, Corp., 42 F.3d 621-22 plaintiff Thiokol Douglas a must first estab nell Cir.1994).)); Spray Matthews v. Ocean Cran prima of discrimination. lish a case facie berries, 122, 1303, Inc., Mass. 686 N.E.2d 378-81, 426 at Shoppe, 94 Hawai'i at P.3d See “plaintiff (noting that the must pri- plaintiff If the establishes the 1059-62. identify employees [or she] to whom he ease, an burden shifts ma intermediate facie similarly performance, in is situated terms of “legitimate, to the defendant to articulate conduct, qualifications and without such dif nondiscriminatory adverse em reason the mitigating ferentiating or circumstances that 378-79, at 14 P.3d at ployment action.” Id. (internal distinguish situations” would them prima If the 1059-60. the defendant rebuts omitted)); quotation marks and citations case, plaintiff to the the burden reverts facie Romines, 862, Swyers S.W.2d demonstrating that present to evidence (noting discovery (Mo.Ct.App.1993) that pretex- articulated reasons were defendant’s “occurring prior to discrimination the effec (cita at at 1060 tual. id. P.3d See dispa in date of the claim is relevant tive omitted). tions establishing in rate treatment case But, pretext by in order to show prima case and to show that em facie comparison, sufficient similari there must be ployer’s pretextual” asserted reasons are ty plaintiff and matters of between the (citations omitted)). original) (emphasis in discovery sought. Addressing the issue acknowledge While we that a more evidence, in “similarly situated” this court relevancy than standard of that set liberal that, prima. to Furukawa held establish applied forth the rules of evidence must be case, prove that all claimant “must facie stage,’some requested discovery at aspects employ [or her] relevant of his materials were relevant under “simi employ ment situation were similar to those larly regarding situated” test. The materials compare to [or she] ees with whom he seeks post-tenure applications for tenure and re 85 Hawai'i at [or her] his treatment.” faculty members view of Defendants omitted) (citations (emphasis 936 P.2d at 650 they not con were irrelevant because are original). While it was cautioned applications promotion. with cerned Sim bearing on the ulti “circumstantial evidence complaints ilarly, evaluations of and student automatically mate issue should not be ex faculty af Defendants members arbitrary application of cluded they professors became full were not ter rules[,]” 936 P.2d at it was id. relevant to Plaintiffs claim she was sub showing that that there must be a concluded jected processing to discrimination employees “similarly situated are those application position. to that her subject policies same who are hand, it is decision-maker as the other evident some subordinate the same On requested appear P.2d at 650. of the materials relevant plaintiff[,]” id. at “subject matter” involved. For ex- juris Similarly, it is in other well-settled per- ample, materials that concerned the plaintiff that a must demonstrate dictions formance, evaluations, appraisal, student prove pre similarities order to sufficient complaints, applications pro- student Lynn by comparison. v. Deaconess text See faculty motion of Defendants and the mem- Campus, F.3d Med. Center-West during period prior attaining bers (8th Cir.1998) (“To employees show if professorship have been relevant situated, only similarly plaintiff need similar to the materials considered that he or she was treated differ establish personnel evaluating committee employees ently than other whose violations applications. (Cita ‘comparable were of seriousness.’ Nevertheless, circumstances, omitted.)); Tech., Inc., Seagate Furr under the tions (10th Cir.1996) (“The of discretion for the court fact was not abuse 82 F.3d deny request prejudice, without may only discrimination finder infer narrowly-tai- instruction to file a more [plaintiffs produce [defen evidence that the request. Plaintiff proffered explanation pretextual lored should have limited dant's

1Q3 compel her motion to promotion individuals who had Plaintiffs and made dossier/files applied promotion depart negative the same recommendationsf.]” “ during proxi ment a reasonable time frame granting denying ‘The a motion limine[,]’ application. mate to Swyers, her time See Meyer City County and Hon olulu, (noting discovery S.W.2d at 865 Haw.App. 510 n. 729 P.2d regarding prior employment practices (quoting was 395 n. 8 Lussier Mau-Van permissible, Dev., Inc., Haw.App. but should be limited to a prior (1983)), time alleged “reasonable frame to the is reviewed for abuse of discre act”). discriminatory Additionally, she could tion. See id. request applications have directed her professors faculty and who had been sub B..

jected to the same evaluation criteria. See granting In motion Defendants’ Matthews, (distin 686 N.E.2d. at 1310-12 comí; exclude, the reasoned that “whether guishing examples between different of mis ... a professor meeting full is still the crite noting conduct employees and that where professor ria of being a full w[ould] tend to disciplined policy[,]” were under a “different throw the focus off’ the issue whether establishing evidence did assist promotion. Plaintiff met criteria for We pretext); Swyers, 858 S.W.2d. In conclude that the court did not abuse its stead, requested Plaintiff regard information granting discretion in the motion. ing faculty all College members of the performance professors Engineering.19 of the full personnel correctly committee was light In Department of the fact that the Fust, performance deemed irrelevant. had its own selection criteria some levels of the committee did not members Department members were not applicable establish standard criteria professors, full we cannot conclude that all evaluating application used in Plaintiffs for a requested information was relevant to the Rather, professorship. full the documents subject of her matter case. We observe that personnel delineating criteria used ample Plaintiff opportunity had to file a sec- reviewing application committee in Plaintiffs request discovery ond of these materials applicable were and were delivered to her Therefore, before the case went to trial. we discovery during provided as exhibits to hold that the court did not abuse its discre- Second, above, jury. as Plain- discussed denying compel tion in the motion to without requests tiff did not tailor her those com- prejudice providing opportu- Plaintiff the promoted mittee who to full members nity discovery requests to tailor her or re-file professor reasonably during pre- status her motion. period scribed and under same criteria applicable promotion application. to her In V. fact, indicated, some of materials re- garding appeared the committee members A. irrelevant to her discrimination retalia- ap Plaintiffs second tion claims. As contention mentioned Defendants’ peal granting attorney is that tidal court hearing erred at the on the motion to exclude, Defendants’ motion to exclude were al- limine evi the committee members testimony “concerning they ready professors dence and the teach when reviewed evaluations, ing records, public In words application. research and of De- attorney, “going funding up extramural fendants’ records and/or [Department promotion”. personnel members com the committee members (who basically Department “people promot- mittee] were] Chair are all were [who professors) tenured and full who ed.” evaluated addition, supra request page page Department.

19. See 51. It is unlikely that information student post-tenure such as evalua- appears status to be extrane- review faculty every professor College in the tions ous. application relevant to criteria used in *12 104 in an had emotional environment resulted

C. supra page page 73 P.3d distress. See rel deemed Even the evidence evant, properly “[al it because excluded relevant, may though be excluded evidence But, instructing jury, the court ad substantially value out probative is its might damages for it that award vised by prejudice, weighed danger of unfair inconvenience, suffering, an “pain, mental issues, misleading the of the or confusion life[,]” part as guish, enjoyment loss of of delay, jury, by considerations of undue any claim. compensatory damages on of Cf. time, presentation of of waste needless Dobbs, § The Dan B. Law Torts evidence.” HRE 403 cumulative (2000) (noting state and that under most 829 statutes, including antidiscrimination federal of a full that We believe the evaluation VII, compensation “some for emotional Title performance purposes of professor’s for the recoverable, now and in addition distress is relating is from that review distinct tenure job notably sexual some professor who seeks advance- discrimination — an associate may a common also warrant professorship. question full The harassment — ment claim”); see, outrage e.g., v. Nor law Smith performance professors whether the of the Inc., Acceptance, F.3d Fin. 129 west pro- personnel committee fulfilled Cir.1997) (10th (holding that emotional requirements applied to motion that were may part damages as a distress be awarded relationship Plaintiff had no direct to wheth- of a compensatory arising out Title actually applicable crite- Plaintiff met the er claim). VII promotion Allowing Plaintiff ria for herself. for of the evaluations to introduce evidence But, jury may fact that consider have, court as the tenure review would damages part as emotional distress opined, confused the issues and misled damages “any compensatory accompanying court, focus, jury. jury’s by as noted claims,” necessarily does not [Plaintiffs] away Plain- would have shifted from whether question separate lia- of whether resolve promotion. tiff met the criteria for in- bility may intentional be established for addition, Plaintiff had other means indepen- as an fliction emotional distress pro- for prove that she met the criteria Miyagi, tort. v. 76 Hawai'i dent See Calleon motion; delineating namely, 310, 320, the documents (stating applicable own dossier. criteria and her that a claim of intentional infliction emo- disposal, ]”); materials With these at her “independent tort[ tional distress is (Second) b, the criteria could establish she satisfied 46 cmt. Restatement Torts (not- identifying portions of her [hereinafter, Restatement] at 72 demonstrating qualifications dossier her ing infliction of emotional intentional Thus, alternatively professor status. we “fully recognized sepa- as a distress has been not abuse its conclude court did liability, and distinct basis of tort with- rate granting motion to necessary discretion Defendants’ presence out the the elements requested tort, assault, evidence battery, exclude because the any such tendency land, lead to confusion and had a would imprisonment, trespass to or the false delay like”). undue and to waste the court’s to cause jury’s time. Ordinarily, evidence of intentional pleaded separate as a of action conduct cause

VI. considered fact finder as a should be A. independent Takaki separate claim. See 57, 67, argument Machinery Corp., Hawai'i appeal Plaintiffs last v. Allied could; (holding that (App.1998) mo- P.2d granting erred Defendants’ against his employee bring Plaintiffs claim “an an action tion for directed verdict on employer for infliction intentional infliction of emotional distress. or her intentional mentioned, claim related distress caused discrimination previously As Hough (citing §§ work Plaintiffs contention that hostile in violation of HRS 378-2” Co., granting Ins. 83 Hawai'i directed verdict the rea- Pacific (1996))); gave P.2d judgment, Nelson Univer sons it “No harmless. cf. Hawai'i, sity reversed, 97 Hawai'i order or shall decree amended (2001) (analyzing an alleged both or modified for error or defect unless *13 § violation of 378-2 an HRS intentional opinion [this] court is the that it has sepa infliction of emotional distress injuriously rights affected the substantial rately); (Hawai'i), (1993). Ross v. Co. Hotel appellant.” § HRS 641-2 As Stouffer 454, 465, 1037, 76 Hawai'i 879 P.2d jury occurred, 1048 the that no found harassment (1994) (addressing § both a 378-2 claim give HRS separate the failure to a instruction re- an intentional infliction emotional dis garding intentional infliction of emotional individually). case, tress claim In a such distress did not affect Plaintiffs constitution- jury should be instructed as to cause of rights. al

action but cautioned that an award made for intentional infliction of emotional distress VII. duplicated compensatory must not be in dam ages given other claim. parties We that observe cited to our jurisdiction’s present formulation of the ele B. ments of tort of intentional infliction of “ ‘(1)

Nevertheless, emotional the court afforded distress as follows: that jury act opportunity damages allegedly causing to award the harm was intention al; (2) unreasonable; (3) emotional in favor in that act was distress recognized that context of her other relief. the actor should claims for See have 98, 103, supra 52, likely pages the act pages 73 was result in illness.’ P.3d Dun 28, 38, jury Dappen, lea v. 83 was also that Plaintiff Hawai'i 924 instructed P.2d (1996) 196, “prove aby preponderance must 206 (quoting the evi v. Marshall Univer Hawai'i, 21, subjected 38, sity dence” that 9 Haw.App. “she was verbal or (1991) (citation 937, omitted)); physical sufficiently which 947 per conduct see also Takaki, 13, vasive or as to 87 Hawai'i at 66 n. 951 severe alter conditions of P.2d at 13; Aiu, employment 516 n. her or Lee 85 Hawai'i 936 create abusive work (1997). 655, ing P.2d defining “pervasive 670 elements environment^]” These severe,” years jury fifty ago or was told that conduct established this court Morrison, (1952), “unreasonably Fraser v. 370 which 39 Haw. interfer[ed] [Plain (First) Torts, performance” upon based tiffs] work or created an “in the Restatement (1934).20 hostile, Recovery only section timidating, working or 312 could offensive en occur if was an or jury bodily vironment” would be there “illness other sufficient. The question, you harm[.]" answered find “Do preponderance of the that Plaintiff evidence However, evolved, as law has subjected to hostile work environment Institute, American Law in the Restatement gender because of female or her Polish na (Second) Torts, reformulated the elements origin” negative. tional in the Inasmuch as of the tort as follows: jury find that did not Plaintiff was sub

jected outrageous hostile work One who extreme environment be con- bias, gender fortiori, or intentionally recklessly cause of racial duct causes se- jury could not have found in Plaintiffs favor vere emotional distress to another is sub- ject liability distress, on her claim intentional infliction emo for such emotional bodily had it tional distress been submitted. Ac and if harm to results error, it, cordingly, any, bodily in the court’s from such harm. Marshall, Haw.App. 20. This court that "three elements See at 821 P.2d at 947 stated must be intentional; Panis, (2) present: (quoting Haw.App. Wong the act is that it unreasonable; (quoting is recognize the actor should P.2d 696-97 Ailetcher v. Fraser, Hawai'i, likely Haw.App. as result illness.” Fin. Co. Beneficial (1981) (quoting expressed 39 Haw. at 374-75. The Fra test Dun ))). linearly holding lea based on the Fraser. ser Also, Restatement, formu- with the supra, (emphasis § at 71-72 line Restatement’s lation, added). Restatement, the conduct must second the actor’s intentional Under the longer necessary actually plaintiff no to suffer likelihood illness is have caused Rather, of the tort. severe emotion Restate- element severe distress.22 See emotional (“The ment, j, result. prohibited is the Severe 46 cmt. rule supra, al distress suf applies only distress is defined “mental where the stated in this Section resulted, fering, anguish, mental mental nervous has in emotional distress fact includ[ing] all un highly severe.”); McDougall, [and] shock where it is Tibke v. reactions, fright, pleasant (S.D.1992) mental such as (stating N.W.2d humiliation, horror, shame, grief, embarrass the tort of intentional infliction of emotional ment, worry anger, disappointment, chagrin, exceeding “requires all distress conduct *14 Restatement, supra, § at and nausea.”21 society usually by bounds tolerated decent intensity “The and the duration of 77-78. especially and which is of a nature calculated to in de cause, the distress are factors considered cause, to and does distress of a mental Restatement, termining severity.” supra, kind”). its very serious Hence, with § 46 at 77-78. in accordance Intentional infliction of emotional Restatement, bodily present injury, while the injury Re recognized is an the distress necessary to compensable, is not establish independently giving as rise to statement severe emotional distress. liability. limited, not, however, to The rule stated is of Because of the fear fictitious or trivial harm; bodily cases where has been there offered, claims, proof of the and distrust sufficiently the conduct is extreme satisfactory difficulty setting up any of the liability outrageous there liability, to law has been boundaries the alone, emotional without such the distress independent protection slow afford to to may per- In courts harm. such cases the in freedom from emotional interest haps way for more of tend look standing only alone. It is within distress outrage guarantee as a that the claim is that years recent the rule stated enormity genuine; outrage but if of fully sep- recognized has been Section in fact carries conviction that there has liability!.] and distinct of tort basis distress, bodily .arate been severe emotional required. harm is not Restatement, b, § supra, 46 cmt. at 72. In Restatement, k, 78; light supra, foregoing, adopt approach cmt. of we see Torts, (Second) Dobbs, supra, § The set forth in the of also Law Restatement change (“Although light Torts. of the at 832 severe distress must be substantial demonstrated, law, must be caused in fact we hold of the tort elements conduct, infliction of the defendant’s tortious medical tes- intentional emotional distress 1) timony ordinarily required causing allegedly is not that the act the harm to demon- 2) reckless, severity or that the strate either distress or intentional act 3) 4) cause.”). outrageous, act caused its cases, proof physical harm 21. The definition of "severe emo much less Restatement courts, however, distinguished impact. tional distress” must be from have carried Some Rodrigues used in of "serious mental distress” as requirement physical over manifestation State, (1970), P.2d 509 Haw. symptoms negligent from tire inflic- law of negligent infliction of emotional distress. require And tion of distress. all courts some Therein, serious mental distress was defined as When kind evidence severe distress. normally [person], "where a consti reasonable enough, defendant's conduct is extreme tuted, adequately cope would be unable prove fact sever When the tends distress. engendered mental stress the circum extreme, defendant's conduct is not so stances of case.” Id. at P.2d at 520. plaintiff may proportionately stronger ev- need itself, By that her distress idence testimony is severe. jurisdic- 22. One commentator observes most plaintiff upset that the cried and was require evidence that emotion- tions some severe simply insufficient. al distress has occurred: Torts, Dobbs, supra, § Law at 832-33 Neither the nor most of the cases Restatement added). (emphasis proof symptoms require physical all extreme emotional distress another. See the tort of infliction intentional of emotional Durham, May City N.C.App. also guide distress to trial courts and liti- future (2000) (“A 525 S.E.2d gants. Adoption of the Restatement’s for- intentional infliction of emotional distress re- provides mulation such clarification. It also (1) quires the existence of three elements: greater symmetry creates as between the (2) conduct; outrageous extreme and which separate torts of negligent intentional and (3) is intended to cause and does cause se- distress, infliction of requiring emotional not (Cita- vere emotional distress another.” proof physical injury where the tortious omitted.)); tions Adjust- Cross v. Bonded outrageously act was intentional or reckless. Bureau, ment 48 Cal.App.4th I, II, III, IV, join V, I also in Parts (1996) (“The Cal.Rptr.2d 801 elements of a VIII. cause of action for intentional infliction of outrageous distress are conduct LEVINSON, Concurring Opinion by J. defendant,

by the intention to cause or I in the results reached in Parts IV concur disregard probability reckless of caus- majority opinion, and V of although I do distress, (3) ing emotional severe emotional necessarily opinion’s subscribe to the rea- suffering, proximate actual and cau- join VI, VII, soning. I in Parts *15 and VIII of (Cita- sation of the emotional distress[.]” majority opinion. omitted.)); tions Holy Spirit Molko v. Ass’n Christianity, World Unification of Concurring Dissenting Opinion by 1092, 122, 46, Cal.Rptr. Cal.3d MOON, C.J., NAKAYAMA,J., in which (1989) (the elements of intentional inflic- joins. “1) tion of emotion outrageous distress are (2) defendant, by conduct intention to Although agree I majority’s with the reso- disregard cause or probability reckless lution plaintiff-appellant of Anna Hac’s distress, causing severe emo- claims, to, disagree I with its decision sua tional suffering, proximate actual and sponte, alter the elements of the tort of distress”). causation of the emotional intentional infliction of in- emotional distress by asmuch as the issue is neither raised VIII. parties presented present appeal. nor foregoing grounds, On the we affirm the previously This court has stated: March judgment 1999 final in favor of judicial self-gover Prudential rules of dispo- Defendants and Plaintiff. Our properly nance limit the role of courts unnecessary sition it makes to consider the society. in a democratic Trustees Cf. remaining parties. contentions raised Yamasaki, 154, 171, v. OHA 69 Haw. (1987); P.2d v. the Land Life of HIFO, J., Opinion of Concurring toas Part Commission, Land Use 63 Haw. Joining VI and In All Other Parts. (citing Warth I concur in the result reached as Part Seldin, 422 U.S. 95 S.Ct. regarding VI intentional infliction of emotion- (1975)). prudential L.Ed.2d 343 such One al judge distress. The trial did not err in judicial power rule is that “the use dismissing because, argued as was public disputes resolve ... should limit below, by Defendant upon by the facts relied judicial questions capable ed to those Plaintiff did not as a matter of law reach the presented adversary resolution and in an requirement “outrageous conduct”. This Yamasaki, context.” 69 Haw. at requirement is the same in both the Restate- (citation omitted). P.2d at 456 Another (Second) previous ment of Torts and Hawaii that, such rule is “even in the absence Thus, law. decisional trial court’s deci- restrictions, constitutional must [courts] affirmed, though sion should be it even wisdom, carefully weigh efficacy, still based on a different and incorrect reason. pow an timeliness of exercise of their notwithstanding, join That I acting, especially Part VII er before where there clarify because is useful to the elements of be an intrusion into areas committed government.” judicial to other branches of Id. distress evinces a lack of restraint. omitted) (citation I, therefore, (emphasis original respectfully ] [ dissent. omitted). Although, generally, issues con

cerning prudential self-governance rules justiciability

arise in cases where is at

issue, self-governance proper and the role preclude only courts this court not case, considering

from but from also

considering any properly that is issue prerogative before it. We do not have the 73 P.3d 62 discharge judi ... ... our individual NAKASONE, Carmen T. obligations opinion[s], cial in our written Plaintiff-Appellee, appeal where case on does not bring squarely the issue this couri. before doing represents To so refrain from NAKASONE, Defendant- judicial self-restraint, exercise in not a Gerald judicial Appellant. shirking responsibility. Madison, speaking James on the notion No. 23460. in a checks balances democratic that, society, framing govern- “[i]n wrote Appeals Intermediate of Hawai'i. Court

ment which is to be [the administered people] people], great [the over diffi- Feb. culty lies this: You must first enable the Reconsideration Denied March government governed; to controul [sic] the *16 place, oblige and in the next it to controul April Certiorari Granted (J. Papers itself.” No. The Federalist Madison). Although judicial review serves

as a check on the unconstitutional exercise power by legislative the executive and government, only

branches of “the check

upon judicial exercise [the branch’s] power is oum sense [its] of self-restraint." Butler, 1, 78-79, U.S. U.S. 56 S.Ct. (Stone, J., 80 L.Ed. dissent- reason, alone,

ing). judicial For that self- surely implied, restraint not an expressed, grant condition au- judicial thority revieiu. Mohr, Attorney’s

In re Fees 97 Hawai'i 9-10, (2001) (emphases 655-56

added) (some quotation internal marks omit

ted) (some added). ellipsis points case, present majority recog-

In the party changing

nizes that neither advocates precedent and

established observes that “the

parties jurisdiction’s present to our for- cited tort

mulation the elements of inten-

tional infliction of emotional Ma- distress[.]”

jority Opinion at at 59. P.3d Given any argument by parties,

the absence of majority’s decision to refashion the ele-

ments of intentional infliction of emotional

Case Details

Case Name: Hac v. University of Hawai'i
Court Name: Hawaii Supreme Court
Date Published: Jul 17, 2003
Citation: 73 P.3d 46
Docket Number: 22357
Court Abbreviation: Haw.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.
Log In