Habig v. BruningHabig v. Bruning
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Robert and Elaine Habig appeal the trial court‘s summary judgment in favor of Gilbert Bruning, Jack Samuelson, and Samuelson-Bruning Engineering and Construetion, Inc. (hereinafter “Bruning“). We reverse.
ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err in determining that the Habigs’ claim was barred by the statute of limitations?
2. Did the trial court err in determining that the Habigs’ claim was barred by the doctrine of laches?
FACTS
The facts construed most favorably to the Habigs, as the nonmoving party to a motion for summary judgment, are as follows. On November 5, 1988, the Habigs contracted with Bruning to build an additional room onto their home. The addition was completed on December 29, 1988.
In early 1984, the Habigs noticed leakage around the skylights in the addition. This leakage did not cause any structural damage to the Habigs’ real property. Over time, more severe leaks developed along the addition‘s east and west roof valleys and over its south wall. The Habigs first noticed the structural damage to their home caused by these leaks in the spring of 1987 when the winter snow melted from the roof.
The Hаbigs repeatedly complained to Bruning regarding the problems with the addition, initially concerning the leaky sky
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the designated evidentiary matter shоws that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
I.
In its judgment, the trial court found that the six-year statute of limitations appliсable to the Habigs’ cause of action, IC 34-1-2-1 (1988), 2 began to run in December, 1988, when the room addition was completed, because “[a] cause of action accrues when damage is first produced by a wrongful act or omission.” Record at 384 (citing Bailey v. Martz (1986), Ind.App., 488 N.E.2d 716). While the quoted language does appear in dicta in Bailey, a tort case, it is not a correct statement of the law governing tort cases today; instead, the discovery rule is applied to determine when a cause of action acerues.
Our supreme court first expressly applied the discovery rule in Barnes v. A.H. Robins Company, Inc. (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 84. Barnes involved a certified question of state law from the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to our suрreme court. The question certified to the court was “[when does a cause of action accrue within the meaning of the [IC 34-1-2-2 (1988) and IC 88-1-1.5-5 (1988), statutes of limitation] when the injury to the plaintiff is caused by a disease which may have been contracted аs a result of protracted exposure to a foreign substance?” Barnes, 476 N.E.2d at 85. Our supreme court responded:
We find that in [such cases], a discovery type rule should be applied, and the statute of limitations in such causes commences to run from the date the plaintiff knew оr should have discovered that she suffered an injury or impingement, andthat it was caused by the product or act of another.
Id. However, the court specifically limited its holding to the precise factual pattern related by the certified question.
The next relevant case was Burks v. Rushmore (1989), Ind., 534 N.E.2d 1101, a state court defamation case. In Burks, our suprеme court interpreted the phrase “after the cause of action acerued” in IC 34-1-2-2 (1988) 3 to require application of the discovery rule. In so doing, the Burks court recognized a degree of divergence in the case law, but proсlaimed that:
[The rule in Indiana has been generally understood to be that a cause of action accrues when the resultant damage of a negligent act is ascertainable or by due diligence could be ascertained.
Burks, 534 N.E.2d at 1104 (quoting Barnes, 476 N.E.2d at 86). The cоurt further noted that, while it had refused “to go beyond the scope of the certified question [presented in Barnes], [it] did not in Barnes offer any rationale suggesting that the discovery rule was necessarily inappropriate in other contexts.” Id.
Finally, in Wehling v. Citizens Nat. Bank (1992), Ind., 586 N.E.2d 840, our supreme court expanded its application of the discovery rule to all tort actions. Wehling involved, in part, a suit by property owners against a bank for negligently recording a deed to the owners’ real estate and failing to escrоw and pay real estate taxes thereon. The supreme court, in reversing the grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank, held:
[The cause of action of a tort claim accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or, in the еxercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of another.
Wehling, 586 N.E.2d at 843.
Thus, the state of the law in Indiana is that a tort action accrues and the applicable statutes of limitations begin to run when the injured party knows or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have known, that he or she had sustained an injury.
The statute of limitations applicable to the Habigs’ claim for damage to real property causеd by breach of contract and warranty, found in IC 34-1-2-1, contains language identical to that found in IC 34-1-2-2 and interpreted in Burks and Wehl-ing. Both statutes of limitation contain the introductory clause, “[the following actions shall be commenced ... after the causе of action has accrued.” As the legislature chose the same language for both statutes, we are compelled to conclude it had the same intent in enacting the respective provisions and we must interpret both statutes in the sаme manner. Further, the policy underlying the discovery rule, that “it is inconsistent with our system of jurisprudence to require a claimant to bring his cause of action in a limited period in which, even with due diligence, he could not be aware a cause of action exists,” Barnes, 476 N.E.2d at 86, is as applicable to actions “for injuries to property other than personal property,” IC 84-1-2-1, as it is for “injuries to personal property,” IC 84-1-2-2(1).
There is an additional reason why the discovery rule necessarily aрplies to actions within the scope of IC 84-1-2-1. Wehling expressly held that the discovery rule applies to tort claims, which could be governed by either IC 34-1-2-1 or IC 34-1-2-2, depending on whether the damage involved was done to personal property or “property other than personal property.” The cause of action in Wehling involved personal property and IC 34-1-2-2(1). Wehling, 586 N.E.2d at 842. However, its holding, applicable to all tort claims, would apply to a tort claim involving real property and governed by IC 34-1-2-1. It would be wholly incongruous to interpret IC 84-1-2-1 as requiring the discovery rule in tort cases but not in other cases covered by the particular statute of limitations.
II.
The Habigs also argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Bruning on the ground that their clаim was barred by the doctrine of laches. Again construing the facts most favorably to the nonmoving party, the earliest the Habigs reasonably could have been expected to file their claim would have been in the spring of 1987; they filed their clаim on January 10, 1991. Thus, assuming the Habigs will prove at trial that their claim accrued in the spring of 1987, we must determine whether, as a matter of law, this delay of less than four years constitutes laches.
“The doctrine of laches may bar a plaintiff‘s claim if the defendant can show: (1) plaintiff‘s inexcusable delay in asserting his or her rights, (2) plaintiff‘s implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions, and (8) prejudice to the defendant due to the delay.” Shearer v. Pla-Boy, Inc. (1989), Ind.App., 538 N.E.2d 247, 254 (citations omitted). The mеre passage of time is insufficient; the defendant must also show that the plaintiff‘s delay was unreasonable and that the defendant was prejudiced as a result. Id. “‘The doctrine of laches may bar a plaintiff‘s claim even though the applicаble statute of limitations has not yet expired if the laches are of such character as to work an equitable estoppel (which contains the additional element of reliance by the defendant).” Id. (citing Siddall v. City of Michigan City (1985), Ind.App., 485 N.E.2d 912; Pickett v. Pickett (1984), Ind.App., 470 N.E.2d 751). Here, several issues of fact must be resolved in order to determine whether the doctrine of laches may properly be invoked to bar the Habigs’ claim: whether the Habigs’ delay (after their cause of action accrued) was inexcusable; whether the Habigs acquiesced in the alleged deficiencies in their room addition; whether the Habigs’ delay prejudiced Brun-ing; and, whether Bruning relied to their detriment on the Habigs’ failure to file a claim earlier. Hence, it was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment on the issue of laches. See Woods v. Harris (1992), Ind.App., 600 N.E.2d 163, 164-65.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings.
SHARPNACK, CJ., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.
Notes
. In its order, the trial court finds both that “Plaintiffs did not file suit until January 10, 1991, after the statute of limitations had expired” and “Plaintiffs delayed an unreasonable period of time in asserting their rights against Defendants, which delay resulted in prejudice to the Defendants and an implied waiver of Plaintiffs’ rights.” We assume, as do the parties, that the latter finding is a finding that the Plaintiffs’ claim is barred by the doctrinе of laches, and will treat it as such, even though the court did not make an express finding in that regard.
. IC 34-1-2-1 reads:
The following actions shall be commenced within six (6) years after the cause of action has accrued, and not afterwards.
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Third. For injuries to property other than personal property, damages for any detention thereof, and for recovering possession of personal property.
. IC 34-1-2-2 includes the statute of limitations for actions involving damage to personal property.