19 Or. 354 | Or. | 1890
delivered the opinion of the court.
During the trial numerous exceptions were taken by the appellant, a few only of which it will be necessary to notice. At the conclusion of the evidence on the part of the plaintiff, the defendant moved for a non-suit, which was overruled and an exception taken. Ernest Haase, the plaintiff, testified in his own behalf, in substance: That he had been living at Trout Lake, in Washington Territory,
On his cross-examination the witness testified: That it was half past seven or eight when he went to the Umatilla House to get the ticket; that he was alone; that he stayed there about five minutes, and from there went to take a walk through the town; he was alone; he went from the Umatilla House along the track and turned to the right, where there was a butcher-shop; stayed there a quarter of an hour or a little longer; he knew no one there; went back down the railroad track and down the street; he met 'somebody and went back again with this person; does not know the place to which he went, but had some port wine; the place was two or three streets from where the butcher-shop stands, on the street leading to the brewery; the name of the man with whom he drank was Keller; he stayed in the saloon about ten minutes; that no one was there but
Other evidence tends to show that the defendant company had been in the habit of carrying passengers on freight trains and charging fare therefor, and that they had been in the habit of taking such passengers aboard the train at the freight depot, which is four or five blocks
The plaintiff also introduced evidence tending to prove that after the injury he was found lying between two tracks in the freight yard, which is along side of the freight depot from twenty to thirty feet from it and to the north; that there were three side tracks between the freight depot platform and where the plaintiff was lying. This is the substance of all the evidence on the part of the plaintiff.
1. The first question to which our attention will be directed is the appellant’s exception to that part of the plaintiffs evidence in relation to what was told him at the Umatilla House and what the unknown man said to him in relation to the movements of the defendant^ trains, etc. The purpose of this evidence is not very apparent, but by it, I think, the plaintiff sought to place before the jury the information upon which he acted in relation to the defendant’s trains and to account for his going to the yard where he was hurt at the late hour of the night when the accident occurred. It is difficult to see how the unauthorized acts or words of a stranger, who is not shown to have any connection whatever with the defendant company, could affect or bind it; and yet it is perfectly obvious from the whole .tenor of this evidence that such was its purpose. What effect the jury permitted it to have upon their deliberations we cannot know, but there can be no doubt it was prejudicial to the defendant. The plaintiff was charged with contributory negligence, and one effect of this evidence was, to some extent, to account for his presence in the defendant's car yard at an unusual hour of the night and under circumstances more or less dangerous, and it may be to relieve him from blame in being there under the circumstances detailed by the plaintiff; but in no view
2. But the defendant’s motion for a non-suit presents a still more serious question, and imposes the delicate duty upon the court of passing on the plaintiff’s evidence and determining whether or not it tended to prove a case sufficient to be submitted to the jury. The defendant, if liable at all, is liable on the ground of negligence; that is, it must have violated some duty which it owed to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff must have been free from any fault which contributed to the injury of which he complains. Looking at the plaintiff’s complaint alone, and it is difficult to say that it contains a charge of negligence. It is clear that it contains no direct charge of that kind. The fact that the plaintiff proceeded to a train which was standing still and was in the act of stepping on one of the cars of the train while the same was standing still at the defendant’s depot, a usual place of stopping, when, without warning to the plaintiff or any signal, the train suddenly and rapidly backed up, does not seem to me to be enough. It is true the plaintiff desired to go as a passenger to Hood River, and went to the car for that purpose, but it does not anywhere appear that the car was at the place where the evidence shows the defendant was accustomed to receive passengers on the freight trains.
But waiving the question of pleading altogether, is the evidence sufficient? The defendant being a common carrier was bound to receive all persons as passengers who wished to travel on its trains and who complied with its regulations in relation to fare; but it was not bound to receive passengers otherwise than at stations or places provided for that purpose. If it was in the habit of receiving passengers at its freight depot at The Dalles, then, whenever one of its trains which carried passengers was drawn up at that place and ready to depart for any point on the road, it was bound to receive and transport to their destination all persons offering themselves as passengers who had tickets or were ready to pay the fare, and in the performance of
These considerations necessarily lead to a reversal of the judgment, and render it necessary to remand the eause with directions to the court below to allow the defendant’s motion for a non-suit.