44 A.2d 776 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1945
Argued September 26, 1945. Appollonia Haas, widow of Harry Haas, filed a petition under the Workmen's Compensation Act asking *293 compensation for herself and certain minors to whom Haas had stood in loco parentis. After a number of hearings, the referee dismissed the petition which was affirmed by the board. The Court of Common Pleas No. 6 of Philadelphia County reversed the board and entered judgment for the plaintiff and ordered the record returned to the board for the purpose of computing the amounts due the claimants and this appeal followed.
The question to be decided by this Court is whether claimant's decedent was in the course of his employment when injured; and that is a question of law and as such open to review. Callihan v.Montgomery,
The burden of proof was upon the claimant to offer proof sufficient to sustain a finding that her husband's death resulted from an accident sustained in the course of his employment.Mauchline v. State Insurance Fund,
For some time prior to September 4, 1937, Harry Haas had been employed as janitor and handyman in the headquarters of the defendant union in Philadelphia. His duties required him to dust, clean, empty waste baskets and perform other duties in various parts of defendant's building. On September 4, 1937, while decedent was working as janitor in defendant's headquarters, he went into the reception room of the headquarters and while there was approached by one Edward Hunt, a trucking contractor, who had called at the office of the union to see any union official relative to *294 straightening out a matter between him and the union. The decedent advised Hunt that no officials of the defendant company were present and an argument concerning the matter ensued between Hunt and the deceased. Hunt called the decedent a vile name and thereupon the decedent hit Hunt upon the jaw, knocking him against the wall. Hunt drew a revolver, drove decedent toward the door, and then shot him in the back before he got out of the room, causing his death a few days later of pulmonary hemorrhage.
Article III, section 301 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides that "The term `injury by an accident in the course of his employment', as used in this article, shall not include an injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employe because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employe or because of his employment", and the compensation authorities concluded that Haas' injury came within this exception.
In Meucci v. Gallatin Coal Co.,
The burden rested on the defendant to show that the claim came within the exception to liability and that the injury resulted from an attack arising from personal difficulties and not because of Haas' employment. Meucci v. Gallatin Coal Co., supra; Larkinsv. Bryant Air Conditioning Corp. et al.,
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the injury in the course of employment embraces all injuries received while engaged in furthering the business of the employer, and injuries received on the premises are subject to these limitations (1) that the employee's presence must ordinarily be required at the place of injury, *296
or (2), if not so required, the departure of the servant from the usual place of employment must not amount to an abandonment of employment. The incident necessary to constitute a break in the course of employment must be of pronounced character. Shoffler v.Lehigh Valley Coal Co.,
There is no evidence in the record to sustain the seventh and eighth findings of fact of the referee that the decedent's presence was not ordinarily required at the place of his injury and that he departed from his usual place of employment. In his third finding of fact the referee found that "the decedent while working as a janitor in the headquarters of the defendant . . . was approached by one Edward Hunt, who inquired for a delegate of the union", and in his fifth finding of fact "that the claimant's decedent was employed as a janitor and handyman in a building operated by the defendant. As such the decedent was at proper times required to dust, clean, empty waste baskets and perform other duties in all parts of said building". (Italics supplied.) It is in evidence that the decedent "was all over the place"; that he cleaned up, ran errands, got lunches, wiped cars and ran errands for the delegates or clerks and anybody at all that wanted him so to do. Moreover, an employee may be doing something other than the exact work assigned to him, and he may not be strictly at his assigned work, either as to time or place, yet the continuity of the employment is not broken unless such activity is wholly foreign to his employment or constitutes an abandonment thereof. Hale v. Savage *297 Fire Brick Co., supra; Haywood v. Henrietta Coal Co. et al.,
The appellant contends that when the deceased employee struck Hunt he committed assault and battery and, therefore, received an injury on the commission of an act which is in direct violation of the law, and cites, inter alia, Shoffler v. Lehigh Valley CoalCo.,
In a statement made by Haas to police officers after the shooting and while he was in the hospital, Haas in response to the question "You saw him (Hunt) drawing the revolver?", answered, "Yes, that's when I hit him". This, if believed by a jury, would be a defense to an indictment charging Haas with assault and battery. However, the weakness of appellant's contention lies in the fact that, even if we assume that Haas, when he struck Hunt, violated the law against assault and battery, the record shows that he did not receive his injurieswhile committing the assault. The evidence is that Hunt drew a revolver, drove those in the room toward the door and then shot Haas before he got out of the room; and the hospital records show that Haas was shot in the back. Consequently, the offense, if any, had been committed and had been completed before Haas received the injuries which resulted in his death. Clearly, also, Hunt did not shoot in self-defense.
In Curran v. Vang Construction Co.,
In the Curran case, supra, claimant's decedent "came in with a large butcher knife in his hand, and approached Smith with threats and menaces, who, deeming his life in danger, as he was very small and Curran very large and armed with a butcher knife, which he declared he would not drop until he had fixed Smith, the latter shot him with a revolver, inflicting a mortal wound." The Supreme Court denied compensation on the ground that *299
where a workman meets his death on his employer's premises and in working hours while committing or attempting to commit a felony, no compensation can be awarded to his dependents, and laid down the rule that an injury sustained by an employee, although on the master's premises and in working hours, is not compensable if atthe time the employee was committing a criminal offense. InMcDevitt v. Checker Cab Co.,
In support of its contention that because Haas might have been indicted for assault and battery the claim in this case is not compensable, the appellant relies upon Beamer v. Stanley Co. ofAmerica,
Section 301, Article III, of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which refers to the term "injury by an accident in the course of his employment", includes every injury received on the premises of the employer, during the hours of employment, so long as the nature of the employment demands the employee's presence there, regardless of whether his presence at the particular place where the injury occurred is actually required, if there is nothing to prove a virtual abandonment of the course of his employment by the injured person, or that, at the time of the accident, he was engaged in something wholly foreign thereto. Callihan v.Montgomery, supra; Boyd v. Philmont Country Club, supra. In this case the deceased employee at the time of the accident was on the premises of his employer during his regular working hours and his presence on the premises was required by the nature of his employment. He was not engaged in a personal argument within the meaning of the exception in the Workmen's Compensation Act; he was not violating any law and he had not abandoned his employment when he received his injuries and, therefore, the claim is compensable. *301
Where a court of common pleas reverses a board on a question of law it is not necessary that the record be remitted for further finding; judgment may properly be entered in favor of the party entitled thereto. Strunk v. E.D. Hoffman Sons,
Judgment of the court below is affirmed.