148 Minn. 468 | Minn. | 1921
The appeal presents the single question whether the description of the premises in a mechanic’s lien statement is fatally defective.
In the spring and summer of 1918, defendant Laura .L. Ludwigson,
A few days after the'time expired for filing a lien, plaintiff - discovered the error and at once began this action to foreclose the lien filed, setting up the mistake and asking to have the lien adjudged upon lot 3. The action was ordered consolidated with others affecting the adjoining buildings, but before trial Campbell, the then owner of the north 82% feet of lots 1 and 2, insisted upon a discharge and release of that property from plaintiff’s lien, and such release was executed and filed.
This court has been liberal in following the direction of the statutory provision that no lien given by law shall be “affected by any inaccuracy in the particulars of the lien statement.” 6. S. 1913, § 7085. But the statute requires a lien statement to be filed and to contain “a description of premises to be charged, identifying the same with reasonable cer
The rule with respect to what is a sufficient description to satisfy the demands of the statute is this: “If there appear enough in the description to enable a party familiar with the locality to identify the premises intended to be described with reasonable certainty, to the exclusion of others, it will be sufficient.” Phillips, Mechanics’ Liens, § 379; Tulloch v. Rogers, 52 Minn. 114, 53 N. W. 1063; Bassett v. Menage, 52 Minn. 121, 53 N. W. 1064. Tested by that rule the description here fails, for, instead of excluding other premises, it clearly and most accurately describes the one adjacent to the one intended, and excludes the latter. There is not a thing in any part of the lien statement that points to the premises intended. P. L. Ludwigson was not the owner of lot 3 nor was Campbell, but Campbell does appear to have had some interest in lots 1 and 2 when the lien statement was filed. There is nothing to estop the respondent mortgagees from claiming the lien statement to be insufficient. Plaintiff’s error was not induced by them or their agent. Indeed, before the expiration of the time for filing a lien, the latter inquired of plaintiff whether its lien had not been filed upon the wrong premises, but plaintiff resented the suggestion of a mistake. On principle there is no distinction to be made between the lien statement in this case, and the one that was held fatally defective in Lingren v. Nilsen, 50 Minn 448, 52 N. W. 915.
The cases of inaccurate description relied on by plaintiff are all distinguishable from the present in that, when the false, erroneous, or inapplicable parts have been eliminated, there still remains sufficient to identify the property intended, at least, if considered in connection with the lpcation of the building erected. N. W. C. & C. Pavement Co. v. Norwegian-Danish E. L. A. Seminary, 43 Minn. 449, 45 N. W. 868; Tulloch v. Rogers, supra; Bassett v. Menage, supra; Evans v. Sanford, 65 Minn. 271, 68 N. W. 21; Doyle v. Wagner, 100 Minn. 380, 111 N. W. 275; Atlas Lumber Co. v. Dupuis, 125 Minn. 45, 145 N. W. 620; Morri
The situation disclosed at the trial also indicates the impossibility of adjudging a lien. Plaintiff had been forced to release the only property described in the lien statement. For the court now to decree a lien would be to revive a lien after it had ceased to exist, and without even the semblance of a filed lien statement containing a description of the property.
We see no way to relieve plaintiff from the legal consequences of the misdescription of the premises in the lien statement.
The judgment is affirmed.