H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bilotto

admission, (Tex.1993). By his own Here, the trial court based a monitor- poured diesel fuel down bad faith and Marshall appellants’ dismissal on the he discloses discovery 1993. Until comply ing order. well on June refusal to with may poured preclude presenta much diesel fuel he so severe as to how Sanctions occasions, appel- assessed tion of the merits should be the wells on other down party displayed flagrant adequate bad defense. unless a has formulate an lees cannot TransAmerican, at 919. рrivilege faith. was considered Marshall’s claim of evidence, key Tampering appel- indeed the rejected by trial court. Two evidence, litigation only during and then re the issue and re- late courts also examined fusing questions regarding that to answer the trial court’s order. fused to overturn very tampering seems to this Court be reme- The Marshalls exhausted flagrant Appellants faith. definition of bad dies, defy trial court. continued to but depo present were ordered to themselves for nothing short of Marshalls’ сonduct is The date, specific yet they refused to sition extraordinary, of no effective and we know comply. of the cause apart sanction from dismissal have been of action that would discovery sought by appellees The cannot presented here. under the circumstances be narrowed avoid the self-incrimination points error Appellants’ first and fourth dilemma. The information so essential are overruled. very appellees’ defense is the information appellаnts divulge. To allow refuse relationship ap- Finding a direct between discovery the trial to continue without this conduct, pellants’ fraudulent their offensive unjust. privileged would be information privilege, Fifth Amendment use very appellees’ forms the basis for defense. imposed, do not find the the sanction individual, rights Neither the the dic- sanction to excessive under the facts of be public policy, nor interests of tates this case. The trial court’s order of dismissal justice by allowing appel- would be served is affirmed. proceed divulging to trial lants without they privileged. information claim is

Nothing suggests in the record that an

abatement would be effective to secure com-

pliance. apparently has The State dismissed charges

the criminal due to Mr. Marshall’s state, prosecution may

mental now be Marshalls, by limitations. The how- barred COMPANY, H.E. BUTT GROCERY ever, trial, did not indicate at and have not Appellant, suggested appeal, they will abandon privilege. We find the trial court acted discretion, appel- within its and we overrule BILOTTO, Appellee. Vinnie second, third, points of lant’s and fifth error. No. 04-94-00116-CV.

Appellants’ remaining points of trial court’s asserted fail error concern the Texas, Appeals Court before dismiss ure to “test” lesser sanctions San Antonio. sure, imposition To be the case. 10, 1996. July penalty” as a first sanction is a the “death step. Generally, drastic lesser sanctions Rehearing Aug. Overruled imposed. Chrysler Corp. v. must first be Blackmon, 844, 850 eases, sanctions exceptional determinative

may imposed in first instance when be clearly justified sanc

they are and no lesser compliance. Commu promote

tion will GTE Tanner, Sys. Coup.

nications Shelton, Shelton, Valadez, B. Lotz

Wade & Antonio, P.C., Jefferson, San B. Wallace ‍​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‍Crofts, Jefferson, P.C., Callaway An- & San tonio, appellant. for Mendelsohn, Poole, Speiser, Ricky Les Krause, Mendelsohn, Jackson, Madole & San Antonio, appellee. for LÓPEZ, Justice. Bilotto recovered

Vinnie (HEB) Grocery Company Butt against H.E. injuries Bilotto as a result of a suffered contends, in slip-and-fall accident. HEB point of trial court erred sole informing the effect of its by conditioning damage answers negligent. Bilotto 50% or less disagree HEB affirm the trial with and decision. court’s trial specifically HEB asserts that informing that a court erred finding in excess of percent-responsibility from preclude for Bilotto would Bilotto 1(a) Questions recovering damages. (b) requested that in the court’s Bilotto or HEB’s determine whether proximate cause of the acci- negligence was 1(a) Questions If the answer dent. to both 1(b) “yes”, jury was instructed 2(a) (b), Questions to continue parties’ respective percentages determine (SCAC), Jury in- responsibility. was further Procedure the Texas Charges, language structed: of Rule If, Question you in answer to have an- Transcripts meetings from can SCAC BILOTTO, swered “NO” for VINNIE interpreting particular be instructive if, Question you 2 in answer to No. Ramirez, 836, R.K. v. rule. See 887 S.W.2d percent negli- found that 50 or less of the Christley, 755 841 Smith gence that caused the occurrence is attrib- 525, (Tex.App 528-29 S.W.2d . —Houston BILOTTO, utable to then answer VINNIE denied). 1988, excerpts Dist.] writ The [14th Otherwise, Question No. 3. do not answer regarding are an instruction on the 50% rule Question No. 3. proposed to a amend mentioned reference Question jury 3No. asked the to assess 277, allowing in ment to Rule the court to damages. Bilotto’s jury form the of the effect of its answers. part conference, Because this amendment did not become

During charge HEB ob- 277, excerpts pertinent of Rule are not jected following to the 50% bar instruction interpretation Question of the Rule its current argued 2. HEB that the instruction form. impermissibly jury informed the of the answer, thereby violating Grieger effect of its question The submitted to the fol- 498, (1954), Vega, 271 153 Tex. S.W.2d 85 80.01, Jury Charge Texas In- lowed Pattern and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 277. The struction 2: objection judge. was overruled the trial If, Question_[the negli- in answer to deliberating,

While a sent note gence question], you hаve answered “No” requesting judge “clarify that the trial if, [plaintiff] Question or in answer to ifybr _ question situation at the end of 2.” The percentage question], [the causation judge responded by asking clarify you percent have answered 50 or less for question. The did not send out [plaintiff], ‍​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‍following ques- then answer the further communication and returned a 10-2 Otherwise, tion. do not answer the follow- verdict HEB and Bilotto each 50% ing question. negligent. jury’s findings, Based on the Jury Texas, 2 Bar State Texas Pattern trial court awarding rendered Bi- Charges (1990). PJC 80.01 $135,346.73, appealed.

lotto and HEB Although we are aware that the Tex “law”,

Error in the is Jury Charges they reviewed as Pattern are under an abuse of discretion heavily upon by standard. Texas are relied both the bench E.B., ept. See, Buick, D Human Serv. v. 802 e.g., S.W.2d and Inc. v. bar. Gunn Rosa (Tex.1990). 647, rio, 628, 649 To establish reversible (Tex.App.—San 907 632 to An complaining party 1995, writ); must show that nio no Westchester Fire Ins. Lowe, arbitrarily, 243, the trial court (Tex.App. acted unreason Co. v. 888 S.W.2d 253 ably, guiding 1994, writ); or Baptist without consideration of —Beaumont no Memorial (Tex. Smith, 67, principles. Aquama rules and Downer v. Hosp. Sys. v. Inc., 238, Operatоrs denied); rine 241-42 App. 701 S.W.2d Antonio writ Dion — San (Tex.1985), denied, (Tex. Co., cert. 476 U.S. 106 v. Ford Motor (1986). denied); S.Ct. 90 L.Ed.2d 721 clear App. “[A] writ cf. — Eastland Jury analyze apply failure the trial court to Texas, Bar State Texas Pattern (1987). Charges correctly the law will constitute an abuse of at xix Introduction The Packer, discretion....” Walker v. in the Texas Pattern recommendations made (Tex.1992). 833, 840 Jury Charges are based on what the commit “perceives present law to tee be.” argues Bilotto Jury Texas, Bar Pattern State properly 50% bar instruction wеre included (1987). Charges Introduction at xx charge. support position, in the For of his only excerpts tran- to locate one case in Bilotto directs us from the We were able expressly script meeting Court which a Texas court has altered Advisory Jury Charge. Kroger Keetch v. Committee on the Rules of Civil Pattern See J., RICKHOFF, DUNCAN, joined by

Co., J. 266-67 GREEN, J., Keetch, separately), (writing in- the court recommended different negligence dissenting. and ordi- structions to define both liability nary premises care in a case. DUNCAN, Justice, dissenting. only аlso able to locate one case

We were appellate court has addressed which a Texas proper applica- appeal turns This Jury Charge H.E. Butt 80.01. See appropriate standard of review for tion of the Paez, Grocery Co. v. presented error. denied). (Tex.App.-Corpus writ Christi discretion whether the trial court abuses its Paez, trial court the court held that the submitting Jury Charge instruc- a Pattern damage question condition- could submit the instruction has been held tion when similar fifty ally upоn liability finding of “at least by error the Texas to be reversible (50) percent or more.” majority the trial The holds Court. trial court expressly prohibits Rule 277 the an in- has discretion to submit such court informing from the of the effect of wording the of “follow[s] struction because it 277; P. Mobil Chem. Jury Charge, answers. appropriate Pattern wide- Tex.R. Civ. (Tex.1974); Bell, 245, Co. v. 517 S.W.2d 256 ly accepted throughout the com- source However, view, at 87. Rule Grieger, 271 S.W.2d and its munity.” In our provides: dangerous 277 also only wrong but a rationale are not of review for pеrversion of the standard required any is cause which Accordingly, we dissent. charge error. among parties apportion loss to questions court shall submit a or any, inquiring percentage, if of the what Applicable of Review Law Standard causation, may case negligence or as the such “shall submit The trial court’s be, injury in occurrence or that caused the to enable proper ... as shall be instructions per- of the question is attributable each Tex.R. Civ. P. to render a verdict.” culpable. to havе been The sons found proper, to be 277. “For an instruction jury to answer court shall also instruct the (1) (2) jury; accurately state assist the must: questions or without re- (3) law; pleadings support find percentage negli- of duction because of the Shop European Crossroads’ and evidence.” causation, person gence any, if of the or Criswell, 45, Center, 910 S.W.2d ping Ltd. v. may predicate the injured. The court denied). 1995, (Tex.App writ 53 . —Dallas questions upon affir- damage question or ... Additionally, “shall not an instruction liability. findings of mative effеct of their an advise the of the given We find that the instruction swers,” “incidentally.” Tex.R. Civ. P. except prohibited by Rule 277 because the is not 498, 277; compare Grieger Vega, v. 153 Tex. loss requires apportionment of the Rule itself (1954) 85, Ball 271 87 with Cannon S.W.2d predi by percentages and allows the court Grasso, 59 S.W.2d Freight Lines v. Motor liability. of damages on a See cate 337, (Tex.Civ.App. Antonio 338-39 — San 825; Paez, v. Exce 742 S.W.2d at Sanchez cf. 482, 1933), 487 aff'd, 125 Tex. Maintenance, Bldg. lo (1935). writ). Fur no (Tex.App Antonio . —San distinguished commentators thermore, As two trial court fоllowed the word “[ujntil noted, recently, great exist confusion Jury Charge,

ing of for com regarding the standard of review throughout the le ed widely accepted source Roger therefore, charge.” plaints about the court’s community. say, cannot gal Townsend, Review: Cor State Standards of the 50% bar instruc that the submission of Appeal, in 6th Annual trial nerstone “a clear failure tion amounted to Conference of 1-9, analyze apply App the law.” See eals Federal on Stateand 1996) (University of Law Walkеr, of Texas School at HEB’s sole Townsend]; see also W. Wendell [hereinafter point is overruled and the of error Hall, Review in Civ- Revisiting Standards affirmed. of Mary’s Appeals, usually applied questions of il St. L.J. 1108 standard law. (1998) (when 21; Hall]. “This confusion was at Hall at 1110 [hereinafter See Townsend complaint explanatory due to the existence different standards is that instruction is aspects charge practice, for ‍​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‍weight different evidence direct comment simplistieally which courts sometimes fail to in violation оf Rule standard of review is proper procedural novo) limit to their context.” (citing City de Pearland v. Alexan 20; (citing, e.g., der, Townsend at Hall at 1108 Ameri E.B., Dept. Human v. Caruth, Serv. can Bankers Ins. Co. (Tex.1990) (“The 647, 649 standard (Tex.App 434-35 no . —Dallas review is abuse of discre writ)). tion, only [which] occurs when the trial court holds, however, majority effectively any guiding princi acts without reference to that an abuse of discretion —error of law— ples.”)). cannot be shown when the trial court submits Fortunately, surrounding the confusion an instruction recоmmended a Pattern dispelled abuse discretion standard was Jury Charge disagree. committee. We court’s landmark decision in Jury Charges “The Texas Pattern are noth Packer, (Tex.1992), Walker 827 S.W.2d 883 guide than a trial more assist the explained which that the abuse of discretion drafting charges; they courts are not standard, aspect standard is a dual and which binding Kroger on the courts.” Keetch v. of applies depends upon the standard the Co., 276, (Tex.App 845 281 . —Dallas type Townsend, of issue involved. See 8-9. 1990) Walls, (citing Royalty Burk Co. v. 616 ruling fact, If the resolves an issue of a 911, n. 7 920 Texas Em reviewing may not reverse unless “the Lara, 224, ployers’ v. Ins. Ass’n 711 S.W.2d reasonably trial court could have reached (Tex. (Tex.1986)), aff'd, 225 845 S.W.2d 262 Walker, only one decision.” 827 S.W.2d at also, Plas-Tex, 1992); e.g., see Inc. v. U.S. If, however, ruling 840. upon rests “de- (Tex. 442, Corp., Steel 772 S.W.2d 444 n. 4 termining applying what the law is or the law 1989) (noting holding required change that in facts,” to the tion’_” the “trial court has no ‘discre- PJC); Grande, 956, Roberts v. Accordingly, Id. “a clear failure (Tex.App 1 Dist.] 960-61 n. [14th . —Houston by analyze apply the trial court to or the lаw writ) 1994, PJC); (disapproving no Universal correctly will constitute an abuse of discre- Pierce, Ins. Underwriters Co. v. tion....” (Tex.App. [1st Dist.] — Houston writ) (disapproving original no on Walker, PJC sub course, original proceed- of anwas rehearing mission but that error and, date, applied no Texas case has waived); was Mid-Continent Cas. Co. its dual abuse of discretion standard in the Whatley, (Tex.App. charge agree majority, context. We with the writ) J., (Hecht, concurring) —Dallas no however, that it is to do so for majority (“point[ing] out that in effeсt First, incongruous, two reasons. it would be disapprove^] pattern jury charge_”). best, at for the of abuse discretion standard thing original pro- of review to mean one in Like courts and the mem- these committee ceedings appeals. and another in Hall See at themselves, recognize bers that the Texas Second, permits 1055. Walker's test Jury Charges represent only what flexibility required reviewing different “perceive[ the committee members ] types charge of error. See Townsend at 20- be,” presеnt may law to and “the [c]ommittee 21; Hall at 1108-11. perceptions....” erred in its State Charges case, by In question presented this Texas, Bar of Texas PatteRN JURY (1990). view, therefore, HEB is a 51% bar instruction im- In our whether xxiv we must permissibly analyze of informs the effect of de novo whether Instruction “proper” its answers violation of Rule 277. Since PJC 80.01 is a instruction under law, law, par- dependent general, this is a of not at all Texas and Rule matters, upon simply P. It the resolution of factual ticular. See Tex.R. Civ. is does, enough say, majority de nоvo as the standard of review should be the Grasso; distinguished a Pat- it approved an instruction has instead its earlier been ground Jury Charge opinion on the that the Grasso con- tern committee. tributoiy negligence “in- bar instruction op Propriety of all its an- formed the effect a Bak Instruction negligence primary swers to issues both early 1900s, In the law was unset contributory negligence.” Id. permissible for the tled as whether it was Grasso, Like the instruction in the 51% legal court’s inform the of the instruction at issue in ease informed bar Tel. effect of its answers. See Southwestern Bilotto effect Sheppard, Tel. & Co. 189 S.W. responsible more than 50% for his accident— 'd) (Tex.Civ.App. writ ref Antonio — San juror ordinary intelligence matter that a split among appeals).2 (noting of civil courts Accordingly, if would not know. Grasso however, opinion this difference law, Grieger court’s sub- remain the trial highest was resolved Texas’ court. See the 51% bar constitutes mission of instruction Grasso, 81 S.W.2d at 487. and, therefore, error of law an abuse of Grasso, included trial court’s majоrity argues, Bilotto discretion. jury that informing an instruction however, holds, per- the instruction only if damages question should answer the amend- mitted court’s 1988 negligence it found that the was defendant’s permitting to Rule 277 the trial court to ment injuries, proximate plaintiffs cause of the damage questions “predicate plaintiff eontributorily negli- was not liability.” findings affirmative gent.3 This court that this instruction ruled disagree. represents noth- This amendment improper impermissibly in- because it Grieger’s ing more than codification of contributory jury of formed the the law of histori- holding; there is no indication Grasso, negligence. at 339. it was to overrule cal record that intended Appeals affirmed. Texas Commission of n Grieger distinction of Grasso. Grasso, 81 S.W.2d at the Com- 487. When support argument, of his Bilotto relies opinion by the Texas adopted mission’s was excerpts transcript primarily upon from the id., Court, opinion of it became an meeting 1985. an November of SCAC until binding that court and on this court majority that agree with Bilotto and the We Maverick, 760 modified. See Willis v. transcripts in inter these can instructive be 644 n. S.W.2d See, Ramirez, preting e.g., the rules. R.K. v. supreme the the court refined Smith (Tex. by permitting conditioning of Grasso rule the Christley, 755 528-29 damages question upon affirmative find- a an de App. writ [14th Dist.] — Houston wrongful Grieger, nied). however, disagree, of conduct. that the court’s meeting at 87. The basis for the minutes— transcripts and SCAC’s ordinary “[a]ny juror that intent to holding was of an when read as whole—establish instruction, ar intelligence would known the ef- as Bilotto permit a 51% bar excerpts negative liability finding. disagree Id. The “the guеs. fect” of a We also that however, of not, pertinent interpretation to Grieger did overrule are not an Court tion, (8th ed.) (before following you need answer the ‍​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‍2. Roles of Form otherwise Grasso, designation (emphasis that su meant either question.’” "writ ref'd” at 338 appeals’ preme approved added). court court of civil opinion necessarily or that the result but not its preserved presented to the was not and error majority rely upon Rule also to 4. The seems court). supreme requirement percentage find- of causation 277’s " However, ings as evi- case. you response foregoing question ‘If in the Grasso, require- by this denced the truck have answered the defendant’s with, certainly nothing to and ment has do manner, operated negligent that such in a condone, bar instruc- cannot be read any, injury plain- negligence, if to the caused the tion; consequence merely necessary tiff, it is plain- you have also answered if comparative causation law of contributing the substantive guilty negligence to the was not tiff or, accident, negligence. day, contributory you following ques- in its then will answer the form,” majori- supreme in its at that [Rule 277] current as the not forwarded the court ty contrary, holds. To the the SCAC tran- time. scripts quite illuminating and minutes are again up Rule 277 was taken the SCAC obliquely suggest and in fact the su- 7,1986 Unfortunately meeting. at its March

preme court declined the SCAC’s recommen- transcript meeting of this is unavailable. modify holdings dation to Grosso However, we know from the committee’s Grieger. meeting minutes of this thаt “Chief Justice At meeting, its November the Pope length regarding at commented pro- had SCAC before the subcommittee’s advising of the effect of its posed explained amendment to Rule 277. As comments, Following answers.” these chair, proposed the subcommittee unanimously pro- SCAC voted to delete the many significant Rule 277 would effect posed permitting amendment the court changes charge practice, to the then-current instruct the of the effect of its answers including mandated broad-form submission. proposed but to retain the amendment codi- proposed require Other amendments would i.e., fying Grieger, permitting the court to the court to inform the of the effect of predicate damages question upon affir- answers, requested, if predicate and to liability findings. mative At the conclusion of damages question upon affirmative liabil- discussion, voted to forward SCAC ity findings. Specifically, paragraph the last proposed amendments to Rule 277 proposed provided: Rule 277 supreme court. Upon request party, of either unavailability transcript Given the court shall instruct the as to the effect 7-8, meeting, March SCAC’s to interrogatories answers will have simply cannot know either the substance of to be entered in the Pope’s Chief Justice comments or the intent case. The predicate court shall also of the committee or the court with damage interrogatories upon affirmative respect particular to this amendment to Rule findings liability. 277. There is some indication that Chief During meeting, there was discussion (and Pope Grieger pre Justice believed that against proposed both favor of and these Grosso) sumably its distinction survived amendments, and, Bilotto, as indicated the 1988 amendments to Rule 277. See Jack several of the suggested committee members Lowerre, Pope & Rule William G. Revised conditionally submitting that damages the Special System 277 — A Better Verdict question permit would a 51% bar instruction Texas, (1973) (revised 27 Sw. L.J. thereby and jury ensure that the not did “accepts premise Rule 277 that the the de waste its answering damages ques- time the sign special verdict is to elicit a state tion in the liability absence of affirmative jurors concerning disputed ment from fact findings. jurors’ and that the concern is not that of point during result,” At one achieving citing its November particular Grieg er). meeting, best, however, the SCAC voted to recommend the At the record is incon proposed circumstances, amendments to Rule 277. Howev- clusive. Under these we er, practice, or, after a discussion of the impute federal should not either to the SCAC the cоmmittee importantly, instead returned the matter to more to the court an study the Grieger. subcommittee for further and intent to overrule Grosso and To reason, drafting. contrary For that and because the the extent a conclusion reached was Paez, proposed Grocery remainder of the amendments— in H.E. Butt Co.v.

including (Tex.App —Corpus mandated broad-form submission— 824 Christi writ de . unresolved, nied), proposed remained Rule 277 was we would decline to followit.5 Paez, jury damages 5. In the trial court’s did not condi- was the tion answer damages question upon question tion affirmative lia- unless it found the defendant 50% Paez, later, bility findings. negligent. response 742 S.W.2d at 825. How- more in to a Id. But ever, response jury, question, in to a from the second the court reversed itself and that, supplemented jury "contrary its with an instruc- instructed the to the instruc- short, that, below, Grieger we would hold while reverse and remand the permits conditioning trial. damages question case for a new liability findings, affirmative Grosso RICKHOFF, Justice, dissenting. precludes informing effect of comparative responsibility answers majority opinion Both the and the dissent- findings with a 51% bar Accord- instruction. ing opinion Duncan authored Justice set ingly, the trial court an error of committed simple case and forth facts of this law and thus abused its in submit- discretion presented comparing pattern dilemma in ting the instruction. jury charge in this instruction submitted case view, my Tex.R. Civ. P. howev- Analysis Hakm er, opportuni- primarily presents this case an Supreme ty to revisit for the Texas Court to the level To rise of reversible juries very basic of whether should of an submission erroneous instruction be advised of the effect of their answers 81(b)(1), harmful under must be Rule Tex. civil cases. R.App. E.g., P. Lone Star Co. v. Le Gas mond, school, prohi- law I have viewed this Since only jurisdic- dichotomy record in this case that bition an odd in the demonstrates parties’ comparative responsibility hotly complete sentencing tion that allows Thus, jurors to contested; criminal cases. we ask re- expressly the 51% bar instruction solve life’s most difficult issues criminal jury that of one informed the a difference еases, cases, but in civil shield them from we percentage point respon in its comparative knowing the effect of their answers sibility findings would whether determine issues, distrusting apparently then- submitted damages; Bilotto recovered re intelligence. integrity demeaning turned a 10-2 verdict Bilotto 50% Moreover, responsible. it is evident from It should be from the substantial evident jury’s question reaching that this before damage given instant case that award in the verdict it considered and was concerned compen- ten members of meant meaning import of the court’s about the Presently, rules and sate Bilotto. our case however, instruction. Under these circum intent; bar not for law thwart stances, we believe erroneous instruction intermediate this consistent- an court to alter rights ly applied precedent. “amounted to such a denial of the an Such alteration reasonably require in-depth analysis calculated to an [HEB] as was would reso- implications change lution of the of such probably cause and did causе rendition of Tex.R.App. Therefore, spite my beyond this case. judgment....” P. improper presented personal judge view this trial 81(b)(1); Young, Reinhart v. see rationally the issues and in the manner I (Tex.1995) (recognizing that “a su presented, would advocate be that the issues perfluous likely instruction more would be join I the dissent in cannot jury improperly” in “a close influence overrule the Court’s decision case”). Freight in Grasso Cannon Ball Motor Lines, 125 Tex. Conclusion (1935), and, therefore, find the would trial court nor trial court has Neither this submitting сourt abused its discretion power Grieger, to overrule Grosso and at issue. instruction Jury certainly members of a Pattern right Charge committee cannot do so. That exclusively

and responsibility instead lies Court of Texas. Accord-

ingly, point of we would sustain HEB’s ‍​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‍er, stated, given response question,” &e court also even if the instruction tion last damages without erroneously given, was to answer error was rendered special regard any instruction, issue. to its answer other by the harmless court’s second affirming, Corpus Christi Court was not event. Id. at the error reversible Appeals did not err in stated trial court instruction; giving jury the bar howev-

Case Details

Case Name: H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bilotto

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas

Date Published: Aug 19, 1996

Citation: 928 S.W.2d 197

Docket Number: 04-94-00116-CV

Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.