In the Matter of GYRODYNE COMPANY OF AMERICA, INC., Petitioner, v STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT STONY BROOK et al., Respondents.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
2005
17 A.D.3d 675 | 794 N.Y.S.2d 87
Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, with costs, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed.
The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, SUNY Stony Brook has sufficient statutory jurisdiction and authorization for this public project (see
We reject the petitioner’s contention that the proposed taking is excessive. While a condemnor cannot take, by use of the power of eminent domain, property not necessary to fulfill the public purpose, it is generally accepted that the condemnor has broad discretion in deciding what land is necessary to fulfill that purpose (see Hallock v State of New York, 32 NY2d 599, 605 [1973]; Matter of Wechsler v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, supra). The determination, made after extensive environmental impact studies, evaluation of alternative sites including the existing campus, and public participation, that the proposed acquisition is necessary to achieve the desired public purpose is rational and, therefore, will not be disturbed (see Matter of Waldo’s, Inc. v Village of Johnson City, supra at 721; Matter of Wechsler v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, supra; Matter of Neptune Assoc. v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 125 AD2d 473 [1986]).
Moreover, the record reveals that SUNY Stony Brook identified “the relevant areas of environmental concern,” took a “hard look” at them, and made a “reasoned elaboration” of the basis for its determination (Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d 400, 417 [1986]; see Matter of Rafferty v Town of Colonie, 300 AD2d 719 [2002]; Matter of Munash v Town Bd. of Town of E. Hampton, 297 AD2d 345 [2002]). Thus, the determination of SUNY Stony Brook is supported by the record and should not be disturbed (see Matter of Village of Pelham v City of Mount Vernon Indus. Dev. Agency, 302 AD2d 399). Further, we reject the petitioner’s contention that SEQRA review was improperly segmented (see Matter of Village of Tarrytown v Planning Bd. of Vil. of Sleepy Hollow, 292 AD2d 617 [2002]; Matter of Long Is. Pine Barrens Socy. v Planning Bd. of Town of Brookhaven, 204 AD2d 548 [1994]).
In light of the foregoing, we do not reach the parties’ remaining contentions. Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Spolzino and Lifson, JJ., concur.
