136 Pa. 96 | Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County | 1890
Opinion,
It is undoubtedly true, as we have several times decided, that the words “ railroad ” and “ railway ” are synonymous, and in all ordinary circumstances they are to be treated as without distinction of meaning. When either one or the other of these words is used in a statute, and the context requires that a particular kind of road is intended, that kind of a road will be held to be the subject of the statutory provision; but if the context contains no such indication, and either of the words is used in describing the subject-matter, the statute will be held applicable to every species of road which is embraced within the general sense of the word used. All of this was decided in the case of Hestonville etc. R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 89 Pa. 210, where we held that the act of May 16, 1861, P. L. 702, entitled “ An act relating to railroad companies,” and authorizing the consolidation and merger of railroad companies, em
The title of the article is “ Railroads and Canals.” This is, of course, sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all classes of railroads and railways; and we accordingly find that a number of the sections are applied to steam railroad companies exclusively, and at least one section, the ninth, is applied exclusively to street passenger railway companies. The first section provides that all railroads and canals shall be public highways; that any association organized for the purpose shall have the right to construct a railroad between any points within the state, and to connect at the state line with railroads of other states; and that every railroad company shall have the right to intersect, connect with, or cross any other railroad, and shall receive and transport, each, the other’s passengers, tonnage, and cars without delay. It must be conceded at once that this section cannot possibly apply to street passenger railway companies, as all its provisions are utterly hostile to such a thought. Section third provides that all individuals, associations, and corporations shall have equal right to have persons and property transported over railroads and canals, and no unreasonable discrimination shall be made in charges for, or in facilities for transportation of freight or passengers within this state, or crossing from, or going to, any other state. It is equally cer
This is the obvious and natural conclusion to reach, and we know of no reason why we should not regard it and be governed by it. If we consider the subject-matter of the fourth section, we are strengthened in the correctness of this conclusion. It provides that “ no railroad, canal, or other transportation company, or the lessees, purchasers, or managers of any railroad or canal corporation, shall consolidate the stock, property, or franchises of such corporation with, or lease or purchase the works or franchises of, or in any way control, any other railroad or canal corporation owning, or having under its control, a parallel or competing line.” The subjects of the prohibition are railroad and canal companies. They are classed together as the subjects of a prohibition common to both. Railroads and canals are means of transportation which relate to and cover the territory of the state. In their ordinary understanding by the people they are regarded as methods of carriage of freights and passengers—most largely of freights—between distant points within the state, and to the borders of the state, so as to connect with other similar systems of transportation without the state to still more remote points. It would be a most strained and unreasonable conclusion, to hold that the constitutional convention, when it plainly, and for wise reasons, prohibited the amalgamation of railroads and canals of this, .character, and parallel or competing with each other, had any possible reference to the mere passenger travel over the streets of cities and towns. There is nothing in the section or in the article XVII. itself indicating that the convention had any such thought or any such purpose. There is no argument in sup
We think, also, that it is quite clear that the sense of “ competing,” which is the essential sense of the prohibition, is not applicable to the travel upon the streets of cities and towns over passenger railways. The competition of traffic between distant points, by rival roads and canals, tends to promote cheap transportation and thereby tends to the public good. But, if this is suppressed by the absorption of one of the competing lines by the other, the wholesome competition ceases and higher rates soon result. ' This is the evil which was sought to be prevented by the fourth section of the seventeenth article. It will be seen at once that it is inapplicable to the travel upon streets of cities and towns on passenger railways. The travel over parallel streets is not necessarily a competing travel. Each street has travel of its own which is conducted upon its own railway. That travel may be almost entirely conducted without competition with the travel upon another though parallel street, nor do railways upon parallel streets have the same termini. Many of them, though running upon parallel streets for a considerable distance, diverge altogether from such a course at their extremities. Two roads would be competing if laid upon the same street, and running in the same direction, but that is not this case, and probably is not the case anywhere in the state. Moreover, no freight is carried upon passenger railways, and it is the carriage of freight that was probably of principal importance in the design of the fourth section. All the analogies which would liken the traffic upon street railways with that upon the railroads and canals of the state are wanting, and hence we are without authority to impose upon the language of the fourth section a meaning which does not reside in its words, and which does not result by any rational implication. The language used in the fourth section in designating the objects of its provisions is precisely the same as is used in all the other sections for the same purpose, and when passenger
The decree of the court below is affirmed, and the bill of the plaintiff is dismissed at the cost of the appellant.