26 Ind. 415 | Ind. | 1866
Suit by Wheeler and wife against Gwaltney. The complaint alleges that Reitz and Haney, at the March term, 1861, of the Gibson Common Pleas, recovered judgment against Wheeler for $703 33, and also a decree of foreclosure of a certain mortgage, executed by the appellees to secure said debt, being a mortgage upon the undivided half of certain'real estate, describing* it; that Beloat became replevin bail on the judgment; that on the 25th of October, 1861, an order of sale was issued on the judgment and decree to the sheriff of said county, by virtue of which he sold the real estate to Reitz and Haney for $250; that after-wards execution was issued to the sheriff, commanding him to levy the balance of the judgment of the property of Wheeler and Beloat, the replevin bail, by virtue of which execution the remaining undivided half of the land was sold by the sheriff to Reitz and Haney; that they received from the sheriff certificates of sale for the undivided halves of the real estate; that Wheeler, about this time, entered the military service of the United States, and went to the seat of war, in the rebel states; that while Wheeler was thus absent from home, the appellant visited Reitz and Haney, and fraudulently pretended to them that he was interested in the welfare of Wheeler’s wife, and desired to procure the real estate, or the proceeds thereof, for her benefit, and to secure to himself a small debt due him from Wheeler; that he proposed to purchase the land from Reitz and Haney for the benefit of Wheeler’s wife, upon the following terms, that is to say, he would pay Reitz and Haney $400, and take from them an assignment of the two certificates of sale; that he would sell the property, and out of the proceeds of such sale he would retain the sum paid to Reitz and Haney,-the, debt due himself from Wheeler, amounting
It is urged that the complaint shows a trust int favor of Wheeler’s wife, and that such trust, not being shown to bo in writing, is void under the statute of frauds. Here is a promise in favor of Mrs. Wheeler, on a sufficient consideration,, moving from Reitz and Haney, on the one side, to the defendant, on the other. She is entitled to the benefit of such promise, and may sue in equity for a breach thereof. Devol et al. v. McIntosh et al., 23 Ind. 529, and the authorities there-cited. Such a promise is a personal covenant, and gives no-interest in the land, although a court of equity would perhaps decree a specific performance of the contract. It is not within the provision that “no trust concerning lands, except such as may arise by implication of law, shall be created, unless in writing, signed by the party creating the same, or by Ms attorney thereto lawfully authorized in writing.” There is no analogy between the case in judgment and Irwin v. Ivers, 7 Ind. 308. In that ease the attempt was to show that the land had been conveyed to William Ivers, as trustee for the children and heirs of the grantors, and the bill sought an accounting against Ivers as trustee. But admitting that the case at bar is one of trust, the defendant is
The next error alleged is that the court refused to allow the appellant to prove the value of certain repairs and improvements made by him upon the real estate after his purchase from Reitz and Haney, and before the sale by him. The answer was the general denial. The proof offered was not in denial of the facts alleged in the complaint. To ¡avail the defendant, the matter offered in evidence should .have been pleaded specially. 2 R. S. 1852, § 66, p. 42.
The appellant offered to introduce in evidence the deed from the appellees to Beloat, and from the latter to Williams, conveying the land. The court below ruled them out. There was no error in this. The fact that Mrs. Wheeler had parted with all her interest in the lands before the purchase by the defendant has no bearing upon the question of .the -liability of the latter to the former, growing out of the promise made by the latter to Reitz and Haney. It wa.s not for the defendant to avail himself of such a
The judgment is affirmed, with costs and five per cent, damages.