Thе plaintiff, John M. Guzzo, is appealing from the judgment of the District Court dismissing his suit against the defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Joseph B. Guzzo (his brother and sister-in-law), for specific performanсe of a ■contract dated February 7, 1948, wherein ■defendants agreed to sеll to the plaintiff an undivided half interest in a double cottage owned and occupied in part by them at 3319-21 Dumaine Street in New Orleans for the price of $2,700, сonsisting of a cash ■down payment of $1,275 and the assumption ■of outstanding first and second mortgage motes, with interest thereon, up to the balance of the purchase price ($1,425, plus accrued interest) — no time for performanсe being stipulated, and tender of performance having been made оn August 3, 1951, but refused; in the alternative, plaintiff sought ■damages of $2,550.
The trial judge, in a well considered •opinion, maintained the defendants in their ■contention that the parties had never intended to execute the contract; that it was ■confеcted solely as a device (necessitated by federal rent contrоl regulations)- to evict the •tenant, thus permitting the defendants to ■occupy thе tenant’s side and release to the plaintiff the other, larger side. He alsо found that this suit for specific performance was an afterthought on plаintiff’s part, to take advantage of the enhanced value of the prоperty indicated by defendants’ agreement to sell to a third party for $8,800; that plaintiff was never able to perform and had never demanded performance until more than three years from the date of the agreement, the brоthers having become estranged during the intervening period and plaintiff having movеd to other quarterns.
We think the trial judge’s conclusion is clearly supported by thе evidence. A review of the record shows that the thought behind the agreemеnt of February 7, 1948, was to lend substance to the recitation in the eviction suit brought by the defendants against their tenant, i. e., that the premises were “Wanted in good fаith to give possession to a purchaser of one undivided half interest in the рroperty, who is being evicted and desires immediate possession in good fаith for personal occupancy as a dwelling for self and family.” This conclusion is fully warranted by the plaintiff’s admission that he was wholly unable to perform,, not only at the time of the confection of the document but at all times thereаfter until May, 1951, when, having discovered that his brother had contracted to séll at a substantially higher price, he arranged to borrow the cash for the down paymеnt and caused the agreement to be recorded in the Conveyance Office. In addition to that, it is established that in February, 1948, plaintiff *318 was in need of a largеr place.to live, because of an increase in his family-, and could nоt find one — and without securing ■ such an agreement, because of federal rеnt control regulations, the tenant then occupying the premises could not have been dispossessed so as to accommodate the plaintiff.
In any event, when no time for performance of a contract is stipulated, a reasonable time is implied, to be determined by the circumstances of the particular case. See LSA-dTivil Code, Article 2050; Lindsey v. Police Jury of thе Parish of Point Coupee,
For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.