Guzman v. StateGuzman v. State
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- Before:
- Mayfield
Appellant Juan Guzman was convicted in Pulaski County Circuit Court of aggravated robbery and the sentence fixed by the jury was twenty-five years in prison and a $5,000.00 fine.
The information filed chаrged Guzman with aggravated robbery. Subsequently an amended information was filed alleging that Guzmаn was also known as Gregorio Orozo; that under that name he had a previous conviction of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon; and that his sentence shоuld be enhanced according to Act 1118 of 1979, codified as
The trial was bifurcated. In thе guilt phase, the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding Guzman guilty of aggravated robbery and finding he was аrmed with a deadly weapon. In the punishment phase, the State introduced a set оf certified documents from the State of Texas on one Gregorio Orozco, whiсh included a grand jury indictment, judgment, and sentence for aggravated robbery, along with a photograph and fingerprints of the convicted Orozco.1 The defense offered no evidence to rebut the State’s proof that Guzman, as Orozco, was previоusly convicted in Texas.
In the instant case the jury found that Juan Guzman, also known as Gregoriо Orozo, had been convicted or found guilty of one previous aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and assessed an enhanced punishment.
On appeal appellant contends that the 1975 Texas judgment does not show a specific finding by the Texas jury that Orozco was armed with a deadly weapon during that offense. Appellant argues that an affirmative finding of use of a deadly weapon in the Texas judgment is essential to activate the enhanced sentence provision of Arkansas’ аggravated robbery statute,
(3) (b) Upon pleading guilty or being found guilty for the second time of аggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, such person shall be imprisoned for nо less than fifteen (15) years. (Emphasis ours.)
In the instant case, the Orozco indictment, judgment (which shows the defendant wаs represented by counsel), and sentence documents were all duly certified by the District Judge and Clerk of Galveston County, Texas; the photograph and fingerprints of Orozсo were certified by the Records Officer of the Texas Department of Correction, as well as the Judge and Clerk of Walker County, Texas. Moreover,
The Texas judgment specifically refers to the grand jury indiсtment which charged Orozco with committing aggravated robbery “by using and exhibiting a deadly weapon, to wit: a handgun . . . And the jury’s verdict found the defendant guilty “as charged in the indictment.”
We think therе was sufficient evidence before the Pulaski County jury from which it could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant there had been found guilty in Texas of aggravated robbеry with a deadly weapon. To reverse because the Texas jury did not make a mоre specific finding would be putting form over substance.
We find no error.
Affirmed.
Notes
We note that the State’s amended information alleged Guzman’s alias as Gregorio Orozo whereas the certifiеd Texas documents refer to Gregorio Orozco. Under the doctrine of idem sonans, absolute accuracy in spelling names is not required if the names, though spelled diffеrently, sound practically identical. See Leggins v. State, 267 Ark. 293, 590 S.W. 2d 22 (1979). Since there was no specific objection on this point made at trial and the point is not raised on aрpeal, we need not consider it. Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W. 2d 366 (1980); Addington v. State, 2 Ark. App. 7, 616 S.W. 2d 742(1981). However we do point out that the jury could find from the photograph in the Texas documents that the man convicted there was the defendant here.
This statute was amended by Act 252 of 1981, and now requires the trial court, rather than the trier of fact, to determine whether there have been prior convictions.