*1 Appellant, GUY, THE STATE CURTIS Respondent. NEVADA, OF
No. 22269 P.2d 578 September denied November [Rehearing 1992] Bailus, for Cherry Vegas, Appellant. & Las General, City; Rex Del Carson Papa, Attorney Frankie Sue Bell, Chief District Tufteland, Deputy District James Attorney, Seaton, Deputy Attorney, Daniel M. District Attorney, Chief for County, Respondent. Clark *3 OPINION Court, Mowbray,
theBy C. J.:
FACTS On the evening April Curtis appellant Guy and his friend Pendleton were Larry cruising the streets of North Las automobile, in Vegas an intending purchase cocaine. Appellant He driving. was the car into the lot pulled parking of a conven- store, Evans, ience they where encountered Ceasor with whom had not been they Evans previously acquainted. told Pendleton that he knew appellant they where could buy cocaine. Evans automobile, entered the and the three men set off to make the route, En Evans purchase. agreed to lead appellant to his source in return for a portion drugs they would purchase. direction,
At Evans’ drove to an appellant undisclosed location where they purchased they cocaine. As drove after away making Evans asked purchase, pull to the side of the road so that Evans could urinate. the car and Appellant stopped Evans alighted from the rear door. The cocaine remained in the car. As car, Evans stood outside the to drive appellant attempted off so as Evans, however, Evans of deprive portion of the cocaine. onto the rear door grabbed frame on the side as the car passenger away. As continued with sped driving clinging Evans frame, the door Pendleton turned and shot Evans three times car, the abdomen with a .25 caliber handgun. Evans fell from the and Pendleton and appellant drove off. Evans died later that evening. later,
Some two weeks after a automobile high-speed chase through Vegas, streets of North Las charged with murder with the use of a The deadly weapon.1 state gave notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. *4 trial, jury theory
At the state’s of the case appellant’s was as murder, follows: was of first Appellant guilty degree either because he aided and abetted Pendleton in murdering Evans or because he dangerous and Pendleton to commit a conspired felony (robbery) Evans was killed in the of this perpetration trial, felony. At the conclusion of the the found jury guilty of first murder. degree trial,
At the the penalty of the state offered evidence of phase record, appellant’s extensive criminal crimes that including plea Pursuant to for Evans’ murder. indicted was also 1 Pendleton parole. possibility of to life without the bargain, was sentenced Pendleton near in had committed together, acting Pendleton and day the before April of Evans. On to the murder time Evans, burglarized and appellant Pendleton murdered they and, returned Courtney when she Jennifer home of Vegas Las in an slashed her throat burglary, the course during home later testified at survived and murder her. She attempt 11, 1990, Pendleton On April trial. of phase appellant’s penalty he Richard French while the home of burglarized and appellant valuables took Pendleton Their search for in his bed. lay asleep French lay sleeping. where into the bedroom and appellant each shot French and Pendleton handguns, appellant Armed with survived, he, miraculously head. French times in the several too, trial. the penalty phase testified at found that four jury penalty phase, conclusion of the
At the a reason- beyond had been established aggravating circumstances not, however, cir- any mitigating find The did able doubt. received a sentence of death. Appellant cumstances.
DISCUSSION PHASE I. GUILT Felony A. murder theory, murder the state felony under a convict appellant
To being by murdered while robbed that Evans was had to prove that the evidence contends Appellant and appellant. he and Pendleton robbed jury’s finding does not support disagree. Evans. We 200.380(1) robbery as follows: defines the person from taking personal property unlawful [T]he will, means of another, against in his presence, or future, to immediate or injury, or violence or fear force of a or person property or or property,
his person in his family, anyone company or of member of his force or fear must be used to Such robbery. time of the or to or property, prevent possession obtain or retain which cases taking, in either of overcome resistance merely If used as a means is immaterial. of force degree consti- taking Such robbery. it does not constitute of escape, that, taking although whenever it robbery appears tutes knowledge of the person without fully completed was taken, the use knowledge prevented whom such from of force or fear. legal no interest argues proprietary first Evans had that entitled him to a portion the agreement because drugs Drake, 14 See Gaston v. was void and unenforceable. drugs
775 will not be enforced if it (1879) that a contract (holding Nev. 175 for an illegal purpose). Appel- or if it is against public policy no legal proprietary because Evans had or lant concludes that taking no unlawful of personal in the there was drugs, interest robbery. and therefore no property Admittedly, agreement the could argument fails.
Appellant’s that illegal because of its purpose; not be enforced as a contract mean, however, be the subject that the could not drugs not does California has declared that The Court of robbery. Supreme of a item, the does not government of an “by prohibiting possession force or stealth from other crimi- by criminals to take it license Dillon, 697, 1983). (Cal. n.5 And v. 668 P.2d 704 nals.” People Pokini, (1961), Supreme P.2d The Court of in State v. 499 a could be robbed of stolen held that thief specifically Hawaii view, correctly robbery characterize as In our these cases goods. that the deal Evans and we believe against possession, a crime him a interest in the gave possessory with his killers made cocaine. to demonstrate next that the evidence fails argues either from Evans’ drugs person he and Pendleton took the
that drugs remained According appellant, Evans’ presence. in rear just open Evans urinated outside in the automobile while Thus, when he and door. concludes passenger-side (the with the “tak- drugs off in the automobile sped from Evans’ nor in person were taken neither drugs ing”), Evans’ presence. also. We have a broad adopted lacks merit argument
This
robbery, stating
with
“presence”
respect
definition of
“
robbery,
in
person,
respect
is in the
thing
presence
‘[a]
control,
reach,
observation or
inspection,
is so within his
which
fear,
could,
prevented by
violence or
he
if
overcome
Sheriff,
300,
of it.’” Robertson
possession
retain his
(1977)
Commonwealth v.
(quoting
565 P.2d
Homer,
(Mass. 1920)).
this defini-
Applying
127 N.E.
tion,
money
determination that
a cash
we
a trial court’s
upheld
even
presence
though
from a bartender’s
was taken
register
entered
bartender,
when the robbers
who was in the bathroom
out of fear. Id.
bar,
robbery
during
in the bathroom
remained
301-302,
also
with the trial court’s
agreed
from while he Even drugs purchased. possessed portion Evans car, were within his view. drugs urinated Evans outside *6 Moreover, if possession portion Evans could have retained his had not him. shot that Pendleton’s of Evans Finally, appellant argues shooting 200.380(1). means merely escape.” “used as a was force to The that the firearm was used disagree. We evidence indicates of the a use of taking drugs; overcome Evans’ resistance statutory robbery. satisfies definition of See NRS force that 200.380(1). is evidence to ver- support jury’s Where there substantial State,
dict, Bolden v. it will not be on 97 appeal. disturbed 71, (1981). 20 In whether a verdict is determining jury P.2d evidence, is inquiry substantial relevant supported “whether, the light after the evidence in most favorable viewing to rational trier of fact could have found the prosecution, beyond elements the crime a reasonable doubt.” Koza essential State, 245, 250, 44, (1984) (quoting v. 100 Nev. 681 P.2d (1979)) Virginia, (emphasis Jackson v. 443 U.S. supports jury’s We hold substantial evidence original). Evans. and Pendleton robbed finding Jury B. Instructions to instructions assigns jury given error several of
Appellant
In
these
phase
reviewing
assignments
of his trial.
guilt
error,
correctly
our task is
that the instructions
stated
to ensure
State,
law. See
105 Nev.
defined The condition mind as malice aforethought of the described arise, hatred, may not alone from or from anger, revenge will, killed, ill or toward the particular spite grudge person may any unjustifiable or unlawful motive or but result from another, heart proceeds to which from a purpose injure disregard bent on or with reckless of conse- fatally mischief .... duty social quences not reflect According accurately this does language addition, of this contends that this the law state. Jury when with Instruction No. 6 conjunction read in language, malice),2 (defining express implied confused the jurors that malice was incorrectly implied imputable appellant merely because he was when Pendleton shot Evans. present Sheriff, 476 P.2d In Thedford v. 86 Nev. murder, malice,
(1970), “does applied this court held that as victim, ill will toward the but necessarily signifies import safety recklessness of others’ lives and general malignant duty.” holding language of social This validates disregard used in Instruction No. 5. Jury No. 6 Jury Instruction also lacks
Appellant’s challenge
merit;
informed the
accurately
for this instruction
malice. See NRS
implied
distinction between
malice and
express
200.020;
Moreover, no evidence confu- showing because offers part jury, allegation speculative. sion on the *7 argues giving next that the district court erred in Appellant No. which states: Jury Instruction
The after the commission of a crime is flight person of in or the guilt not sufficient itself to establish crimes which, may but is a fact if be considered charged, proved, in the of all other facts in by you light proven deciding of his or innocence. Whether or not evidence question guilt of flight guilt of shows a consciousness crimes and the to be attached to such a cir- charged, significance cumstance, your are matters for determination. the trial court erred in instruc- agree giving flight
We
days
The
occurred some thirteen
after
purported “flight”
tion.
leaving
killed and
not involve
the scene of the
Evans was
did
there are numer-
proclivities,
murder. Given
criminal
appellant’s
on
why
police
as to
he fled from the
possibilities
April
ous
that he fled because of a con-
speculative
It is
to assert
1990.
of
arising
killing
of
and fear of arrest
out
of
guilt
sciousness
(1976).
v.
Nev.
the life of a fellow which is manifested external circum- capable proof. stances implied provocation appears, Malice shall be when no considerable killing or when all the circumstances of the show an abandoned and malignant heart. evidence of overwhelming that because of the elude See beyond a reasonable doubt. guilt, the error harmless Warden, P.2d 847 Manning 30, which Jury next Instruction No. challenges Appellant states: or innocence of guilt
You are here to determine You called evidence in the case. are not defendant from the any to return verdict as to the or innocence of guilt upon So, you if the evidence in the case convinces person. other you beyond guilt a reasonable doubt defendant find, you believe or more though may so even one should are guilty. also persons to jury this instruction tended confuse the
According was a it to “an erroneous conclusion that by leading [appellant] in the death of Evans override moving party causing [sic] had knowl- may [appellant’s] the trier fact as doubts [sic] which led Evans edge of and/or events participation [sic] death.” giving that the court did not err in Instruc- Jury
We hold trial effect, jury tion No. 30. this instruction admonishes determining when whether ignore culpability appel- Pendleton’s as an was both appropriate lant is Such instruction guilty charged. necessary. C. Sufficiency the indictment grand in the murder of Evans charged way alleged part: indictment which relevant GUY LARRY PENDLETON
Defendant CURTIS *8 did, 7, 1990, there, and on or about then without April aforethought, wilfully with and authority law and malice EVANS, being, by CEASOR a human feloniously kill into body LARRY PENDLETON at and the shooting a deadly weapon, said CEASOR EVANS with a to wit: firearm; aiding abetting CURTIS GUY and Defendant encourage- LARRY PENDLETON THROUGH counsel and LARRY PENDLETON by transporting ment Defendant and by the crime and away being present to and from scene before, during, after the commission of said crime. and indictment, challenges arguing Appellant sufficiency information as to the provide that the indictment fails sufficient acts that and specific aiding abetting. constituted
779
State,
Barren v.
lacks merit. In
contention
Appellant’s
(1983), we held:
669 P.2d
establish a defendant’s
seeks to
prosecution
[W]here
abetting,
and
the indictment
guilt
theory
aiding
on a
abetted,
the defendant aided and
allege
should specifically
to the specific
information as
and should
additional
provide
so as to
constituting
aiding
abetting
the means of
acts
notice to
his defense.
adequate
prepare
the defendant
afford
State,
(1991).
D. trial, from sought to elicit one of During the by an out-of-court statement made Pendleton. witnesses state’s admitted under the that the statement should be argued Appellant rule. See NRS 51.035. hearsay co-conspirator exception that the statement constituted inad- asserting The state objected, statement, to admit the hearsay. The trial court refused missible constitutes error. contends that this refusal for, offered being statement was Because Pendleton’s not apply. does co-conspirator exception against, appellant, P.2d 1130 Johnstone v. See brief, but asserts that opening concedes as much in his at trial under NRS nevertheless admissible statement was trial, 51.075, 51.315, disagree. At or NRS 51.345.3 We part: provides in relevant 3 NRS 51.075 hearsay by rule if its nature not excluded 1. A statement is was made offer assurances which it special under circumstances witness, calling the declarant as likely enhanced accuracy not to be though he is available. even part: provides in relevant NRS 51.315 hearsay rule if: not excluded 1. A statement is which it was made (a) special under circumstances Its nature and the accuracy; and strong offer assurances (b) as witness. unavailable The declarant part: provides NRS 51.345 in relevant
when asked the witness to appellant state’s recount Pendleton’s statement, the out-of-court state responded hearsay objec with tion. At that the trial court excused the invited point, jury and the parties present arguments concerning admissibility to the of the During statement. this the trial colloquy, appel court asked lant several times to provide hearsay exception under which the statement could be Appellant only admitted. offered which, above, noted exception as is co-conspirator inapplicable; 51.075, 51.315, he did not mention NRS or NRS 51.345. Because failed to these at present hearsay exceptions trial, court had the trial no to their merit. opportunity consider we will them for Consequently, not consider the first time on Brown, Mine, Old Aztec v. appeal. See Inc. 97 Nev. 623 P.2d (1981). misconduct E. Prosecutorial brief, of four reproduces pages some
In his appellate
argument
guilt
rebuttal
from the state’s
transcript
the trial
portion
that the reproduced
trial.
contends
Appellant
phase
“illustrative,
occa-
dispositive,”
and not
is
transcript
remarks of
disparaging
made
prosecutor
sions “where the
evidence.”
defense counsel”
“misstated
State,
(1991), we held
II. PENALTY PHASE A. circumstances Aggravating
NRS 200.033 enumerates those circumstances which mur- case, der degree may first be In the aggravated. present found aggravating beyond four circumstances a reasonable doubt, (a) and two: appellant challenges following murder was committed while the was person engaged commission (b) of or an attempt any to commit the murder robbery; another, committed aby for himself or to receive person, money 200.033(4) other thing monetary value. See NRS (6). According to there was no appellant, evidentiary basis for these two aggravating disagree. circumstances. We As noted above, the evidence shows that Evans was murdered while being robbed by Pendleton and The evidence also shows that appellant. cocaine, murdered they Evans to obtain which has monetary value. Testimony
B. Joy Mundy-Neal trial, In the penalty phase Joy Mundy-Neal, an Probation, of the Nevada of Parole employee Department testified for the Mundy-Neal prepared state. had the presentence on reports for his convictions.4 her testi- appellant previous committed mony, she commented both on offenses had appellant before the murder he of Evans and on those had committed after recounted, the murder. also over Mundy-Neal appellant’s objec- tion, statements made to her two by appellant during presentence investigation According Mundy-Neal, interviews.
stated he during supported those interviews that himself bur- glarizing an of ten homes week and that average per during burglarized December he and some cohorts approximately three per day. argues homes that the trial court com- mitted error her to prejudicial by allowing testify about his 176.156, statements. under According these 4 Mundy-Neal prepared presentence report first on in December burglary. testimony 1990 after he was convicted of At the time of her in this case, Mundy-Neal prepared reports had appellant. three such on in the cases sentencing appellant only be used in may
statements
were
reports
prepared.5
presentence
for
the corresponding
which
not be
may
that these statements
corollary,
As a
submits
trial.
unrelated
subsequent,
of a
phase
used
during
penalty
175.552,
untenable. Under NRS
here is
Appellant’s position
concerning
on questions
has broad discretion
the trial court
State,
Pellegrini
admissibility
penalty phase.
of evidence at a
Moreover,
NRS 175.552
C. Allocution engaged and the court phase, parties
During penalty of of regarding scope right discussion lengthy appellant’s to make ultimately The trial allowed appellant allocution. court but the statement to jury an statement limited unsworn “remorse, other that do not mercy to have and matters request con- Appellant to contradict the evidence case.” attempt erred in his statement. restricting tends that the district court to make an right he had a common law According and this statement jury, unsworn and unrestricted statement the crime and a denial may concerning charged include comments 5 NRS 176.156 states: attorney, The Court the district 1. shall disclose to the counsel for report the defendant and the defendant the factual content of the presentence investigation department and the recommendations of the probation opportunity parole party and and afford an to each object to factual errors comment on the and recommendations. by Except required report 2. for the disclosures subsection and its sources of are confidential must not be made information
part any public record.
783 even without first taken the witness stand. guilt, having Appel- lant’s contention lacks merit. State, (1992),
In Homick v.
D. Instructions next challenges penalty phase jury instructions and the verdict forms special used for its reporting findings aggravating and circumstances. The mitigating record discloses, however, that when the trial court specifically asked if he had to either the objections penalty phase jury forms, or the special instructions verdict he responded nega- we tively. Consequently, hold that these were challenges waived failure to at trial. object See Williams v. 106, 110-111, 734 P.2d *12 E. The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro- hibits the death imposing penalty on a defendant who “does not kill, kill, himself a attempt killing or intend that take or place Florida, that lethal force will be Enmund v. employed.” 458 U.S. 795, (1982) (overturning 798 death sentence for felony murder because there was no that defendant proof possessed the degree Arizona, culpability the death In Tison v. warranting penalty). 137, (1987), 481 U.S. Court held that Supreme “major committed, in participation felony combined with reckless life, indifference to human to satisfy is sufficient the Enmund 409, culpability In Doleman v. requirement.” 418, (1991), synthesized 812 P.2d 1292-1293 we Enmund Tison, sentence, and that receive holding the death “[t]o [a have, himself, killed, kill, must attempted intended defendant] be employed that lethal force intended killing place, that a take indifference to a reckless exhibiting while felony in a participated life.” human Here, was not made culpability the Enmund determination determination, however, be made at can This by jury. Bullock, by jury. made Cabana and it need not be point, Doleman, court, while (1986). In this 386-387 U.S. make the deter jury culpability that the a expressing preference evidence, “we have no declared the trial upon
mination based
Dole
appeal.
the determination on
making
about
reservation”
Thus,
man,
turn to consider
we
Nev. at
ish statute, sentence is excessive con- we review whether the death Thus, we no the defendant. because only the crime and sidering imposed consider whether the death sentence longer cases in this in similar penalty imposed disproportionate state, on Pendleton is irrelevant. imposed here penalty *13 found the of the four circumstances light aggravating
In murder, the jury, senseless nature of the and appellant’s signifi- behavior, history cant of criminal we conclude that the death sentence not excessive.6 misconduct
G. Prosecutorial made several that the alleges prosecutor Lastly, appellant argument comments in during closing prejudicial improper in his brief .presents appellate Appellant again penalty phase. allegedly containing improper trial transcript of the portion statements he finds those referencing specific without comments foregoing that “the again he contends And objectionable. illustrative, prose- of “instances” where and not dispositive,” to these According in misconduct. cutor engaged evidence, to attempting place misstating include “instances” victim, inflaming passions in the shoes jurors possible rehabili- about making predictions jury, speculative however, record, arewe unable the entire examining tation. After alleged “instances.” any to locate these state- prosecutor’s one of by appellant, not cited Although closing argument, concluding clearly improper. ments was stated: prosecutor You have havoc on our streets. you Mr. have created Guy, victimized Jennifer homes. You have stolen from our You cer- Richard French. You have victimized Courtney. gentleman, Ladies and Evans. have victimized Ceasor tainly sir, to you, die. Guy, and Mr. Curtis deserve added). In Collier v. (emphasis (1985), prosecutorial court held be this
P.2d following statement: misconduct Gregory Allen to look you asks counsel] [Defense you tell him that want eye him the and to look Collier him, him. him want execute you to tell kill you not ask do I would
Ladies and gentlemen, that myself. I could do unless and faces turns [prosecutor Collier] Collier, to die. deserve you Allen
Gregory prosecutor whether the does not indicate the record While here die, he deserved to him telling when turned and faced distinction. meaningful does not constitute slight this difference imposed sentence was appellant’s death 6 We conclude that further factor. See arbitrary prejudice, or passion, under influence 177.055(2)(c). *14 786 Collier, prosecutor’s appel the remark that
Like the statement in the beliefs into injected prosecutor’s personal deserved death lant from “unprejudiced, impartial, the and detracted the argument the attorney that a assumes in prosecuting and role nonpartisan” 102 P. Rodriquez, courtroom. State v. cases, the the author prosecutor, invoking both and invites ity experience knowledge, his supposedly greater the he endorses. personally undue reliance conclusions upon (11th 1985) (en v. F.2d 1484-1485 Cir. Kemp, Tucker Frascone, (5th F.2d Cir. banc); United States Thus, we that remark was 1984). prosecutor’s conclude the Nevertheless, of the light aggra in several egregiously improper. conclude this error is jury, factors found we that vating beyond harmless reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION assignments have examined the of error and remaining We they that without for the rea- Accordingly, conclude are merit. above, affirm of convic- judgment sons set forth we tion and sentence of death. Young,
Rose, JJ., concur. Steffen and Springer, J., dissenting: conviction stand robbed felony-murder Guy
The cannot unless dealer, are fellow-drug drugs subject his Evans. The Evans; and, therefore, robbery never to supposed belonged is, never drugs. Evans could have been robbed of the This case case of one dealer another. It plainly simply, drug killing Guy heartlessly Pendleton and not who shot and killed Evans in cold blood. really happened discover what in this case very
It is difficult to did not There is no principals episode testify. because to evidence, doubt, certainly to beyond no evidence a reasonable as shooting the events that Pendleton’s Evans. The follow- preceded can from ing is about best that one derive the record as to decedent, Evans, the was without any money what happened: friend, Guy to Evans told buy drugs. Guy’s with which Pendleton, where For this they go buy could some cocaine. information, Guy they give and Pendleton told Evans that would would they drugs [Guy portion Pendleton] him “a 773; added.) (Majority Opinion emphasis purchase.” they drove where Evans told them that place The trio clear, It is but not at drugs. possible, could all purchase so, but he drugs; made the actual if he did purchase Evans Pendleton, it clearly agent did as the of Guy and who had the wherewithal make the buy. Evans delivered the cocaine to and Guy Pendleton and off went in they a car driven by Guy, with Evans harboring hopeful that he expectation would be given a portion cocaine for trouble in arranging for the pur- chase. When the car to relieve himself. got The ill-fated Evans out of him, tried to gain entry off without Evans started drive
Guy (Id.) frame.” For to the door by “clinging back into car Pendleton, shot Evans known only reasons Pendleton, Now, strangely, Guy, him. and killed abdomen I do not shooting needle for Evans. understand facing the lethal very of these poorly- make a out anyone felony-murder how can *15 facts. established homicide, any stated is that felony-murder simply “The rule is felony, or first attempting committed while perpetrating P.2d Payne murder.” degree it, intentional, clearly guilty Pendleton is of As I see Guy neither homi first-degree murder. committed premeditated, did Guy anything Neither Pendleton nor that robbery. cide nor could be said remotely robbery. They possibly approaches even contract, is refusal of a breach of to be guilty “perpetrating” reward; promised to Evans a by promise give to abide their case facts of this that even this it is not clear from the although to Even if Guy Pendleton and Evans. we promise was made get to back into the trying assume that Evans was were allowed to contraband that enforce his interest in the had car in order to him, then, most, Pendleton’s been to supposedly promised attempt of was done in order to avoid Evans’s shooting Evans executory, completely unspecified undivided and claim some not constitute robb certainly in the cocaine. This does interest ery.1 of had claim kind the cocaine that Evans no identifiable did, Guy. Pendleton and If he it is of a most purchased nature, even we put illegal- and unenforceable if aside
vague we Evans had say such a transaction. Even if were to an ity of just what Evans’s see, not establish does the evidence I far as can 1 As assuming that might have cocaine undivided interest been — claimed Maybe Evans was car. into the trying get back why Evans was this only right claiming interest; maybe Evans was claiming full one-third Pendleton or what either do not know We his trouble. crumbs for to a few only we do not tip. Not give him for the going they were Guy told Evans car, we have no get into trying to back why Evans was reason know against supposed claim of Evans’s nature or extent idea robbed, what the possibly know we could been indeed Guy. If Evans had might be. robbery supposed subject of the interest or some other kind of to immediate ownership right contraband, possession quantity to a there is still no possibility making Guy a robber out of either or Pendleton. This is not a and therefore not a I robbery “felony-murder”; so would reverse conviction. Guy’s MALLIN, Individually, JENNIFER B. and JENNIFER B. GRILL, MALLIN ROBERTA as Guardians MALLIN, JESSICA B. and JENNIFER B. MALLIN as Special Administratrix of the Estate of VIRGINIA EGYED, Deceased; EGYED, MALLIN EDITH Execu- EGYED, trix of the Estate ALEX aka ALEXAN- Deceased; EGYED, DER JEANNE DI FIORE II; COSGROVE; SHAFER, JARED E. JOHN DI FIORE Executor of the Estate of ELIZABETH BARTON DI FIORE, FIORE, Deceased; aka BETTY DI MILES LEVY; KAGASOFF; SHAFER, ELISE and JARED LEVY, Administrator the Estate JACK Deceased, Appellants, v. FARMERS INSURANCE Respond- EXCHANGE, Corporation, a California ent.
No. 20903 September P.2d 105 *16 Rogers Rogers, & Las for Jennifer B. Mallín. Vegas, Jemison & List and
Beckley, Singleton, DeLanoy, Daniel F. for Mallín. Polsenberg, Vegas, Appellants Las