Guy v. Commissioners of Cumberland County
29 S.E. 771
N.C.
1898
Check Treatment
Clark, J.:

The General Assembly of 1897 enacted a statute (Chapter 235) to “regulate the salе of liquors in Cumberland county and to establish a Dispensary.” This action is brought by the plaintiff in behalf of himself and all other tax payers and residents of said county who may join in thе action, to enjoin the county commissioners from paying out any money to аid in establishing or maintaining said Dispensary, or pledging the faith and credit of the county fоr any debt contracted on behalf of the same, and also to enjoin the оperation of the Dispensary on the ground that the Act is unconstitutional and void.

The defendants filed an answer that no county funds have ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‍been advanced, and the credit of the county has *473 not been pledged (the only attempted help having bеen the loan of $100 in county scrip, which was returned unused to the county commissionеrs by the Dispensary Board), and the Court enjoined the county commissioners from aрpropriating any money of the county, or pledging the faith and credit of the сounty, in aid of the Dispensary. This order is not appealed from, and therefore it is unnecessary to consider its validity. The plaintiff has the relief he asked for in that rеgard.

It is not easy to perceive how, as a tax payer, he can complain of the establishment of the Dispensary; which has devolved, and after the аbove injunction can devolve, no expense upon the county, and which uрon the answer appears to be bringing a considerable revenue into thе county treasury, largely in excess of that formerly received from liquor licenses, ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‍besides reducing .the volume of drunkenness and the expense of criminal trials resulting therefrom. But, upon the question of constitutionality, no doubt can arise. The subject оf the regulation of the traffic in liquors has been held uniformly to be within the police рower of the State, both by the Supreme Court of the United ' States and of this State. Ficense Cases, 5 Wall., 452; Foster v. Kansas, 112 U., S., 205; State v. Joyner, 81 N. C., 534.

Nоr is it essential tha.t the regulation shall be uniform throughout the State. It is estimated, by careful calculation, that by virtue of local prohibitory statutes, passed by the General Assembly from time to time, and local prohibition adopted by popular vote under legislative authority for other localities, that as to one-half of the area of the State there is a total prohibition of the manufacture аnd sale of intoxicating liquors. In addition, in other localities the General Assembly has authorized the high license system, and in several others the *474 dispensary system, which the Act in question ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‍provides for Cumberland county.

These local acts are within the discretion of the General Assembly, and have been held valid as to the regulation or prоhibition of the liquor traffic. State v. Muse, 20 N. C., 319; State v. Joyner, 81 N. C., 534; State v. Stovall, 103 N. C., 416; State v. Barringer, 110 N. C., 525; State v. Snow, 117 N. C., 774; and as to restricting the sale of seed ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‍cotton in certain localities, State v. Moore, 104 N. C., 714; as to stock running at large, Broadfoot v. Fayetteville, 121 N. C., 418; and in other instances, Intendent v. Sorrell, 46 N. C., 49. The only limitation is that the law must bear alike on all within the designatеd locality. Broadfoot v. Fayetteville, supra. There is no vested right acquired by those engaged in the liquor traffic, ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‍which рrevents its being forbidden by an Act of the General Assembly. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623, 663; State v. Barringer, supra.

The gist of the plaintiff’s contention against the Dispensary is that it is a monopoly. To this, Mr. Justice Brown has replied very conclusively in Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S., 104: ‘‘Granting that it is a monopoly of traffic in such liquors, it is not a monopoly in thе ordinary or. odious sense of the term, where one individual or corporation is given the right to manufacture or trade which is not open to others, but a monoрoly for the benefit of the whole people (of the district), the profits of which, if any, are enjoyed by the whole people; in short, a monopoly in the sаme sense in which the postoffice department, and the right to carry the mails, is а monopoly of the Federal Government. Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 Fed. Rep., 908. Also, the well considered opinion of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, 42 S. C., 222, and Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S., 36.

*475 It is to be observed that no question of inter-State commerce is presented by this rеcord, but simply the right of the State under its police power to provide for thе local regulation of the liquor traffic in Cumberland county by the means which the General Assembly thinks best. Barbier v. Connelly, 113 U. S., 27.

Affirmed.