40 Neb. 775 | Neb. | 1894
This was an action by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error in the district court of Keith county to recover the price of certain hose, hose carts, reels, ladders, and other apparatus of like character in common use by town and village fire companies. It is alleged that said property was sold and delivered to the defendant, at its request,on the 29th day of April, 1887, for the agreed price of $569, and for which amount judgment was demanded. An answer was interposed, in which it was alleged, in substance, that although the board of trustees of the defendant village entered into an agreement to purchase from the plaintiff the property mentioned in the petition and for the price therein stated, said agreement is void, for the reason that no appropriation had previously been made for the purchase of said property, or that was available for said purpose; and that during the municipal years of 1885 and,18.86;and-
There is practically but one question for consideration, and which is fairly presented by the offer and ruling above named. In this connection it should be remarked that no claim is made that this case is within any of the exceptions contemplated by the statute quoted. The cases bearing upon the question of the power of municipal corporations to ratify their unauthorized contracts are confusing
2. The defendant was permitted, over the objection of the plaintiff, to prove by a witness called for that purpose that he, witness, had examined the minutes of the proceedings of the village board for the years beginning in May, 1886, and ending May, 1887, and that said minutes contained no record of any appropriation for the purchase of the apparatus in controversy, or for defraying any of the expenses of the village during said period. Exception was taken to that ruling, which is also assigned as error. The objection urged to the testimony of the witness is that it is secondary only. A sufficient answer to that objection is that the record referred to by the witness had previously been offered in evidence by the plaintiff and received without objection. We must presume that the book being in evidence, the court and jury were fully advised with respect to its contents, as far at least as material to the question at issue. But it was not secondary evidence. That contention is based upon an entire misconception of the rule, which excludes only that evidence which of itself indicates the existence of more original sources of information. (1 Greenleaf, Evidence, 82.) Any person who has examined offices or records, and shows a sufficient knowledge of their contents, will be permitted to testify that a par
Affirmed.