200 Mich. 355 | Mich. | 1918
Lead Opinion
This case is here on certiorari to review the action of the industrial accident board in reversing an order of the committee on arbitration, and ordering compensation to be made to claimant.
If compensation should be awarded in this case at all, it would be in the sum of $10 per week for a period of 300 weeks. The sole question is whether any award should be made to the claimant.
Claimant herein is the widow of Dalyrimple Guthrie, machinist, who died on the 30th day of April, 1916, while in the employ of the defendant company. On that day deceased started work at about 7 o’clock a. m., and at 3 o’clock p. m. he had finished one job. After an intermission of two hours, and at 5 o’clock p. m., he started on the job of repairing the steering gear.'of the steamer City of Alpena, and remained there up to the time of his death at about 11 o’clock p. m.» The long working day was not unusual in his employment, as he had worked 31% hours on April 21st and 22d. This was about a week before his death. There was necessity of working rapidly on the repairing of the steering gear; and at about 11 p. m., deceased, with two others, was working on the water level deck of the steamer in a room in which
On September 7, 1916, a committee on arbitration heard and considered the testimony and found that no compensation was due to claimant, and made an order accordingly. The decision of the arbitration committee was reversed on appeal to the full board (the depositions of two additional physicians having
It is the claim of appellant that the order and award of the industrial accident board should be reversed and compensation denied, because the death of deceased was not due to an accident arising out of his employment. The cases relied upon by appellant are: Kutschmar v. Manufacturing Co., 197 Mich. 146; Van Gorder v. Motorcar Co., 195 Mich. 588; Stombaugh v. Fence Co., 198 Mich. 445; Johnson v. Mining Co., 199 Mich. 218.
It is, as we understand it, the claim of the appellant that there was nothing about the work, or employment, that was accidental or even unexpected; that the work was proceeding in the manner intended, and that nothing fortuitous occurred while the work was proceeding.
Upon the subject of the place where the men were working, it may be said that it was not even unusual. The undisputed evidence shows that the temperature was from '75 to 78 degrees, which was about what is termed summer heat. The evidence shows that steam had been off for 20 hours, and the room in which the work was being done was ventilated by two portholes, 12 inches by 14 inches in diameter, one on each side, and two large doors, one open to the dock and the other to the river. Claimant’s physician testified that the temperature was not an excessive heat and would not have produced death from heart disease. So we repeat, that it cannot be claimed that the temperature in which claimant’s decedent was working was unusual or fortuitous.
Upon the subject of strain: Deceased was a machinist, and was employed to do any machine work that the foreman or the superintendent directed bim to do. The work that he was doing at the time of his
Upon the subject of long hours, it cannot be said that the working day was out of the ordinary. The testimony is undisputed that deceased had worked longer hours before, having worked 3114 hours on April 21st and 22d.
The burden certainly is on claimant to show that there was an accident; and there was nothing fortuitous in the long working day. No claim is made that the place itself was unsafe or insecure. There was no .claim or evidence that the deceased slipped, and there was nothing on the platform that would cause one to slip or fall. The undisputed evidence is that they were just dry planks — not even grease spots upon them. There is nothing from which it can be inferred that the deceased slipped or stumbled. It cannot be assumed that the man made a misstep, and then again assumed that such misstep caused fright, and then again assumed that the fright caused the heart to stop. This would be not only basing an assumption upon an assumption, but would' be taking one into the realms of conjecture.
It seems to us that the instant case falls within the doctrine of the English cases just referred to.
It is the claim of appellee here that death was due to an accidental injury arising out of the employment of the deceased, and it is said:
“The industrial accident board having found as.a fact that the combined circumstances resulted in the death of the deceased, their finding is final and cannot be reviewed, provided, however, that there is any legal evidence produced to support such finding.”
Was there any evidence to support such finding? We think there was none. An examination of the finding of the board shows that its decision is based upon and sought to be justified by the following cases: La Veck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 190 Mich. 604; Schroetke v. Jackson-Church Co., supra; Ramlow v. Ice Co., 192 Mich. 505.
While the LaVeck Case is a borderline case, there was evidence there of overexertion and excessive heat, a condition which was clearly unusual if not fortuitous; and the Schroetke Case is clearly distinguished from the instant case. We can arrive at no other conclusion than that the claimant has failed to show, by any evidence, that the death was due to accident. The record is entirely barren of any evidence of an accident.
That an injury received by a workman while engaged in his usual work, without intervention of something unusual or fortuitous, is not an accident, is now so well established by our decisions, that the proposition needs no discussion. Van Gorder v. Motorcar Co., supra; Kutschmar v. Manufacturing Co., supra;
In all of those cases compensation was denied. They have been so often referred to, and discussed by us, that it is unnecessary here to quote from them.
In our opinion there was no evidence to support the finding of the industrial accident board, and its award and order are reversed.
Concurrence Opinion
For thé reason stated by me in Tackles v. Bryant & Detwiler Co., ante, 350, I concur in the reversal of the award in this'case.