hln this dоmestic matter, Christi R. Guste appeals the trial court’s rulings on child support and custody. Ms. Guste argues that the trial court committed several errors with regard to the award of child support, and with regard to an evidentiаry issue at trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the the trial court’s decision.
BACKGROUND:
Appellant, Ms. Guste and Bernard Guste, Jr., appellee, were married on June 5, 2010. They resided in Orleans Parish, and at the time of trial, had two children, ages four and two.
Ms. Guste filed a Petition for Divorce as well as other matters, including child support and custody, on July 29, 2014. After a failed mediation attempt, the trial court ordered a custody evaluation. The рarties thereafter entered into a Consent Judgment dated March 5, 2015, wherein Mr. Guste was ordered to pay $600 per month child support for the children, with an additional $500 per month for the children’s tuition.
I ¡/Trial on the divorcе and other matters commenced on June 23, 2015, and was heard over four days concluding on August 26, 2015. A final judgment, along with reasons, was rendered on September 23, 2015. The trial court awarded joint, shared custody of the children, with еqual physical
DISCUSSION:
Ms. Guste makes several assignments of error questioning the trial court’s child support award. Specifically, she argues that the trial сourt erred in permitting Mr. Guste to depreciate assets in calculating Mr. Guste’s gross income, in not making the child support award retroactive, and in failing to order reimbursement of school tuition. She also argues that the trial court erred in not admitting certain medical records maintained by Dr. Luscher, who conducted the custody evaluation.
We first address the assignments of error concerning the support award. The Louisianа legislature had established guidelines for the implementation of child support. La. R.S. 9:315, et seq. The guidelines are designed to fairly apportion between the parents the mutual obligation they owe to their children in an efficient, consistent and adequate manner. Bickham v. Bickham, 46,264, p. 8 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/2/11),
sIn her first assignment of error, Ms. Guste argues that the trial court erred in permitting Mr. Guste to depreciate certain assets, therеby reducing his gross income for purposes of determining child support. Mr. Guste owns several rental properties in Orleans Parish. On his 2014 IRS 1040 form, he claimed a depreciation expense of those properties of $18,734.00 and total expenses of $86,422.00.
Ms. Guste argues that by allowing the depreciation, the trial court is allowing Mr. Guste “artificially” reduce his gross income. She agrees that the Internal Revenue Service provides for a depreciation deduction; however, she argues that in this case, the depreciation should not have been permitted, as it allows him to maintain a higher income not accounted for in the child support obligation calculation.
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:315 C(3)(c) expressly provides that ‘“[o]rdi-nary and necessary expenses’ shall not include amounts allowed by the Internal Revenue Service for the аccelerated component of depreciation expenses ... for determining gross income for purposes of calculating child support.” It is the burden of the parent claiming the depreсiation to prove that earnings are calculated without the use of accelerated depreciation. See Riggs v. LaJaunie, 98-304, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/7/98),
In Dejoie v. Guidry, this Court determined that straight-line, non-accelerated depreciation may be considered as an ordinary and necessary expense. 10-1542, p. 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/13/11),
Ms. Guste also argues that the trial court inaccurately calculated Mr. Guste’s income from his job with Gulf Coast Bank. Mr. Guste testified that his income is based on commission, not salary, and that the commission is contingеnt upon the res
We cannot say that the trial court’s method of calculating Mr. Guste’s gross income was legal error. Although this Court might have calculated his income differently, as suggested by Ms. Guste, we cannot say that the trial court wasj^ manifestly erroneous in its calculations. See Dejoie, 10-1542, p. 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/13/11),
The next assignment of error raised by Ms. Guste is that the trial court erred in failing to make the child support award retroactive to the date of filing. She cites La. R.S. 9:310, which provides:
Retroactivity of spousal support order
A. An ordеr for spousal support shall be retroactive to the filing date of the petition for spousal support granted in the order.
B. Any support of any kind provided by the judgment debtor from the date the petition for support is filed to the date the support order is issued, to or on behalf of the person for whom support is ordered, shall be credited to the judgment debtor against the amount of the judgment.
C. In the event the court finds good cause for not making the award retroac-five, the court may fix the date such award shall become due.
Although this statute’s title clearly addresses the retroactivity of spousal support, Subsection B rеfers to “[a]ny support of any kind provided by the judgment debtor.” Further, following the 1993 amendment to La. R.S. 9:310, the retroac-tivity of child support was re-designated as La. R.S. 9:315.21, which provides in part:
A. Except for good cause shоwn, a judgment awarding,' modifying, or revoking an interim child support allowance shall be retroactive to the date of judicial demand, but in no case prior to the date of judicial demand.
B. (1) A judgment that initially awards or dеnies final child support is effective as of the • date the judgment is signed and terminates an interim child support allowance as of that date.
The statute also provides that only if there is no interim support awаrd order in place should a final support order be made retroactive to the date of judicial] ñ demand. La. R.S. 9:315.21 B(2). In this case, the trial court provides in fits reasons for judgment that a consent judgment entered intо by the parties on March 5, 2015, provided that Mr. Guste was to pay Ms. Guste interim support of $600 per month, plus an additional $500 per month for the children’s school tuition, subject to any credits or debits established upon determinаtion of a final child support obligation amount. Additionally, a written stipulation was entered into by the parties on April 23, 2015, by which it was agreed that Ms. Guste was to receive the entire 2013 and 2014 state and federal tax refunds. Cоnsidering the record before us, wé cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in not making the child support award of September 23, 2016, retroactive to the date of judicial demand.
The record indicates that the pаrties stipulated in open court that they agreed to pay and had already paid tuition for the 2015-16 school year for Holy Name of Jesus School and Stuart Hall faculty daycare. Further, the testimony of Ms. Guste rеveals that when the parties initially separated Mr. Guste agreed that she could withdraw $11,800 from a joint account for her use. Ms. Guste testified that she had also paid from the joint account three months of tuition ($2,400) to Ursulinе, where their daughter was enrolled at the time of their separation. As noted previously, Mr. Guste was also ordered in the interim support award order to pay $500 per month toward school tuition.
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:315.8 provides that extraordinary expenses should be included in the child support calculations; however, La.R.S. 9:315.6 provides:
|7By agreement of the parties or order of the court, the following expеnses incurred on behalf of the child, may be added to the basic child support obligation:
(1) Expenses of tuition, registration, books, and supply fees required for attending a special or private elementary or secondary school to meet the needs of the child, (emphasis added.)
The trial court also noted in its reasons for deciding the custody arrangements that the parties demonstrated the ability to come together to make major educational decisions regarding the children, and had already agreed on schools for the children for the 2015-16 school year. The parties also testified that they were capable of discussing the future educational needs of the children.
A trial judge’s decision to add private school tuition expenses to the basic child support obligation will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. A.S. v. D.S., 14-1098, p. 19 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/8/15),
Ms. Guste also argues that the trial court erred in not admitting certain medical records maintained by the custody evaluator, Dr. Luscher. She argues that La. R.S. 13:3714 A provides that certified records maintained by a health care provider shall be received into evidence as prima facie proof of its content. Dr. Luscher testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination by Mr. Guste.
The trial court ruled that the records were inadmissible, and Ms. Guste objected. However, Ms. Guste did not proffer the records. Therefore, this Court cannot review the records in question to determine whether the trial court erred in not admitting them into evidence. Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 07-2441, p. 19 ( La. 4/8/08),
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED