Gustave ZURAK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Paul J. REGAN et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 425, Docket 76-2100
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Decided Feb. 7, 1977
Argued Oct. 29, 1976.
Trusts No. 1 and No. 2 contain identical provisions directing the trustees to collect and pay income as follows:
To the payment and discharge of any and all liabilities and obligations arising out of or connected with the operation and maintenance of the trust property including, but not limited to, the payment of interest and amortization of mortgages, the discharge and satisfaction of mortgages, the payment of taxes and water charges, if any, as well as the payment of administration, legal expenses and Federal and State Estate Taxes and Income Taxes.
The Tax Court found no clear expression of intent in these provisions that the estate tax chargeable against these trusts should not be payable out of principal as provided for by subdivision (b). The Court stated that the language used refers to the “source of the funds” and was not intended to negate the statutory rule of apportionment. We are unable to make this same fine distinction.
Trust No. 1 consists of a parcel of real estate. The trustees are prohibited from increasing the mortgage indebtedness on the property except for its maintenance or improvement and are forbidden from selling it so long as the tenant, First National City Bank, its successor, or a bank of similar repute, continues as lessee. Unless the property is sold, a rather remote contingency it would appear, it is not at all clear how the “source” is to be replenished from the trust corpus.
Although Trust No. 2 permits the trustees, at appellant‘s written request, to mortgage the trust res for up to $200,000, if this provision is construed as appellant would have it, this money has already been preempted for her own personal use.
In Trust No. 1, testator provided that payment to the life beneficiaries is to be made out of the “remaining net income” after payment of taxes, etc., and in Trust No. 2 it is to be paid out of “net income“. The reasonable interpretation of these provisions is that income is to be applied first to the payment of administrative expenses and taxes and only the net income thereafter remaining is to be paid to the life beneficiaries. We conclude, therefore, that it was the testator‘s “clearly expressed intention” that taxes on these two trust estates be paid out of the trust income.6
The parties have not briefed or argued the question of possible illegal accumulation of income proscribed by
We remand the case to the Tax Court with directions to grant petitioner a new trial.
Gordon J. Johnson, The Legal Aid Society, New York City (Natalie J. Kaplan, William E. Hellerstein and Donald H. Zuckerman, Attys., The Legal Aid Society, New York City, on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellees.
Arlene R. Silverman, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of New York, New York City (Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of State of N. Y., and Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Asst. Atty. Gen., State of New York, New York City, on the brief), for defendants-appellants.
Before LUMBARD and VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judges, and BONSAL, District Judge.*
LUMBARD, Circuit Judge:
Defendants-appellants, members of the New York State Board of Parole (hereinafter “the Board“) and state correctional services officials, appeal from an injunction issued in the Southern District, dated July 30, 1976, upon findings by Judge Carter
Under
Plaintiffs were all inmates serving definite sentences of more than 90 days at Rikers Island.3 In its unreported decision of July 30, 1976, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion to proceed as a class pursuant to
The operation of the conditional release program was described at trial. Raymond Dorsey, the official supervising the Rikers Island conditional release program, testified that he and his staff attempt to explain the program to all eligible inmates within the first week of their arrival. Parole officers then interview those who wish to apply. There are no written guidelines on how these interviews are to be conducted. There are no established practices determining the order in which arriving applicants are to be interviewed;5 rather, the district court found that the interviews are
Based on the interview and the inmate‘s file the parole officer prepares a written report, which is placed in the inmate‘s file. The report includes a personal and social history of the inmate based upon the interview and information contained in available presentence reports. The parole officer makes no independent investigation and although he sometimes makes a recommendation, the conditional release decision is ordinarily left entirely to the discretion of a Board commissioner. The district court found that under existing conditions, it customarily takes 60 to 90 days for parole officers to submit their reports to the Board.
The commissioner‘s decision is based entirely on the information contained in the inmate‘s file, including the parole officer‘s report and the presentence report; the commissioner neither interviews the inmate nor consults with the parole officer who conducted the interview. Inmates are not allowed to see their files. There are no written criteria upon which the commissioners base their decisions, although the testimony at trial indicated that they are primarily influenced by the applicant‘s prior record, the nature of his offense, the applicant‘s institutional adjustment and his future plans.7 In September, 1975 the Board began to provide written statements of reasons and facts to inmates whose applications had been denied; prior to that time the Board‘s practice was merely to deny or defer an application without any statement. An inmate whose application has been denied may apply to the chairman of the Board for reconsideration.8
Before proceeding to the merits, we treat an initial issue regarding this court‘s jurisdiction. At oral argument appellants pointed out that by some time after the evidentiary hearing but prior to the district court‘s certification of the class in its order of July 30, 1976, all of the named plaintiffs had been released; accordingly, appellants now contend that the controversy is moot. We reject this contention. Although a litigant must ordinarily be a member of the class that he seeks to represent at the time the class is certified, see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402-03, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975), this case is a “suitable exception” to that requirement. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110-11 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), Sosna v. Iowa, supra, 419 U.S. at 402 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 553. Because of the relatively short periods of
Turning to the merits, we must first inquire whether a prisoner‘s interest in conditional release is sufficient to warrant due process protection. Although the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that every state action having adverse consequences for an inmate automatically raises a question of due process, see, e. g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 97 S.Ct. 274, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976), it has left open the issue of whether, and to what extent, parole release procedures may be held to activate due process rights. See, e. g., Moody v. Daggett, supra, 429 U.S. at 89, 97 S.Ct. at 279; Scott v. Kentucky Parole Board, 429 U.S. 60, 97 S.Ct. 342, 50 L.Ed.2d 218 (1976). As the district court noted, however, it is settled in this circuit that a prisoner‘s interest in prospective parole or “conditional entitlement” is entitled to due process protection: “Whether the immediate issue be release or revocation, the stakes are the same: conditional freedom versus incarceration.” United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, New York State Board of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015, 95 S.Ct. 488, 42 L.Ed.2d 289 (1974). See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Holup v. Gates, 544 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1976); Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).9
Having determined that due process attaches, the question remains of how much process is due. In this inquiry we are guided by the Supreme Court‘s observation that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three factors: 1) the private interest involved; 2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 3) the public interest in maintaining existing procedures, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens entailed in additional or substitute procedures. See Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893.10
Turning first to the inmate‘s liberty interest we note that this court and others have distinguished between the in
The district court found the administration of the conditional release program to be chaotic. Obviously, the program is almost meaningless to an inmate if he is unable to obtain even a preliminary interview after six months at Rikers Island,14 and such administration amounts to an arbitrary denial of the statutory entitlement. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.‘” Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at 333, 96 S.Ct. at 902, quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965); see Moody v. Daggett, supra, 429 U.S. at 89-96, 97 S.Ct. at 279-283, (Stevens, J., dissenting).15 Since the testimony at trial indicates that applications are currently processed within 60-90 days of arrival at Rikers Island, the district court‘s order requiring that applications for conditional release be processed in order of eligibility and within 60-90 days of an inmate‘s arrival imposes little, if any, additional administrative or fiscal burden. However, although we agree in principle with the district court‘s order, as a practical matter it may be impossible for the state authorities to process applications in strict order of eligibility and still maintain a fair and rational conditional release program.16 Thus, for example, in processing applications the state authorities may wish to take into account the fact that an application has been filed in a tardy fashion. Because we view the court‘s order as an effort to deal with the exigencies at hand and not an attempt unnecessarily to tie the hands of the state authorities, we understand the court‘s mandate to require the processing of applications in strict order of eligibility only to the extent that this is practical and fair to the applicants. The state authorities thus remain free to fashion their own procedures to deal with administrative problems that may arise in the application of the program as long as applications are processed in a timely and rational fashion.
We have no difficulty with the district court‘s requirement of a statement
Given the foregoing procedural safeguards, and keeping in mind the interest at stake and the additional administrative and fiscal burdens involved, we conclude that a personal hearing before a member of the Board is not constitutionally mandated. Unlike a parole revocation proceeding, the procedures used in the conditional release program are not adversary in nature; rather, both the Board and the inmate have an interest in obtaining the inmate‘s release. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 784-85, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); Hyser v. Reed, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 318 F.2d 225, 237, 242 (1963) (en banc), cert. denied, sub nom. Thompson v. United States Board of Parole, 375 U.S. 957, 84 S.Ct. 446, 11 L.Ed.2d 315 (1963). Unlike parole revocation, the conditional release decision will rarely, if ever, involve complex factual disputes in which the inmate may have to prove himself innocent of criminal behavior or show factors in mitigation. See Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, 411 U.S. at 786-88, 93 S.Ct. 1756; Carson v. Taylor, 540 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1976). Nor will conditional release decisions involve questions of serious violations of discipline in maximum security institutions as in Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. at 558-63, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Under the district court‘s order, applications for conditional release must be processed within 90 days of an inmate‘s arrival at Rikers Island. The Board‘s decision is primarily influenced by the applicant‘s prior record, the nature of his offense, his institutional adjustment, and his future plans. Thus, given the short span of time between arrival at Rikers Island and the release decision and the fact that the parole officers make no independent investigations, the information upon which the Board acts must necessarily be obtained in large part from available presentence reports and the inmate interviews. Under
Although a personal interview might provide the inmate with a better opportunity to present his case to the Board, we think that, under all the circumstances, the inmate has sufficient opportunity to present the relevant facts through the parole officer and by his own submission of any information helpful to his cause.
We cannot ignore the significant additional financial and administrative burdens necessarily involved in providing in-person hearings to all conditional release applicants. In 1974 there were some 2578 applications for conditional release by inmates at 62 local penitentiaries and jails throughout the state; 1200 of these applications were made by inmates at Rikers Island. The Board, which currently consists of 11 members, conducts about 15,000 hearings per year in panels of three. Even if the impact of a decision of this court requiring conditional release hearings could be limited to the class of inmates at Rikers Island, “[w]e only need say that experience with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate additional cost in terms of money and administrative burden would not be insubstantial.” Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at 347, 96 S.Ct. at 909. Weighing all of these factors, we conclude that due process does not require that a personal appearance before a member of the Board be given to each conditional release applicant.
Finally, we find no merit in appellees’ claim that the difference in procedures between inmates seeking conditional release and inmates seeking parole violates the Equal Protection Clause. See
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the court except as it requires appellants to provide a personal appearance before a member of the Board to applicants for conditional release.
VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in that portion of the majority opinion which holds that appellees are not entitled to appear personally before the Parole Board.
Since August 1975, the State has been furnishing rejected applicants for conditional release with written statements of the reasons for their rejection. For this reason, and because this Court has already spoken on this issue in the related field of parole, see, e. g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of New York State Board of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015, 95 S.Ct. 488, 42 L.Ed.2d 289 (1974), I also concur with the majority that such statements should be furnished.
As to the balance of the order appealed from, I would reverse. It requires the State to institute appropriate procedures to “insure” that conditional release applications be processed in order of eligibility and mandates that they be processed within 60-90 days of the arrival of an inmate on Rikers Island. In thus holding that the State may not process one prisoner‘s application until after it has processed the appli
If constitutionality is to be equated with fairness, an unjustifiable equation under the law, see Meachum v. Fano, supra, 427 U.S. at 223-225, 96 S.Ct. at 2537, fairness to all should be the criterion. A plan is not fair which requires a prisoner, who makes prompt application for release, to sit patiently by until after the application of a less diligent inmate, albeit one with earlier eligibility, is passed upon by the Commission. A procedure is not just which mandates that an application, which is complete and untroublesome, gather dust on the shelf until information is compiled to complete the file of a more controversial applicant. Such Federal interference with the routine operation of a state penal system is not compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment which, we should occasionally remind ourselves, provides simply that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”
My colleagues, recognizing the inequities in the District Judge‘s order, construe it as if it did not contain the word “insure“. They say that the procedures which the State is ordered to adopt must require the processing of applications in strict order of eligibility “only to the extent that this is practical and fair to the applicants.” I submit that this constitutes not an affirmance but a reframing of the District Judge‘s order and, with all due respect to my colleagues, merely substitutes one unfortunate consequence of unnecessary federal interference for another. It is one thing to direct the State to promulgate rules which require processing in order of eligibility only to the extent that it is “practical and fair“; it is quite another thing to promulgate them. If it is possible for the State to draft rules which will withstand the challenge of indefiniteness, what a Pandora‘s box they will open for the litigious prisoner who asserts their impractical or unfair application. This infelicitous result, we mandate in the name of Due Process.
My brothers say that, because applications are presently being processed within 60-90 days, the order which requires that this be done imposes little, if any, additional administrative or fiscal burden on the State. Of course, this is not the proper test to be applied in determining whether a Federal Court order should issue. The question, simply put, is whether the Constitution forbids the lapse of 91 days in the processing of applications. In his dissenting opinion in Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. at 89-96, 97 S.Ct. at 279-283, which my brothers cite with apparent approval, Justice Stevens, speaking with regard to parole revocation hearings, said at 97 S.Ct. 283 n. 12:
I should also make clear that I would not prescribe any inflexible rule that the hearing must always take place within a fixed period.
There is no such inflexible rule in the Constitution.
Assuming that a prisoner has a constitutional right to have his application for conditional release processed with reasonable dispatch, this right cannot accrue until his application is made. The order, which requires that processing be completed within 60-90 days after the inmate‘s arrival on Rikers Island, completely ignores this fact. The order may well operate to benefit the tardy and troublesome inmate at the expense of his more diligent and deserving brother by requiring overworked parole officers to lay the latter‘s easily processed application aside while they meet the court-imposed deadline for the tardy troublemaker.
Our eagerness to correct asserted wrongs should not blind us to the fact that when we create a right, we also lay the groundwork for a remedy. One would expect that
LUMBARD
CIRCUIT JUDGE
Leonard SHELTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Larry TAYLOR, Warden, and Maurice Sigler, Chairman, United States Board of Parole, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 651, Docket 76-2099
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Decided Feb. 22, 1977
Argued Jan. 18, 1977.
Notes
2. Definite sentence. A person who is serving one or more than one definite sentence of imprisonment with a term or aggregate term in excess of ninety days may, if he so requests, be conditionally released from the institution in which he is confined at any time after service of sixty days of that term, exclusive of credits allowed under subdivisions four and six of section 70.30. In computing service of sixty days, the credit allowed for jail time under subdivision three of section 70.30 shall be calculated as time served. Conditional release from such institution shall be in the discretion of the parole board, and shall be upon such conditions as may be imposed by that board, in accordance with the provisions of the correction law.
Conditional release shall interrupt service of the sentence or sentences and the remaining portion of the term or aggregate term shall be held in abeyance. Every person so released shall be under the supervision of the parole board for a period of one year. Compliance with the conditions of release during the period of supervision shall satisfy the portion of the term or aggregate term that has been held in abeyance.
“There is a substantial difference on the due process issue between a finding of serious disciplinary action leading to loss of good-time credits, involved in Wolff, and denial of an application for parole. The broad discretion of the Board in the latter instance lessens the content of required due process . . . .”
