*1 death, appliance arising out prosthetic employment while
of and in the course premises occupied, in or about the
at work employer, in-
used or controlled places
curred while at work where the
employer’s requires employ- business presence subjects
ee’s and which the em-
ployee to extrahazardous duties incident * * *. business. 27-12-102(a)(xii) (1988). § Sub-
Wyo.Stat. (D), which we recited above in foot-
section part
note was not a of that definition in However,
December 1984. even if the hear- wrong examiner did cite the definition of
“injury,” hold error to be harmless. exactly
The result would be the same under case,
the circumstances of this whether the employed.
former or the latter definition was
Any reciting error in the incorrect definition disregard and we harmless must it. Wyo. R.App.P. 9.04 affirming
The order of the district court hearing examiner’s denial of benefits is
affirmed. GURNEY,
Renae G. Renae G. n/k/a Tollman, Appellant (Defendant), (Plaintiff). GURNEY, Appellee
Russell C.
No. 94-144.
Supreme Wyoming. Court of 1995. *2 Lathrop Wiederspahn, Lum- V.Whether the court abused its discre- Diane M. P.C., by considering Cheyenne, appellant. appellant tion not that was Liepas, for mis & primary giver care of the minor child. Eddington Eddington A. of Jones & James Russell states issue as follows: Offices, Torrington, appellee. for Law by the trial court abuse its discretion Did GOLDEN, C.J., THOMAS, Before and granting primary custody of the LEHMAN, MACY, TAYLOR and JJ. appellee? minor child to the GOLDEN, Chief Justice. FACTS primary appeal, In this we con- issue July Russell and were divorced on Renae necessary it is to demon- sider whether 19, incorporated 1993. The divorce decree change a substantial in circumstances strate joint agreement stipulating custody modify in order to an order of daughter, Gurney, their Laurie Jane bom parents when both inform the district court 22, January granted pri- 1992. Russell was joint custody arrangement that has mary custody period for the six month Appellant Gurney, failed. Renae G. now 1, 1993, 1993, through 30, April September (Renae), known as Renae G. Tollman and primary custody and from Renae had Octo- (Russell) appellee Gurney Russell C. shared through Primary the end of March. ber (Laurie) custody daughter following of their every would continue to alternate six fifty their divorce in 1993. Within until the school. months child attended filed, days after the divorce decree was Rus- rights. had visitation noncustodial petitioned primary custody for sell of the parents agreed At the time the to their Following stipulated a informal hear- joint custody arrangement, living both were ing, granted petition the district court his Torrington, Wyoming. in After the divorce appeals. and Renae now entered, accepted posi- decree was Renae a We affirm. Lusk, Wyoming, in tion a distance of about and,
sixty Torrington, August in miles from ISSUES to Lusk Laurie and Lau- moved stepsister, August rie’s Jessie. On presents following Renae issues: modify petitioned Russell the court to I. court Whether the abused its discre- joint custody arrangement grant him change in in finding tion a material circum- primary custody, alleging Renae had failed to stances, by supported which is not sub- in by abide the visitation set out the divorce contrary stantial evidence and is to the change in decree and a substantial circum- weight presented. manifest of the evidence change warranting stances had occurred II. court Whether the abused its discre- custody. finding appellant’s tion in relocation petition response to Russell’s de- Renae’s change
was a material
in circumstance
change
nied a material
of circumstances had
supporting
custody.
requested
the modification be
occurred
III. Whether the court abused its discre-
However,
peti-
also counter
denied.
she
by
considering
sepa-
tion
the effect of
primary custody.
In December of
tioned for
rating siblings
determining
when
the best
requested
hearing on the mat-
Renae
chang-
purposes
interest of the child for
ter because communication between
two
custody.
longer
deteriorated and she no
believed
had
the court abused its discre-
was
the best interest
IV. Whether
considering
hearing,
each
past relationships
tion
child. At the informal
appellant
granting custody
presented
of the minor
evidence adverse to the other and
herself,
as
appellee
relationships
child to
when the
evidence favorable
himself
be,
entry
may
on the issue of
prior
had occurred
to the
the case
hearing,
Following the
original
present
decree and had no
effect
of Laurie.
a material
in circum-
on the best
minor child.
the court found
interests
justify
quired to
of a
modification and the best
warranted
stances
order as contrasted with a
required that she reside
interests of the
case,
order.
the earlier order
greatest sense of
providing the
place
in the
providing for
under consideration was one
consistency,
permanent
rela-
security,
*3
joint custody1,
awarding primary
not one
consequently, the court awarded
tionships;
parents. Recognizing
to one of the
appeal
custody to Russell. This
fol-
primary
importance
fact
central
in deter-
that
is of
lowed.
justify
mining
required
should be
to
what
reopening the order because we see several
DISCUSSION
distinctive features between a
custo-
matters,
an abuse of
In these
we use
dy
joint custody
order and
order. One
reviewing
the deci
discretion standard
place-
distinctive feature concerns child
Love,
court. Love v.
851
sions of the district
stability.
awarding custody
ment
An order
1283,
(Wyo.1993) (quoting
1286
Gaines
P.2d
parent
pri-
parent
to one
fixes that
as the
(cita
566,
(Wyo.1990)
Doby,
P.2d
570
v.
794
mary
of
nurturer
the child and the one with
omitted)).
tions
the child shall reside. Once such an
whom
entered,
stability in
order is
considerations of
presented in
analysis of the issues
the
Our
impor-
placement
become of central
recognize
promoted if we
instant case is
law,
tance.
In our case
we have shown a
usual
dis-
case does not involve the
strong
against reopening the order be-
bias
awarded cus-
pute, in which the court earlier
always
is almost
cause a child
harmed
tody
parent and the other is now
to one
transfer from one
to the other.
change
attempting
reopen
to
the order and
custody, asserting
change
a substantial
of
reopening
joint custody
When the
of a
justification
request-
court, however,
for the
circumstances as
order is before the
the stabil-
reopening of the custodial order.
ity-of-placement
ed
consideration that is central
countless
cases we have ad-
pri-
to our strict
standards in the
mary
circum-
appears
hered to the “substantial
of
custodial context
to be of mini-
test,
past
importance
joint custody
stances”
but
cases
have
mal
because the
pri-
should be re-
order has not fixed one
as the
had occasion to consider what
cept”
today.
court’s
as it is
He
1. It is unclear from the district
order if
known
“joint custody”
physi
ordered includes both
the
states: "I have encountered at least fifteen
legal joint custody.
important
cal
It is
and
terms used to refer to various alternatives to
clearly
judges,
legislators, and writers
define
custody: joint legal custody, joint physical
sole
custody”
by "joint
what meant
as the lack of a
custody,
custody, separate custody,
divided
al-
creates confusion. The case
standard definition
ternating custody, split custody, managing con-
Thronson,
(Utah
55
revisory powers
light
and in
recognize a measure of
cise its
mary nurturer. We
viz.,
circumstances,
instability
in a
order
demonstrated
is inherent
parents, who are not
requires
parties’ inability
it
two
to resolve visitation is-
together,
rights
sues,
custodial
residing
light
share
best interests of the
logistics
responsibilities and resolve the
Id.
Moody Moody,
v.
715
caring for the child.
Here, considering
span
brief
of time
(Utah 1985) (J.
Zimmerman
P.2d
510
entry
between the
of the divorce decree and
Keith,
concurring);
and see Keith
to the district court to
invitations
(J.
(Minn.App.1988) Huspe
N.W.2d
issue,
reopen
considering
the custodial
ni, concurring);
Marriage
Lovejoy,
In Re
reopen,
parties’ express
invitations to
*4
Ill.App.3d
109 Ill.Dec.
510 N.E.2d
158
common sense dictates the district court
Blair,
(1987);
App.3d
636
Blair v.
34 Ohio
joint custody
reopen
should
the
order and
N.E.2d 950
518
custody
parent
to one
or the other.
award
suggests
Gaines,
A second distinctive feature
Here,
party
inas
each
invited the
joint custody
readily
more
a
order should be
district court to do so. No error can be
joint custody
opened.
premise of the
The
and,
accepted
claimed because that court
at
ability
parents’
is the
to resolve be
order
behest,
upon
parties’
the
acted
the invita-
tween themselves
the
custodial details.
contends, her relocation to
tions. As Renae
joint
question that
custo
There can be little
not,
itself,
in
a material
in
Lusk is
part
dy requires sincere dedication on the
Love,
I that a court do take into at a modification
consideration hear-
ing relationships occurring prior romantic original custody agreement. agree I majority’s regarding resolution
with the aof decree when the intervene, parties ask the court to and concur NEAL, Appellant (Petitioner), D. Shane only result because the in- record support other sufficient evidence to cludes the trial court’s decision. ROJO, INC., Appellee CABALLO signs a district court When decree of (Employer), incorporating divorce child custo dy stipulation, the district court makes a finding custody provision that the inis Wyoming, Wyoming ex State rel. best interests of the child. The trial court is Compensation Division, Workers’ accept stipulation, not bound to but rather Appellee (Objector-Defendant). independently must consider what No. 94-77. arrangement is in the child’s best interest. Forbes,
See Forbes v. Supreme Wyoming. Court of (Wyo.1983).findings are made the context surrounding regarding of all circumstances 1995. parties’ lifestyles, parenting abilities and being the well When the court awarding parties
enters a decree
custody, assumption can be made that the thorough findings
court was even more in its joint custody presents many unique
questions involving the best interests of the Singer Reynolds,
child. J.B. & W.L. A Dis Custody,
sent on Joint 47 Md.L.Rev. 497
(1988) Derdeyn, and E. A. Scott & Rethink Custody, Joint 45 Ohio St. L.J. 455