History
  • No items yet
midpage
Gunter v. State
858 S.W.2d 430
Tex. Crim. App.
1993
Check Treatment

*1 peace breach of the judge alleged had been committed. urges error he This Court decided this exact same issue appeal. pre- He has therefore failed to adversely appellant in Satterwhite v. 52(a). Tex.R.App.Proc., serve error. Rule State, 726 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), S.W.2d 81 Appellant’s point final of error is over- 249, part, rev’d in 486 U.S. 108 S.Ct. ruled. (1988). 100 L.Ed.2d 284 There we conclud- error, Finding judg- we affirm the ed that the “search of the vehicle was a ment of the trial court. search incident to arrest and was therefore lawful.” Id. at 87. legal princi- Under the MALONEY, J., points concurs as to ple of “the law of the case” our resolution joins error and 13 and otherwise question of this appellant’s previ- law opinion. appeal ous govern this same case will disposition present of this issue in his WHITE, J., participating. not appeal. Harris v. 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Cr.App.1989); Ware v.

S.W.2d 700 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). None of surrounding facts dispute search in changed since this Court ruled on the legality during search appeal. Therefore, appellant’s

first six- point teenth of error is overruled. Appellant’s alleges final of error GUNTER, Appellant, James Lee the trial court in instructing erred with an erroneous definition of the term “deliberately” as that term in Arti- is used Texas, Appellee. The STATE of 37.071, supra. cle The trial court instruct- ed jury: 69,812. No. employed Special “As in the first Is- Texas, Appeals Court of Criminal sue, the word ‘deliberately’ has a mean- En Banc. ing different and distinct from the word ‘intentionally’ previous- as that word was March 1993.

ly charge guilt. defined in the Rehearing May Denied 1993. ‘deliberately’ The term as used in the Special first Issue is defined as with deliberation;

careful consideration or intent; hastily with full or careless- ly deliberately purpose; formed —as consequences.” with awareness of the trial, objected At appellant to this definition comport because “it does not with what the majority of Appeals the Court Criminal

suggests definition.” The trial objection

court overruled this and refused appellant’s requested instruction. In his appellant argues brief now that the defini- tion as submitted confused the distinction

between “deliberate” and “intentional” be-

cause it used the words “with ... intent” to define argues “deliberate.” The State preserve any has failed to definition,

such error in the trial court’s agree. and we Appellant’s objection trial way in no specifically alerted the trial *3 committing in the course of

Ruth Deanda commit offenses of attempting “aggra- burglary, robbery, kidnapping and Prior vated sexual abuse.” to submission jury the State abandoned of the case to the theory of “aggravated sexual abuse” court The trial authorized offense. appel- jury to under theories that convict intentionally murdered in the lant Deanda committing attempting or to com- course of robbery kidnapping. burglary, mit either murder, Lesser included offenses bur- habitation, *4 invol- glary voluntary of untary manslaughter were also submitted. general appel- In a verdict found capital lant Article guilty of murder. See 37.07, 1(a), In accordance V.A.C.C.P. § issues, with answers to affirmative punishment the trial assessed court 37.071, (e), Ap- death. Article V.A.C.C.P. (h). Id., peal is to this automatic Court.

I. alleg- appellant

In his first of error support is insufficient to es con- jury’s Specifically, verdict. does tends not establish that the evidence beyond a doubt murder reasonable that the perpetrated in the commis- Deanda was attempted commission of sion underlying three felonies submitted to charge. jury in the court’s

A. following produced evi- State dence at trial: Scardino, Jr., Houston, Larry A.

Robert Urquhart, Brenham, appellant. P. Phone Calls Work Holmes, Jr., Atty., B. Dist. Har- John J. January Pam Knox testified Hudson, vey Totschall and Bert Gra- Glenn February she and Ruth Deanda ham, Houston, Attys., Asst. Dist. Robert clerks at together worked as a convenience Huttash, Austin, Atty., State’s for State. during the Sometime store Houston. February of a caller

second week spoke as “Lee” who identified himself Knox, According Deanda. Deanda OPINION speak seemed reluctant to with “Lee” WHITE, Judge. by telling him that ended her conversation appellant else and In a four count indictment she was “involved someone him at that she couldn’t be involved with accused of the offense murder Code, 19.03(a)(2). just Penal the time and she wished he would under V.T.C.A. § again alleged alternatively that leave her “Lee” called back The indictment alone.” briefly intentionally spoke caused the ten appellant death of minutes later Deanda later, “Leroy couple days Sey- with him. A Deanda driver’s license” with the name again Appellant told Knox mour” on it. Bond blood that Lee Gunter had called showed again on his shoes and told Bond that “the “pester- her at work and that he had been guy pretty Appellant bad.” had a ing was hurt girlfriend, Marylou her and her [Lo- pocket four-inch knife on sheathed his belt pez].” em- Deanda instructed fellow habitually. known to which he was wear ployees to tell future callers other than her mother that not there. Deanda was appellant her car and Bond asked about parked her that the car was told 21, 1986, Friday, February

On Knox ar- building. side of the other When Bond rived at the convenience store at about car, go appellant out to her started p.m. finishing as Deanda was her shift. asked her to wait and left. Bond waited Knox, According planned Deanda moment, then followed out to the apartment, meet someone at her and she parking lot getting where she observed him male, “implied and she was real out of a small Chevrolet. When Bond happy, real excited.” Deanda did not tell car, appellant asked about her own told her meeting. testi- Knox whom she was Other “my right get car was all or he didn’t me dating a mony indicated that Deanda was any trouble.” He said the Chevrolet be- Steve, man she left a club named and that longed Leroy Seymour. He told Bond Roper 11:00and 11:30 called Bill’s between Boy’s, her car that he was at Babba p.m. Friday night meet Steve at *5 would take her there once he was able another club called Struts. start Chevrolet.

Friday Night Appellant neigh- went to one of Bond’s gave help and him five dollars to old, bors Appellant, years who and his jump-start the Chevrolet. After unsuccess- 17-year-old Medina, companion, “Chachi” attempts ful start the car with the use of staying Cheryl had been Bond at her cables, suggested they 21, 1986, jumper neighbor apartment. Friday, February On complex Lee Bond, push the car out of the onto appellant drove with whom he was They hand-pushed the car onto a involved, Road. romantically in her to work Ford perpendicular appel- Lee Road street and up Appellant picked Fairmont. Bond after eventually into lant steered the Chevrolet p.m. Friday work at 9 and returned to driveway house close of an abandoned apartment. p.m., her At about 11 Medina neighbor to by. Appellant asked the tell go gave appellant wanted to home. Bond see her later. Bond that he would When keys to her car so that he could take return, appellant Bond called the failed home, asleep Medina and then fell police reported and that her car had been couch.

stolen. Saturday Morning Evening Sunday Saturday morning, 1:20 a.m. At about day, on Bond went to work later that appellant apartment returned to Bond’s Saturday, Sunday on she and walked ceiling fan in its and a radio. box looking her neighborhood for around Bond, According appellant said that car, Sunday, At on a Ford Fairmont. dusk buy ceiling fan and man wanted parked Bond saw Chevrolet permission asked Bond for to use her car house, Del- driveway of the abandoned again. appellant Bond consented and left again mack Bond went home and Street. apartment again her at about 1:40 a.m. police. called the Appellant apartment returned to Bond’s a.m., telling Bond he about 3:40 Monday Morning Bond, According appellant “in trouble.” County gotten fight Deputy of the Harris said that he had into a Shaver store, Boy’s” grocery Department met Bond at about “Babba had stabbed Sheriff’s someone, to the guy pret- Monday morning and went and “that the was hurt a.m. guy’s where the Chev- ty bad and he showed me ... a house on Delmack Street that he did happened, and what to know parked. discovered rolet was Shaver thought. anybody else Deanda, what not care to Ruth eventu- registered car was on Benmar. tracing her to an address ally “raped the him whether Bond asked Boy’s” run “Babba After a fruitless Appellant said “no.” appellant girl,” and car, Bond of Bond’s grocery store search to “know Bond he wanted again told Benmar proceeded to the and Shaver then that she replied Bond but happened,” what Bond’s Ford apartment, found where did know because what did not want to Fairmont. Appellant repeat. could not not know she found, and Deanda had been Fairmont, asked whether Shaver In the trunk of the Appellant then asked “yes.” containing packaged Bond said pillowcase found a dead, again said and Bond she was Bond whether pies ground beef. pot frozen pas- “yes.” ceiling fan in the the boxed observed car and an at- senger compartment of her Bond, then relat- appellant According to these in her trunk. None of items

las Friday previous her the events of ed to hers. gone to Dean- Bond he had night. He told glass, Enloe, and had broken apartment da’s Sergeant who Deputy Shaver into the and crawled scene, the window unlocked requested on the investi- had been home and discov- Deanda came They apartment. gated apartment. observed threat- apartment in her appellant ered door lock had bro- window near the been They him in.” talked glass ened to “turn Fingerprints on the broken ken. persuaded Deanda appellant’s. to match awhile were later found Deanda to take receiving Appellant then asked to. Knocking on Deanda’s door still messed doorknob, he was answer, they him home “because tried the but shoes, but agreed, looked for apart- up.” She apartment was locked. After the to wear door, find and decided the offi- could not them manager ment unlocked the night temperature that in her apartment. The fan booties. cers searched the *6 left in her degrees. They on, lights still had was about the bedroom was Boy’s. to Babba and went off, Chevrolet apartment turned and the entire been appeared undisturbed. police statement recalled As Bond 28, 1986, ap- February after given Friday, body morning that Deanda’s was

Later to her: pellant confessed clearing in the discovered face down in a got on of the “[Appellant] woods close to the abandoned house said that he out fastened, [Appellant] said strap Boy’s. still Delmack. Her bra was car at Babba that on the side pulled up her had been above her that he walked but bra a leak. on and he took knee-length stockings dumpster was breasts. Her were around down, guy that a came [Appellant] said partially pulled and her shorts and [Ap- him a knife. building, at her panties around one of were wadded guy took the at that time he pellant] said ankles. said that [Appellant] his knife. out with Appellant’s Tuesday Night he guy fought and that and the him [Ap- to Bond times. guy about three stabbed the Confession that he knew for sure pellant] said that Tuesday p.m. 10:00 on Between 9:30 and gut in the at least him he had stabbed appellant to find night, Bond was startled say [Appellant] did not where once. apartment. in her Accord- waiting for her [Appellant] time. said girl at this her, Bond, “Cheryl, ing appellant told got into the car and back that he went you for I would not hurt don’t be scared. Boy’s.” Babba they and left up anything in He raised his the world.” way back told Bond that Appellant if like for hands and asked her she would him “if him, Deanda asked apartment, give him her knife. She told Bond’s her, yes. and he said to with everything knife he wanted “just don’t touch the and they went to that is when alright.” Appellant [Appellant] her he said will be told house, found ... her, the car was he her where wanted to talk to that wanted he parked driveway.” [Appellant] in the himself in. told me ... turn [and] intercourse, having While sexual after he [appellant] couldn’t. I told that off,” suddenly meaning Deanda “went “she police. going I to call the left was screaming.” Appellant put started then [Appellant] said that he understood and her, quiet his hand over her mouth to but just asked if I do him one favor he began hitting scratching Deanda him. least an hour just and that was to wait at Appellant off himself then “went and he police. I I told him or two before call back,” started to hit her but he did not no, that I could not do that.” many he hit Deanda. recall how times De- left, appellant police. Bond called the When and, appellant anda then out” told “went night by Later informed De- that Bond, him. this scared appellant that had tective Gendrett been testimony, According appellant to Bond’s apprehended. then leaned over her to see Deanda was breathing barely pulse. felt a He then Appellant’s Midnight Confession grabbed legs pulled her her out to Detective Hill car, but “when he did that her head just J.R. Hill testified that be- Detective [Appellant] hit the concrete. said it sound- night, midnight Tuesday fore on he “re- somebody had ed like threw a brick [appellant] could ceived information that [Appellant] concrete and it bursted [sic]. just possibly in a vacant house that was grabbed leg said that then he one pulled By Cheryl her into the woods.” across the fence where Bond’s Saturday time it 4:00 a.m. morn- deputies was about Hill apartment was.” and two ing, appellant returned to Bond’s appellant there and arrested him. In found apartment. squad cage in the of one of the back Hill cars made a statement According given to Bond’s statement largely comported story that police Friday, February 1986: evening. Ac- had told Bond earlier that “I [appellant] told that I had been down Hill, however, cording appellant told him given to the Police station and that I had “slung” killed when he her to Deanda was [Appellant] if I statement. asked me ground; “just had smashed her that he him, every- lied. I told told them Appellant’s against face the concrete.” thing happened night. [Appel- Hill not reduced to writ- statement to good told me that was and that he lant] ing, recapitulate Hill’s trial testimo- sorry got but we he had me into all this [appellant] ny margin.1 mess. I told he needed to in the *7 rattling killing keys.... he 1. "He told me that Ruth had outside and He said [Deanda] accident, kind of been an and I don't recall if he behind the went and hid in the bathroom said that he didn’t mean to kill her or he didn’t he had the TV door.... He said that seen her, kill but one intend to either two.... sitting figured and when Ruth seen on the floor gone apartment said he had to Ruth’s on [H]e being see it and realize she was it she would Friday night Saturday early morning that or burglarized probably go and would to another and that he had intended to break into the apartment.... apartment police he to call the and at that time He said Chachi had [Medina] out_ get was—she could He said that as he they been him earlier and that had dis- with apartment, of her came into the and instead breaking apartment cussed into the but Chachi leaving thought started like he she would she it because he knew Ruth too had backed out on looking apartment in the like she was around He said after he had taken Chachi well.... seeing missing whatever.... He what was gone apartment home he had over to Ruth’s and walking around in the said that as she was got had He said that he into the broken in.... up apartment of the that she came to the door apartment was ... and he had taken a TV that apparently in and saw bathroom and looked sitting a stand or a and either on table ... he him behind the door.... So that time unplugged it and unhooked the cable from it open pushed and the door and went ahead wrapped up the cord.... He said that after and stepped and told her not to He out scream.... ready go had to he went to the kitchen he that apparently she said she didn’t scream and that taking things refrig- and started some was, recognized asking and she who he started Cheryl erator and cabinets Bond’s [to car].... why trying rip to her off.... He him he was things put After he in the car he went back a told him that she didn’t have apartment preparing said that she into the ... and was to begin footsteps with but whatever she had take the TV when he said he heard whole lot to fracture, skull Testimony Medical Examiner’s eye consistent legs and scratches on her lip bruised and Examiner, The Assistant Medical Dr. Jor- had an alcohol content don, He face. She also performed autopsy on Deanda. being five tall described Deanda as feet .10. approximately weighing pounds. and She had a black pulled willing off of one give kle. ... said he had them she would be him if he had asked He leg, just they on her the other he broke and and were ankle on her for it.... At that down up crying, cry leg_ pushed there he blouse started and I let him sit and said ... her [H]e crying pushed up several seconds and when he finished above breasts.... ... and her bra her shoes, person wearing any she he said that’s the kind of she was.... that said she wasn't [H]e just wearing He said when asked her not to scream he first white He said was booties.... they talking they apartment went and sat and started over that shoes, leave the she didn’t he down on the He said that could tell bed.... on white all she had was ... little that scared, still he wanted to relax. they getting she was and her it on in He said booties.... belt, he in the sheath So had knife on his get car and he the front seat of the wanted going he wanted he and her to know wasn't trying her into the back seat and was to talk So hurt her. he told her if it make her getting but want to. the back seat she didn’t into gave pulled and out the knife feel better he and She seat was He said said the front fine.... said she laid on the her knife.... He get that that he about to it off in her and telling him [S]he bed.... had been that if he suddenly just freaked and started she ... out gave wanted the have him had stuff she'd it to scratching said she He that whenever him.... they and all that and that had talked for about get scratching trying him he started started sitting 30 minutes is what he told me on the got out of after out —or he the car and that he talking bed.... He said that Ruth had been just crazy, got and out said I went that after he drugs him about and that she had told that him grabbed of the He said while car he her.... Mary- was the reason she had moved out from scratching just he went she him said he apartment Lopez’s lou was because she wanted car, crazy, trying get he was out of kids_ things He better for her said after ... got finally the car he and whenever he out of they had this conversation for a while asked she just grabbed punched reached in and her and put up him to her TV back He stand.... He that after he her the face.... said put up said that he TV back the stand just punched face she laid face down her in the up and hooked to it but the cable said that he right he reached his in the seat and that in with plug didn’t it back in.... He said that because got grabbed her and then hand and hair night, up indicating he drunk, messed that he was her with his other and started the arm hand trying that Ruth had started talk him dragging that He said her out car.... letting into her drive him home. [He indicated laying down in and he was she was face the seat girl- home that] wanted to take him in his car, standing in and he reached outside car_ friend’s he men- [Bond’s] had think right got grabbed hair with hand her apparently Cheryl's tioned that she had seen start- ahold arm with his other hand and of her agreed said he [Bond’s] car.... He to let dragging he ed out of the He said her car.... her take him home but then he remembered the car, dragging out of the and he said her her things he had out of the taken kitchen and had up just He feet were still on the seat. raised Cheryl’s put didn’t into car and he want her to just slung he her down.... He said see because he said he was ashamed.... against the He smashed her face concrete.... taking he He said talked her into him home said she said she never made noise.... got her car.... He went said out and she never must died real fast because left, into the car had and that went down body drug made a He said he sound.... Imperial Valley going turned east on He said he blood on his into woods ... had [driving towards Ruth was car] 59.... pants Cheryl shoes and that asked him and his according to said he him.... He had been *8 got into a about and he had told he had it staying Cheryl taking and she him fight guy Boy’s grocery Babba with a ... they driving He home.... said as were down had Lee Road and that he stabbed him.... him, Lee, you Ruth 525 that asked do want to be just think he went ahead and told her, he said that yes, with me? ... He said he told but he story he blood on her that because had the really didn’t think wanted to be he outside to He said that went back him.... you He him.... said that she said never know got get rid car and that he into of Ruth’s when you he till ask.... He said that asked her if she car it wouldn’t start.... asked [H]e [one wanted to.... He said that he directed her to neighbors] give Bond's if he him could drive to the Delmack.... house on He said jump.... I steered car back to the they got He said after ... the house on Delmack [t]o they house where I killed Ruth.... He getting on Delmack started it on.... He said caught get really he said must wanted to in the the car ... told were front seat of [H]e pulled Ruth he hitch- had because he said after killed that he her shorts down and her leg panties and turned and hitch- down and had taken them off one hiked to Kansas around just hanging and that an- hiked on her back." opinion by gravity It was Jordan’s that Deanda died have been caused the force of alone, pulled as a result of a fractured skull “with resul- she was feet first from the hemorrhage ground. tant subarachnoid her head struck the But due blunt car and trauma, By probable trauma to the head.” blunt “the more cause” of Deanda’s in- explained, redirect, jury, Jordan he meant “that either an Jordan maintained on object gravity, struck the head or the head struck not the mere force of “the use but surface,” object making or a but “the more of force the head considerable probable pavement cause was the use of considerable strike the or whatever surface.” making pavement force the head strike the (an phosphatase Jordan found no acid required or whatever surface.” The force enzyme present high concentration in blow, testified, to inflict the Jordan could semen), lacerations, abrasions, and no “no gravity have been the force of alone from a hemorrhage, no areas of or indication of height ground.2 at least two feet from the did, vaginal] He trauma area.” [the found one-inch Jordan laceration on the however, sperm deposited find in Deanda’s forehead, left side of her sur- which was vagina, but no tests were conducted to rounded an area of abrasion and bruis- appellant’s. determine whether it matched ing. He likely testified that “the most Jordan indicated that could have been laceration, possibility” was that the abra- up days there five to seven before bruising sion and were inflicted at death. time, same consistent with a “one-blowthe- ory.” Jordan concluded that the lack of B. hemorrhaging in the brain indicated that In Virginia, Jackson v. U.S. very quickly Deanda died after the fracture 2781, (1979), 61 L.Ed.2d 560 S.Ct. part” of “the most delicate of her skull. Supreme the United States Court identified body While the fluids in the were consis- determining process the test for the due down, having tent with her left face been sufficiency threshold for of the evidence to twigs and brush in the back of her hair “whether, viewing the evidence having was consistent with her been prosecution, light most favorable to the dragged up. face Jordan found no marks any rational trier of fact could have found body, eyes, on her or her which would beyond the essential elements of the crime indicate that she had been struck with a Id., a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at human fist. He testified that it was also 99 S.Ct. at 61 L.Ed.2d at 573. possible that Deanda had died from suffo- State, (Tex.Cr. Butler v. 769 S.W.2d 234 cation, although body the condition of her App.1989), this reaffirmed the “out Court indicated otherwise. standing hypothe alternative reasonable appellant weighed ap- analysis approach

Jordan estimated sis” as a “utilitarian” proximately pounds measuring sufficiency 145 or 150 and was of circumstantial ev ten, five “five nine.” When asked idence to ensure it meets minimum due prosecutor injury process requirements guarantee whether the to Deanda con person height proof was consistent with a and victions will not had on less than weight “smashing against beyond her face con- doubt. reasonable Carlsen v. crete,” ultimately responded 444 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) Jordan that it (Opinion rehearing).3 was. On cross-examination he admitted it on State’s motion for “possible” injury upon that Deanda’s could The State relies circumstantial evi- gave prosecutor photograph 2. The Jordan a 3. In Geesa this Court decided that appar- the car in which ently engaged and Deanda analytical “reasonable-hypothesis-of-innocence asked, you in sex and "Can tell light construct" was not valid "in of this Court’s upon just looking the members of the based abrogate earlier decision to the circumstantial *9 pictures given your at the of that car and basic State, charge.” Geesa v. 820 S.W.2d knowledge as an American consumer about cars (Tex.Crim.App.1991). at 155 This Court high appears ground about how it ... from the Geesa, however, also noted in that this decision replied, ap- the to proximately seat?” Jordan “Looks to be applied only to cases tried after Geesa. Geesa two, two and a half feet from the State, S.W.2d, at 163. ground." seat to the State, by the then presented of prove underlying dence the offenses tial evidence to Butler, supra, we both under robbery kidnapping, appellant and that Carlsen to hold the evidence “in of” be killed Deanda the course the admit- would constrained hand, If, the other excul- Appellant on burglary apartment. ted of her insufficient. of aspects appellant’s of version patory now that to Bond contends his statements necessarily contradict or conflict and Detective Hill raise alterna- events reasonable drawn from inculpatory inferences hypotheses negating tive inference with Deanda, presented kidnapped that or or other circumstantial evidence he robbed State, committing the all of the killed her “in the course of” the evidence viewed prosecution light favorable to the burglary. the most support rationally jury a verdict of would statements, According to appellant's beyond degree of confidence guilt to discovering her apartment, after him in doubt, we must hold the evi- reasonable appellant to home Deanda offered drive In ease sufficient. our view this dence him relations consented sexual with category. into latter falls the along way. Thus, being ab far from sufficient, ducted, To the evidence need accompanied appellant Deanda will ingly. Furthermore, may only support of the theories of it inferred one killing appellant’s jury. from murder submitted Pinkerton statements that the State, (Tex.Cr.App. perpetrated was not either the at 62 facilitate evidence, 1983). already Canvassing apart or burglary, complete, which car, aspects appellant’s taking exculpatory es of Deanda’s which was statements, afterthought. Although pre find it without dis sentially an we shows apart Deanda’s senting appellant’s pute appellant in their en that entered statements tirety chief, Appellant’s in its case in is no ment her consent. State without longer Deanda dis exculpatory portions bound to the statements establish that own State, had him there and that he a knife. therein. See Russeau v. 785 S.W.2d covered (Tex.Cr.App.1990). Having in Deanda’s car to no Thereafter drove burden Street, disprove Delmack exculpatory portions appel house on abandoned statements, however, appellant ne had sex Deanda and lant’s where with State body prove beyond must killed Deanda’s was found vertheless reasonable then her. woods, Al nearby doubt that he killed Deanda the course in the without shoes.4 acquainted attempted burglary, kidnap though apparently of actual or she beforehand, ping robbery. applying may In be inferred appellant the “reason phone calls at hypothesis” analysis, responses able alternative from her procedure accepting workplace that she had resolved correct involves her “[t]he him inculpatory circumstances and then have no further contact with ... apartment.5 asking him in her hypothesis if there a reasonable time she discovered friendly guilt story other that Deanda was Appellant’s than which also would account had him after she discovered he such circumstances.” Girard v. toward apartment, and she (Tex.Cr.App.1982). her that S.W.2d broken into home, Thus, him does not exculpatory aspects appellant’s volunteered to drive apparent in har aversion. Gir fully statements are consistent and “account for” supra. mony Because Deanda with all what would otherwise ard v. police, appellant him to appear purely inculpatory identify circumstan- could to be wear; shoes; pair explains appellant Dean- that she had other his statement that 4. willingly da been her In view had not able to find shoes. she leave in the middle just gotten had work the fact she home from night temperatures in the sixties wear- nightclub, jury and sonably presume one rea- at least could ing only pair and a of booties her feet. shorts wearing when she shoes apartment. discovered support a conclusion 5. There was evidence accepts story Even if one expected to that the "male” Deanda unidentified talked, sat on Deanda’s bed awhile and appellant, boyfriend, later but her meet reject could short contention in that misplace "Steve.” time amount of Deanda would *10 improp- Ralph Mrs. E. Frede was reperson silence her. have had a motive to would reasonably jury facts a could as a qualified From these she to serve er because willingly not accom infer that Deanda did in Adams juror under standards announced pany appellant, and that some force was Texas, 448 U.S. S.Ct. Accord likely used to overcome will. (1980) Wainwright v. L.Ed.2d 581 appellant “re ingly, it could found that Witt, 412, 105 S.Ct. 469 U.S. Deanda, contemplation strained” within the (1985). Specifically, appellant L.Ed.2d Code, 20.01(1)(A).6 Penal of Y.T.C.A. § though qualified even argues that she was Furthermore, to the that he took Deanda penalty the death since disagreed with support an infer house would abandoned conscientiously and she stated she could rise to ence that this restraint would soon obey the oath impartially apply the law “abduction,” purposes of the level of an juror.9 Appellant therefore asserts of a 20.01(2)(A).7 jury could reason Thus a § grant the trial court’s decision to at least at ably conclude against Mrs. challenge for cause State’s Deanda, tempting kidnap as that offense jury right impartial Frede violated Code, Penal 20.- by is defined Y.T.C.A. § by the and Fourteenth guaranteed as Sixth 03(a),8 killed her. at the time he the United States Constitu- Amendments to exculpatory portions ap- Because the tion. with pellant’s statements are not consistent other- all of the circumstances that would dire excerpt portions of Frede’s voir We appellant killed De- wise tend to establish appellant’s conten- examination to illustrate kidnap attempting anda the course questions propounded tion, beginning with her, present alter- they do not a reasonable attorney. by prosecuting hypothesis necessarily demonstrat- native Now, peo- lot of Q. knowing that a ... ing finding guilt beyond a reason- that a as a us that could not serve ple tell finding. View- able doubt is not a rational murder degree capital on a juror to that light most ing all of the evidence you you is: Do my question to case. So prosecution, while can- favorable to the we about your ybur reservations feel that — say appellant was the inference that penalty are such attempting kidnap Deanda when he serving on you from prevent one, particularly compelling killed is a answering murder and ever neither can we conclude that no rational questions punishment “yes” to those two accepted that to a jury could have inference presented degree beyond regardless a reasonable of what State of confidence Virginia, supra. We doubt. Jackson v. that make sense? as evidence? Does is sufficient to sustain hold the evidence part the first you stopped If A. jury’s verdict and overrule question. first of error. respect my from co- Q. Okay. get counsel.

II. the death your reservations about three, Would points of error two answering prevent you from ever penalty of veni- appellant asserts that the dismissal (A) (1)(A), secreting holding place where or him in a supra, reads: 6. 20.01 § likely “(1) [.]" he is not person's to restrict a 'Restrain' means found consent, so as to interfere movements without substantially 20.03(a), supra, 8. reads: § liberty, moving with his him confining place another or him. one "(a) person if he inten- A commits an offense consent’ if it is accom- Restraint is ‘without person.” tionally knowingly abducts another or by: plished intimidation, (A) force, deception[.]" point and hereaf- referred to at this 9. The oath (All emphasis supplied unless otherwise indicat- 35.22, “You and is that of Art. V.A.C.C.P.: ter ed.) solemnly you that in the case each do swear defendant, you 20.01(2)(A), against the supra, the State of Texas reads: 7. § according law render to the a true verdict "(2) person will to restrain a ‘Abduct’means evidence, help you God.” by: so prevent his liberation the intent *11 that no mat- Q. Okay. Does that mean in the punishment questions those two might kind of evidence the State ter what affirmative? case, case, capital murder present in a IA. don’t know ... ques- say “yes” to those you could never dire From her initial answers to the voir “yes” you you if said tions because know capital questions, position Frede’s Ms. penalty would result? the death Upon uncertain. fur- punishment appeared the same you asking I are me A. think however, questioning, she voiced ther already that I’ve answered. questions penalty. During opposition to the death I’m not Q. You answered it. haven't following questions, she indicates that duty to quarrel. I’m under a trying to “yes” special she could never answer to you asking you questions unless keep issues10: to of- say “yes” “no.” I don’t want or Graham) my I Q. (By ... think Mr. times, many by asking too but you fend imagine yourself question you is: Can explain. I am my me to counsel wants any in kind of a murder case ever your hear answers earli- not deaf. I did punishment voting “yes” to those two did; er, I we do have but—and but guilty of questions you somebody if find “Yes, answers, either, I have definite capital murder? if the questions ‘yes’ could answer those feeling way I think I do that A. knowing the the case to me proved State not to probably it would be better for me result,” or, “No, I penalty death would I jury be on a where would have I feel like I do about couldn’t because questions. consider those I have and the reservation penalty Q. See, feelings your I understand ‘Yes’to those it I could never vote about feeling very that’s a natural to have. we’re questions.” I mean that’s where Unfortunately in the law we have realize, get I but we have stuck have definite answers— “yes” or “no.” A. Oh. case, no Okay. A. In that ... Q. way stage —one or the other questions by the After several other may you which seem unfair because ha- State, venireperson then examined anything ven’t heard evidence or else Next, the court by Appellant. counsel you’re having project into the concerning her the witness addressed do; you future about what would but the penalty. Finally, she on the death views requires you law us to ask to be definite again by the State. Ms. questioned you about whether or not could do that ap- penalty to the death opposition Frede’s stage you because we can’t at this reinforced when she peared to be further not,” say “maybe” “maybe then by the State whether she could was asked put you jury month and then a juror. responded of a the oath She follow realize, you finally “Hey, I now special issues answering “yes” to the that press you to can’t do it.” So we have to violating her conscience and mean would you say “yes” get or “no” whether Spe- the oath. therefore could not take she say you “yes” or not could ever to those cifically, responded prosecutor’s to the questions. following in manner: questions Well, I think since there is a me earlier Q. you A. doubt From what told ... say Mr. my you mind it for me to told Scardino would be better and from what feeling you saying that got the no. (2) probability guilty, 10. When whether there is was found acts of vio- defendant would commit criminal following required special to answer the continuing that would constitute lence during sentencing phase: issues society; threat “(1) the defendant whether the conduct of evidence, (3) the con- whether if raised that caused the death of the deceased was killing the deceased duct of the defendant deliberately committed the reason- response provoca- to the was unreasonable expectation able the death of the de- tion, any, the deceased.” result; ceased or another would 37.071(b). Art. your feelings penalty about the death She stated that she could the oath follow prevent taking you from ever “yes”; and answer the issues how- *12 well, say, oath that would I affirm or ever, response prior questions, to capital swear that in this murder case I not answer the spe- that she could stated according will a true verdict render to “yes” if cial issues it meant that the death help the law and the so me God. evidence penalty Specifically, would result. the fol- Basically you saying you are that would lowing interchange occurred: juror; swear to follow the law as a that Q. Okay. you If ... were forced to you you’d if took that oath then be put jury take an oath to be on the on placed jury you on a would have to jury you like a murder case laws; follow these that I understood but you heard that be- convinced you say your feelings to that were such yond a reasonable doubt that the defen- you conscientiously that could never take guilty dant was and that the answers to you you that oath because if know did punishment questions those two should you’ll placed then the situation of “yes,” you would nonetheless have to having disagree to that follow laws questions answer one of those “no” to your feelings; with conscience and get make sure the defendant didn’t that correct? penalty? (sic) thought A. I I that was choices A. No. being given, yes. Q. you Okay. assuring Then are me Q. I think that’s the choice the law— if you put jury that were on a like that my understanding A. That what proved you and the State that you said. “yes” punish- answers should be to those Q. is; way That’s the I understand it questions you say ment that would you conscientiously you that if feel that “yes”? actually “yes” if say You would not, placed could should not be in the you put jury on and if it were this were position having your to violate con- proven beyond a reasonable doubt? you science then don’t have to take the A. Yes. you disagree oath to the laws that follow Q. you saying You realize what are my with to that extent. is it under- So now? standing you that if were asked to serve on a A. require you that would an- Yes ... “yes” punishment ques- swer those dire, Towards the end of her voir Ms. tions, you got if that far that the law again Frede once contradicted her initial required you say “yes” if the State following questions answers. case; proved you its that could never asked and answered: just you take that oath? I read to be Graham) Q. guess I I’m (By Mr. ... particular type juror of a because obligated you concerned that feel some- answering “yes” questions to those how, know, you the law and it follow your

would violate conscience to the may particular moment be at this over- you conscientiously would not know, riding, you you might really what juror; take oath to be a is that you get tonight you feel when home correct? up I sat there and realize bombard- A. That’s correct. questions. ed me a bunch of Then Q. Okay. thought straight, I when it was all challenge MR. GRAHAM: We on that me, Judge questioned then me talked to basis, Your Honor ... some more I was confused because about point, judge get laying get- At I trial did not it. When home down grant challenge ting ready go sleep the State’s for cause. In- the bottom line stead, prosecutor probe going was allowed to is I’m to have to vote for the death case, proves if penalty further into Ms. Frede’s beliefs. This re- the State their them, contradictory why why didn’t I tell didn’t I do vealed somewhat answers. challenge for ruling I on a them when Why just didn’t tell that? cause, judge It’s late. trial must determine had a chance. too you. prospective juror’s views I told A. I think whether or sub penalty prevent Q. Okay. the death their stantially impair performance penal- not in favor of the death A. I’m juror asked I had to be accordance ty. When duties as those “yes” I could jury, if answer given by the court instructions yes. questions answer is juror. taken Farris oath say Q. you really you could Then feel De (Tex.Cr.App.1990); *13 questions? the “yes” to 701, State, at 717 799 v. S.W.2d Blanc Objection, ROBERT SCARDINO: Witt, MR. v. (Tex.Cr.App.1990); Wainwright thing. requires inquiry the same the 850, U.S., 420, S.Ct., 83 L.Ed. 105 at at 469 THE COURT: Overruled. U.S., Texas, at 849; 448 2d, Adams v. at really Graham) you If Q. (By Mr. S.Ct., L.Ed.2d, 45, 2526, at 589. at 65 100 questions then say “yes” these could juror prospective presented with a When proved you if the State the conflicting feelings regarding who has yes. answered should be oath, punish law, juror’s the Yes. A. ment, judge unique position in the trial a Q. really You would do that? feelings same whether those to determine Yes ... A. substantially impair or prevent would juror. a venireperson’s performance as held point, a discussion was At State, S.W.2d, It is 819 at 501. Farris v. court, prosecutor, appel- among ju prospective requirement that a attorney not a lant’s wherein each communicated opinion regard- proven unmistakable respective on the law ror’s their bias Id.; State, ing granting challenge a for cause based 799 S.W.2d clarity. DeBlanc v. juror’s penalty. views on the death judge’s on a trial This court accords the at 717. recess, Frede asked After a lunch Ms. regard given in this ruling great deference questions during a few more the court a judge’s trial determination that the incorrectly commu- which it was somewhat prevented or juror prospective would be to her that had a choice wheth- nicated she his impaired obeying substantially from juror’s When she er to take oath. following instructions is based his oath her take the communicated desire to not of the venire- largely upon determinations oath, challenge for the State renewed its credibility and demeanor. Farris person’s granted. trial cause which the court then 501; v. State, Fearance 819 S.W.2d at v. (Tex.Cr. State, 486, 771 S.W.2d at 501-02 challenge properly The state may trial determining App.1988). In whether refuses to follow a venireman granting the discretion judge abused truthfully answer statutory scheme and prospec challenge for cause to questions put judge. the trial State’s 422, Witt, U.S., testimony as a whole juror, juror’s 105 Wainwright v. 469 at tive L.Ed.2d, State, S.Ct., 83 If the 819 at at 850. v. must examined. Farris law, obey 501; State, is to his oath and follow the 771 juror S.W.2d, at Fearance v. willing accept that only to he must be S.W.2d, 500. at accept is an in certain circumstances death almost identical The facts Farris were also the statuto penalty but to answer able Farris, in the instant to those case. ry questions without distortion conscious during juror questioned prospective State, (Tex.Cr. v. 726 39 bias. Ellis S.W.2d concerning on the death dire her views voir U.S., Texas, at App.1986); Adams at Farris v. penalty. S.Ct., L.Ed.2d, at 590. could Initially, she that she 499. stated take the demon Refusing juror’s oath not, circumstances, ver- render a under person’s prevent that a them strates views penalty. Id. assessed the death juror. dict which carrying out the duties of a - however, S.W.2d, questioning, 44. Upon further See Ellis venireperson “vacillated.” at 500. regarding Id. She evidences that her beliefs stated that she would follow the oath of a penalty beyond merely went influenc- juror and “yes” vote issues ing her in her guilt deliberations at the proper “in the proper ease and the evi- punishment phases of the trial. The trial although dence” to do so would have “vio- judge position the best to determine Throughout lated conscience.” Id. prevent whether would or substantial- dire, remainder of repeated the voir ly impair performance duties. opposed that she penalty to the death ruling. We will therefore defer to his Ac- but understood the oath and would not cordingly, points of error two and three are violate it. Id. Confronted with these overruled. facts, we held that presented with “[w]hen prospective juror conflicting who has III. feelings regarding law, juror’s oath, capital punishment, Appellant argues the trial in his fourth judge unique position is in a to determine of error that the trial court erred in whether feelings prevent those same striking venireperson Ralph Mrs. Frede be *14 substantially impair venireperson’s appellant’s cause counsel was not allowed performance Id., juror.” as a at 501. to cross-examine her before the State’s Since judge we believed that the trial was challenge for cause was sustained. As position in the best to determine her support proposition, appellant for this cites feelings opposition capital pun- towards holding this court’s in Perillo v. 656 performance ishment would effect the (Tex.Cr.App.1983). S.W.2d 78 juror, duties as a we to deferred his Perillo, In the defendant was never al- ruling. Id., 501, at fn. 3. question prospective juror. lowed to Per- We find in this case that the trial court illo, supra juror at 79. After this had been granted did not err when it the State’s dire, examined during the State voir it challenge against for cause Mrs. Frede. could not be determined whether he held strong feelings She had about the death prevented views that him making from an penalty which were reflected in her voir impartial decision on the imposition of the initially dire answers. She stated that she Id., penalty. death at 81. The Court then special could not answer the “yes” issues if granted challenge the State’s for cause imposition meant penalty. against venireperson. Id. Defense She then stated that she could follow the counsel, however, given was never op- an oath and “yes”, answer the issues portunity question person. to this Id. Be- although it would “violate her conscience.” 2, cause Article 35.17 V.A.C.C.P.11ex- § wholly This was not inconsistent with her pressly allows the defendant to examine previous opposition answers since her to cases, prospective jurors capital in felony capital punishment was still evident. Addi- found that it error we was to refuse de- tionally, her comment that following the opportunity question fense counsel the might oath violate her conscience seemed venireperson granting before forgotten to be progressed. as the voir dire challenge State’s for cause. Id. Her may prevented views therefore have Perillo, Unlike defendant performing her from juror. duties as a Additionally, feelings given opportuni- the instant case was may pre- these have answering ty venireperson vented her from to examine statutory Frede. She questions initially questioned without conscious distortion or was State juror’s bias. The entire voir dire testimony passed Next, then counsel. 35.17, 11. Article provided Then, opinion. 2§ at the time: on demand of the State or defendant, case, capital felony In a either is the court entitled to examine each shall propound panel prospective juror the entire individually apart on voir dire jurors questions concerning principles, as panel, may question the entire further trial, applicable to the case on of reasonable juror principles propounded by doubt, proof, burden of return of indictment court. by grand jury, innocence, presumption of ap questioned by (Tex.Cr.App.1991), The 365 we will consider she was the Court. propound penal then addi- pellant’s State was allowed claims that the Texas death questions venireperson Fi- tional Frede. ty applied unconstitutional as scheme was nally, challenge the State’s for cause was case, appellant In the instant to him. be granted appellant noting objection. family background and lieved his turbulent Although appellant may preferred mitigating ef youth would have a relative prospective juror re-examine the immedi- punishment deliberations. jury’s fect on the ately ruling before the court’s on the chal- whether, in the ab We must determine cause, lenge say appel- we cannot informing them sence of instructions given opportunity ques- lant give appel could effect to consider hold, therefore, tion Ms. Frede. We mitigating evidence, lant’s complied the trial court with Article 35.17 provided expressing a with a vehicle for result, 2. As a is overruled. § response” “reasoned moral to that evidence reaching its verdict. Gosch v. IV. (Tex.Cr.App.1991); S.W.2d at 785 Pen points ap of error five and six U.S., S.Ct., ry Lynaugh, pellant complains of the exclusion of veni- L.Ed.2d, at 284. reperson Spradling. Specifically, ap Janet Expert testimony during punishment pellant venireperson’s asserts that this be phase Penry established the defen- disqualify serving liefs did not her from as mildly moderately dant retarded. juror granting in a case and that Penry Lynaugh, supra. Although he challenge the State’s for cause violated his twenty-one years old when he commit- right impartial jury guaranteed by to an as *15 crime, charged the ted the the defendant had Sixth Fourteenth Amendments to However, learning ability year the United States Constitution. of a six-and-a-half the object did not maturity when the court old and the social of a nine or ten granted challenge the State’s for A cause. year old. It was further established that timely objection required preserve a Penry organic from “an brain dis- suffered complaint appellate for review. Tex. order at the time of the offense which 52(a). R.App.Proc. Points of error five and impossible appreciate made it for him to six consequently are overruled. wrongfulness of his conduct or con- Penry conduct to the form his law.” was V. routinely severely punished and beaten as seven, In of error number Additionally, Penry a child. was and out 37.071, appellant asserts that Article throughout hospitals of state and schools V.A.C.C.P.12is unconstitutional as was experts his childhood. The state’s testified applied to him. Specifically, appellant ar “Penry person extremely that was a of gues given that the jury instruction to the ability, limited mental and that he seemed penalty phase pursuant of the trial from his mistakes.” This unable to learn to this deprived jury Article “two-edged a evidence was found procedure considering giving for only could reduced sword”: it not weight mitigating concerning evidence crime, pointed culpability for the but also background his childhood and in order that finding dangerousness. toward a of future they might return a sentence less than Supreme Penry’s Court found that death. The record does not reflect that retardation, damage, mental brain appellant requested an he instruction which background unique was evidence which adequately jury believed more directed the culpability. was relevant to his moral Fur- mitigating consider his evidence. thermore, that, Supreme Court held unique Penry Lynaugh, Pursuant to v. 492 because of the nature of this evi- U.S. (1989) dence, special punishment 109 S.Ct. issues sub- L.Ed.2d 256 State, jury Penry’s and Black v. 816 S.W.2d at 364- at trial did not mitted 12. See Footnote 9. State, Nobles v. S.W.2d 503 express- for death.

provide with a vehicle State, v. Goss response (Tex.Cr.App.1992); to that ing its “reasoned moral State, 165; Lackey v. rendering its decision.” evidence S.W.2d 135, fn. 10. Appellant pointed Court to evidence he at trial showed that presented which defendant, ap- like Goss Appellant as a child. estab- was abused case, presented evi- in the’ instant pellant his natural mother abandoned lished that childhood. Goss a dence of troubled adoptive age three-and-a-half. His him at S.W.2d, included at 166. This disciplinarians also parents were strict shoe, a youngster as a with a being beaten a him to school and unfed as sent unbathed However, Id. belt, and a wooden slat. punishment. A record that form of school any mental testimony there was as into admitted evidence documented actually damage physiological disorder sexually suspicion teacher’s explained by the" defendant suffered authority testi- abusing him. One school “culpable than why morally he less “deep appellant manifested emotional fied excuse.” Id. had who no such defendants Appellant developed behavior- problems.” relevant, held that evidence was We problems and there is some evidence al issues, to scope special beyond the impairment and a hearing from a suffered jury’s individualized assessment time in and learning spent disorder. He the crime. culpability moral defendant’s juvenile and facilities and out of foster by the presented Id. None of the evidence age expelled adoptive from his home at the sought explain the connection defendant twenty years He old of seventeen. problems of his childhood between crime. he committed the instant when held the crime. Id. We commission childhood was troubled defendant’s Evidence about jury’s encompassed adequately within background and is relevant be character two —whether consideration issue criminal acts defendants who commit cause indica- or an the murder was aberration disadvantaged that are attributable propensity to com- of the defendant’s tion background, or to and mental emotional Id., at 167. acts violence. defen mit future problems, may culpable be less than have no dants who such excuse. Califor *16 Goss, no evi appellant presented inAs Brown, 837, 538, nia v. 479 107 S.Ct. U.S. sought explain the connec dence which State, 934; Goss v. L.Ed.2d 826 S.W.2d 93 appellant’s troubled childhood tion between 162, However, instruc jury at 165-166. Appel the crime. the commission of type mitigating evidence tion on this of tend does not background evidence lant’s required mitigating the may not be unless act, such explain or his criminal excuse special the verdict evidence relevant damage organic brain as the evidence has to the defen questions, or relevance presented mental retardation that scope beyond the culpability dant’s moral “Sympa Penry, supra. defendant the State, questions. Lackey v. of the verdict during plight may be to his thetic as we 111, (Tex.Cr.App.1989). at 819 S.W.2d 135 adolescence, think do not we childhood less might rationally found Lackey, appellant be suggested “In we culpable for morally his adult behavior the mitigating may evidence be relevant basis, mor according contemporary pro of the this jury’s individualized assessment seg significant as shared if nexus between al values priety of death there is a State, v. society.” Draughon circum our the ment of mitigating evidence and (Tex.Cr.App.1992). What might, 331 crime that 831 S.W.2d surrounding' stances may relevance evidence society, reduce ever viewpoint from ” issues, adequately it encom Goss special the defendant’s ‘deathworthiness.’ spe jury’s consideration State, passed In other at 165. v. 826 S.W.2d State, 827 Fuller v. S.W.2d words, excuse or cial issue two. tend to must Goss (Tex.Cr.App.1992); act, make that at criminal so as to explain the State, (Tex.Cr.App. deserving 826 S.W.2d defendant particular V.A.C.C.P., 1992); 38.22, 3(c), State, and al- Earhart v. at Article § regarding (Tex.Cr.App.1991); testimony the statement. Lackey lowed Appellant asserts that for an oral state- 819 S.W.2d at 134. 38.22, under Article ment to be admissible appellant’s We also find that childhood 3(c), must the facts in the statement § scope sexual abuse evidence was within police the state- unknown to the at the time special issue two. The evidence number given. ment is that docu- was limited to a school record suspicion. grade ments a school teacher’s appellant’s The deemed oral trial court allegations proven These never nor were since it contained the statement admissible they supported by testimony dur- oral following of facts or circum- assertions Nevertheless, ing trial. even such abuse true and stances which were found existed, or “nex- there was connection guilt: conduced establish charged us” between and the offense. 1) deceased’s The television set Appellant guilty was not found of a sexual living room was connected to the cable jury charge direct a crime. did not outlet, plugged into the electrical but not jury murder conviction if the found outlet; during a murder course was committed 2) appellant’s girl- Food was found committing attempting to commit an car; friend’s aggravated Appellant’s sexual assault. 3) found, her When the deceased was own oral statement reflected that the sex clothing arranged in the condition between he and his consensual. victim was by appellant in his oral state- described Appellant during punish- also testified ment; phase ment that it was consensual. Since 4) body appellant’s The scratches on by appellant the crime committed was not statement; his oral were consistent with charged offense, as a sexual we find no nexus it and between his childhood sexual 5) portion Anthony Harris verified the abuse. We therefore find that the describing his as- statement adequately provided issues jury with a pushing sistance to the expressing vehicle for a reasoned moral driveway at deceased’s automobile to the response reaching to that evidence in its 14919 Delmaek. verdict. Gosch v. S.W.2d argues corroborating Appellant these 786-86. already police to the facts were known Appellant argues also in his seventh made and it was when statement was point of error that Article 37.071 is uncon- therefore inadmissable. applied stitutional as to him because rule, general As a oral confes precluded giving any miti- 38.22, *17 gating sions are not admissible. Article youth. effect to his In relative 3(a); State, Briddle v. 742 S.W.2d 379 Lackey, age we held that ais factor that § State, (Tex.Cr.App.1987); can Jimmerson be considered within the ambit of the State, (Tex.Cr.App.1978); 661 S.W.2d 5 McGil second issue. Lackey v. 819 State, (Tex.Cr.App. very 533 24 S.W.2d aspects appellant’s S.W.2d at 134. All of 1976). 38.22(c), 3(c), However, in Article seventh of error § are therefore over- provided: effect at that time ruled. (a) (Art. section of this “Subsection

VI. (oral) 38.22) apply shall state- not error, eighth point appel In his of ment assertions of facts which contains argues lant that the trial court in that are found to be erred circumstances overruling suppress appel his motion to true and which conduce to establish the accused, guilt finding lant’s oral statement Hill such as the to Detective J.R. of the in- permitting testify property and also Hill to of secreted or stolen or the Detective the about the statement. The trial court ruled strument with which he states of- that the statement under committed.” was admissible fense was 448 38.22, 3(c), made, given they subsequently in example

The Article when were were § corroborated, only a limitation on the is illustrative and not and conduced to establish which to establish guilt, the statements conduce the defendant’s deemed that we guilt and true. Briddle v. shown be Id. properly statement was admitted. S.W.2d, State, 742 at “While some 388. “Implicit holding in this the notion that case indicates that the oral confession law ‘found to true’ meant that facts about be recovery or statement must lead to the of police are time of which the unaware at the information confes items or before the oral confession, later, confession are after the admissible, sion or statement is the statute State, true.” found Romero v. plainly requires only the statement (Tex.Cr.App.1990). at S.W.2d 544-545 are assert facts or circumstances that At least two of the assertions of fact found to be true and conduce which made the in his oral statement of Port v. guilt establish the the accused.” police information revealed which the (Tex.Crim. State, 791 S.W.2d at prior A limit- unaware the statement. by an App.1990). Oral made statements investigation apartment ed the victim’s in the accused need not lead or result was made between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. on long discovery incriminating evidence so February 24, Monday, During the 1986. requirements as the of the statutes are morning early Wednesday, hours of Febru- Additionally, places statute met. Id. the 26, 1986, ary appellant gave an state- oral upon the the no limitation manner which police in which he that he ment revealed Id.; facts are found be true. Briddle v. stealing decedent’s televi- intended the State, instance, at For the S.W.2d 388. killed; however, night she sion on the may facts “found a third to be true” caught he stated that when he was State, party. Briddle v. at 388. S.W.2d taking television, act of he returned Subsequent of facts corroboration location, in the plugging to its initial cable previously in an oral statement which were connection not the electrical cord. but make unknown will an oral statement ad police then search of conducted second missible. Port v. apartment morning of the victim’s Port, 107. defendant arrested February 27, During Thursday, 1986. 8,1984, suspicion on June under of murder search, photo was revealed taken which ing postal carrier. Port v. This unplugged. the television was S.W.2d, arrest, at 105. At the time of his previously unknown “found to be fact was body deceased could not be locat guilt. true” established During transportation po ed. to the Id. Additionally, beyond evidence went station, orally lice admitted defendant it result- requirements statute since shooting the in the head. deceased twice discovery incriminating evi- ed in the exiting police Id. While car at the Although dence. there is no indication station, gun defendant noticed a police were aware that the television arresting possession officer’s and identified unplugged during first search Id., it as the one “used to kill her.” apartment, not the victim’s body of 106. The the deceased was significance of this fact have known following January. until the Id. A found even had noticed it. autopsy subsequent revealed that the de in the Additionally, appellant police told A ceased was shot twice in the head. Id. *18 early morn- during oral statement that the gun test then that the ballistics established February ing Saturday, hours of weapon the defendant identified was the Anthony attempt Harris him helped the from which bullets were fired. Id. ultimately He start Ruth Deanda’s car. Thus, autopsy and the ballistics results ver driveway left the car in the of a vacant to be ified or “found true” the facts just he had house where killed the victim defendant’s oral statement. The state the statement, Prior the oral properly therefore ad hours before. ments were deemed Anthony Id., police 108. in did not Har- mitted. Since the assertions the know ap- by police helped appellant the car until push the statement were ris the unknown granting erred in autopsy Like the that the trial court pellant told them. Port, challenge against for cause venire- report subsequent po- in State’s ballistics majority The holds that Anthony Harris “found to man Frede. lice interview justified finding in trial court was appellant’s true” the facts in oral state- “feelings” penalty about Frede’s ment. This was therefore an assertion answering her from “may prevented his oral statement which was subse- within statutory questions without conscious to es- quently corroborated and conduced At 444. The trial distortion or bias.” guilt. appellant’s tablish court, however, finding. never made such a If but one of the assertions within fact, apparent to me that the trial In it is and con a confession is found to be true made Frede court assertions believed accused, guilt duces to show special issues hon- that she could answer in its en then the confession admissible evidence, estly and in accordance with S.W.2d, 107; State, tirety. Port v. imposition if her resulted in even answers State, (Tex.Crim. Marini v. 593 S.W.2d penalty. of the death The trial court never- case, App.1980). In the instant at least two granted challenge theless State’s appellant’s oral assertions of fact state authority of Ellis v. cause on ment found to true and conduced (Tex.Cr.App.1986),for no other S.W.2d 39 guilt. to establish Cf. Almanza v. his opined given that if reason than that Frede (Tex.Cr.App. at 821 opportunity opt out of the distasteful 1992). therefore need not address the We issues, special duty honestly answer the remaining assertions which the trial court my In this cause demon- she would. view Accordingly, the statement. used admit has created strates distortion Ellis point this of error is overruled. the law. VII. A. error, point ninth ar- had acknowledged Frede Venireman

gues that the trial court erred in submit- penalty. the death “reservations” about ting charge to the that directed them Asked whether her reservations would to convict him of murder if special one of the cause her to answer found he murdered the deceased while irrespective prov- issues “no” of evidence kidnapping robbery. Ap- the course of ing beyond to her a reasonable doubt pellant asserts that there nowas first “yes,” Frede at should be answered support charge. analysis this under I mean she an- equivocated, which point supports of error number one our swered, “I don’t know.” Pressed for holding that there was sufficient evidence answer, she indicated she more definite support charge. Accordingly, appel- way questions in a could not answer the lant’s ninth of error is overruled. imposition result in of the death that would Having considered each of However, trial court penalty. when the error, points nine do not we believe her, apparently changed questioned Frede judgment of them merit reversal tune, point on main- and from that Appellant’s of the trial court. conviction steadfastly tained that she could answer and his sentence of death are affirmed. honestly and in accor- issues the evidence. She later ex- dance with CAMPBELL, J., concurs in the result. inconsistency to the plained apparent MALONEY, J., dissents. thusly: prosecutor, CLINTON, Judge, dissenting. “Okay. you I under- Let me tell what plenty all this because it’s stand about

I. confusing. thought I I At first that was majority’s being given I dissent first of all to the asked that the choice would *19 disposition third er- not be on this because of death cause, in complains penalty, ror in which he I said I not. Then would doubt that answers if I’m a reasonable question I was asked was the other though questions I should be jury, even one of these forced to be each jury, ‘yes.’ on this kind a you don’t want be them “yes” would answer ques- truthfully to those could answer is THE That correct. PANELIST: n yes.” to that is tions and the answer previously also THE You’ve COURT: answered, deviation, And so she without want to take you would not stated her voir dire. for the remainder of juror. the oath as denying prosecutor’s chal- initially In right. That’s THE PANELIST: cause, opined: lenge the trial court for right. All Understand- THE COURT: every juror in case I think when “... way, penalties any ing there is no against expresses personal prejudice refusing for to take an shape or form can law, question then becomes you if to ask juror, as a I were oath trial. There are they set it aside for this you can you in up stand and swear with; agree but jurors lots laws don’t no take the oath and say I will refuse to law, they take an oath to follow when can walk out problem, you refused. You says it they the law where can follow courtroom, know, penalty, no you of the qualified. This ‘yes,’ then are wom- nothing. only The no consequences, if a number of times now an has stated juror. as a you is not serve result would juror an oath as a to follow she takes us, if I you have told Based on what Texas, beyond a if she believes law up right now you to ask to stand ques- to both of those doubt the answer following oath you to the and to swear answer ‘yes,’ tions should she will render you a true verdict would if takes an yes. has stated she them She evidence, according the law and the will follow what the juror oath as a your response? Would would be what is. law juror or would to the oath as a you swear said she wouldn’t She [Prosecutor]: not take say Judge, I’d like to—I will you the oath— take oath. jurors my THE mind do COURT: given the If I’m THE PANELIST: whether or not have a choice as to not say I not take I would would choice to take an oath.” want oath. being agreement I am on record as Okay. THE COURT: State, 757 this last remark. Hernandez v. re- The would State [PROSECUTOR]: (Plu- (Tex.Cr.App.1988) at 753 S.W.2d challenge for cause. new its rate, any junc- at this rality Opinion). At granted.” THE That will be COURT: chal- ture the trial court denied State’s cause, agreed supply to look at the trial lenge for but did indeed prosecutor hour, prosecutor could muster over authority authority during the lunch court with here, There, hour. the lunch as supra. viz: Ellis v. he would answer who said a venireman reconvening Immediately upon after honestly and in accordance special issues lunch, again questioned the trial court veni- challenged for cause the evidence Frede: reman acknowledged that he “would because he couple A more min- “THE COURT: “a true verdict an oath to not want to” take utes, question. one You Dr. Frede. Just V.A.C.C.P., 35.22, knowing render,” Article you if an oath previously stated that took him, force should the might proved if juror; serve as a the State in such a dictate, special issues to answer that the you beyond a reasonable doubt imposition way as to cause him guilty, you’d find defendant was penalty.1 proved you beyond guilty; the State jury, nevertheless robbery would prosecution lected to serve on the in a 1. Would we hold subject challenge he also who maintains he would for cause because that a venireman robbery legislature choice, simply as the given define the offense of maintained that if 29.02, Code, but § chose to do in V.T.C.A.Penal oath? There not take the Article 35.22 legislative definition if se- would abide

451 preference not take cause he felt Frede’s to B. indication she could not the oath was an granting does not authorize Ellis honestly discharge duty and without her challenge for cause in this The cause. Clearly conscious or distortion. he held bias reason the Court Ellis that a venire- Rather, man’s prefer statement that he would not he did so be- believed she could. support granting to take the oath will cause he that Ellis authorized the believed challenge of a for cause it is State’s is that challenge granting of for cause the State’s that, despite some assertions to against she solely Frede because acknowl- contrary, really the venireman like- will edged duty find that dis- she would ly by scruples against affected his so tasteful, possible. if avoid it and would penalty consciously as distort given no basis Such a venireman has for his issues. 726 answers See “substantially conclusion or she is that he Obviously rejected S.W.2d at 43-44. Texas, impaired” under Adams v. 448 U.S. Id., J., reasoning. (Clinton, this 51-53 38, 2521, (1980).2 100 65 L.Ed.2d 581 S.Ct. dissenting). agreed if I But even side-steps preference majority Ellis The reversible error majority that a mere not to take the oath is some evidence of a finding by the trial deferring to a court distort, propensity to I would reverse 444-45. that was made. At The never cause. judge trial did not excuse Frede for here regarded preference cause her because he

A venireman who maintains he can fol- not to take the oath as an indication she subject low the should not be law deemed The trial challenge ground judge for cause on no could not follow the law. other than prefer put that he would not preferred to be excused her she not to because position, given and would refuse if oath, Presumably period. take even option. only juror “The reason for a not majority in Ellis would have en- if refuse to take the oath is he cannot dorsed such a rule. State, supra (Clin- follow it.” Ellis v. at 53 I would that the trial court excused hold ton, J., dissenting). See also Hernandez upon impermissibly Frede broad basis State, State, supra; Farris v. 819 S.W.2d Fourteenth under the Amend- Sixth (Tex.Cr.App.1990)(Teague, J., dissent- ments to the States Constitution. United ing). Clearly the trial court believed veni- subject analy- Such error to a harm is not reman Frede could follow if she oath 122, 429 U.S. Georgia, sis. Davis v. take it. he Otherwise would have 399, (1976); Gray S.Ct. 50 L.Ed.2d 339 granted challenge the State’s for cause be- 2045, Mississippi, 107 S.Ct. 481 U.S. But, fore the lunch recess. confronted reason, (1987). L.Ed.2d For this holding Ellis, this Court’s the trial other, judge granted no should be reversed nevertheless conviction the State’s challenge did for cause. He so not be- and remanded. nothing holding disqualified, though to the intrinsic in Ellis that had made it clear even application limits its voir dire issues. she could oath if she took it. This abide precisely argument appeal. his on At argues appellant preserve

2. The did State appellant after did the lunch break ever object error in that he failed to the trial say anything do that would ”create[] grant challenge for court’s cause. I dis- impression abandoning distinct that he was agree. Shortly adjourned before the court for opposition to dismiss for to the motion cause.” appellant the lunch break announced: Compare at 366 Purtell v. we have the record "Could reflect we will (Tex.Cr.App. 1988). contrary, objected On the object challenge challenge to the in that it is a challenge that the trial court sustained Supreme based on the rationalization of the allowing opportuni cause without him another challenging Court case of Adams and are ty question judge the venireman. trial an oath and not on whether or not she appellant opposed was well aware that the chal juror impartial a fair and can be based on lenge, ruling and that he was on a "contested” penalty.” feelings about the death Purtell, point. supra. my appellant view object- In context it is clear was thus ing prosecutor’s position preserved error. See Crane v. to the that because S.W.2d 1990). (Tex.Cr.App. did not to take the Frede want oath she was at 345 *21 452 tendency as it relates to the current Texas

II. Yet, capital sentencing scheme. to allow disposition majority’s I also dissent to of mitigating to this evidence runs effect appellant’s Appel- of error. seventh belief, long by this counter to “the held 37.071, Y.A.C.C.P., lant claims that Article commit crimi society, that defendants who him, applied was unconstitutional as in to a disadvan nal acts that are attributable special that the issues did not account for taged background, or to emotional and significance mitigating full of his evi- problems, may culpable less than mental punishment phase dence of at trial. such excuse.” defendants who have no agree. 319, Lynaugh, supra, 492 U.S. at Penry v. Appellant’s mitigation evidence in is of 2947, 278, quot at 106 L.Ed.2d at 109 S.Ct. variety. general the childhood abuse In Brown, 538, v. ing 479 U.S. at California following: As an in- outline it shows the 934, 545, 837, 841, at 93 L.Ed.2d 107 S.Ct. fend for himself all fant he was left J., (1987) (O’Connor, concurring). at 942 night his natural mother was at while Moreover, appellant’s jury precluded ageAt three-and-a-half his mother work. giving any mitigating effect from At time he still abandoned him. In Lockett v. youth. fact of his relative consisting ex- wearing diapers, had a diet Ohio, 2954, 586, 98 57 438 U.S. S.Ct. fries, clusively hamburgers of and french (1978), plurality L.Ed.2d 973 a of Su- and had not been toilet trained. He was preme the death sentence Court invalidated adopted by parents appellant’s whom 21 Under the year of a old defendant. suspected sexually teachers later of abus- governing capital then Ohio statute sen- disciplined ing adoptive him. His father tencing, judge impose a the trial him, strap appellant harshly, taking a one of sentence of death unless found bloody, sometimes until he was and send- statutorily mitigating circum- three defined ing him to and unfed as a school unbathed factors, includ- Although various stances. punishment. adoptive form of His mother age, considered ing Lockett’s could be punished once him with a hot iron. He any statu- the determination whether clothes, out,” dirty, ill-fitting wore “worn existed, they mitigating circumstances tory subject peers. and was to the disdain of his regarded justifications could not be as Appellant developed problems, behavioral than right their for a sentence less own and there is some evidence he suffered Supreme plurality A Court death. hearing learning impairment from a and a range of this limitation of the held authority ap- disorder. One school testified incompatible mitigating circumstances was pellant “deep prob- emotional manifested juris- Eighth Amendment with its recent spent juve- lems.” He time in and out of North v. Woodson notably prudence, most expelled nile and foster facilities and was 2978, Carolina, 280, 49 428 U.S. 96 S.Ct. adoptive good age home for at the (1976). case to companion L.Ed.2d 944 only twenty of seventeen. He was when Ohio, 637, Lockett, 98 Bell v. U.S. S.Ct. 438 crime. he committed the instant 2977, (1978), plu- same 57 L.Ed.2d 1010 penalty of a rality the death overturned disadvantaged Appellant’s evidence of years old had sixteen defendant who been abuse, background, history family at the time of his offense. compel- problems is at least as emotional so, ling, presented by Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, if not more as that In Eddings v. Penry Lynaugh, Penry himself. 869, (1982), majori- 102 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 302, 309, 2934, 2941-42, U.S. at 109 S.Ct. at adopted the hold- ty Supreme Court 256, (1989). at 272 It is not 106 L.Ed.2d sen- Lockett. ing The Oklahoma likely evidence will have tencing provided that such for consideration statute circumstances,” bearing jury’s special mitigating answers to the and the “any sixteen, issues, persuade jurors Eddings’ age, judge unless trial did take pose probable assessing punishment. in fact future appellant will into account Thus, approv- danger. Supreme will Thus the Court observed recognized that only aggravating, mitigating ingly: judge not “The trial fully circumscribed aspect miti- That a relevant youth must be considered Eighth “The Amendment issues. 115, 102 S.Ct. gating factor.” 455 U.S. than some consideration requires more 11. Because the trial 71 L.Ed.2d at Collins, mitigating evidence.” Graham cir- the troubled judge declined to consider — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. Eddings’ upbringing, howev- cumstances of (Souter, J., dissenting). (1993) L.Ed.2d 260 overturned, er, sentence also his death *22 authority of Lockett. mechanism given Appellant’s response moral expressing its reasoned supra, Lockett, Eddings, all Bell evidence, impose, and to mitigating to this youth that has support proposition so, a less it choose to do sentence should mitigating relevance as Eighth Amendment supra, Penry Lynaugh, v. than death. evidence, apart from bear- quite whatever 328, 2952, 284. L.Ed.2d at S.Ct. at U.S. statutory special ing may have on Arti- agree appellant that I therefore issues.3 37.071, ap- as supra, is unconstitutional cle Kentucky, It is true that v. Stanford case, sentenced and he has been plied his 2969, 361, L.Ed.2d 492 109 S.Ct. 106 U.S. of death under circumstances violative (1989), Supreme Court held it was 306 v. Eighth Amendment. Gribble per impose not cruel and unusual se 65, (Tex.Cr.App.1990). at 75 upon penalty defendants who were reason, also, the cause should be For this commis- sixteen or seventeen at the time of Because the ma- reversed and remanded. mean, of the offense. This does not sion not, respectfully dissent. jority does however, youth that has lost its constitu- significance. tionally mitigating Penry BAIRD, J., joins. per Supreme itself the Court held it is not mentally to execute a se unconstitutional in the same

retarded accused. But opinion Supreme Court then insisted mitigating sig- retardation has

that mental special beyond nificance its relevance to the MORENO, Appellant, Angel 37.071, Jose supra. By under Article issues token, Eighth same Amendment categorically prohibit does not execution of Texas, Appellee. STATE youths young adults does not reduce No. 69807. significance youth as a circumstance might justify Texas, that in the individual case Appeals of Court of Criminal sentence less than death. Youth remains En Banc. aspect

as an of the individual character and 7, April 1993. circumstances of the offender which is a 12, May 1993. Rehearing Denied “constitutionally indispensable part of the inflicting penalty death.” process of Carolina, v. North 428 U.S.

Woodson 2991, 304, 96 S.Ct. at 49 L.Ed.2d at 961. it, statutory special issues opinion beyond the recent struction 3. As I understand purposes of rule” for Supreme would constitute a "new United States lins, Court in Graham v. Col review, — -, Teague corpus under S.Ct. 122 L.Ed.2d federal habeas Lane, U.S. 113 (1993), L.Ed.2d proposition S.Ct. 103 U.S. does not stand for (1989). Teague application bars youth Because does not call for that evidence corpus, Eighth the Su- Penry on federal habeas held the “new rule” additional instruction of Gra- required. simply preme not reach the merits held Court did Amendment Graham Supreme Penry Whether the Court precedent ham’s contentions. that dictated did rule,” holding adopt mitigating ultimately a "new necessarily will such dictate an additional in Penry youth, extrapolation that evidence of to accommodate evidence of as struction instruction, mitigating youth may given does call for an additional at least some which — petition to this Court for writ of certiorari in context of the second issue. effect here, Thus, at -, question following appeal is a a direct S.Ct. at to hold that U.S. 902. open. youth requires an additional in- remains evidence of

Case Details

Case Name: Gunter v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Mar 10, 1993
Citation: 858 S.W.2d 430
Docket Number: 69,812
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.