36 S.E. 553 | S.C. | 1900
July 11, 1900. The opinion of the Court was delivered by
So much of the Circuit Judge's decree as is necessary to understand the questions presented by the exceptions is as follows: "This action, instituted in *182
1897, and heard at the fall term, 1899, came before this Court on the pleadings, the testimony taken by a special referee, and the argument of counsel. The Dundee Mortgage and Trust Investment Company, Limited, answered the complaint, and has contested the claim of plaintiff. The other defendants have not answered — at least, no such answers were submitted to the Court. The defendant, D. U. Addy, on January 31, 1883, made and delivered to plaintiff his note, whereby he promised to pay to plaintiff the sum of $919.18, with interest from date at ten per cent, per annum, interest to be paid annually, and if not so paid, to become principal, and bear interest at ten per cent. The consideration of this note is a prior note, a small open account, and $5 or $10 paid in cash. To secure said debt, defendant, D.U. Addy, on the same day executed and delivered to plaintiff a mortgage upon `a certain tract or parcel of land, known as Gable lands, on waters of Cut Log branch, county and State aforesaid, bounded on the north side by lands of Bell Court, on the east by lands of Mrs. Betty Smith, on the south by lands of Wesley Risenger, on the west by lands of Alonzo Rose,' and the same was duly recorded on February 15th, 1883. D.U. Addy, on March 24th, 1884, to secure a loan of $2,200, then paid to him in cash by the Dundee Mortgage and Trust Investment Company, Limited, executed and delivered to said defendant company a mortgage of real estate, covering with other lands the premises mortgaged to plaintiff as above stated. This mortgage was duly recorded on March 28th, 1884. The condition of the note or bond given as aforesaid by the said D.U. Addy to plaintiff, as stated in the said mortgage, when executed, delivered and recorded, was for the payment of the full and just sum of $919.18. Afterwards, to wit: on February 16th, 1886, the following words were inserted, written, upon the face of said mortgage immediately after the words just cited, to wit: with interest from date at ten per cent. per annum, interest to be paid annually; and if not so paid, to become principal, and bear interest at ten *183
per cent. At the same time the following words were inserted, written, in said mortgage just after the description of the mortgaged premises, to wit: containing 165 acres, more or less. It is apparent from an inspection of said mortgage, that the words above stated are not in the same handwriting nor in the same ink as in the body of the mortgage. I may be mistaken as to the handwriting, the same person may have written both the original instrument and the words inserted. As the plaintiff submitted his said mortgage in evidence, and it appears to have been altered, it was incumbent upon plaintiff to explain this appearance. 1 Greenl. on Ev., sec. 569; Vaughn v. Fowler,
The conclusion which this Court has reached upon certain questions raised by the exceptions renders speculative the other questions therein presented. There are practically but three questions to be considered — the first of which is whether the insertion in the plaintiff's mortgage of the words, "with interest from date at ten per cent. per annum, interest to be paid annually; and if not so paid, to become principal and bear interest at ten per cent.," rendered it null and void. The circumstances under which the alterations were made are set forth in the Circuit Judge's decree, and clearly show that they were not made with a fraudulent intent. They were made three years after the execution and recording of plaintiff's mortgage, and two *186 years after the execution and recording of the appellant's mortgage. The plaintiff was only allowed to foreclose his mortgage for the amount due him as disclosed by the record. The defendant has in no way been prejudiced, and we do not see what right it has to complain.
The second question is whether there was error in deciding that the insertion of the words, "containing 165 acres, more or less," rendered the mortgage null and void. These words were not material, for the following reasons: 1st. Because they expressed correctly the number of acres contained in the tract, and were not in conflict with the other description of said land; and 2d. They could not, in any event, prevail against the words describing the land by boundaries, even if they had been in conflict.
The third question is whether the Circuit Judge erred in deciding that the appellant was not entitled to be subrogated to the rights of Westly Nichols. For the reasons stated by the Circuit Judge, this Court concurs with him that the appellant did not have such right.
Judgment affirmed.