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Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc.
348 F.3d 417
4th Cir.
2003
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 as And when a defendant very process. his guess second Bowman to attempt by an reason, manip- serts, to withdraw a of a motion support for whatever plea, guilty con- evidence beneficial ulating pleading known that he lied guilty plea, report toxicology in the tamed provides so—he an repeatedly guilty—and court. The lied to the that he claiming manipulation, of such example its discretion was well within district court is judgment The district this effort. reject to AFFIRMED. III pro to designed is colloquy Rule 11 the defendant protect a structure vide and invol making an uninformed pro and to plead guilty

untary decision judgment of unjust public from

tect the not been trial has public

guilty when not held a trial is Because

conducted. guilty, the court pleads a defendant

when rely on the defendant’s able to

must be testimony and his truthful

self-interest based guilty to find the defendant

deciding Moreover, avoid de guilty plea.

on a statements, pre-colloquy

pendence on Mary GUNNELLS; A. Gun B. William advice, misunderstand agreements, Cyn Corporation; nells; Tech Tele is colloquy Rule 11 at the ings, the court Mullinax; Truck and de & W the defendant thia W to review with required Jerry Incorporated; components Company, material all of the novo Tractor when a consequence, guilty plea. As Transmissions, Freeman; Incor AAA Rule 11 lied at says he defendant Robertson; B. porated; Pamela heavy burden seek he bears a colloquy, International, In Avionics/Seaonics what process. repeat We nullify the ing to Cassleman; corporated; E. James before, con appropriately that an we said Workman; Strickland; Larry Brenda can serve colloquy Rule 11 ducted Buchanan; Clark; Bobby F. Helen rely if is entitled meaningfully the court Hansen; Buchanan; Brian Joanne made under statements on the defendant’s Stanley; Wise; N. E. John James plea. United States accept guilty oath Vowels; Driggers; Brenda Daniel L. (4th 1389, 1394 Cir. Lambey, 974 F.2d v. Vowels; Livingston Auto David J. (en 1992) banc); see also United States Philip Living Parts, Incorporated; Cir.1996) (4th Wilson, F.3d Cycle Services, Incorpo ston; Lukes a motion key to whether (noting that Lucarelli; rated; HH Moorman Jeff grant guilty plea should to withdraw Moorman; Sons; Oakland Harold & proceed or not the Rule ed “whether Buxton; Stylon Of Club; B. Mark conducted”). To view ing properly was Parker; Terry Charleston; Mary colloquy procedural as a plea the Rule 11 Single Singletary; Hensley; Ora Earl moved and ma pieces are game which Representa Individually tary, and as that can beat to achieve a result nipulated Simi and Entities all Persons tives of due providing system established for Plaintiffs-Appellees, Situated, larly undermines to the defendant process *2 Spooner; Bradley; v. L. Charles Ter Rhue; Shaw; rence E. Noel D. Paul SERVICES, HEALTHPLAN INCORPO- Askew; Phillip Stashin; Averies, Ken individually RATED, and as successor Mary Gunnells; Defendants. B. Party in interest to Third Claims Gunnells; Cynthia William A. Mulli Management, Incorporated; Third nax; Jerry Freeman; Pamela B. Rob Party Management, Incorpo- Claims ertson; Cassleman; Larry E. James rated, Defendants-Appellants, Strickland; Workman; Brenda Helen Clark; Bobby Buchanan; F. Joanne Fidelity Group Inc.; International Buchanan; Hansen; Brian E. James Guild, Incorporated; Workers Nation Wise; Stanley; H. L. John Daniel al Association Business Of Owners Driggers; Vowels; Brenda J. David Professionals; Iwg And Health and Vowels; Philip Livingston; Jeff Lu Fidelity Fund; Welfare Claims Man carelli; Moorman; Harold Mark B. agement, Incorporated; Executive Buxton; Mary Parker; Terry Hens Agency; Ray Consultants Insurance ley; Singletary; Singletary, Earl Ora Olivi; Branham; mond R. John Ste Individually Representatives Broughton; Collins; ven John Rex Similarly of All Persons Entities Culbertson; Davies; Robert Richard Situated; & W Truck And W Tractor Dextaze; Every Andrews; Kenneth Company, Incorporated; Cycle Lukes Fort; German; Gary Frankie Robert Services, Incorporated; AAA Trans Geitler; Geitler; Melissa Martin T. missions, Incorporated; Livingstоn Geitler; Geitler; George Michael D. Parts, Incorporated; Auto HH Moor Gradek; Greene; Phillip Hubert G. S. Sons; Company, man & Tech In Tele Isabell; Hodgsen; Stephen Lacy; Earl corporated; Avionics Inter Seaonics Malone; Martin; Frederick David E. national, Incorporated; Oakland Massey; Henry Merchant; Michael Club; Stylon Charleston, entities Messinger; Requa; Tina R. Michael similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appel Rowan; Regopoulus; Bruce Pamela lees, Ryals; Scott; Bruce A. Barbara Hen ry Skinner, Jr.; Stone; K. Elmer Ken Taylor; Tallmadge; neth R. Lee Valentine; Requa; Michael R. Arnold H. Thomas; Todd; Michael Scott Arnold Benefits, Incorporated; Financial Valentine; Vann; H. Richard M. Wade; Ryals; George Lewis H. Bruce Wade; White; Lewis H. David M. Gradek; Messinger; Tina Kenneth Williams; Wells; Herbert L. Ben L. Every Andrews; Raymond Olivi; R. Wilson, Individually E. Jack Executive Consultants Insurance Representative Capacity; his Anchor Agency; Massey; In- Michael Anchor Agency; Insurance Branham And Agency; Collins, surance John indi- Associates; Geitler Diversified Insur vidually representative and in their ance; Legend Equities Corporation; capacities, Defendants-Appellants, Benefits, Incorporated; Financial Taylor Agency Incorporated; Associates; Fort; Fidelity

Truett and Group Inc.; Colonial Frankie Life In Company, Guild, & Accident Insurance A Incorpo ternational Workers Dwayne Company; rated; Unum A. Samu National Association of Busi els; Eugene Duncan; Professionals; Iwg O. David ness Owners and Fidelity Fund; And Health Welfare Incorporated; Management,

Claims Broughton; Branham; Steven

John Davies; Culbertson; Robert

Rex *3 German; Dextaze; Robert

Richard Gary Geitler; Geitler;

Gary Martin T. Geitler;

Geitler; Hubert Michael D. Greene; Phillip Hodgsen; Earl S.

G. Stephen Lacy; Ma

Isabell; Frederick Henry Martin; Mer

lone; E. David Rego Rowan;

chant; Bruce Pamela Henry Scott; K. A.

poulus; Barbara Jr.; Stone;

Skinner, Kenneth Elmer Taylor; Tallmadge; Lee 5 Michael

R. Todd; M.

Thomas; Richard Scott White; L.

Vann; M. Herbert David

Williams; Wells; L. E. Wil Ben Jack Associates;

son; Branham Geitler Equi Insurance; Legend

Diversified Taylor Agency, Corporation; The

ties Associates;

Incorporated; Truett and Life & Insurance Accident

Colonial Company;

Company, A Health- Unum Services, Incorporated, Individu

plan

ally in Interest Successor Party Management, In Claims

Third Party Man

corporated; Third Claims Incorporated; Dwayne

agement, A. Duncan;

Samuels; Eugene David O. Bradley; Ter

Spooner; L. Charles Rhue; Shaw; D. Paul E. Noel

rence Averies, Stashin;

Askew; Phillip Ken

individually representa and in their capacities, Defendants.

tive 01-2419,

Nos. 01-2420. Appeals, Court of States

United

Fourth Circuit. Sept. 2002.

Argued:

Decided: Oct. *4 Carolina;

dale, Charleston, Thomas South II, Keaveny, Keaveny, Simons & J. Carolina, Charleston, Appellants. South MOTZ, NIEMEYER, Before KING, Judges. Circuit part, part, reversed Affirmed Judge by published opinion. remanded wrote DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ KING concurred. Judge in which opinion, opinion Judge NIEMEYER wrote part. dissenting concurring part OPINION *5 MOTZ, Circuit DIANA GRIBBON Judge: question appeal presents

This its dis- the district court abused whether certifying a class conditionally cretion brought by purchasers action in a suit health multi-employer of a beneficiaries growing out plan for care court condi- collapse. The district plan’s certification tionally granted class administrator, Healthplan plan’s claims Inc., in interest as successor Services (col- Inc. Management, Party Claims Third “TPCM”) against individual lectively, mar- Nelson, agents who Lewis, corporate insurance R. William ARGUED: prop- L.L.P., plan. The and sold the keted Mullins, Scarborough, Riley & principles controlling legal Carolina; erly applied Y. Charleston, James South findings factual P.A., well-supported made Boyd, Becker, Haynsworth Sinkler certify a class decision to Carolina, supporting its Columbia, Appellants. for South thus, TPCM; no we see Richardson, Hartley, Hancock Christian How- in that decision. Brickman, L.L.C., of discretion Patrick, abuse & Westbrook its class ever, court rested Carolina; because the Charleston, Justin S. South agents the individual Firm, Charleston, certification Kahn, South Kahn Law misapprehension in a findings grounded BRIEF: on Carolina, ON Appellees. law, conclude we must Mullins, governing Norris, Nelson, Riley of R. Charles in certi- its discretion Charleston, did abuse L.L.P., the court South Scarborough, & Ac- actions. separate class Tiller, fying those Carolina; Elizabeth J.V. John H. reverse P.A., part, we affirm cordingly, Boyd, Sinkler Haynsworth Speidel, proceedings for further and remand Carolina; part, Columbia, H. Michael South opinion. Clement, with this Bowers, Tis- consistent Rivers & Young, Plan. many gone I. As 2900 claims have as unpaid, amounting to millions of dollars in interlocutory Since this appeal, unpaid medical bills. parties filed even before complet- have August Fidelity Plaintiffs sued discovery, ed surrounding the facts (col- NABOP, IWG, Group, and the Fund purchasers claims of the and beneficiaries Defendants”) lectively, Fidelity “the “Plaintiffs”) (collectively, have not been state court in South Carolina. defen- Thus, fully developed. the record to date dants removed the case federal court. following reveals rough outline of year, Later in the Plaintiffs amended their leading present the events to the up law- complaint to add and the agents suit. complaint, defendants. In that Plaintiffs 1995, Fidelity Inc., Sometime in Group, allege that one or more the defendants the National Association Business Own- engaged fraud, negligent undertaking, (“NABOP”), ers and Professionals and the negligent misrepresentation, breach of Guild, (“IWG”), International Workers Inc. contract, conspiracy, civil and violated the created the Health and Welfare IWG Fund South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices (the “Fund”), in turn which offered a Act, (1985), § S.C.Code Ann. 39-5-140 (the “Plan”) plan health care and dental Title IX Organized Crime Control purchasers. August interested From (West §§ Act of 1961-68 U.S.C.A. until June when South Carolina (“RICO”).1 short, Supp.2000) & Department of Insurance ordered market- agents Plaintiffs assert that the breached cease, ing to agents marketed and sold fiduciary contractual and duties owed to Although Plan. purportedly was *6 the misrepresented Plaintiffs and the marketed plan, as an ERISA the Plan through Plan’s attributes then."marketing never complied requirements. with ERISA efforts, which Plaintiffs purchase caused to 1995, In April Fidelity hired TPCM to woefully TPCM, the Plan. deficient As to process claims the Plan under as a third allege Plaintiffs mismanaged that it admin- party keep administrator. TPCM failed to Plan, istration of the a huge created back- pace received, with the creating claims log claims, unpaid not timely did trans- huge backlog unprocessed claims. In information, fer impossible made it and 1997, May Fidelity fired TPCM for incom- forecast accurately, rate increases result- petence and attempted transfer ing collapse pay Plan’s and failure to management claims process to an in-house hundreds, thousands, if not of health care operation. Assertedly, difficulties ob- relief, prayer claims. their for Plain- taining data from TPCM and the massive tiffs backlog it had ultimately created led to the seek recovery legally for all allowable collapse. Plan’s damages refunds of including premiums Approximately employees paid, payment their outstanding medi- families coverage bills, contracted for under the reimbursement for medi- cal/dental 1. Department Also in the United States case. After the New York court clarified that Defendants, against Fidelity Group stay Labor filed suit Fidelity reached for relating actions the Fund in the Eastern district case at court in the hand lifted the District of stay respect New York. That court issued "non-Fidelity with to the Defen- January staying pending agents. order on Ultimately, all dants” —TPCM and the against court-appointed actions fiduciary, Fund. Pursuant to this on the advice of a order, the district court in South Carolina the New York court ordered the Plan termi- stay proceedings prеsent issued a January of the in the nated effective claim TPCM. mismanagement treat- where by Plaintiffs paid bills cal Moreover, although the court declined to Plaintiff [s were] while ment occurred Plan, conspiracy for civil compensation certify Plaintiffs’ covered credit, injury agents, it did claims compensation RICO injury to credit, spent time permit subclasses to Plaintiffs ability certify to obtain to the difficul- attending liability— four theories of pursue incurred their costs fraud, the failure resulting undertaking, negligent from negligent ties attendant of life Plan, enjoyment breach of con- loss of misrepresentation, by the failure caused separate to the stress class actions tract —via agents that as- twenty-three Plan. each of the sertedly insurance to a named class sold damages. punitive Plaintiffs also seek withholding “ruling on representative, Plaintiffs discovery, initial After some agent classes for which certification of class, pursuant of a for certification moved currently representative.” no [wa]s there Procedure Rule of Civil to Federal 1265 n.21. J.A. who 23(b)(3), people “all entities Plan or who were Fidelity Proce- to Federal Rule of Civil purchased Pursuant Fidelity under the coverage 23(f), with and a number of provided dure both TPCM time.” Carolina (collectively, Agents”) peti- Plan South “the agents2 “agent- addition, to certain respect with to file an interlocu- permission tioned for claims, moved for certi- Plaintiffs specific” granted. we tory appeal, which consisting of “all en- fication of subclasses II. Fi- purchased who persons

tities and provided or were delity Plan from criteria. must meet several Class actions agent Fidelity particular Plan First, the four comply must the class South Carolina.” 23(a): (1) in Rule established prerequisites (2) commonality parties; numerosity un- certify any claims refusing to

After issues; typicality of legal Trade factual and Unfair Carolina der the South representa- of class and defenses § Act, Ann. 39-5- see S.C.Code Practices *7 representation. 1985) (a tives; adequacy 140(a) (West bring and “may person 23(a). Second, ac- the class Fed.R.Civ.P. repre- not individually, but an action of the three cate- fall within one tion must actual dam- capacity, to recover sentative 23(b); here in Rule enumerated gories Plain- granted court the district ages”), under Rule proceed to Plaintiffs seek large motion class certification tiffs’ is- Inc., 23(b)(3), requires that common which Fidelity Group, part. Gunnells ones and 2001) individual (D.S.C. 28, over predominate sues Sept. No. 2:98-2639-23 1244-1271). superior other class action be (located that a at J.A. Fed. adjudication. methods of available motion for granted Plaintiffs’ conditionally 23(b)(3). respect to their R.Civ.P. with certification 23(e); opinion. Fed.R.Civ.P. See light of this agents appealed the Originally, fourteen Windsor, Prods., Inc. v. 521 Amchem appeal see also order. While class certification 2231, 620, 591, L.Ed.2d 117 S.Ct. 138 U.S. eight agents moved to withdraw pending, was (1997) (articulating for different standard a set- 689 appeal they had reached because their certification). settlement-only Our hold- grant We now the class. tlement with certifi- respect the district court's ing with appeal withdraw their eight agents’ motion to agents, against individual cation of subclasses court for consider- to the district and remand therefore, agents only the six pertains proposal pursuant to of the settlement ation 23(e) appeals before us. remain whose and in Rule of Civil Procedure Federal 424

If a requirements, reаsons, lawsuit meets these very we have expressly “em impor- certification as class action serves braced the view that the mass tort action purposes. tant public pro- addition to damages may be appropriate for class moting judicial economy efficiency, action, either partially or whole.” Cen class actions also “afford aggrieved per- Wesleyan Co., tral Coll. v. W.R. Grace & remedy sons a if it economically is not 177, 185 (4th Cir.1992) (citation, F.3d inter through feasible obtain relief the tradi- marks, quotation nal ellipses, and altera tional multiple framework of omitted). tions damage actions.” 5 James Wm. Moore et Furthermore, courts “[district al., (3d § Moore’s Federal Practice 23.02 have wide discretion in deciding whether ed.1999). Thus, federal courts should certify or not to a class and their decisions “give Rule 23 a liberal rather than a re- may be reversed for abuse of discre construction, strictive adopting standard (internal tion,” id. quotation marks omit flexibility application which will in the ted), course, recognizing, of that this “dis particular case ‘best serve the ends of cretion within must be exercised justice parties for the affected and ... ” framework promote judicial of Rule 23.” efficiency.’ Dry In re A.H. Lienhart v. Robins, (4th Cir.1989). Inc., (4th vit Sys., 880 F.2d 255 F.3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Inc., Sys., re Am. Med. sure, 23(b)(3) To be class actions (6th Cir.1996)). 75 F.3d Our predominance must meet superiority review is particularly deferential in a case requirements imposed on other kinds like involving interlocutory appeal of class actions. This is because these this— of a conditional class certification. See suits involve situations where “classaction Wesleyan, Central 6 F.3d (noting at 186 clearly treatment is not as called for.” tentative, that “[t]he limited nature advisory Fed.R.Civ.P. committee’s note (1966 (b)(3)). Amendment, conditional certification ... counsels in fa subdivision However, affirmance.”).3 noted, as the Supreme Court vor of has predominance superiority require mind, principles With these we turn 23(b)(3) ments in Rule do not foreclose the case at hand. Plaintiffs’ claims possibility actions, of mass tort class but Agents TPCM and the rest on merely ensure that class certification in different Accordingly, bases. like the dis- time, such cases “achieve economies of ef court, trict we consider class certification fort, expense, promote ... unifor respect to TPCM and the Agents mity of decision as to persons similarly separately. situated, without sacrificing procedural *8 bringing fairness or about other undesir III. Amchem, 615, able results.” 521 U.S. at 117 S.Ct. 2231 (quoting Adv. Comm. district court conditionally certified Notes, 697). U.S.C.App. 28 at For plaintiff these allowing TPCM Thus, paying 3. in "superseded” heed to "the by conditional’ post Amchem. See at 468. here, not, aspect fact, disagree. [the] certification” we do Wesleyan, We in Central asserts, as the respon- dissent carefully [ ] “default our recognized sought and sibility” "employ[] a backward problems burden.” avoid created the lower court Rather, post See simply at 465 n. 8. we follow Wesleyan, in Amchem. See Central 6 F.3d at Wesleyan's Central well-established (noting directive. 189 that "the Third Circuit's on- directive, only ignores The dissent not that going experiment it in class certification [in (without explanation) also contends that litigation] other unquali- Amchem has not been "portions” Wesleyan success”). may of Central have been fied

425 of the Plaintiffs’ recognized “that that some single claim: pursue the class duties, damages might require both contractual “individual violatеd its TPCM law, that, administrator party necessary, as third found if those inquiry” and but was a cause of and such conduct the Plan ‍​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‍issues could be bifurcated for individual failure,” and that “fail- Fidelity Plan’s they Wesleyan, in Central trials as were and the ab- directly injured Plaintiffs ure 1254. re- F.3d at 188-90. See J.A. With 1249. class members.” J.A. sent 23(a)(4) adequacy, to Rule the court gard

recognized representatives” that “class A. pos- of the same class and part must “be sess the same interest and suffer same both that note at the outset We injury as the class members” and found concerning TPCM is certification order in this the named satis- that case certification order strikingly similar requirements, noting particular- and that fied these Wesleyan in upheld we Central carefully followed conflict existed” ly “potential the district court that no Wesleyan, 1257; approved framework Central among class members. Id. at cf. Here, Meineke, at 183-186. as Central 6 F.3d 155 F.3d 337- Broussard “the district court conducted Wesleyan, (4th Cir.1998) “manifest con- (holding the class certi analysis of straightforward of class among flicts of interest” members under Fed.R.Civ.P. requirements fication certification). precludes class 23(a) 23(b)(3),” that each and determined 6 F.3d at 183- Wesleyan, As Central met, “supported had been requirement to the the district court next turned 23(b)(3) 23(a) holdings with each of its 23(b)(3) requirement “questions Rule 183, 186. findings.” Id. at detailed fact common to members of the of law or First, court found that the district questions af- predominate over their families” cov employees plus “1400 members, individual fecting only Plan, un possibly ered other avail- superior a class action [be] claims, “easily” satisfied paid adju- to the fair and efficient able methods 23(a)(1)’s requirement. J.A. numerosity controversy,” “specifi- dication of the F.3d at Wesleyan, 6 1248. Central Cf. matters the Rule cally addressed the four finding “that some (noting district court’s First, findings.” to these pertinent lists as easily class members would potential the class members the court found satisfy numerosity requirement”). deal of interest great had evidenced “no 23(a)(2) commonality The court found Rule sup- litigation,” noting ... 23(a)(3) typicality and Rule because although “1400 finding port for legal pertaining many “factual exist,” there was potential litigants ... common” to “all conduct TPCM’s until cases filed now.” “dearth of individual members,” and class such as: Plaintiffs Second, court held that 1260. J.A. “(1) how man surrounding facts cases, a class preexisting view of the few it created whether aged operations; productive. Id. at action would be ([3]) claims; whether failed backlog *9 Third, flexi- concluded that “the the court ([4]) system; claims into its to enter in one of this action bility and control duties; it its contractual whether breached in South federal district court forum [the alleged negli ] whether TPCM’s [and which out- provides the benefits Carolina] inju caused Plaintiffs’ gence proximately litigation.” method of individual weigh the by contributing to the failure of ries Id. at 1260. 1254-55. The district court Plan.” J.A.

Finally, again Wesley- and as in As in Wesleyan, Central Central we must ac an, 6 F.3d at the district court ac- knowledge that an approach has its “[s]uch knowledged “particular concern” with the First, promise.” 6 F.3d at 185. it appears likely fourth factor: “the difficulties to be likely that in the absence of class certifica management encountered of a class tion, very few claims would be brought 23(b)(3)(D). action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. TPCM, making adjudication “the that bifurcation found few is- of through [the] matter a class action ... issues) (e.g., sues some damages requiring superior adjudication to no of the matter individualized determination would assist at all.” See 5 Moore’s Federal Practice action, it in managing recog- class but (1997). Thus, § class 23.48[1] certification that, so, nized even “given the number of provide will access to the courts for those possible class members ... action with claims that would be if uneconomical manageability quickly dissipate.” could brought in an individual action. As the Accordingly, J.A. 1260. the district court matter, Supreme put poli Court “[t]he only grant resolved conditional certifica- cy very at the core of the class action explained tion the class and problem mechanism is to overcome the decertify would not hesitate to the class if small provide recoveries do not prove it should unmanageable. Id. at incentive, bring individual to a solo (We 1260-61. that in note Central Wes- prosecuting rights.” his or her Am 188-89, leyan, 6 F.3d at we upheld dis- chem, U.S. 117 S.Ct. 2231 trict court’s conditional certification order (citation omitted). in the face far more formidable man- concerns, ie., agement possi- Moreover, Wesleyan, as in Central ble need for damage individualized deter- certification in likely this case seems minations, but also a “daunting number of litigation reduce through costs the “consol- necessary individual issues” to “establish recurring idation of common issues.” 6 liability,” including determination of “com- F.3d at recurring 185. Such common is- parative among fault” numerous defen- up sues make the heart of case Plaintiffs’ dants, time bar “[different defenses” with TPCM, ie., whether mis- respect differently positioned defen- Fund, managed the whether TPCM’s mis- dants, necessity and the of application of management a proximate was cause of the jurisdictions.) the laws of different Plan’s collapse, whether the De- Fidelity Thus, here, Wesleyan, as Central Fund, fendants mismanaged also carefully district court considered the re- Fidelity whether the Defendants’ misman- 23(a) (b)(3) quirements of Rule agement intervening was an cause of the made specific findings and detailed as to Plan’s collapse sufficient to relieve TPCM compliance requirements. with those liability. Proving these issues in indi- so, doing the court followed the admonition vidual would require trials enormous re- Robins, in A.H. 880 F.2d at to “take effort, dundancy including duplicative full advantage provision in [Rule discovery, testimony by the same wit- 23(c)(4) permitting ] treatment of actions, nesses in potentially hundreds of separate ... range to reduce the similar, relitigation many and even disputed in complex litigation, issues” identical, legal issues. especially most teachings of Central Wesleyan itself, recurring and then Consolidation of these com- exercised its dis- grant cretion to conditional class mon issues will important certifica- also conserve tion. judicial resources. The record this case

427 concept estoppel apply of collateral cannot a trial on these com already reveals that likely lengthy, to be party against alone is when the whom the earlier mon issues exploration extensive requiring not have a ‘full decision is asserted did issue.”) and TPCM’s role. collapse Plan’s opportunity’ litigate fair trial, possibility with the long of a prospect States, (citing Montana United U.S. may also encour large damage award 147, 153, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 S.Ct. factor, settlement, be a age which “should (1979)). promotes Class certification thus factor, to be considered important and an results, consistency giving defendants certification.” Id. at determining when finality repose.4 the benefit of Robins, F.2d at A.H. (quoting Indeed, appears juncture at this 740). single claim certified TPCM— Furthermore, “pro class certification in mismanagement resulting of the Plan in which to de single proceeding vides a collapse similarly affecting large ultimate claims, plaintiffs’ merits of the termine the group people single state —seems from protects and therefore defendant even better suited for class treatment than adjudications.” 5 Moore’s inconsistent against many the diverse issues defen- (1999) (emphasis § Federal Practice 28.02 involving dants the laws of a number of added). This from inconsistent protection Wesley- that we certified in states Central adjudications from the fact that derives an. binding on all class the class action is 23(c)(2)(B). members. See Fed.R.Civ.P. B. contrast, By proceeding with individual Notwithstanding these substantial makes defendant vulnerable to certification, TPCM, advantages to class estoppel: If asymmetry of collateral Wesleyan, like the defendants Central on a claim to an individual TPCM lost “argue[s] the district court committed use plaintiff, subsequent plaintiffs could conditionally multiple certifying errors estoppel prevent collateral offensive disagree. 6 F.3d at 184. We class.” the issue. See litigating from TPCM Shore, Hosiery Parklane Co. v. 439 U.S. 1. 322, 331, 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 99 S.Ct. argument, which it principal TPCM’s of offensive (concluding that the use again, proba- is that the again sounds estoppel precluded

collateral should not be courts). necessity proof of individual some ble victory by A federal damages by the claimed plaintiff, an individual howev action prevents meeting Plaintiffs from er, members on binding would have no effect future Initially, TPCM requirements. Rule 23’s would not plaintiffs because the damages de- contends that individualized party original have been to the suit. See 90, 95, destroy commonality, typical- 101 terminations McCurry, Allen v. 449 U.S. (1980) (“[T]he Rule 23 con- ity, predominance.5 But 66 L.Ed.2d 308 S.Ct. Thus, keep attempt Plaintiffs with from class certi- tion in an TPCM benefits more altogeth- relatively small claims out of ways, than the Plaintiffs in some fication problem precisely the the class on collat- since the effect of class certification er-— designed to address. See mechanism was of defen- estoppel eral redounds to the benefit Amchem, S.Ct. 2231. 521 U.S. at dants, plaintiffs, whereas the beneficial all economies of class certification redound to argument involv- as one 5. TPCM couches parties, the courts. One sus- as well as to authority ing process” no indi- “due but cites therefore, pects, certifica- that TPCM resists applies cating concept in this con- that this *11 suggestion necessity tains no that the ultimate Plan collapse for and so caused damage destroys determinations damage. Plaintiffs’ Whether TPCM commonality, typicality, predominance, breached its contract to administer and or otherwise forecloses class certification. timely Plan, pay claims under the whether fact, explicitly Rule 23 envisions class party Plaintiffs are third beneficiaries of damage actions with such individualized contract, whether TPCM otherwise determinations. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 advi- Plaintiffs, fiduciary duty owed a of care to (1966 Amendment, sory committee’s note duty, whether it breached that whether (c)(4)) subdivision (noting that Rule all, mismanaged claims at and whether its 23(c)(4) permits certify courts to a class mismanagement contributed to the ulti- respect particular with issues and con- collapse mate of the Plan —are issues com- possible adjudication templates class of lia- members, potential mon to all and do bility issues “the with members of the require any inquiry. individualized class ... ... required thereafter to come issues, Of these one that individually and prove the amounts of even TPCM contends is not to all common claims.”); respective their see also 5 class members is that of causation. (1997) § Practice Moore’s Federal 23.23[2] argues TPCM that an individualized inqui- (“[T]he necessity making an individual- ry necessary to determine whether its damages ized determination of for each mismanagement proximately caused Plain- generally member does not defeat injury, arguing tiffs’ “pro- that Plaintiffs commonality.”). absolutely vided no credible evidence that Indeed, money actions for damages “[i]n any TPCM action or proximately inaction 23(b)(3), under Rule usually require courts damages caused to them.” argu- TPCM’s individual proof damages of the amount of ment fails for several reasons. each member incurred.” Id. First, sufficiency of the evidence as added). § (emphasis 23.46[2][a] proximate presented cause Plaintiffs When such inquiries individualized are goes merits of Plaintiffs’ case—an necessary, if questions predomi- “common Supreme issue the Court has held courts questions nate over individual as to liabili- may not in ruling consider on a motion for ty, generally courts predominance find the class certification. See Eisen v. Carlisle & 23(b)(3) standard of Rule to be satisfied.” 156, 177, Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 94 S.Ct. Id. (1974). 40 L.Ed.2d 732 is precisely This the situation here— Second, questions “common predominate [do] to the extent that argues over individual questions liability.” as to Id. proximate it was not the cause of the requested, Plaintiffs and the district court collapse, argument actually Plan’s pro- certified, class TPCM that support proceeding vides further rest on single theory: that TPCM’s mis- this as a case class action. As discussed management earlier, of claims contributed to the class treatment will avert the ne- event, any text. injury. Substantively, TPCM contends argument that "due is identi- process” contention, that, requires text, the district court to conduct cal to the discussed in inquiry an individual to determine the benefit opportunity TPCM must be allowed the amount to which each class member was show that an individual class member did not above, rightfully entitled and if a any damages. explained member was not suffer As af- deprived fording benefit as a result opportunity TPCM this does not de- collapse, Plan’s stroy ability satisfy then TPCM could not be said require- Plaintiffs' proximate

to be the cause of that member’s Rule 23. ments of *12 Inc., 1069, Sys., re Med. 75 F.3d trials in Amer. of individual cessity for hundreds (6th Cir.1996) that (stating as TPCM’s asser 1080 common- issues—such which core cause of rather than proximate ality “qualitative quanti- it was not test is tion that (citation omitted)). relitigated, be collapse it is here. the Plan’s tative” So —would wit testimony by the same requiring inquiry that individualized possibility efforts, nesses, discovery etc. duplicative damages into claims will be re- Plaintiffs’ establishing in that it succeeds If TPCM quired does not defeat Plan’s cause of the proximate not the was pre- common issues nevertheless because enjoy the effects collapse, preclusive it will dominate. members, against all class of this decision Moreover, calculations in damage asym disadvantaged by the rather than be appear particularly this do not to be case estoppel. of collateral application metric in complex, unlike the calculations those 23(c)(2)(B) (making Compare Fed.R.Civ.P. in nu- cases which courts have found that members) with binding on all class action in- complicated damagе individual merous 95, 101 449 U.S. at S.Ct. McCurry,

Allen v. over common issues. quiries predominated “cannot (noting estoppel 411 that collateral Am.Brands, Inc., v. 565 F.2d Windham Cf. whom the party against when the apply Cir.1977) (4th 59, 66-67, (affirming 72 de- is asserted did not have earlier decision of over- nial of class certification because litigate that opportunity’ ‘full and fair whelming predominance of thousands (citations omitted)). issue” fact, damage questions). In individualized Third, the extent that TPCM’s causa- punitive damages Plaintiffs’ claims for do argument inquiry tion is that individual inquiry individualized at require collapse whether the necessary to establish this calculation would damage all because any damages, of the Plan caused Plaintiffs solely be based on TPCM’s conduct. argument made the same precisely this is addition, appears court-appointed that a all in mass tort by almost defendants already most of fiduciary has calculated require determining damages will cases: using claims for medical bills the Plaintiffs’ inquiry. Courts have an individualized program that TPCM computer the same rejected argument, conclud- routinely claims. Fidelity used to evaluate cases, previous ing, as we have Thus, many likely there is to be cases damages proof need for individualized over the amount to dispute little or no certification. alone will not defeat class enti- an individual class member is which 189; Hill Wesleyan, Central 6 F.3d See Similarly, unpaid medical claims. tled for (4th Co., Inc., 381, 672 F.2d v. W. Elec. that Plaintiffs are if the court determines Cir.1982) (“Bifurcation of ... class action paid, premiums to a refund of entitled ... hearings damages on proceedings easily quickly amounts could be these v. Tran- commonplace.”); is now Chisolm determined. 556, 566 Corp., Fin. 184 F.R.D. South damages claims—those Plaintiffs’ other cases). (E.D.Va.1999) (collecting As one lost, credit, time relating injury “Quantitatively, almost explained, court in- may require enjoyment loss always be more indi- definition there will life— considering But even inquiry. dividualized liabili- damages issues than common vidual as a against TPCM Plaintiffs’ claims however, ... Qualitatively, ty issues.... whole, that the district we cannot conclude may “far in com- liability issues” exceed finding its discretion mundane individual dam- abused plexity the more predomi- Co., juncture common issues at this In re Motor ages issues.” Honda may (D.Md.1997); see nate over the individual F.Supp. also Donaldson, resolving involved in these claims. & Corp., We Jenrette Secs. Lufkin (2d Cir.2000) (“The fully note that the district court was aware 222 F.3d Su- issues, possibility preme Court Surowitz Hilton Hotels 363, 370-74, currently although Corp., subordinate to com- 383 U.S. 86 S.Ct. issues, liability damage might mon expressly disap- 15 L.Ed.2d 807 *13 predominate time un- prove proved adequacy case of attacks on the of a manageable. expressly representative The court indicat- on the repre- based ignorance.”). ed its resolve to deal with this if it became sentative’s problem, agreed only a and for this reason argument TPCM’s as to insurmountable certify conditionally. the class action class conflicts fares no According better. respect Such care reflects assiduous for TPCM, the interests of the employer requirements, Rule 23’s an abuse of class members conflict with those of the discretion.6 employee employ- class members because may ees wish to employers sue their for unpaid medical resulting bills from the col- remaining arguments have TPCM’s even lapse of the Plan. require less merit and little discussion.

Specifically, argues TPCM that the named To adequacy require defeat repre- constitute ment of Rule a conflict “must be more inadequate they purportedly sentatives because lack merely speculative than or hypothetical.” knowledge, sufficient alleged and because Moore’s Federal Practice (2002). case, § insurmountable conflicts exist within the 23.25[4][b][ii] no class. also contends that the inter- conflict exists that renders rep the named est of certain individual class members inadequate. resentatives TPCM has not pursuing individual litigation defeats single support cited a case of its conten argument provides that a class action employees tion that the would have viable superior adjudication vehicle for of the against their employers unpaid arguments claims. These also fail. medical bills caused the failure of a plan, employee non-ERISA no has filed The lack of knowledge contention is claim, such and South Carolina’s three- particularly law, meritless. It is hornbook year statute of limitations now bars such recognized, district court “[i]n § claims. See 7 S.C.Code Ann. 15-3-530 lawsuit, complex such as one which the (West Supp.2002) (applying three-year liability defendant’s can be established for, statute limitations to actions among great after a deal investigation fraud). other things, breach of contract and discovery by counsel background legal knowledge, Furthermore, representative if employee even could need not have extensive knowledge bring of the such a claim employer, facts of the case in order to an adequate require this would not decertification. For representative.” (quoting J.A. 1256 32B a conflict of prevent plaintiffs interest § Federal Am.Jur.2d Courts from meeting requirement of Rule (footnotes omitted)); 23(a), see also that conflict “must be fundamental. Baffa damages 6. TPCM reprise argument testify reasserts its individualized the same to the fun- argument contending when the certified damental weakness its contention that numerosity superiority. class lacks conditional class certification order constitut- argument persuasive is no more in those con- ed an abuse of discretion. Indeed, repeated attempts texts. TPCM's doctrine,” litigation.” theory the heart go pleadings It must which Newberg, complaint B. held that “a must proceed upon 6 Alba Conte & Herbert (4th theory, § some Newberg theory on Actions 18:14 definite on that Class ed.2002). succeed, Here, must plaintiff and em- or not succeed employers Wright at all.” 5 Charles Alan objectives and the & Arthur ployees share common Miller, R. Federal Practice & Procedure They legal positions. same factual and (2d ed.1990) (internal § at 188-89 establishing have the same interest omitted). quotation marks and citation Thus, liability any potential con- TPCM. Cf. (“[W]e post at 463 should take the com- go flict does not to the heart of their roles written.”). plaint as This observation representatives. as class See Uniondale particularly seems apropos pro- to actions Inc., Anheuser-Busch, Beer Co. v. *14 23, ceeding under Rule provides which that (E.D.N.Y.1987) 340, (finding F.R.D. 343 “an action bemay brought or maintained competitor that economic conflict between respect particular as a class action with members in antitrust action did not 23(c)(4)(A) (empha- issues.” Fed.R.Civ.P. representatives inadequate render because added). sis sought prove all that class members Furthermore, fix conspired prices).7 defendants even if the Plaintiffs want- proceed ed to with direct against claims addition, suggests the dissent con- TPCM, only claim that the district flict thosе who were not between Plaintiffs court against certified TPCM is based on Plan, injured by collapse of the but the theory collapse that TPCM caused the against have “direct” claims TPCM for a (“Plaintiffs of the Plan. See J.A. 1249-50 delay payment, those Plaintiffs alleged mismanagement have that TPCM’s that against “indirect” claims TPCM de- processing of claims to the contributed collapse rive from the of the Plan. Post at Fidelity of Plan.... failure Plaintiffs 461-464. As the Plaintiffs have made if allegations, proven, any will vitiate need however, abundantly appeal, they clear on particular to demonstrate claim was do not seek class certification for di- prior expiration submitted to the of the See, e.g., rect claims TPCM. Brief Fidelity.”). contract between TPCM and Appellees (“Contrary at to TPCM’s Thus, did Plaintiffs’ counsel not so much assertions, Plaintiffs do not claim that ... questionable make “a decision to aban- adjudicated improperly particular don,” theory liability appeal, on as the injured all claims. TPCM Plan insureds suggests, post accept dissent see at collapse because it was the cause of the scope of the claim that the district Plan.”). sure, To be position ap- this court certified class treatment. at pears somewhat odds with the Plaintiffs’ However, original complaint. Finally, suggests feder- “[t]he dissent errs effectively ing “pre al rules abolish the restrictive the district court’s order omitted); Bogosian 7. The dissent insists that an additional con- citation see Oil Gulf employer Cir.1977) (find (3d flict exists between the class mem- Corp., 561 F.2d employee bers and the members based ing representation adequate was even sought by on the different remedies each though gas current station lessees and former However, group. post "[p]o- See 466-467. ultimately lessees would seek different reme relating tential conflicts to relief issues which dies); generally Newberg see on Class Ac plaintiffs arise would if the succeed on 3:25, (collecting § at 422-23 & n.4 tions liability common claims on behalf cases). Therefore, any conflict in the forms of finding adequacy.” bar a class will not recovery sought by groups these Britt, Hanrahan v. 174 F.R.D. warrant decertification. does not (E.D.Pa.1997) (internal quotation marks and involving in the the sale and eventual fail- recovery dudes for those who were olina ure of Plan.” The district court collapse Fidelity circumstance where the First, injury.” carefully Id. within Plan did not cause considered acted well argument premised rejecting argument. seems on the its discretion dissent’s assumption false under the district The court found that while Ms. Gun- order the Plaintiffs’ direct claims $70,000 unpaid nells claims medical ex- would be barred the rule claim- penses, alleged “not all of the Plaintiffs’ course, action, But a class “of is splitting. damages high damages are so and the recognized exceptions to the one of gamut fig- could run the to much lower against claim-splitting.” rule 18 Moore’s ures.” Nothing J.A. 1260. the record § Federal Practice 131.40[3][e][iii] finding judi- refutes this and we can take (Second) Judg (citing Restatement many cial notice of the fact that health 26(1)(c) (1982)). Second, § ments care claims will involve dollar amounts 23(c)(2) permits members of a class main Moreover, that are much lower. we note (b)(3) opt tained under section out of the recovery that the size of class members’ class, providing option Plain for those hardly superiority. determinative of See pursue tiffs who wish § 5 Moore’s Federal Practice 23.48[2][a] *15 inqui requiring TPCM more individualized (1997) (noting “a that when class action Thus, aside, ry. rhetoric Plaintiffs with provide will the most fair and efficient claims being direct are not case, adjudication may of a an such “[j]amm[ed],” “caught” “sacrificed” or in superior be though even class members against class action their will. Post at have sufficient pro- means or incentive to 463.8 individually”). ceed As to seventeen actions, argument already-commenced TPCM’s final is that class the district members’ asserted “interest in individual court concluded that their existence did litigation purported pos- of the claims” and make in superior not individual actions a “large damage session of claims” renders involving potential case over 1400 liti- pursuit gants. their of individual actions superior Again, nothing the record to certification a any way class action.. This en- contradicts this common-sense argument tire rests on one fact—that a finding. TPCM itself notesthat it “has Gunnells, single plaintiff, Mary named B. been named as a Defendant a sin- $70,000 actions,” in unpaid gle medical ex- one of [seventeen] those thus penses' raising questions one contention —that “at least as to whether the exis- —-and 17 actions filed in [have been] South Car- tence of those actions is even relevant to Crown, disingenuous 8. We find somewhat the dis- would be successful. Cork & Seal Cf. Co., Parker, 345, 353-54, suggestion we Inc. v. 462 U.S. sent's that have "done a disser- (1983) (holding S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 628 group plaintiffs,” by vice to an identifiable " 'the commencement of a class action exposing suspends applicable statute of limitations arguments them to that their claims are now as to all asserted members of the class who First, untimely. Post at 463 n.7. Plaintiffs parties have would been had the suit been ” against with direct claims TPCM would action,' permitted to continue as a class equally subject arguments to these under the that "[o]nce the statute of limitations has been proposed dissent's resolution tolled, of the case. it remains tolled for all members of the Second, is, course, while dissent cor- putative class until class certification is de Utah, rect that TPCM could raise a statute of limita- (quoting Pipe nied” Am. & Constr. Co. v. 538, 554, asserting tions defense Plaintiffs di- 414 U.S. 94 S.Ct. 38 L.Ed.2d claims, (1974))). rect it is clear far from that TPCM 713 problems class certification TPCM. Accord- of administering a lawsuit ‘than ” ingly, hardly we can conclude that in ren- appeals.’ does court of (quoting Wind dering findings these the district court ham, 65)). 565 F.2d at If the district its discretion.9 abused court’s current assessment turns out to be

inaccurate, and it apparent becomes damage predominate issues will C. or render the case unmanageable, sum, court district followed the undoubtedly recognize will its re course we charted in Wesleyan. Central sponsibility to decertify the class. analysis Its careful of Rule require- 23’s factual findings sup- ments and its detailed We note also that in conditionally certi- porting grant decision to conditional cer- fying the class the court specifically stated tification TPCM reveal no abuse of it intended to “heed[] the Fourth course, discretion. recognize, Of we as the warning keep Circuit’s vigil watchful did, may district court that this case ulti- complicated case such as this one to mately present manageability problems. ‘make certain manageability and other Nonetheless, say we cannot at this inter- types problems do not overwhelm the locutory stage that the decision to condi- ” advantage of conditional certification.’ tionally certify a class action against (quoting J.A. 1260 Wesleyan, Central discretion, constitutes abuse of 189). Indeed, F.3d at expressly the court particularly light special defer- noted that “should such concerns render ence due trial courts on this issue. See ineffective, the class mechanism the dis- (“Issues Wesleyan, Central 6 F.3d at 185 trict court must be prepared to use its of class action manageability properly are *16 considerable discretion decertify to committed to the district court’s discre- class.” Id. at 1260-61. We are confident tion, ‘generally because that court a has this, that the court will greater precisely do if familiarity expertise’ with the ‘practical ... primarily ... factual’ necessary.10 analogize 9. The dissent's respect every effort to this case to would plain- be different with to Lierihart, ignore and to assert that we tiff. "the complex question comparative fault” arises ancillary arguments 10. TPCM makes two misperception regarding sepa- from same First, only briefly. we need address it asserts rate Plaintiff classes that animates the dis- improperly that the district court relied on argument respect sent’s with to conflicts principals Fidelity affidavits of Defen- 464, among post Plaintiff classes. See dants, whom TPCM could not examine be- single Because there is a Plaintiff class cause it was not a defendant in this case when single with a cause of action—that TPCM's deposed, the affiants were and the New York mismanagement contributed to the demise of stayed proceedings against court later all comparative the Plan —issues of fault will re- Fidelity argument Defendants. This rests on quire inquiry apart no individual from that i.e., premise, faulty a that TPCM was unable required damages. to calculate The extent to fact, depose to the affiants. we do not which TPCM’s conduct contributed to the col- deposed know whether TPCM could have Plan, lapse comparative and the fault of sought affiants because it never to do so. intervening parties, Fidelity, such as will be Second, TPCM asserts that the district court’s Lienhart, every the same for Plaintiff. In ruling rested on erroneous facts. Even if 149, contrast, F.3d at intervening ac- findings could show these factual were intervening erroneous,” tors and the acts were different "clearly utterly it has failed to every plaintiff, thereby creating possi- demonstrate that of these errors affected bility degree liability rights. that the defendant’s its substantial See Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. deter- case such individual ing that this IV. necessary and so minations would not in sub- granted, court also The district In do- predominate. common issues would for class Plaintiffs’ motion part, stantial so, its dis- ing abuse[d] “the district agents against the individual certification by ... the law- misapprehending cretion marketing selling responsible for issues.” underlying See respect certify Although the court refused to Plan. Quince Valley Ass’n Orchard Citizens conspiracy to Plaintiffs’ a class as Cir.1989) (in- (4th Hodel, 872 F.2d claims, concluding that RICO citations omit- marks and quotation ternal conditionally it did predominated, ted). on four oth- Plaintiffs’ claims based certify liability: undertak- negligent er theories of A. fraud, negligent misrepresentation,

ing, orga- of contract. The court and breach why issues do The first reason common claims into certification of these nized its Plaintiffs’ predominate twenty- for each subclasses—one need for individ against Agents is the had marketed insurance agents three who rebanee. In ual into the issue of inquiry Each subclass was plaintiff. named misrepresentation disputably, negligent pursue its four theoriеs permitted proof of reliance. See require and fraud liability action. separate via a Bank, Nat’l v. First Union Robertson (Ct.App. 565 S.E.2d 313-14 we accord the district S.C. again, Once 2002) negligent elements of (recounting substan class certification decision court’s Nevertheless, under misrepresentation in and fraud claims tial deference. law). fraud, stance, To establish we the court abused South Carolina believe alia, that plaintiff prove, must inter The individual class actions discretion. truth of a fraudulent simply cannot hearer relied on the Agents certified statement, rely there right and com and had satisfy predominance Rule 23’s negligent misrepre To This be on. Id. estabbsh monality requirements.11 is so sentation, inter plaintiff prove, must Plaintiffs’ claims the individ cause alia, “justifiably relied plaintiff elements not Agents require proof ual ... representation; necessary single [a false] claim on their *17 TPCM; loss as the plaintiff pecuniary suffered a and a number of these additional upon his rebanee proximate can after con result of elements established Thus, at both representation.” Id. 314. inquiry. Although siderable babibty require plain that the recognized this as theories of apparently district court (2) matter, actual reliance and ig it misunderstood or tiff demonstrate general a rely on plaintiff right that had a controlling legal principles hold- nored addition, (1997) (noting governmental that "if a unit In we note our reservations 11. issue, brought court’s determination as to a about the district suit on the same has compliance numerosity requirement, ‍​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‍with the may proposed action is decide that the class (noting Agent that some sub- see J.A. 1265 adju- unnecessary inferior method of and an members), eight classes have as few as dication”). We need not address these is- compare superiority requirement, and the however, sues, of Rule 23's re- because all (holding the South Carolina De- J.A. 1271 Therefore, quirements be met. our must partment of Insurance's current administra- to meet the conclusion that the class fails Agents’ proceeding tive to revoke the licenses require- commonality predominance proceeding”) bearing ... on this has "no dispositive in case. ments is this § 23.49[3] Federal Practice with 5 Moore's

435 fraud) (in Basic, any nor precedent, misstatement the case of other supports justifiable presumption was under of actual such reliance reliance the case that (in at hand. negligent the case of the circumstances inevitably, Almost es-

misrepresentation). Basic involved a suit alleg- shareholders’ requires an indi- tablishing these elements ing company material misrep- made inquiry. vidualized resentations about status of merger Broussard, reliance As we held “the certification, opposing talks. ... negligent misrep fraud and element argued company that common issues did suscepti readily [is] resentation claims not predominate because each shareholder rather, proof;” “proof to class-wide ble had to establish on the misrepre- reliance depend[s] upon ... reasonable reliance in making sentation to buy decisions or sell into what informa inquiry fact-intensive rejected The Supreme the stock. Court actually Brous [plaintiff] tion each had.” argument, reasoning that “[b]ecause this sard, Nor are alone in 155 F.3d at 341. we publicly most available information is re- T, See, e.g., AT & holding. so Andrews v. price, flected market investor’s reli- (11th Cir.1996) (decerti- 1014, 1025 F.3d 95 misrepresentations ance on material part plaintiffs class in because' “the fying may ... be presumed purposes aof show, ... have to on an individual would Basic, 10b-5 action.” U.S. basis, they misrepresen relied on the S.Ct. 978. presumption This was tations, result, injury suffered as a on the based “fraud-on-the-market theo- damages”); incurred a demonstrable amount of i.e., if ry,” even an individual investor was Co., tano v. Am. Tobacco Cas (and misrepresentation not aware (5th Cir.1996) (concluding F.3d directly “rely” did not therefore on it in “a certi fraud class cannot be sense), price the traditional the market be an fied when individual reliance will misrepresentation, reflected the stock issue”). thereby providing requisite “the causal found The district court nevertheless between a misrep- connection defendant’s required proof that the of reliance plaintiff’s injury” resentation and a that is would not an individual “fact- require case the touchstone of reliance. Id. at inquiry” intensive sufficient to render class Basic, therefore, capaci- S.Ct. found improper, certification but instead capital rapidly ty of the markets assimi- “presumed” that actual reliance could be into public prices late information stock right rely Those “assumed.” provided presuming basis for causal on a findings grounded are misunderstand- misrepre- between a material connection ing of controlling law. injury, sentation and a even plaintiff may have been com-

when *18 1. misrepresentation pletely unaware of the (let First, in suggest in “relied” on it the district erred alone traditional Levinson, sense). contrast, ing By allegations that Basic Inc. v. Plaintiffs’ 485 U.S. 224, 978, (1988), misrepresentation 108 99 L.Ed.2d 194 of fraud and offer no S.Ct. supports presumption of actual reliance for actual to establish substitute reliance (“[A] Rather, causal if in this ease. See 1268 and n.27 such a connection. an J.A. case un- approach presuming plaintiff common sense reli were misrepresentations, of the may acceptable alleged ance exists be this cir aware cumstance.”) Basic, Plan, (citing purchased 485 U.S. but nevertheless we 978). 246-47, fact, presuming basis for that the 108 S.Ct. neither see no mis- 436 unintelligible that Plaintiffs could proxi- ment so were

representations nevertheless any falsity damages. reasonably Absent this have discovered mate cause of her not inquiry will by reading policy, individualized presumption, representation actually Plaintiffs to show that required bearing “assumption” has no the Giles misrepresen- Agents’ alleged relied on noted, it As even the Giles here. tations. long been the law South Carolina has

that: repre- upon or not reliance [w]hether court also erred con The district justifi- particular in a case is sentation inquiry would cluding that individualized excusable, rea- or what constitutes able the second necessary not be to establish prudence diligence sonable Plaintiffs had element of reliance —that reliance, and what con- respect such Agents’ alleged on the mis right rely or constitutes a reckless conscious duct justi that reliance was representations or will prudence, failure to exercise such fied. various circum- depend upon the The court held that South Car “[u]nder involved, as the form and such stances law, an insurance olina such reliance on (sic) materialty representations, reasonable,” (citing J.A. 1268 agent intelligence, experience, respective Co., Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Trotter v. State physical condition agе, and mental and 465, 343, (Ct.App. 297 377 S.E.2d 351 S.C. re- and the relation and parties, 1988), that it is “reason proposition for the knowledge and means of spective to assume the truth [an] able for insured knowledge parties. represen agent’s fulness of’ an insurance tations). fact, law But in South Carolina v. (quoting at 918 Thomas Am. Work- Id. that “it is reasonable for the holds men, 178, 886, 14 S.E.2d S.C. truthfulness of’ his insured assume the added)). Thus, (emphasis the dis- cir under limited agent’s representations Carolina trict court misconstrued South and, present in this cumstances not case— right law when it concluded Plaintiffs’ indeed, in Trotter either. present See rely Agents’ misrepresentations on the Trotter, (concluding at 350-51 377 S.E.2d into inquiring be assumed without could that reliance was not and dis reasonable plain- circumstances of each the individual from those of tinguishing circumstances tiffs case. Gibson, Inc., 285 S.C. Giles & Lanford Therefore, that the district we conclude (Ct.App.1985)). 328 S.E.2d in finding court abused discretion Giles, Thus, in South Carolina’s interme- or justifiable reliance could be assumed appellate court held that when the diate in this this as- presumed case. Absent language agree- of a written unintelligible sumption presumption, individual issues an from prevent ment would insured dis- clearly predominate. Supreme As the covering falsity agent’s insurance Basic, U.S. at recognized Court in- it is reasonable for the representation, “[Requiring proof S.Ct. individ- sured the truthfulness of the to assume member of the ualized reliance from each agent’s misrepresentation insurance oral *19 effectively would proposed plaintiff class Giles, agreement. 328 S.E.2d the written [plaintiffs] proceed- prevented have from hand, like at Because the case at 918-19. action, since individual Trotter, ing with of oral allegations not involve does overwhelmed the agree- then would have misrepresentations, or written issues

437 Broussard, objectively 155 agent common ones.” Accord reasonable insurance on being sought 341.12 notice that his advice is F.3d at Trotter, relied on.” Id. 377 (citing S.E.2d 347). Obviously, at B. consideration of these thus proof any factors —and implied A why second reason common issues do duty requires an inquiry into the facts of — predominate not Plaintiffs’ claims particular each case. duty relates Agents the to the certifying "When subclasses owed to Plaintiffs the Plain- the Agents. however, Agents, ignored district court of negligent undertaking tiffs’ contentions legal principles. appeal, these On Plain- Agents’ are alleged based on the failure do, must, They tiffs cannot. acknowl- “duty properly their Plaintiffs inform maintain, They however, edge them. and other members class about principles value, articulated Trotter quality, pro- coverage” and extent apply Carolina Production Plan. insur- vided under the These contentions agents and Agents ance that the defendant require inquiry. also individualized brokers, who, are insurance Plaintiffs as- Generally, under South Carolina sert, duty have a special “do to their law, agent an insurance does not have clients.” duty Pitts to advise an insured. v. See Co., Jackson Nat’l S.C. But Insur. Plaintiffs’ argument Life —that 319, 502, (S.C.Ct.App.2002) Agents really 574 S.E.2d were “insurance brokers”— 347). Trotter, (citing dutyA premise. 377 S.E.2d at rests flawed Under on South however, law, may imposed, agent, “if an repre Carolina “insurance broker” nevertheless, insurance, in people seeking undertakes to advise the sents while an Maint., agent” sured.” Prod. Inc. v. represents Carolina “insurance the insur Co., company. 38-1-20, §§ & United States Fid. Guar. 310 S.C. ance See S.C.Code (1992) 39, Trotter, (2002); 425 S.E.2d (citing 38-43-10 see also Allstаte Ins. Co. 347). Smoak, express Absent an S.E.2d S.C. 182 S.E.2d (and (1971) duty undertaking assume such a (distinguishing 753-54 between in Agents Plaintiffs do contend that brokers on agents surance basis of here), expressly a duty employed by person seeking undertook such a whether in duty can be But in impliedly company created. Id. surance insurance solicit insurance). case, implied if an been determining duty has and write In this created, must specifically consider fac found that courts several district “(1) tors, “insurance including agent Agents agents” whether: are licensed pay Plan. beyond received consideration a mere who marketed and sold the Plaintiffs (2) ment premium, point nothing ... insured record to support advice, request Agents made a clear ... or their contention that were ac dealing Accordingly, there is a over an extend “insurance tually course brokers.”13 period put hardly ed which ignore of time would we can Trotter and Carolina course, agent proof 12. Of reliance broker of individual Plaintiffs’ versus distinction need not given heavy overwhelm common issues in surprising reliance their on However, every considering case. the cen- Trotter, agent, involving case an insurance trality allegations involving of the Plaintiffs’ argument in Part for the discussed IV.A.2. reliance, requiring other indi- and the inquiry, clearly vidual common issues do not predominate in this case. *20 438 require not without merit would proof are and the individualized

Production in at least some inquiry individualized require. those cases inquiries indeed, Therefore, “de- they may, cases. C. plaintiffs to each peculiar on facts pend Accordingly, “class certification case.” deter to the individualized In addition Id. at 342. erroneous.” [wa]s in Plaintiffs’ claims inherent minations defens Agents, the affirmative against the negligence, assumption comparative es D. risk, Agents asserted and setoff inquiry the need for individual Given obstacles to class certifica pose significant issues, hold that we must into these actual, justifiable if Similarly, even tion. court certified the district class actions Agents presumed, could be reliance not the com- Agents do meet to introduce evi permitted

would still requirements monality predominance with re presumption rebut dence to Thus, Rule 23. the district See Banca plaintiffs. to individual spect conditionally certi- abused its discretion Sons, Inc., Alex. Brown & 132 Cremi fying these class actions. (4th Cir.1997) 1017, (citing Car F.3d 1036 (4th 251, Burns, F.2d 257 Cir. ras v. 516 V.

1975), that the inference proposition rebuttable). The district court reliance contention Finally, we turn to a for class certi again ignored problems our by any parties: raised never posed by fication these defenses. argu dissenting colleague’s “threshold” that “nu- Plaintiffs maintain appeal, On ment, 450, that if common post at even rejected the notion courts” have merous in Plaintiffs’ cause predominate issues do of affirmative defenses that the assertion i.e., action, whole, against TPCM — inappropriate. class certification renders duties, both con “that TPCM violated its However, re they only cite Visa law, party and at as third adminis tractual Litig., Check/MasterMoney Antitrust of the Plan and such conduct was trator (2d 124, Cir.2001), in which F.3d failure,” Fidelity Plan’s cause of merely stated Second Circuit injured Plaintiffs and directly that “failure does not of affirmative defenses presence members,” 1249—the the absent class J.A. “automatically” certification render class confining predo court erred in district Rather, like other consid- inappropriate. of action. inquiry to that cause minancе erations, affirmative defenses must be fac- steadfastly contends that The dissent into the calculus of whether common tored evaluat district court should instead have Id. at predominate. predominated whether common issues ed a whole.” Moreover, in- in the entire “action taken as regardless of other courts’ see post (emphasis original); at 446 flatly of Rule we have See terpretations (“the whole”); case as affirma- also id. held that “when the defendants’ (“the whole”); 450, 451, as a action may depend ... on facts tive defenses action”). (“the According case, entire class certi- to each peculiar dissent, Broussard, must first a district court 155 to fication is erroneous.” (citation [a] that” an law suit “as “determine entire quotation at 342 and internal F.3d (i.e. action omitted). the cause of to whole” Although it is difficult marks very different against TPCM but also the any precision, appears determine asserted causes Agents’ here the affirmative defenses

439 predominance and su- Agents) predominance satisfies fíes the and superiority re- 23(b)(3) 23(b)(3)” periority requirements imposed quirements imposed by only employ 23(c)(4), then only satisfy the entire lawsuit does subsection post at if 453, 23(c)(4)’s simply ignores requirements may “manage[ these a court Rule express ] 23(c).” course, command.14 through orders authorized Of courts have See no dis- cretion ignore plain argument language id. at The dissent’s of a finds See, statute or federal rule. e.g., United support no the law—not Rule 23 itself States Indeed, Oregon Nat’l Bank v. Indep. Ins. nor case or treatise. Am., 439, Agents 454, 508 U.S. 113 S.Ct. ignoring plain language addition to 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d (noting rendering Rule subsection of the “plain meaning enforced, must be superfluous, rule dissent’s argument is course”). contrary Supreme to the interpre- Court’s precedent

tation of Rule our own Moreover, the dissent’s approach would every (including eight (c)(4) that of other court render subsection of Rule super- courts), appellate federal and every schol- fluous. The require dissent would a court arly treatise has addressed the issue. considering the manageability of a class action—a requirement for predominance First, rigidly ap- the dissent’s sequential 23(b)(3)(D) under Rule pretend that —to proach ignores plain language (c)(4) provision subsection specifically —a 23(c)(4) provides rule. that: included to make a class action more man- (A) appropriate action may [w]hen ageable not exist until after —does brought be or 'maintained as a class manageability determination is made. issues, respect particular action with Thus, under the reading dissent’s of Rule (B) may a class be divided into sub- 23, (c)(4) a court could use subsection classes and each treated subclass as a manage cases that the court had al- class, provisions and the rule ready determined would manageable be applied shall then be construed and ac- (c)(4). without consideration of subsection cordingly. (c)(4)(A) reading This leaves subsection 23(c)(4) added). (emphasis Fed.R.Civ.P. any practical without application, thereby Thus, specifically Rule 23 dictates that rendering superfluous. See In re Tetra- Cases, appropriate” may cycline “[w]hen class action 107 F.R.D. 726-27 and, (W-D.Mo.1985)(“If “particular “maintained” as to issues” requirement under done, 23(c)(4)(A) provisions “the of this Rule was that ... one or more after rule,” predominance such as the require- ‘predominate’ issues in the usual Rule (b)(3), 23(b) sense, ment of “shаll ... then be construed compared when with all the added). applied.” (emphasis case, Id. The issues there would obviously dissent’s approach 23(c)(4)(A).” a court de- place first be no need or for Rule —that termine “that the action (emphasis as whole in original)). [a] satis- Such an interpre- Advisory 14. Committee on resolving Civil Rules has certain claims and defenses on a (c)(4)’s recognized despite subsection force leaving while basis other controversies Thus, (b)(3). placement after in 1995 the separate for resolution in actions.” See Ed- Advisoiy amending Committee considered Cooper, ward H. Class Actions and the Rule- read, (c)(4) may "an action be certified as a making Challenges Process: Rule 23: to the claims, respect particular class action with Process, 13, 56, Rulemaking 71 N.Y.U. L.Rev. defenses, or place- issues ...” because "the (1996) (quoting Proposed Amendments to (c)(4) ment provision in subdivision Procedure, (Feb. Rules of Civil Class Actions permitting particular class actions for Draft)). potential has tended to obscure the benefit of *22 representation requirement of Rule the well-es- of Rule 23 contravenes tation 23(a)(4), reading therefore never prohibition “pass tablished and would 23(a). make provision in a manner would through of Rule at gate[ Post ]” sentence, “clause, super- or word ... 450; (noting see also id. at 449 that an fluous, void, insignificant,” TRW Inc. requirements satisfy action must first “the Andrews, 19, 31, 441, 122 534 U.S. S.Ct. 23(a)” employ of Rule a court can before (internal quotation 151 339 L.Ed.2d (e)(4)).15 lengthy Despite attempt its omitted). citations marks and hand, analogize case at in Amchem to the support ga- an effort to find some plain ignoring In addition to Rule 23’s 449-451, at tekeeper theory, post see rendering part super- of it language dissent to take into account the fails Su- fluous, rigid, sequential the dissent’s read- preme own characterization and Court’s ing controlling the rule conflicts with application in of Amchem Ortiz. re- precedent. Supreme The Court has strictly to read Rule 23 se- fused Moreover, acknowledges, the dissent but quential fashion advocated the dissent. disregards import then conclu contrary, To in its most discus- recent sion of the itself that Amchem Court “set 23(c)(4), sion Ortiz v. Fibreboard of Rule certification,” tlement relevant to a class 815, 856, 2295, Corp., 527 U.S. 119 S.Ct. 23(e) and that a court’s Rule affects evalu (1999), suggest- 144 L.Ed.2d 715 the Court 614, predominance. ation of 521 U.S. at judge could initially ed that a district act added). (emphasis 117 S.Ct. 2231 The Su (c)(4) pursuant to subsection to create sub- preme Court explained Amchem satisfy the previously classes so as to listed settlement-only when dealing with (a)(4). Indeed, requirements of subsection 23(e), “a pursuant to Rule district court out pointed Ortiz Court that this result case, need not if inquire whether Amchem,” “is obvious after the case on tried, present manage would intractable heavily which the dissent so relies for its problems,” ordinarily ment which would (noting that theory. See id. “it is obvious 23(b)(3)’s necessary satisfy predo Rule after Amchem that a class divided between minance Id. at requirement. 117 ... present holders of and future claims added) (citing 2231 (emphasis S.Ct. Fed. requires homogeneous into division sub- 23(b)(3)(D)). R.Civ.P. dissent ig thus 23(c)(4)(B), Rule sepa- classes under nores the most lesson of Amchem relevant representation rate to eliminate conflict- to the dissent’s “threshold” contention Amchem, ing (citing interests of counsel.” hand, ie., the case Supreme at Court’s (emphasis U.S. at S.Ct. 2231 recognition that the subsections of Rule 23 added))). Although dissent claims oth- interactive, fоllowed, are and not to be erwise, interpretation if its of Rule 23 is suggests, strictly sequen the dissent followed, notwithstanding, a court Ortiz sum, tial in its two fashion. most re (c)(4) could never use subsection to divide decisions, cent class Ortiz Am- homogeneous into “to subclasses chem, the counsel,” Supreme Court eschewed the conflicting interests eliminate id., reading dissent’s plaintiffs’ suggested approach “entire “as a because action” satisfy adequacy provisions sequentially. whole” would not each of Rule 23’s course, (c)(4)(A) 15. involves Of subclasses under does interact with other sub- Ortiz 23(c)(4)(B), while the in- Rule case hand sections same of Rule 23 in the fashion as particular certification of under volves issues (c)(4)(B). (c)(4)(A), nothing suggests in Rule but 23(c)(4)(A) Additionally, precedent from our own considered actions 23(b)(3) rejects sequential flatly brought dissent’s under Rule ... particu A.H. interpretation of Rule In re well larly suited for certification of fewer Robins, F.2d at we counseled that than all Their issues. conclusion follows advantage take full “courts should 23(c)(4)(A) the fact from that Rule assists (c)(4) provision permitting in subsection 23(b)(3)’s satisfying additional class in the separate class treatment requirements predominance certification *23 recognized expressly case.” We that (citations omitted)); and superiority.” “if claims, multiple includes one [an] action Co., 379, v. Am. Emig Tobacco 184 F.R.D. might qualify or which as a certi- more (D.Kan.1998) 395 that (explaining of Rule claim, may separate class the court 23(c)(4)(A) fiable permits “adjudication of any is such claims from other claims in the ac- sues common to though the class even certify provisions tion them under the and litigation may satisfy entire not the re (c)(4),” of that “each provided subsection 23”); of quirements Newberg Rule 6 on must independently subclass meet all (“Even § Class Actions 18:7 cases which (a) of requirements and least one of the not might satisfy predominance test (b).” categories specified in Id. at 728 when case is viewed as a whole may added). Thus, (emphasis contrary to the sometimes be certified as a class limited to case, protests dissent’s we do not common, selected issues are that under the espouse a new rule. Rather we follow authority 23(c)(4).”); Wright Rule 7B & rule in A.H. sub- articulated Robins —that Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 23(c)(4) section should be used to separate (“Subdivision (c)(4) § 1790 particularly “one or that are appropriate more” claims helpful enabling courts to restructure treatment, provided for class within complex require cases to meet the other (rather that claim or than claims within for maintaining ments action.... class whole), the entire lawsuit predo- 23(c)(4)(A) theory of Rule is that the necessary all require- minance and other advantages adjudicating and economies of (a) (b) and ments of subsections of Rule 23 issues are common to the entire class are met. representative on a basis should be se Nor are we alone. Not a single even other though cured issues the case has approach. followed dissent’s Sev may litigated have to separately by eral and a of distinguished courts number member.”). class each explicitly commentators have endorsed All other have explicitly implic courts specific predominance analysis broad issue (c)(4) itly interpretation endorsed See, e.g., of Rule 23. v. Valentino Carter- predomi that considers whether Rule 23’s Inc., (9th Wallace, 1227, 97 F.3d 1234 Cir. requirement by examining nance is met 1996) (“Evеn if questions common do independently each cause of one predominate over individual questions another, lawsuit, not the entire as the dis so that class certification of the entire See, e.g., sent would. Smilow v. South warranted, action is Rule 23 authorizes the Inc., Sys., Bell western Mobile F.3d in appropriate district court cases iso (1st Cir.2003) 32, (reversing decerti- 38-43 late the common under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) fication two out of three decertified proceed with treat class (citations affirming particular ment claims decertification with of these issues.” claim); omitted)); Morris, Inc., v. Philip respect Simon to third Piazza EBSCO v. (E.D.N.Y.2001) Industries, 1341, 1349, 21, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 273 F.3d 28-31 J.) (11th (“The Cir.2001) (Weinstein, (finding framers “no basis 1351-53 Hudson v. concluding all-or-nothing proposition”); the district court for Int’l, Inc., certifying F.Supp. Capital Mgmt. its discretion a class abused (N.D.Cal.1983) claim Defendants on” class cer (granting EBSCO 630-31 duty for lost fiduciary profits statutory for breach fraud for claims of tification for finding abuse of discretion certifi but negligent denying misrepresentation cation of stock sale and under-valuation despite for common claims certification law reversing claims EBSCO questions recognizing “[individual to claims respect certification vastly law and fact would overshadow defendant, Price Waterhouse Coo another if court were questions common per); Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter certify based on the common law classes (2d Cir.2001) Co., R.R. 267 F.3d Invs., claims”); Capital Mortgage Lewis (evaluating plaintiffs’ disparate impact (D.Md.1977) (granting 78 F.R.D. from separately pattern-or-practice claim law certification securities *24 claim); disparate Becherer v. treatment excluding common fraud claim but law 415, (6th Lynch, 430 Merrill 193 F.3d Cir. certification); from Hernandez class action banc) 1999) (en (Moore, J., concurring in 558, Skyward, v. F.R.D. Motor Vessel 61 judgment) (noting that court district (S.D.Fl.1973) 561 class certifica (granting a class with “properly respect certified exposure cause of negligent tion for action defendant, against one the contract claims” contract, of but not of breach im breach ruling on fraud and other claims without warranty, or plied inadequate medical defendants); id. against multiple at 428 action); of causes see also Hannah treatment opinion) (majority (noting disap without ott-Bumsted, Note, Pack St Severance proval that “the court reached the district ages: Rule Judicial Use Federal of of question respect class certification with 23(c)(4)(A), Civil 91 Geo. Procedure L.J. issues, remaining the contract but not the 219, that “there (observing is 231 claims”); Citgo Allison v. Petroleum single little that of a dispute” certification (5th Cir.1998) 402, 151 F.3d 421-22 Corp., claim in a suit where assert mul an (conducting independent predominance tiple an of claims “is use acceptable action); inquiry for each of cause Cannon court’s under district discretion Rule Inc., Cherry Toyota, v. Hill 184 F.R.D. 23(c)(4)(A).”) (“This (D.N.J.1999) 540, court ... has 544 Indeed, the Third Circuit has twice re- previously rejected the notion class courts taking versed district for dis- certification under Rule 23 is ‘an all-or- approach failing sent’s to consider proposition’ requiring certifi nothing class class certification of individual claims. See of all in a cation causes of action asserted 434, Bogosian F.2d Corp., v. Oil 561 (citations omitted)); single pleading.” Ste Gulf 453(3d Cir.1977) (“Even assuming 279, phenson Bell Corp., v. Atl. F.R.D. court were correct its conclusion that 4, (D.N.J.1997) n. (granting 289 & claim not appropriate lease is claims, class certification for antitrust de determination, it nevertheless should have statutory claims of nying certification for certification the trade-mark fraud, considered of duty law of and common breach 23(c)(4)(A).”); claim unjust Geraghty under Rule and fair good dealing, faith enrich Comm’n, ment, received, States Parole 579 F.2d money United had and “[djifferential (3d Cir.1978) 238, (rejecting 252-53 district noting that treatment 23(c)(4)” court’s conclusion “that a class action is permitted by claims is Rule “not all of the suggest inappropriate” that no cases “that certifica because grounds alleged complaint in the tion of all asserted causes action is nance, 425-426, be- at applicable [proposed] are class” ante 427-430.16 That properly cause that “does not conclusion reaches a dissent different conclusion acknowledge powers and duties predominate as to whether common issues (c)(4) 28”), trial section of Rule court under respect Plaintiffs’ claim 888, grounds, vacated on other 445 U.S. TPCM does not mean that we “strip[] 402-03, 63 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 23(b)(3) just Rule of its meaning;” means (1980). disagrees the dissent with our assess- Indeed, continuing ment. vitality of

Again, adopted no has the dis- 23(b)(3)’s predominance Rule 23; requirement sent’s of Rule no court interpretation our respect dictated reversal with required lawsuit-specific predomi- has Plain- Thus, analysis. nance the dissent’s attacks tiffs’ claims Agents decision —a they on our are as are approach baffling as with which the dissent concurs. ill-founded. The dissent’s contention The dissent offers an equally perplexing our approach “bypasse[s]” and “sub- response to the wealth authority cited 23(b)(3)’s predominance re- vert[s]” above, First, including cases from Sec- 23(b)(3) quirement, “strips Rule ond, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, meaning,” post 450 and Circuits, and Eleventh of which all have simply scrupulously false. have ana- We rejected the dissent’s contention that a lyzed whether Plaintiffs’ claims *25 if class can be certified the common Agents satisfy predo- TPCM and the ie., issues in “the entire every action” — requirement. minance See at 425- ante against every cause of action defendant— 426, 427-428, so, doing 434-438. After we predominate over individual issues “the have concluded Plaintiffs’ cause of entire action.” dissent does not dis- against action TPCM —“that violat- TPCM cuss, distinguish, let alone most of the party ed its ... as third duties administra- cite; it Plan,” simply cases we maintains that tor of the which caused Plan’s “the (dissent they not at “directly injured post do exist. See 63 failure” and so Plaintiffs” whole, can noting “identify” prece- a all no circuit J.A. 1249—taken as satisfies of requirements, including predomi- majority’s holding).17 Rule 23’s dent supporting " Thus, contention, contrary to the and is dissent’s "defined factual contours” ‘co 16. post at is no “wonder regardless there reason to with the terminous transaction of exactly what” the common issues certi- in the the number of substantive theories ... ” against "predomi- fied cause of action TPCM may plaintiff.’ be available to the CoreS over;” they predominate nate over the indi- Bank, America, Inc., tates N.A. v. Huls 176 vidual issues involved in that cause action. 187, 194, 1999) (3d of (quoting F.3d 200 Cir. (Second) Judgments § 24 cmt. Restatement of Pointing liability to the various theories of a). part of the Thus "claims are same cause alleged complaint against twen Plaintiffs’ they out of of action when arise the same TPCM, ty-three surpris agents dissent operative ... or the same core of transaction ingly each of con asserts that these theories Englander, v. 321 F.3d facts.” Grausz stitutes a action and certified cause that the of (4th Cir.2003) (internal quotation 473 marks simply claim TPCM is a "common casеs, omitted). Certainly, in some each the question.” post at were See 452. Even if this liability ory arises from a different set of of so, it is aids the unclear how this contention part operative facts and so constitutes a predominance inquiry would dissent—for the here, although different cause of action. But still be within the of these conducted confines liability whole, Plaintiffs assert several theories of "causes of action” not the lawsuit as TPCM, Allison, See, arise from all of these theories e.g., as the dissent would. 151 fact, "operative single a set of facts” so are F.3d at conten 421-22. dissent’s herring. single part tion is a A is a red cause of action cause of action—that 444 Allison, 421-22; Castano, F.3d at 151 84 confounding, as is dissent’s con

Just sure, 21.18 has F.3d at 745 n. To be as the adopted the Fifth Circuit tention we, noted,there is a approach and that in Second Circuit has circuit the dissent’s refusing predominance the Fifth conflict as to whether must assertedly to follow Cir respect cuit, See at be shown with to an entire cause of post create circuit conflict. Texaco, 446-447, action, specific to a merely respect v. or (citing 452-453 Smith (c)(4). (5th issue, Inc., Cir.2001), in order to invoke See Robin 263 F.3d Allison (5th Co., R.R. 151 F.3d 402 son v. Metro-North Commuter Corp., Petroleum Citgo (2d Cir.2001) (not Co., Cir.1998), n. Am. 267 F.3d and Castano v. Tobacco (5th Cir.1996)). fact, ing application the Fifth Circuit’s “strict 84 F.3d 734 (b)(3) state, predominance inquiry cases let alone the en Fifth Circuit do would, hold, pattern practice tire or claim” as the dissent that “the entire before i.e., (c)(4) action,” noting “the all court can invoke and further or action as whole” — understanding parties all that “an alternative causes of —must (b)(3) (c)(4) 23(b)(3)’s ... has satisfy predominance Rule re interaction been including by the quirement employ before a court can advanced elsewhere” 23(c)(4) Valentino, Rather, certify a the Ninth Circuit class. F.3d 1234). But we have need to enter merely require Fifth cases that “a no Circuit (and action, whole, satisfy fray similarly must the dissent’s rumina cause as a 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement” “pinhole” tions about issue certification rule here) 23(c)(4) because, “rule available.” have no relevance we before See Smith, added); within, (emphasis F.3d have in this at 409 demonstrated case resulting mismanaged employer administration of the Plan re treatment their in a timely pattern sulting pay practice in the Plan’s failure to out intentional discrimina- Moreover, impact disparate Plaintiffs assert different tion and claim aris- benefits. *26 action, very ing facially arising employment policy. from a a causes of different from neutral facts,” "operative against Agents— analyzed Circuit each of set of the Fifth these determining Agents misrepresented separately the in that the Plan’s fea claims whether (b)(3)’s leading purchase predominance requirement the a woe had tures Plaintiffs been Notably, looking at the fully deficient TPCM met. Id. at 420-25. In Plan. neither first challenges any disparate treatment/pat- other cause action—the defendant the dis nor of clearly proper practice tern held trict court’s treatment of Plain or claim—the court that the single against stage pattern practice the tiffs' claim TPCM as a cause of "first of or claim” separate independent stage” and their could not be divorced from its "second action from predominance analysis. at agents. the for the Id. 421-22. Instead, predomi- the court the conducted inquiry by looking pattern at nance or fundamentally suggest- 18. The dissent errs in whole, practice claim as a and found that engage ing of that we in some sort "words- predominate common issues did not with re- noting mithery” important distinction this spect Although cause to that action. Id. the Fifth view and between Circuit’s the dis- of parts disparate treatment/pat- of the fact, different approach. post See at 453. In sent's practice tern or cause action could not be plain itself it Fifth Circuit has made that "severed,” completely the court a conducted exactly means what it said—a court is to has predominance analysis independent for the predominance determine that is ‍​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‍satisfied action, disparate impact second cause action—the assessing "cause of as a when each assess, said, whole,” lawsuit, whole, possibility it claim—to as "the a not the entire as as Allison, certifying only disparate a class on the posits. example, in action the dissent For 407, added). impact (emphasis Id. at 422 plain- at claim." 151 F.3d African-American charged precisely approach we employment This is have fol- tiffs discrimination and lowed; dissent, sought majority, class certification of two causes of it is the precedent supports. systemic disparate action: a Fifth Circuit claim of whole first ques- action a J.A. 1249. Neither of the two Plaintiffs’ cause predominance require any inquiry, TPCM satisfies tions and if Rule 28. Thus even the requirements question may require nothing third (that the Fifth adopted by view Circuit a more than ministerial determination that be within a predominance must established made simply quickly. can be We are (c)(4)) rath- given cause of action to invoke at stage confident this that proceeding (that Ninth Circuit this er than cause of on a this action classwide “ required) necessarily is not constituted time, basis will ‘achieve economies of ef- circuit, holding law our would of this here fort, expense, ... promote unifor- with the Circuit full accordance Fifth mity decision as persons similarly view. situated, sacrificing procedural without fact, bringing fairness other aware about undesir- we are of no decision ” Amchem, able results.’ See adopted court that has the dissent’s U.S. at (citation omitted).19 that in such as the before 117 S.Ct. 2231 view cases one us, Moreover, of ac- than one cause it involving important more to remember tion, predominance a court must evaluate are approving we conditional in the context the “action taken as a case, certification and that the dis- Post at whole” or the “case as a whole.” explicitly trict court has stated that it as dis- contrary, 458 and 459. On decertify would not hesitate to if above, approach cussed is the dissent’s unmanageable. it became J.A. 1260-61. all that would create direct conflict with Thus, unlikely in the event the case courts, abrogate other longstanding morass,” a “procedural becomes as the precedent in the of class practice area predicts, post we dissent at are confi- law. at See ante 439-448. dent that district will fulfill its responsibility to the class. decertify

Finally, predicting the dissent errs “procedural on remand. See nightmare”

post class action 448. The certified VI. the district court TPCM involves conclusion, prece- we note that circuit single, straightforward cause of action con- guidance resolving dent clear provided questions to all sisting of three common presented case. On one “TPCM Plaintiffs —whether violated *27 hand, against Plaintiffs’ class action ... party duties as third administrator of many the Plan,” bears similarities to class action the “such was a whether conduct failure,” in Fidelity Wesleyan, and we approved cause of the Plan’s Central and injured promises many advantages: of the directly whether “that failure the theory advance'a of liabili- single Plaintiffs and the absent class members.” 19. While the bemoans need for trict court did not its discretion in dissent the abuse 1,400 conditionally separate certifying on the one cause of ac- individual full trials the claims, would, TPCM, faithfully approach against non-certified fact, its in tion we have adhered against purpose add of the to text and of Rule and chosen claims—all claims the time, that TPCM—to it describes as a a course effort, will "achieve economies of what "minefield expense, legal Denying promote uniformity for Post at class error.” and and require persons similarly against as to situated.” certification TPCM would of decision prove advisory note Plaintiffs to the same See Fed.R.Civ.P. committee’s elements Amendment, (1966 (b)(3)). against certified of action TPCM in subdivision In do- cause 1,400 trials, so, we possibility ing believe we removed from the individual have findings contradictory one-way pre- and "minefield” those mines could issue dissent’s contrast, holding be properly that the dis- removed. clusion. inquiry; apply respect fails to law with

ty, individualized hends or requiring no issues, likely to conserve it its underlying class certification seems to abuses discre- litigation judicial resources conserve we that the dis- Accordingly, tion. hold relitigate by reducing costs need in granting trict court abused its discretion trials; multiple in in the liability issues against conditional class certification appears certification absence class Agents. against claims many Plaintiffs’ PART, AFFIRMED IN REVERSED brought; and class TPCM would not be PART, IN AND REMANDED FOR defendant, protects certification FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TPCM, adjudications from inconsistent NIEMEYER, concurring Judge, Circuit Moreover, one-way preclusion. issue part in dissenting part: Wesleyan, Central as the district court all of 23’s

carefully require- assessed I part judgment concur in that ments a class action and for issued detailed its holding the district court abused findings explaining decision in factual in certifying discretion individual “sub- Indeed, conditionally certifying the class. I against Agent classes” defendants. significant to the extent there are differ- I dissent from the remainder. would hold ences the class action certified between that the district court abused its discretion against action certifi- TPCM and class certifying single for claims Central Wesleyan— cation approved against representative TPCM because the Wesleyan the need in Central such as parties requirements have not satisfied the fault, comparative appli- determine and the Federal Rules Civil Procedure jurisdic- cation of the laws of different 23(b)(3). 23(a)(3), 23(a)(4), and weigh tions—these differences even more majority The case able opinion heavily in favor of class certification here. a partial class-action certifica- approve Wesleyan virtually sum, Central com- full faibng tion account pels the conclusion the district court range plaintiffs’ claims the ex- conditionally did abuse its discretion in tent to which most of their claims must certifying Plaintiffs’ class TPCM. concededly adjudicated anon individual hand, proposed On the other Plaintiffs’ basis, ignoring the effect that the erosive Agents class actiоns have adjudications of these additional many to the action parallels we re- predominance require- claims has on the in Broussard: jected 23(b)(3) ment of Rule that common issues Agents require proof individualized predominate ques- over the individualized rebanee and individualized of a proof spe- a whole. raised in tions taken Agents’ cific undertaking advise. example, For the majority never addresses affirmative also require defenses would the practical legal difficulties that will Thus, inquiry. further individualized from the arise certification of a class action *28 Broussard would seem to require the con- respect only or TPCM with to one predom- clusion that not common do leaving two issues while for individual ad- inate, that is and class certification 1,400 judication in separate individual tri- Indeed, appropriate. the district court and, als the damages issues of some Broussard’s force recognized there- cases, causation, as web as: to attempted mightily distinguish fore the 1) all claims under the South Carolina however, so, case. The court could do Act; Unfair Trade Practices by misconstruing ignoring controlling 2) legal alleging conspiracy; a all principles. misappre- When claims civil

447 3) (c)(4) involving housekeeping is a that all claims violations rule allows

RICO; courts to sever the common issues for a class trial. 4) plaintiff each qualify all issues Plan; applicable under the for claim Co., v. Castano American 84 Tobacco F.3d (5th Cir.1996); 734, n. 21 see also 5) sold agents all the who claims v. Citgo Allison Corp., Petroleum 151 F.3d (5th Cir.1998). Plan.

the 421-22 separate The need for these individualized addition, opinion In the majority at- trials is conceded. case, to tempts shoehorn this even with its issue, single limited focus on a into the overwhelming predominance

Despite the parameters of our distinguishable holding of these issues and claims individualized Wesleyan College Central v. W.R. Grace majority over the common issue that the (4th Co., Cir.1993), & F.3d 177 treatment, which for ma- now class the certifies we affirmed the conditional certification of jority adopted approach an inventive has this, litigants. doing a class of asbestos of a to Rule 23 allows certification majority fails consider the broad predominance requirement class where 23(b)(3) complexities raised admittedly unmet in the unaddressed is- Rule According litigation apply sues in this and fails to context of the case as a whole. later and more majority, require specifically applicable to the the certified con- trolling case to predominate ruling Supreme issue in this over Court Products, Windsor, in the Inc. individualized issues action as Amchem 23(c)(4)(A), it ignores whole Rule which U.S. 117 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (1997). appears to view as fourth avenue certification, footing on equal Finally, majority meaningfully fails 23(b)(3). 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), Rules to address overt conflicts of interest exist- so, doing majority glorifies Rule ing among conditionally members 23(c)(4)(A) au- housekeeping rule that —a example, certified class. For does not certify thorizes a court to for class treat- how attempt explain conditionally ment “particular issues” case may include, certified class on the one 23(a) 23(b)— otherwise satisfies Rule hand, employers seeking rescission materially rewriting

with the effect pre- insurance contract the return of 23(b)(3)’s requirements 23 such that Rule and, hand, paid, miums on other their action,” longer applied no need be “[a]n employees seeking enforcement 23(b), see Fed.R.Civ.P. but rаther to insurance same contract to obtain benefits single issue, no small. matter how discounts, majority it. The also on under Not only majority’s approach does the deposition testimony, potentiality scant reach, expand beyond Rule 23 its intended aggrieved employee-class members but conflict it also creates a direct with the damaged nonpayment who were or de- Fifth which has Circuit held: payment may implead layed employers,

A cannot their who are also pre- district court manufacture defendants through the members and who made the decision dominance nimble use (c)(4). proper woefully inadequate plan. interpre- purchase subdivision antagonistic posture tation of the interaction between subdi- Even aside from the *29 (b)(3) (c)(4) employee of and class mem- employer visions and is a of the cause action, whole, satisfy bers, injured employees’ pre- as a must the claims them- the (b)(3) will be an- requirement aggregated dominance of in that selves have to into subclasses, mismanagement a when their whether was tagonistic based on TPCM’s whom, Answering cause of the Plan’s failure. this mismanaged by claims and were on dif- no class member’s claim premised question to relief resolves with entitlement of only questions these the difficult By lumping ferent all of and invites theories. proceed question once the is an- employees apparently into one class and how Little, informally any, if time can casting “disavowed” swered. or effort aside as by answering this in the theory question of best of recov- saved group employees’ be on ery, inherent- because full individual trials majority the deindividualizes abstract lops liability will have to be conducted for ly individual claims off substantial still members’ each individual class member. limbs from the various class the conglomeration order to bless I would the certification of the reverse disabled, similar, now class of of albeit in this the class case for litigants. reasons that follow. by Had problems these been addressed I distinguish- majority opinion aspects Wesleyan, able of as well Central majority Because the dis- holds that Amchem, controlling analysis as of of a trict court’s conditional certification explored, ap- been it would have become single issue TPCM constituted parent satisfy, under cannot 23(c)(4), application of Rule ante at proper any applicable require- precedent, 425-427, it at necessary address ments Federal Rule Civil Procedure why outset the fundamental issue of 28(1) that claims be of the typical their 23(b)(3) requirement of Rule predominance they claims of so that can act as the class Rule bypassed by cannot be reliance on representative fairly and ade- parties, able 23(c)(4). short, I ma- believe that the quately protect the interests of the jority, expansive interpreta- an adopting 23(a)(3) class, (4); by Rule required as 23(c)(4), enlarged tion of Rule has (2) questions that common of law and fact in a manner contem- reach Rule 23

predominate questions affecting over con- plated by the Rule’s drafters and not members, required by individual class as Supreme approach sistent Court’s 23(b)(3); Rule the class calling for an “undiluted” application superior methods for other available 23(b)(3)’srequirements every case. adjudication fair of the and efficient Amchem, 2231; U.S. S.Ct. controversies, numerous claims and as re- written, Rule, (noting see id. that the 23(b)(3). quirеd the requirements “sets are bound [courts] “judicial majority’s counseling against As result of the limited to enforce” and Rule). on single application focus the facts related to a issue inventiveness” in Thus, case, I history this it has left a difficult and would conclude text, complex procedural light structure created the Rule and its read in Amchem, try Supreme holding the need numerous individual claims Court’s re- quire involving for each member that will result in that even in cases the certi- classes, unnecessary, ultimately unhelpful, issue-only fication of the common procedural nightmare. predominate questions And on a broad issues must over level, judgment question affecting only one has to individual members of the utility of morass in the as a enduring procedural context the action single majority's to the purpose answering for the whole. conclusion unhesitating to invite an question contrary certified for class treatment: seems

449 granting 23(a)’s In approach class certification addition satisfying procedural where other devices would suf- prerequisites, parties seeking class certi- fice, so, doing in a opens conflict fication must show that the action is Thus, Fifth only with the Circuit. after I 23(b)(1), (2), maintainable under Rule my elaborate the basis of conclusion that a (3).

predominance analysis is mandated ev- 23(b)(3)

ery Rule class action do I then

proceed required analysis by with the look- qualify To

ing at for certification pre- the various issues and claims under Rule 23(b)(3), sented this case. class must meet require- two 23(a) beyond ments the Rule prerequi- Of the Rule 23 adopted amendments questions sites: Common must “pre- 23(b)(3) 1966, the addition of Rule was “the any dominate over questions affecting most adventuresome innovation.” Am only members”; individual and class res- chem, 614, at U.S. 117 S.Ct. 2231 olution “superior must be to other avail- (internal quotation marks and citation able methods for the fair and efficient omitted). 23(b)(3) Because Rule was an adjudication controversy.” innovative device and indeed involved speculation impact, some about 614-15, Indeed, Id. at 117 S.Ct. 2231. impose Rule was careful to two specific 23(b)(3)’s emphasized Court that Rule re important requirements that must be quirements are “class-qualifying criteria” found as conditions to any certification of and that ... “[f]ederal courts lack authori under “predominance” the Rule. The ty to substitute for Rule 23’s certification requirement requires the district court to criteria” any other standard than the one evaluate the “action” to determine whether adopted in 621-22, the rule itself. Id. at “questions of law or fact common to the 117 S.Ct. 2231. members of the class predominate over though every Even class action must any questions affecting pass through gates 23(b)(3), of Rule members,” “superiority” and the require is, course, entitled to take into requires analyze ment the court to wheth account the manageability tools supplied proposed er the class action would be “su 23(c)(4) by Rule in determining whether perior to other available methods for the predominance superiority require- adjudication fair and efficient of the con 23(b)(3) ments of Rule are satisfied with troversy” raised the “action.” Fed. Thus, regard to the action aas whole. 23(b)(3). R.Civ.P. If an action does not just as a court may consider the availabili- satisfy two “class-qualifying those criteria” ty of in determining subclasses whether an requirements addition to the of Rule 23(a) 23(b)(3), 23(a), Amchem, satisfies Rules 621, U.S. 117 S.Ct. see Ortiz v. 2231, Corp., Fibreboard there is U.S. no basis for the court to class, S.Ct. certify proposed L.Ed.2d 715 even on a condi that, (1999)(noting at the class tional basis. The certification predominanсe supe stage, riority requirements availability to elim- are thus subclasses organic to 23(b)(3) Amchem, every conflicting action. inate interests could factor into where 23(a)(4) plaintiffs sought requirement whether the bypass predo of Rule satisfied), requirement minance certifying may so it consider the avail- settlement, for Supreme ability issue-only Court in making could classes case, not have made that proposition clear same determinations. either er: issue-only such subclasses or classes to be *31 23(b)(3) 23(e), a and management particular in between Rule the play

useful tools too, satisfy case, they, individually upon parties must the provisions sought which 23(a) and, of and a requirements settlement-only the Rule certification class 23(c)(4) 23(b)(3). (pro- See ultimately, approval negotiated Fed.R.Civ.P. set- that, issue-only if a court utilizes viding settling parties The viewed the tlement. subclasses, or provisions classes “the as a predominance requirement require- ap- then this rule shall be construed action applicable only ment to an that was us, plied accordingly”). In the case before trial, they destined and therefore ar- however, dispute the threshold I have with gued that of the action and fair- cohesion majority single- is not whether the the ness for settlement was better determined that issue class has been certified here 23(e) by hearing ap- a under Rule when 23(b)(3),1 Rule rather whether satisfies but Supreme Because the proving settlement. main- issue-only may class action analyzed in the Court Amchem relation- 23(c)(4) Rule com- tained under when the ship predominance require- between the predominate does not over mon issue the 23(b)(3) ment of Rule and the settlement in the that litigation other issues affect 23(e), authority analysis ap- Rule is only individual members. posite analysis pre- of whether the 23(b)(3) requirement of Rule dominance I conclude when the text Rule 23(c)(4)(A). by can be subverted Rule 23(b)(3) provides “questions of law or to the fact common members of the class The district in Amchem certified af- predominate any questions over [must] objectors’ settlement-only class over in fecting only individual “[a]n members” 23(b)(3) objections strenuous that the Rule action,” “action” means the action as a requirements did not class meet I whole. And do not believe that 23(a) (b)(3). Third Rule Circuit possibility maintaining an bringing certification, the class holding vacated respect particular action “with issues” settlement-only class satisfied neither 23(b)(3) expand was ever meant to Rule 23(a) 23(b)(3) Rule nor and that the cases allow class certification when the proceed through should either consolida- the class members’ case 42(a) under Rule smaller tion or as comparably defendant tower over in- actions under 23. 521 U.S. at Rule common significant issue or issues. The 2231. Affirming 117 S.Ct. the Third Cir- majority disagrees my reading, which cuit, Supreme “emphasize[d]” Court it disparages “rigidly sequential,” ante 23(a) requirements that the of Rule at reading instead adhering to (b)(3) “impractical are “safeguards,” 23(c)(4) that Rule allows a district court disregarded impediments” that can be certify any litigation, common issue in the perceives court that a measure of fairness view, my no matter how small. overlooking partic- standards these 23(c)(4) majority’s interpretation of Rule ular case. Id. 117 S.Ct. 2231. invites a diluted application of Rule holding was that settlement “rele- While 23(b)(3) classes, issue-only the context of vant” to certification acknowl- respectfully depаrts which I from submit of a edging manageability trial principle elaborated in Amchem. relevant was not to a class where no question

The core Su- the court contemplated, addressed trial was noted preme Rule, Court Amchem was the inter- that the other specifications satisfy requirements 23(a) explain infra, I For reasons that I would of Rule 23(b)(3). hold that the class certified does not even issues, 23(b)(3)’s requirement, vital including predominance prescription *32 undiluted, stripped in heightened meaning even an even more “demand[ed] way dramatic than it was in at 2231. Amchem. attention.” Id. S.Ct. majority The in boldly this case holds that settlement-only satisfy class to Requiring a individualized claims and in 23(b)(3)’s this ac requirements, the Court Rule tion are not a factor in analyzing whether held, appraisals to inhibit “serve[s] predominate common issues in the certi chancellor’s foot kind —class certifications TPCM, claim leaving one to dependent upon gestalt judg the court’s fied exactly wonder what the isolated common overarching impression ment or of the set predominate issue must over. For if Rule Importantly, fairness.” Id. tlement’s 23(c)(4)(A) allows a court to omit from its concluded that “it is not the mission Court predominance analysis any claims or issues 23(e) of Rule to assure class cohesion members, affecting only individual it would in legitimizes representation action predominance seem that the of the select 623, 117 place.” the first Id. at S.Ct. 2231. ed issue is a foregone conclusion since the compromise “If a interest in a fair common question common of law or fact would al require satisfy predominance could ways predominate over the individual is 23(b)(3),” the ment of Rule Court contin sues that are not a factor. And in the rare ued, prescription “that vital would be majority might instance where the find a in stripped any meaning the settlement predominate common issue not in a context.” Id. case, given it could simply narrow the 23(e) Just as it is not the mission of Rule until, view, pinhole its the selected issue supply legitimizes the cohesion that a predominates over the other issues it action, settlement-only class neither is it Indeed, nothing chooses to see. in the 23(c)(4)(A) of Rule to supply mission majority’s opinion supplies any lower limit legitimize issue-only the cohesion to just on how narrow a common may issue situations, class action. In both the cohe- analysis be yield before its must to com 23(b)(3) legitimize sion essential to a By mon adopting sense. a view of Rule action can shown when the action be 23(c)(4)(A) 23(b)(3) strips Rule predominance as a whole satisfies the re- meaning, necessitating the aid of additional 23(b)(3). quirement principle of Rule itself, principles found nowhere in the Rule 23(b)(3) every is that Rule Amchem majority has for Rule “substitute[d] satisfy provi- class action must all of the 23’s certification criteria a standard never 23(a) (b)(3), sions of Rule and the adopted,” a substitution that “[f]ederal Rule, provisions including other authority” courts ... lack to make. Am 23(e), cannot be used to dilute the chem, 2231. U.S. S.Ct. requirement proposed that each class must legal authority In an effort to enlist satisfy predominance requirement ac- interpret Rule 23 to authorize a class view, major- merit In my certification. issue, single majority, tion on a Part 23(c)(4) ity’s reading of Rule allows for a V, interpreted how I have misconstrues 23(b)(3) application diluted of Rule re- appreciate Rule 23 and fails to the conse- moving from the predominance calculus quences reading the Rule a manner most of the individualized issues 23(c)(4) gate a lets Rule serve as case. determining house for whether class ac- majority’s analysis,

Under which tion should certified. Even as an action action” may looks at the common issue the case include different “causes of recovery, all causes of through pinhole ignores all other different theories a “cause of Naming question this certified be related to form or claims must 18-21, action,” any specific it to tying but Fed.R.Civ.P. the action. See that, majority makes qualify complaint, “an in the claim provides And Rule action, question prerequisites analysis of what this common action” as (b) (a) particularly over ab predominate and subdivision must of both subdivision 23(b). analysis seemingly majority’s Sub struse. The be satisfied. See Fed.R.Civ.P. (c) manage causation issue and then addresses the identifies common division *33 23(c)(4)(A) authorizing immediately the to Rule jumps of the action then ment issue-only newly insulate the certified certification of either issues sub-classes. to respect scrutiny predomi to an the of the But a class certification with class from 23(b), cannot, Rule in the context of the bypassing requirement without nance issue whole, as the impor undertaken unless the issue is so case as a even be that it the entire action urged tant to of “the action” consideration of disposition affect a any questions over and certification of the action as whole. “predominates at 4 only members.” Rule See Pls.’ Mot. for Class Certification ing 23(b)(3). by single cases cited the of a class for (seeking None of the certification majority bypassing such a all causes of action advocate seven defendants). entirely majority now advances as an and certain other the proposition. novel failing to examine the various other majority my The criticizes demand in the entire action to presented issues conducted, predominance analysis a full required “cohesive determine whether the Amchem, required by both Rule 23 present “legitimize! represen ] ness” is rely insisting single that it can on a issue man place” tative action the first —as notwithstanding a certify the 23(b)(3), Amchem, 521 at see U.S. dated class— predominance test conclusion by jumping 2231—and S.Ct. not be satisfied in the context of would 23(c)(4), only majority bypasses stating action a that I have as whole—and impor one of the most essential most plain language “ignore[d] [Rule certify imposed by checks Rule 23 on tant 23(c)(4) 438-439, ],” my ante at and that 23(b)(3) classes, a ing opens it also a subsection of the rule analysis “render[s] among conflict the circuits on issue. at superfluous,” ante applied Fifth has the Rule The Circuit dogged requirement satisfying with very I disagree. This case illustrates considering other as predominance before importance my conceptual disagree 23(b)(3) in a class. pects of the Rule See inviability majority with the and the ment Texaco, Inc., 394, 409 263 F.3d Smith case, In this majority’s position. of the (5th Cir.2001) (later pursuant withdrawn class members have asserted seven causes parties, see 281 F.3d settlement an unfair of action TPCM: trade (5th Cir.2002)); Allison, 151 F.3d claim, undertaking practices negligent Co., 421-22; v. American Tobacco Castano claim, claim, negligent misrepre fraud Cir.1996). (5th n. 21 84 F.3d claim, claim, a of contract sentation breach Smith, on explained position the court claim, and a claim. conspiracy a civil RICO predo between the proper relationship majority, idеntifying without to which The 23(c)(4): requirement and Rule minance these seven causes certified inquiry involves a belongs, predominance certified for class treat The issue has among common vague question comparison whether TPCM ment Plan. and the issues indi- “a of the failure of the the class members was cause” consistency remains with Fifth analysis This Circuit vidual them. face- tious, majority’s a class is certified at best. The unchanged whether wordsmith- 23(b). ery respect one or more sections rule to the term “cause of under constancy disguise plain serves as action” does not conflict inquiry’s holding limitation on the use of bifur between the Fifth Circuit’s important and its sure, by preventing holding. majority a district court To be cation identi- manufacturing predominance court opinions, fies some district commen- from taries, that, of Rule and a through citing the “nimble use” student note one 23(c)(4). Co., another, Am. in favor argue majority’s Castano v. Tobacco (5th Cir.1996). I interpretation. disagree F.3d 745 n. 21 But respectfully authorities, so, with the cited in doing Therefore, action, the cause of as a I adhere to the view of the other 23(b)(3)’s whole, satisfy predo rule must circuit court to address the issue. Id. requirement. minance Once re 23(c)(4) met, rule is avail quirement I would hold therefore that under the *34 able to sever the common issues for proper analysis, the district court must To read the not as a class trial. rule determine that the action as whole satis- rule, housekeeping but instead as allow predominance fies the superiority and re- pare to ing repeatedly 23(b)(3), imposed quirements by and ac- achieved, predomination until would satisfying requirements may tions these 23(b)(3)’s predominance obliterate rule managed through by orders authorized in requirement, resulting automatic cer 23(c). Thus, 23(c)(4), under Rule a court in every any tification in case which could create subclasses or even bifurcate exists, common a result drafters of issue issues, by grouping claims them for class rule could not have intended. complicated action treatment. But in this case, predominance superiority and re- 409; Allison, see also 151 F.3d 263 F.3d quirements cannot be even satisfied at 421-22. Valentino v. Carter-Wal Cf. manageability supplied the aid of the tools (9th Cir.1996) lace, Inc., 1227, 1234 97 F.3d 23(c), I by proceed as now to demon- (reversing rely a district court’s effort to strate some detail. 23(c)(4) 23(b)(3) bypass on but ac knowledging “appropriate that cases” II predominance requirement could be overlooked). The in this purchasers case are identify prece We can no a multi-employer and beneficiaries of Supreme dent from the Court or from our (the “Plan”) plan sponsored and healthcare support majority’s fellow Circuits to marketed in Carolina the Fideli- South holding. demise, they ty Group, Inc. On the Plan’s majority’s breathtaking assertion commenced this class action under Federal 23(c)(4) that of Rule not in reading its does 23(b)(3) against Rule of Procedure Civil way contravene the Fifth Circuit’s Fidelity Group companies and related simply cases is not true. The Fifth Cir- individuals, against agents who cuit, by very language, only its consults Plan, and sold marketed “housekeeping” provisions of Rule administrator, alleg- the Plan’s first claims 23(c)(4) predominance] “once require- [the fraud, contract, ing mismanage- breach of Smith, is met.” ment 263 F.3d at 409. ment, and related claims. exactly “rigidly sequential ap- This is court, by Sep- proach” majority that the criticizes in its The district order dated opinion, making parallel ante at claim tember certified 24 deficient, backlog pro- in the causing agents each of 23 classes—one claims, ultimately cessing paying the claims administrator —but one claims, numerous becoming for individual trials un- contributing left to the Plan’s claims, within class-action numerous issues and to its demise. There is ev- derfunded issues, concluding ap- that damage and all support allegations idence the record 1,400 mini-trials will be re- proximately poor job paying that did a quired. claims, losing claims and other sometimes claims adjusting “adjudicating” times the defendants’ motion granted

We adjudicated. that should not have been Rule of review this order under Federal it a suffi- TPCM admits that did not have 23(f). Civil Procedure number of trained claims examiners cient discovery has com- Although not been filed, stay being current with claims yet fully have not been pleted and facts and, result, pro- backlog as a appears Fidelity it developed, developed grew to six to cessing to create and market a Group intended began Plan members eight months. multi-employer plan healthcare would widely delays pro- in the complain and indi- be available to small businesses cessing of their claims. subject to regu- and that would be viduals To do provisions lation ERISA. During period the same TPCM was this, it both the National Associa- created case, administering the Plan was Business Owners and Professionals tion of *35 experiencing backlog also a claims for (“NABOP”) potential to act on behalf least ten other clients. There is evidence customers and the International business part caused in problems that TPCM’s were Guild, Inc., a union to act on Workers that, during fact by approximately the the employ- of the business customers’ behalf claims un- administering 20 months was might elect ees and other individuals who Plan, moved its claims ad- der the TPCM the coverage under the Plan. NABOP and twice, each time operations ministration International Workers Guild thereafter requiring new notifications to healthcare “negotiated” provide the Plan to health- claims to providers of the need to forward Plan partici- care and dental benefits to address. After failed to re- new TPCM Fidelity The pants and beneficiaries. backlog continuing the and fulfill its duce NABOP, then ‍​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‍entered into Group, through NA- Fidelity Group assurances to the and Party with Third Claims Man- contract deficiencies, that it would correct the BOP (“TPCM”)2to agement, Inc. administer terminated the contract with NABOP Plan con- process and claims. Under this cause, 1,May for effective tract, 1, 1995, April effective TPCM be- Fidelity Group claims ad- and the moved responsible processing incoming came for “in-house,” by handled ministration to be claims, determining eligi- each claimant’s Inc. Fidelity Management, Claims bility coverage, computing benefits paying and claims out of a bank payable, backlog Because there was a serious and Fidelity Group maintained account Fidelity Management, lacking both Claims and NABOP. apparently and was experience expertise, administrator, step not to allege prepared that over the next three

Plaintiffs delayed Plan continued to suffer years, the Plan’s administration became members convenience, contract, I refer to or all of these 2. At the time TPCM’s name was For of. Healthcare, Inc., and later TPCM Millennium collectively as “TPCM.” entities Services, by Healthplan Inc. was succeeded nonpayment of their claims. рayment sentations made about the formation of the year After than a of additional more frus- Plan, benefits, administration, its its and members, Plan Secretary tration (4) value; negligent misrepresentation, Labor commenced an action in 1998 which plaintiffs alleged induced them to Group against Fidelity and related purchase and pay Plan; continue to for the companies and individuals the Eastern (5) (6) contract; breach of civil conspiracy District of New York to take control of the form, market, to and sell a “substantially Plan’s assets and to shut down the Plan’s health worthless care dental” plan; operations. The district court New (7) RICO, violations of 18 U.S.C. stay, York enjoining prosecu- issued 1961 et seq. § gravamen plaintiffs’ The against Fidelity Group, tion of suits TPCM, against claims TPCM is under Plan, corporations in- related circumstances that vary plaintiff from dividuals, appointed and it an independent plaintiff, breached duties pay plaintiffs’ fiduciary manage the assets. On the timely claims provide in- accurate fiduciary’s request that the Plan be termi- concerning formation pending status of nated, the New York district court ordered claims. plaintiffs allege The these terminated, the Plan January effective breaches not only inju- caused them direct ry but also contributed ultimate plaintiffs commenced this action on Plan, failure of the causing injury them on 11, 1998, September and the district court this indirect gravamen basis. The followed New York court and likewise (1) plaintiffs’ agents claims stayed claims the Fidelity defen- agents that the sold worth- But, by dants.3 an order dated December less insurance that did comply 27, 1999, the district court stay lifted the (2) statutory requirements, South Carolina Defendants,” “all non-Fidelity as to allow- agents were not licensed to sell ing prosecution of the Plan, *36 the and that they fraudulently TPCM for or mismanagement claims and against selling for agents misrepre- negligently the misrepresented the Plan and senting agents the Plan. The selling are 43 provided negligent regarding advice the companies individuals and that sold the Plan. Fidelity Plan on behalf of Group the relief, For the employer-plaintiffs and during peri-

businesses individuals the provided the Plan benefits to their employ- August od from when the Plan com- ees seek premiums paid return for menced, to July when the agents “worthless insurance” as well as conse- by were ordered Carolina South De- quential damages. The employee-plain- partment of Insurance to marketing cease tiffs in the Plan payment enrolled seek the Plan. they benefits to which were entitled In their complaint against TPCM and and consequential damages, including selling agents, the 43 the plaintiffs alleged damages anguish, enjoy- for mental loss of (1) violations the South Carolina Unfair life, injury ment of reputations to their and Act, § Trade Practices S.C.Code Ann. 39- (2) ratings, rectifying credit and costs of de- seq.; 5-10 et negligence in undertaking administer, market, layed payments. All represent puni- seek (3) Plan; repre- fraud connection with tive damages. Plan, Fidelity

3. The Fidelity Fidelity Management, defendants include the Claims and in- NABOP, formed, Group, employees. the union that it volved executives and acknowledged The court employees. a class plaintiffs sought represent “[wjhile definitely these numbers do 1,400 consisting persons of all persons, numerosity, Plain- finding Plan on constitute coverage under the purchased who agent Defendants failed 15, 1995, tiffs note claims August who have or after significant number to take into account the agеnts as a against against dependents that were also covered employees and all and beneficiaries group, including depen- It found that the Plan.” three-year peri- during had claims who dents, of the class there were members sought to operating. They od it was also agent the one and 21 for the other. agent-specific subclasses with represent numerosity with The court did not examine and fraud particular negligence respect agent other 21 classes but it respect to the particular agents. claims ' they contained more mem- observed they alleged: explanation, concluded, num- It these “[w]hile bers. claims the Defendant Certain may fall on the borderline of numer- bers conspiracy and Agents, including civil osity, numerosity the court finds that claims, can be treated on a class- RICO agents.” met as to these the de- wide basis. Other agents may agent-spe- be more fendant pro- The court next concluded that the may cific and exist between those commonality classes satisfied the posed particular and the Defen- class members requirements of Rule typicality marketed, sold, oth- Agent dant who 23(a)(2) (a)(3), noting that the common provided coverage erwise under the (1) included whether TPCM mis- plaintiffs. fund to (2) claims, whether managed plaintiffs’ negligence proximately alleged TPCM’s agents whom there As to the other —for Plan, and caused the failure of the plaintiffs-— no named" corresponding were agents misrepresented whether requested. no subclasses were The court acknowl- plaintiffs. Plan to the problems Troubled somewhat however, that all edged, claims for “mental granting class treatment as to all asserted anguish damage distress” and or emotional claims, granted part the district ratings reputation to credit would part plaintiffs’ and denied in motion for individually. have to be decided The court so, doing class certification. the court need for acknowledged potential also between, complex individual- left division cau- proximate individualized mini-trials on subject ized claims and claims to class- *37 specifically relating sation to the reason Assessing the motion action treatment. claim. This nonpayment given for against require- for class certification the true, noted, as to especially was the court ments of Rule the court first concluded “non-adjudicated medical unpaid claims for “ap- that the number of class members is bills,” i.e., had been those which never 1,400,” proximately which it concluded sat- analyzed by adjuster. a claims numerosity requirement of Rule isfied 23(a)(1). evaluating adequacy-of-represen- proposed agent- But on the 23 “subclasses,” forth in Rule requirement the court acknowl- tation set specific 23(a)(4), rejected the court TPCM’s con- edged numerosity that issue was a agent, represent the court tention that could not question. close As to one adequately in- the class because of conflicts of only employees noticed were volved, among members. TPCM already of them had filed interest be- against agent. argued An- had that there was conflict individual actions pur- who employer-plaintiffs 13 to 14 tween the agent other had enrolled eating the issues of rebanee where indi- coverage for their em- chased insurance inquiries proper. who vidual would be employee-plaintiffs ployees employers their against a claim might have superiority requirement On the of Rule seeking any event be and who would 23(b)(3), acknowledged the court The court ruled that the different relief. “[mjanageabibty of this class action is of claims their employee-plaintiffs’ court,” particular pointing concern to the “viable,” and, employers were of individual particularly necessity event, employer employee' However, the court “mini-trials.” then opt out of the class.” members “could concluded requirements of Rule considering presently The record before the court 23(b)(3), concluded that the court first of individual- suggests bifurcation issues predominated common issues over damages possibly proxi- ized issues only some of the class members. affecting non-adju- regarding mate cause issues that, because most of The court reasoned present dicated claims would not unpaid already claims had plaintiffs’ unmanageable scenario for the court. “adjudicated,” inquiries individualized been Addressing conspira- separately the civil plain- proximate cause of relating to counts, cy and RICO the court concluded not be neces- unpaid claims would tiffs’ predominated, that individualized defenses that causation sary. The court reiterated claims and therefore excluded those claims unadjudicated relating It from class-action treatment. said: resolved the individualized could be significant problem court notes a [T]he to resolve dam- necessary also mini-trials inherent regarding individualized issues ages. (in fact a where numerous defendants “subclasses,” agent-specific As to the 23 defendants) being class of are accused acknowledged rep- that oral the court also as the part conspiracy of a vertical such and individual reliance tended resentations alleged in These issues one this case. suggest treatment individualized primarily due to individualized de- arise Nonetheless, agents. claims may to the fenses which be available court concluded that those defenses Agent Defendants. generalized presumptions could be treated on a class-wide basis: therefore approach presuming common sense

[A] may acceptable in this reliance exists be Therefore, that indi- the court concludes Therefore, in certain circumstance. con- regarding vidual issues Plaintiffs’ cases, may presumed “reliance rendering spiracy predominate claims law claims when fraud-based common conspir- class treatment of all Plaintiffs’ misrepresen- alleged omissions Agent all Defendants acy and material and the tations are uniform unadvisable. *38 in a consis- class members acted manner Unfair Trade On the South Carolina tent with reliance.” count, again re- Practices Act individual trials because statute

quired See mandates such treatment. itself analy- if erred in its Even the court has 39-5-140(a). §Ann. S.C.Code predo- does threaten the sis and reliance case, division be- making this overall in this After minance of common issues for class-action claims and issues by can be eliminated bifur- tween that threat 458 8)all relating to questions on hand and claims and whether

treatment the one other, “adjudicated” plaintiffs’ on claims were issues for individual trials delayed and to the cause of certify- payment following court entered the order adjudi- nonpayment for those not as a ing this case class action: cated. ordered, is, therefore, forego- It for the ing agent-defendants that Plaintiffs’ for the 23 reasons Motion against whom actions conditionally Certification is were certified Class by Spe- filed a motion under Federal Rule of granted as modified this Order. Civil 23(f) cifically, permission appeal class of all Plain- Procedure proposed order, interlocutory the district court’s against tiffs for claims TPCM is condi- 30, 2001, tionally (excluding certified claims under order dated November we granted Unfair Trade Prac- that motion. South Carolina Act). However, treat- tices class-wide Ill conspiracy

ment of Plaintiffs’ claims Agent all Defendants is denied. It appropriate set forth the estab- Instead, conditionally the court certifies principles applicable lished to consider- proposed currently Plaintiffs’ subclasses previously ation of the issues. We have representatives Agent with based on the held that “[district courts have ‘wide dis- Defendants as individual for all classes deciding cretion in or not to whether certi- (excluding the Plaintiffs’ claims claims class,”’ fy proposed Wesleyan Central under the South Unfair Trade Carolina Co., 177, Coll. v. W.R. Grace & 6 F.3d 185 Act). Practices (4th Cir.1993) (quoting In re A.H. Robins (4th Co., 709, Cir.1989)), F.2d 880 728-29 sum, the court certified 24 distinct but we have noted that this discretion actions, parallel having rejected “ must be ‘within exercised the framework any overarching class action ”23,’ Inc., Dryvit Sys., of Rule v. Lienhart agents, try range a limited of claims and (4th Cir.2001) (quoting 255 F.3d issues. The court ruled that individual Inc., Sys., In re Am. Med. 75 F.3d trials would have to be conducted on: (6th Cir.1996)). Where, here, as 1) all claims under the South Carolina plaintiffs have sought class certification Act; Unfair Trade Practices pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce- 2) all claims alleging conspiracy; civil 23(b)(3), plaintiffs dure bear the bur- 3) all involving claims violations of proving “numerosity, den of that the com-

RICO; monality, typicality, representativeness, predominance, require- and superiority 4) not, any reliance issues that could 23(a) (b)(3) ments of both Rule are law, presumed; a matter of placement met.” Id. The of this burden 5) issues; all damage upon parties seeking class certification 6) agents the 20 principle reflects a class action is no whom named had deal- exception “an to the litiga- usual rule that ings; tion is conducted behalf of and on 7) all regarding parties only.” the fact and na- named Califano Yamasaki, 682, 700-01, injury specifically ture of plain- as to 442 U.S. (1979). anguish

tiffs’ claims of mental and S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Though distress, emotional injury manageability proposed to credit the issue of of a *39 rating, injury reputation; and and is “peculiarly class action within dis- [the]

459 court, superior v. action is the district Windham other available meth- eretion” of (4th Inc., 59, adjudication ods for the fair Brands, and efficient 565 F.2d 65 Am. 23(b)(3). controversy.” Fed.R.Civ.P. Cir.1977), will nonetheless vacate the we predominance requirement is “far plaintiffs of a class when have certification 23(a)’s demanding” more than Rule com- sufficiently presence of all not shown monality requirement and “tests whether 23(a) (b)(3) requirements. and of the Rule proposed sufficiently classes are cohesive satisfy Every class action must the four adjudication by representa- to warrant 23(a): in Rule numerosi criteria set forth Amchem, 623, tion.” 521 at 117 U.S. S.Ct. adequacy ty, commonality, typicality, and opinions, 2231. Our recent decided after 23(a). representation. Fed.R.Civ.P. Amchem, recognize demanding this more Numerosity requires that the class be so standard. “joinder of all members is numerous Broussard, judgment we vacated a 23(a)(1). Fed.R.Civ.P. impracticable.” against a defendant and franchisor ruled requirements The “final three Rule franchisee-plaintiff that certification of the 23(a) merge,’ commonality ‘tend to class was error in an action where the [ing] guideposts for typicality and ‘serv had franchisees asserted claims for breach ... of a determining whether maintenance contract, fraud, fiduciary duty, breach of economical and whether the class action is negligent misrepresentation, among plaintiffs claim and the class claims named Despite others. 155 F.3d at 352. our that the interests of the are so interrelated recognition that the district court had ex- fairly adequate will be class members in deciding ercised “broad discretion” ” ly in their absence.’ Brous protected class, certify the we nonetheless decerti- Shops, sard v. Meineke Discount Muffler fied class because the franchisees had Cir.1998) (4th Inc., 331, 155 F.3d 337 commonality typi- not shown that the Falcon, (quoting Tel. 457 Gen. Co. U.S. 23(a) cality requirements of Rule were 2364, n. 102 72 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 340-44, met. Id. at F.3d 331. The (1982)). addition, a class action hodgepodge franchisees were “a of factual- 23(b)(1), satisfy must the criteria of Rule ly legally plaintiffs”: as well as different (b)(3). (b)(2), or they signed different contracts with the sought Plaintiffs here have certification defendant, alleged upon relied different 23(b)(3). Rule of a class under Because misrepresentations, varying oral exhibited 23(b)(3) designed for “situations degrees upon misrepre- of reliance such which ‘class-action treatment is not as sentations, presented factually differ- ” for,’ clearly plaintiffs go called must be- tolling ent bases relevant statutes 23(a) yond satisfying prerequi- the Rule Moreover, limitations. Id. at 343. satisfy require- sites and two additional damages alleged Broussard ments, “predominance” “superiority.” “inherently that were individualized and Amchem, 521 U.S. S.Ct. easily to class treat- thus amenable 23(b)(3) (quoting Advisory Fed.R.Civ.P. acknowledged ment.” Id. at 342. We Notes). satisfy predo- Committee To although the need for mini-trials on dam- requirement, plaintiffs minance must show class certifi- ages necessarily is not fatal to cation, “questions profits that the of law or fact common lost plaintiffs’ claims for predominate to the members of the class not a “natural candidate for classwide were affecting only governing state questions over individu- resolution” because members,” case-by-case satisfy superiority required al and to law analysis Id. at 343. they must that “a class of such claims. requirement, show *40 recently, Dryvit in Lienhart v. how this fractured class action advances Most (4th Inc., judicial efficiency. questions The certified Systems, 255 F.3d Cir. 2001), major portion do not resolve even a “[t]he we held that where functional individually, issues that must be decided damages of a full-blown trial on equivalent 1,400 including up to mini-trials on dam- putative each class member causation for 1,400 alongside and causation individ- ages to which required would be to determine claims, conspiracy ual full trials on the civil liable,” defendant] individuals the [the claims, 23(b)(3) and claims the RICO under South requirement of Rule predominance Act. The Carolina Unfair Trade Practices an of application is not met. This was majority require- also concludes that principle elaborated in we Windham 23(a) (4th Brands, Inc., ments of Rule satisfied have been Am. 565 F.2d 59 Cir. 1977), despite substantial conflicts of interest that may be pre-dominance de upon are evident based the minimal discov- stroyed regard when individualized issues ery already conducted. ing damages require large would number separate mini-trials. See id. at 69 view, majority’s In the case is a this (“[W]here damages impact the issue of and copy Wesleyan, near carbon Central does not lend itself such a mechanical nationwide class action asbestos calculation, separate but mini-tri requires manufacturers which we affirmed the overwhelming large als of number my conditional certification of a class. claims, courts have found that however, here, view, the class certified un- staggering problems logistics thus Wesleyan, like the one certified in Central (the) damage aspect created make dissimilarly is a situated hodgepodge predominate, case un render case who dealt with the defendants action”) manageable (quotation as a class different times and under different circum- omitted). marks and internal citations antagonistic stances and who inter- have together ests. The class here is cobbled background It is that we very ultimately resolve little before rele- must consider the class-action certification. gating the hard questions to individual tri- IV Although majority’s als. effort prece- fashion a certifiable class under our complaint Presented with a seven-count surface, appears, dents on the to aid the agents, majority and 43 aggrieved I plaintiffs, majority believe the has affirmed the conditional certification substantially require- deviates from the 1,400 a class of insureds them families ments of Rule in the end denying pro- 23(c)(4) against TPCM under Rule to an- I litigants. cedural fairness to all of the mismanaged swer “whether TPCM begin by demonstrating plaintiffs’ most Fund” and “whether TPCM’s misman- obvious failure —their failure to show that agement proximate was a cause of the questions “predominate the common over collapse.” (empha- Plan’s Ante at 426-427 any questions affecting only individual added).4 23(c)(4) relying sis on Rule 23(b)(3). members.” Fed.R.Civ.P. analysis complete of Rule 23(b)(3), majority majority fails to answer approved how class as questions predominate employers, employees, these common consists and indi- Fund, majority’s evolving aged Fidelity 4. The definition of the cer- De- whether the mismanagement intervening tified issue now also includes “whether the fendants’ was an Fidelity party collapse Defendants” —who are not a cause of the Plan's sufficient to re- liability.” was class that certified —"also misman- lieve TPCM of Ante at 426-427. *41 fashion, in a timely thereby causing used healthcare that purchased who or viduals through spon- plaintiff injury. a Plan The provided substantial effort in benefits Fidelity Group by consolidating and marketed the the “common in question” sored period over a companies yield remarkably and related this case thus will little the course of those years. During three the advancing class members’ individual the Plan were years, claims under three claims toward a resolution. 1996 and by during TPCM administered that, majority persuaded despite The were then administered part of 1997 and all the among differences the class by Fidelity during remainder

in-house require many members that so in January until the of 1997 Plan’s demise issues, trials on the most difficult the com- Having delayed payment of suffered question mon the class members’ claims nonpayment allegedly or due claims alleged mismanage- of whether TPCM’s injuries rang- mismanagement, claims ment of claims “contributed to” or was “a ratings credit to emo- ing damaged from “predomi- of the failure cause” Plan’s distress, plaintiffs recovery tional seek any over questions affecting only nate[s] Plan, of the from the administrators individual members” beсause Rule itself, and the 43 who sold the agents Plan 23(c)(4)(A) authorizes the certification of diversity Plan. It is the of the factual individual issues. But this not fulfill does underlying that legal bases these claims requirement that whole “action” be plaintiffs’ bold effort to re- confounds scrutinized to determine whether individu- pro- through solve them the class action predominate. al claims Indeed, majority recognizes that cess. I that Although recognize many-—but inquiries pervade the individualized not all—of the class members’ claims re- the individual plaintiffs’ against claims quire of whether contrib- resolution TPCM agents preclude certification of classes Plan, collapse uted to the this is an majority And both the against them. underwhelming commonality light of the plaintiffs’ recognized the district court inquiries individualized neces- substantial based on the South Carolina Unfair claims sary liability, not to mention determine Act, RICO, and civil con- Trade Practices If damages. proceeds the court under the That spiracy proceed individually. must proposed class structure as and deter- certification potential leaves for four mismanage- mines TPCM’s claims TPCM, against seven which was, fact, a cause of the Plan’s ment in negligence sound and contract. Yet the failure, liability inquiry will have presented evidence that will need to be just begun. subsequent more the class action TPCM will need to litigated difficult to be individu- questions, repeated to in the be some extent individu- claims were ally by members whose example, al trials TPCM. For by Fidelity either handled be- TPCM, complaint alleges among other persist, tween 1996 and would name- defendants, violated the South Carolina ly, Plan caused whether the failure provid- Unfair Trade Practices Act injury the class member’s and the more ing timely coverage explaining and not fault. complex question comparative claim, why payment delayed. was This must, Although presumes class as certified statute, which tried individual- member, group plaintiffs proceeding a unified on ly by each class will of course theory liability, single legal of indirect require proof responsible that TPCM was complaint good for reasons asserts dif- making payments and did not make plaintiff fering recovery requiring to that individual theories of payments such different, clearly asserts di- complaint, which conflicting, even presentation evidence, predominance. which undermines rect claims TPCM: the- Specifically, complaint alleges two duty breached their [TPCM] Defendant *42 (1) liability against direct ories of TPCM: [by] failing timely pay ... claims who, liability, example, suf- as to those them; charging ... fees in submitted to ratings solely injury fered to credit be- by agree- excess of what was allowed during the delayed payment cause of a ment; failing plaintiffs to inform and claims, indi- managed time TPCM members of the class of their lack other liability, rect as to those whose claims of experience mismanagement unpaid paid by Fidelity or were late went failing provide processing; claims claims mis- prior as a result of TPCM’s and other members of the class plaintiffs management. majority, recognizing concerning with accurate information theory” analysis “single “appears that its submitted; in other the status of claims complaint somewhat at odds” with the failing to exercise due care in the words analogy inconveniences its to Central Wes- ...; processing of claims submitted leyan, apparently accepted has an informal misleading, fraud- providing false and/or theоry liability in disavowal of the direct why ulent information about claims were But clari- appellees’ argument brief. oral being paid.... not As a direct result of anything appellees fied that do not disavow conduct, negligent Defendants’ the complaint regard. in their in this At oral injured Plaintiffs have been in numerous argument, appellees’ argued: counsel ways. claim, single they “There is not a can’t allegations direct claims These assert one, point suggest where we that Third against based on failures Party Management anything Claims did encompass that more than the alternative But any specific wrong.” with claim coun- theory liability flowing of indirect from the claims; liability sel did not disavow direct Plan’s failure. simply portrayed liability he direct claims something they other than what are.5 Because counsel did not disavow the it, argument betrays language mischaracterized complaint, simply Counsel’s the but Questioning by argument prefer proceed the court at oral not on an not—or indirect to— plaintiffs’ liability theory revealed that counsel was not disa- to file their own individual actions, vowing anything complaint, but exposes arguments rather that them to making demonstrably argument untimely. false Although eq- are their claims now complaint alleged any theory never direct tolling might arguably uitable rescue these liability against TPCM: plaintiffs having unwanted from their claims dismissed, potentially employ the need Judge argument Motz: You have a direct when extraordinary only bespeaks such an measure TPCM is still in there. peculiarity majority’s cutting these Honor, making Counsel: Your we're plaintiffs’ complaint certi- claims out of the argument at all. fy surviving allegations. Perhaps recog- Judge Okay, you’re disavowing Motz: so nizing severity holding plain- that the argument. claims, majority assert tiffs do not direct argument. Counsel: We never made that alternatively plaintiffs now states that the "do By embracing plaintiffs’ a disavowal that even not seek class certification for direct making, major- counsel disclaimed he was TPCM,” conclusion, against claims but this ity plaintiffs leaves the with direct liabili- too, complaint ty against flies in the face of the and the TPCM out claims in the cold. As certification, out, both of majority points motion for class which the South Carolina appears to seek certification of all claims TPCM. statute of limitations have run on fraud, quite clearly actions for breach of contract and ante The direct claims inconvenience majority’s analysis. at 431. That leaves these who can- any recovery by any cludes class member that these claims unwilling to concede I am case. It theory liability from the on a direct have been removed plain- TPCM, decision for questionable regardless be a of the merits of their would theory 429-430(“[C]lass to abandon tiffs’ counsel case. Ante seg- an identifiable liability that best suits ... single theory: TPCM rest on a instance, For ment of the certified class. mismanagement of claims TPCM’s de- simply whose claim was class member collapse to the ultimate contributed when ultimately paid, but layed, damage.... Plan and so caused Plaintiffs’ administrator, would the sole TPCM was [Although] somewhat at odds *43 claim TPCM for only have a direct original complaint Plaintiffs’ ... Plaintiffs that mismanagement, damage as the to abundantly appeal have made clear on ... way related to the col- plaintiff was no they do not seek class certification for Plan.6 these unfortu- lapse Jamming TPCM”). direct claims single- members’ claims into the nate class By plaintiffs’ the mischarac- accepting pur- here —which theory class certified the the ma- complaint terization of —which theory on the of ports proceed only to jority treats as disavowal of the direct liability only requires rep- indirect —not theory liability majority of also tacit- —the shoulder the more party resentative to ly recognizes the conflict that inheres of theory recovery of for some attenuated a single proceeding single when class on a actually but also her fellow class members theory represent purports who were in recovery for those precludes recovery. with dissimilar theories of This the collapse circumstance where the of to a class action response complex court’s injury. And even as to Plan did not cause complaint alleging differing theories of re- claims were ulti- class members whose covery prune allegations should not be might have a mately unpaid, persons who recovery theories of until a and entire TPCM find themselves direct claim remotely emerges. certifiable Al- caught in class Cf. by counsel and sacrificed (“[W]e lison, n. 151 F.3d at 422 should only them to not that requires that show ap- condone a eertification-at-all-costs not that mismanaged claims but also simple purpose proach to this case led to the failure of mismanagement settlement”). Rather, forcing a we of Plan Plan and that the failure of the written, complaint take the as should injuries. theory may caused their This complex- recognizing the conflicts members, particularly suit some class reading from a counsel plain obvious ities unpaid by Fideli- those whose claims went by individual that this case be conducted of TPCM’s con- ty after the termination groups parties of tract, parties all such small certainly is not fair to but it view, my may appropriate.7 be majority opinion pre- The now members. Indeed, ing theory liability from the pursue excised that of 6. counsel’s reluctance to both suggests indig- their ina- direct and indirect claims complaint, majority then treats with bility represent absent class members "disingenuous” sug- my nation what it calls only whose claims are direct claims. rewriting complaint done gestion has group plain- a disservice to an identifiable plainly majority’s 7. The treatment of Making reference tiffs. Ante 432 n. mystifying. pleaded theory liability is direct opt-out claim-splitting exceptions to and the upon Perplexingly, majority the lib- relies its selective feature of Rule 23 to surround theory pleadings justify its excision eral legiti- redrafting complaint an air of theory liability pleaded from the com- why macy, majority does little to address seemingly of its plaint, for the convenience timely any plaintiff to excise a analysis. Hav- it is fair to certification Ante at 429-430. recovery if conflicting negligence theories of recov- which would bar

existence of plaintiffs’ failure ery only reveals exceeded that of the ad- negligence to demonstrate that the common issues Davenport v. ministrator. See Cotton inadequa- predominate but also reveals Prop. Horizontal Re- Hope Plantation cy single representative of a for these dis- gime, 325 S.C. 482 S.E.2d parate theories. (“[A] (Ct.App.1997) plaintiff South Car- majority addresses also never if may negligence olina recover his complex question comparative fault. defendant’s”). does not exceed that of the example, pay- For a class member whose from apart Even the direct-indirect delayed ultimately paid ment was but problem and com- the individualized 1996, when TPCM was the sole claims parative liability questions, which include administrator, might prove that TPCM’s inquiries intervening into causes malad- mismanagement rendered it 100% liable cases, injury, particular for the class member’s whether it ministration in the indi- damage rating to credit or emotional questions payment vidual of entitlement to case, distress. the failure of the under the terms of the Plan and the *44 Plan would be irrelevant to the of cause any amount of such entitlement also loom. delayed payment. Another class mem- surely require, among This would other ber, payment delayed whose was or went things, proof relating submission of to in unpaid shortly the summer of claim, timely filing proof of of medical management after claims went in-house at rendered, Indeed, services and the like. Fidelity, ultimately might prove that qual- some claimants have had their claims liable, or TPCM was 42% 70% or even 0% coverage payment, ified for but not if proved indepen- liable TPCM some qualified coverage. some have not been for inadequacy Fidelity dent of par- caused a adjudicated Those whose claims have been go ticular claim to unpaid. Yet another determination, may challenge the benefits member, unpaid whose claim went in already TPCM has indicated that it years almost two after claims admin- accuracy intends to look of individu- in-house, might istration went be able to adjudications, they al claims if de- will be prove responsibility even lesser on liability. terminative of Those whose part. TPCM’s necessary evidence to yet adjudicated claims have not been comparative establish fault —evidence re- would have to establish the facts that garding wrong what in a partic- TPCM did qualify coverage, would them for which ular Fidelity wrong case versus what did would include the nature of the illness or in that case—would a second require pres- made, claim injury for which the is deduct- during entation individual trials much of exclusions, documentation, ibles and doctor evidence, individualized, albeit And, course, and similar matters. majority believes certified class struc- noted, in district court addition to all of ture presented only allows to be once. this, inquiry necessary “an individualized is And, course, given class member’s damages damage such as to one’s cred- negligence getting paper- the proper rating it as well as emotional distress and work to the insurer could constitute delayed payment cause of or mental nonpayment, anguish.” pleaded theory recovery give from the com- would rather the benefit of plaint, leaving any plaintiffs wishing timely plead, assert fullness of their claims as theory they thought they alleged theory plead- had accordance with the liberal anew, plead likely untimely. ings. albeit now I what It thus difficult to conceive ad- claims. The combination of is the various vantage gained by certifying 1,400 mini-trials, a class up to individual trials — commonality. on such a sliver of premised full trials as to all defendants on civil necessary evidence The individualized violations, conspiracy, RICO and South (1) comparative liability determine violations, Carolina statutory and a class- based, Fidelity part, versus on action trial involving differing (or the date the class member medical produce TPCM—will a hodge- (2) claim, provider) filed a the class mem- pоdge findings of factual legal rulings, (or if provider’s) negligence, ber’s medical perhaps conflicting, that will have to be any, causing delayed the claim to be or applied sorted out and jury either (3) unpaid, go intervening causes of the court as the law of the case. (4) maladministration, the class member’s This will create a minefield for legal error. payment entitlement based on the na- the overwhelming Given breadth of the ture of the services received and whether issues separate reserved for full trials and (5) covered, they are the amount of entitle- mini-trials, I conclude ment, due, considering copayments deduct- common predom- this case do not ibles, benefits, and other sources of Amchem, inate over the individual ones. the existence and amount of other dam- (“Given 521 U.S. at 117 S.Ct. 2231 ages, anguish, surely such as mental will greater questions peculiar number of require presentation substantially all of categories members, the several of class necessary the evidence to make the un- and to category, individuals within each helpful determination that TPCM was *45 and the significance of those uncommon cause of the Plan’s failure. And to the questions, any overarching dispute about extent the Plan’s failure can be shown to consequences the health expo- of asbestos injury— be a cause of a class member’s 23(b)(3) satisfy sure cannot the Rule pre- case, always which will not be the standard”). dominance questions course—there remain of whether there were other parties potentially re- addition, judicial In the substantial ef- sponsible for the Plan’s failure. fort required manage procedurally case in which the same evidence will be complaint alleges

Because the seven dis- presented individually to the court both tinct causes of action and the district court justified by and on a classwide basis is not approximately has determined that one- the minimal contribution to the case that half of these claims will have to be re- an answer question pro- to the certified trials, through solved individual the result- whether, fact, questionable It vides. ing complexity itself should counsel against any by certifying time will be saved the class-action treatment. Neither the dis- event, against class TPCM. the trict nor the majority have even procedural nightmare such a certification begun to address how the trials and mini- invites cannot to come proceed; thought trials will how the close to law of the case 23(b)(3) judicata satisfying requirement or res Rule applied; will be and how the superior evidence will be received when it the class structure be most of adjudicating will relate to various individual other available methods of plaintiffs, defendants, 23(b)(3). See Fed.R.Civ.P. controversy.8 and individual case, majority running 8. The finds comfort in to the of the and ... in the certification unlike- certification, aspect stating ly 'procedural "conditional” event the case becomes a mo- rass,’ only approving that "we are a conditional ... we are that the district confident Thus, hand, seeking on one taking employers the class rescission Sep- has defined in its of the contract and return district court it insurance order, and, hand, only premiums paid, tember one con- on the can other (1) employees seeking clude that the fact enforcement of the in- questions law or common to members class do not surance contract and benefits due under it. conflict, predominate questions affecting employee over the addition to this potential individual members and that the class- class have members common-law superior process employers, pur- is not in this case. their who Plan, majority’s proceed negligence conclusion to chased for or mis- one or the contrary, through representing two issues to the Plan.9The incompatible 23(c)(4)(A) by employers class under Rule in relief sought treatment and the view, my enlarges employees precludes adequate repre- reach of alone 23(b)(3) beyond proper scope groups by because sentation of both one represen- tative, only predominance supe- constraints of and this concern is heightened riority applied. potential by employees have not been for lawsuits employers. majority While the class, I also believe that as condi only pre- addressed some of the conflicts certified, tionally satisfy does not the re sented, gave any notion that are conflicts quirement representatives representation the back untenable in fairly adequately protect the interests of its hand. of all of the class members. See Fed. 23(a)(4). view, In my majori recognized R.Civ.P. The district court also some ty ignores overt conflicts interest exist of these conflicts but resolved them ing among conditionally they with the members observation that could be Fundamentally, certified class. it does not cured members’ right opt the class attempt explain mention how the out the class action. But this observa- include, conditionally may certified class tion does address a fundamental defi- therefore, decertify suggest, court will ... the class.” Ante at alternative I is that this *46 responsibility proceed according 445. This view defaults our case to the usual rule that employs and a backward in be asserted the individual burden demon- strating superiority parties, availability named and I note the of procedure to majority apparently our rules of civil achieve econo- device. The believes that my Benja- complex, even without a class action. complaint no how See matter comes Continuing Kaplan, min Work bearing the Civil to an entitlement to certifi- Committee: 1966 Amendments the Federal prove can why cation unless the court (I), Rules Civil Procedure 81 Harv. L.Rev. should not be certified. This view is reflected (1967)("[T]he procedural alterna- willingness in the to court's inconven- excise action, hardly tives are confined to the class recovery ient complaint theories of from the side, on the and the 23(c)(4) one individual uncoordi- willingness and elevate other; lawsuits, issue, nated on there are often allow pre- certification of common possibilities ranging other from use of a mod- unspoken sumably subject limiting to some el action to consolidation or coordination principle. the fact But remains that a class the numerous individual actions for all "exception to the action is an usual rule” that (citation omitted). purposes”) selection litigation pursued by is to be the individual 700-01, parties, Califano, 442 atU.S. 99 S.Ct. added), be, (emphasis seeking notes, the party may that majority It well that as proving many certification bears the burden of satis- employees may of the claims the have class-qualifying faction of the employers criteria of Rule their are now barred 23(a) (b), limitations, depending and that the court is to measure statute of on what the- plaintiff's ability ory third-party to meet that burden of when a claim is accrues alleged complaint. applied. the action as in the The concerted efforts to conceal cieney among of a conflict class members this knowl- plaintiffs edge, burden that must or even nor the whether certain of defen- carry seeking represent in the class as a products dants’ crumble and release dust whole, who, for whatever including those under pressure.” hand Id. at 185. reason, opt never out. Federal Rule of Wesleyan. This case is unlike Central 23(a)(4) requires plaintiffs, Civil Procedure This is not a massive nation-wide litigation class, purported representatives as in resolving which certain primarily factual they fairly can to demonstrate questions on a classwide basis would sub- adequately protect the claims of class stantially reduce repetitive factfinding. They obviously cannot fulfill members. only question The certified here is whether if responsibility this some class members’ failure, TPCM was “a cause” of the Plan’s in claims are conflict with others’ claims. law, question which is a mixed of fact and See Amchem, 626-28, 117 521 U.S. S.Ct. which, noted, as step is the first (finding fairly could not in a inquiry steeped causation that is where, represent a class adequately necessary individualized determinations class, a “disparity within the there was requiring presentation duplica- of often currently injured expo between the tive evidence. While the court Central sure-only categories plaintiffs” making Wesleyan in- countenanced individualized claims). asbestos quiries to damages, it noted that relatively Given the insubstantial com- potential inquiries individualized relat- by only mon shared some of the ing liability “pose management could con- class members and the irreconcilable judicial difficulties and reduce the efficien- inhering flicts of interest the certified cy sought through to be achieved certifica- class, agree majority I do not with the tion,” indicating might decertification “strikingly similar” to Central case Here, be warranted. Id. at 189. the need Wesleyan Wesleyan. Central was as- for individualized determinations as to cau- bestos removal case which 16-23% of hypothetical unique sation is not or even colleges America’s and universities were rather few class members but is a char- in- potential class members and which every every acteristic of claim of volved dozens of defendants and hundreds member. products of asbestos sold over decades. 6 complexity case of this counsels conditionally F.3d at 189. The issues our decisions Broussard and Lien- “primar- certified for class treatment were apt comparisons hart are far more than factual,” ily id. at in a context where Wesleyan, portions may of which Central *47 litigation” “the sheer volume of in the area superseded by even have been the Su- impelled many courts nationwide to con- preme analysis in Amchem. Court’s tentatively that clude class treatment of Lienhart, and we both Broussard conclud- very certain common factual issues in this ed that the district court abused its discre- particular type litigation judi- advanced in certifying tion the class. neither of settlement, economy cial and fostered id. 181-83, array those actions was there such an Conditionally certifying at 185. required individual actions that primarily questions factual for class treatment, adjudication presented in held, as those this the court relieve would Indeed, case. in Lienhart we stated that colleges and of the need universities requirement of individual trials on prove “to over and over when defendants damages require causation alone would knew or should have known of asbestos’ hazards, predominance require- engaged finding or whether defendants

468 23(b)(3) look at the predominance Rule not met. 255 conduct a “close ment of was Amchem, criteria.” 521 majority superiority over glosses F.3d at 149. 615, case, Disapproving 117 2231. overlooking U.S. at S.Ct. complexities rule, metamorphosis the Court clearly distinguishes what this case from 23(b)(3) that, stated in Amchem while a Wesleyan. Central thought class action was to be the most 23(b)(3) effi- designed Rule was to effect adventuresome innovation of the 1966 procedural fair- sacrificing ciencies without 2231, amendments, 614, id. S.Ct. Advisory *48 28, 2001, and this case for further remand through prescribed it except process proceedings. Act.” ‍​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‍Congress Enabling the Rules added). (Emphasis already Because of its contours, original

adventuresome un- 23(b)(3)

derstanding of class actions would

clearly contemplated that courts Notes ness. As the Committee decades since the 1966 revision of “[i]n the state: to the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 23, practice Rule class action has become (b)(3) encompasses those Subdivision ” ‘adventuresome,’ even an example more cases which a class action would Court, 617, of which was before the id. at effort, time, economies of achieve 2231. S.Ct. promote uniformity of deci- expense, Although the district court’s efforts situated, persons similarly sion as to patching together certifiable sacrificing procedural without fairness well-intended, may TPCM ener bringing or other re- about undesirable indeed, creative, getic, and even the class sults. is nonetheless far too adventuresome sim understandably The drafters Rule 23 issues, ply few to resolve a common seri respect a cautious approach counseled ously risking procedural the creation of 23(b)(3) classes, recognizing to Rule Predict we can unfairness. as how this understanding even under their limited structured, it might case be tried as is now broadly might apply, how the idea only queue problems I see that sacri was adventuresome and was not “as clear- procedural po fice fairness and have the (b)(1) ly called for” as class actions under creating legal tential for error. Without (b)(2). Amchem, 615, See 521 U.S. at forecasting how numerous cautious and S.Ct. This con- adjudicated “just, might be to secure the 23(b)(3) stricted envi- approach speedy, inexpensive determination” of by authors relaxed sioned its should not be claim, 1, each Fed.R.Civ.P. I conclude that simply passage now of time and the the plaintiffs’ proceed against effort experience courts have had additional under Federal Rule of Civil Proce tend to with the Rule. Such comfort would 23(b)(3), dure as certified the district transmogrify already what is an adven- 28, 2001, September court in its order of experiment applied turesome into one “desirable,” neither “convenient” nor Am proce- its own and not for sake the sake of chem, 521 U.S. at 117 S.Ct. dural efficiency and fairness. As the that such a structure amounts to an adven Corp., Court stated Ortiz Fibreboard turesome embrace is too enthusiastic 815, 861, U.S. 119 S.Ct. possibilities. for Rule 23’s (1999), to fol- L.Ed.2d 715 “we are bound Accordingly, entirety I would vacate the upon low Rule 23 as we understood it of the district order September court’s and ... adoption, we are free to alter

Case Details

Case Name: Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date Published: Oct 30, 2003
Citation: 348 F.3d 417
Docket Number: 01-2419, 01-2420
Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.
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