27 Ala. 663 | Ala. | 1855
The first question presented upon the record, is as to the sufficiency of the sixth plea.
This plea sets out a judgment against the appellant, Gunn, who was the plaintiff below, and one Jones, in favor of James M. Calloway, rendered in the Superior Court of Taliaferro county, Georgia, which court (it avers) had jurisdiction. It then avers, that the administrators of Calloway, Malcolm Johnston and Samuel Johnston, made affidavit, pursuant to the statute of the State of Georgia, of the amount of the indebtedness, &c., and at the same time gave bond and security, as required by the laws of Georgia, conditioned, &c._ the issue of the summons of garnishment, service of the same on the defendant, a judgment of condemnation on his answer, and the payment of such judgment, — all'before the institution of the present action; and it also alleges, that the court rendering the judgment upon the proceedings by garnishment had jurisdiction, and that the debt condemned is the same with that sued for.
It may be conceded, as a general rule, that where a party claims a right, based not upon the common law, but the law of a foreign jurisdiction, it devolves upon him to prove, as a fact, the law upon which the claim or right which he asserts depends (Cockrell v. Gurley, at the last term); and under the application of this principle to the rules of pleading, he would be required to set out the law or statute under which he claimed, in order that the court might see that the right claimed was in conformity to it.
This rule, however, is not of universal application, and, if it applies to foreign judgments proper, does not< extend to judgments of a sister State, which by the constitution of the United States (Art. IY, § 1), requiring “ full faith and credit” to be given them, are placed rather on the footing of domestic judgments, and, when duly authenticated and proved, are evidence prima facie of jurisdiction ; so that, in pleading them, it is not necessary to set out affirmatively.the facts upon which the power and authority of the court pronouncing the judgment, depends. — Mills v. Stewart, supra; Scott v. Coleman, 5 Litt. 350 ; Bank of the United States v. Merchants’ Bank at Baltimore, 7 Gill, 415, and cases cited. We are aware that decisions are to be found recognizing a contrary doctrine, but they are founded upon the principles of the common law with reference to foreign judgments proper, and in all of them which we have found in the American' courts, the effect of the constitutional clause we have referred to does not appear to have been considered. On the other hand, the cases which we. have cited rest, as we think,, upon sound principle, and are conclusive as to the sufficiency of the plea.
On the trial of the cause, as appears from the bill of excep
The act of 23d December, 1822, (Prince's Dig. pp. 36, 37,) by its' first section, authorizes the plaintiff in any suit pending, or his attorney, on making affidavit of the debt or demand supposed to be due, and that he is apprehensive of the loss of the same, or some part thereof, unless a summons of garnishment issue, to issue such summons, directed to any person supposed to be indebted to the defendant, requiring the garnishee to appear at the nest term of the court, and answer to such indebtedness. The second section is in these words: “ In all cases, where judgment has heretofore been obtained, or may hereafter bo obtained, it shall be lawful for the plaintiff, his agent, or attorney, to issue summons of garnishment, returnable to the superior, inferior, or justice's court, as the case may be, to be directed, and requiring the garnishee to depose, in like manner as in the preceding section ; provided, that the plaintiff, his agent, or attorney, shall, if required by the defendant, or garnishee, or by any plaintiff holding a younger judgment or execution, or his attorney, swear that he believes the sum apparently due and claimed on said judgment or execution is actually due ; and provided, further, that the sheriff, or his deputy, or constable, shall enter on said execution that there is no property of the defendant to be found.”
The last proviso to this section certainly contemplates that, before a summons of garnishment can be sued out, an execution must first issue, and be returned “ no property.” This is necessary to entitle the plaintiff to the remedy given by the act, which is not in conformity with the course of the common law. The rule is, that where a court of general jurisdiction has a special authority conferred upon it by statute, it is, quoad hoc, an inferior or limited court. — Stevens v. Wilson, 5 Har. & Johns. 130; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119; Den-
In the case at bar, the statute of Georgia under which the administrators of Calloway asserted the right to proceed by garnishment, did not confer that right upon them, unless, as we have seen, an execution had been issued upon the judgment, and returned “ no property.” It is not necessary by the act, that this should appear, either in the affidavit, or the summons, but ifc'is a fact upon which the authority’of the party and of the court to proceed depends ; and as it is the duty of the latter to determine, whether the law in this respect had been complied with, it is necessary that the record should affirmatively show that it was done. If the court should determine the fact incorrectly, it would be error, but it would not affect the validity of the judgment. In a case like the present, whether -the jurisdictional fact actually existed, cannot be collaterally inquired into, if the tribunal to whose cognizance the question is referred, determined it to exist; but if the record fails to show the fact, either actually, or by the determination of the court, then the basis on which the right to the special remedy rests is wanting, and the whole proceeding is void.
The record of the case would properly consist of the affidavit and summons, with the return of the officer, the answer of the garnishee, either incorporated into the judgment or the bill of exceptions, or identified by an entry of the court.— Saunders v. Camp, 6 Ala. 73 ; Jones v. Howell, 16 Ala. 695. Neither the judgment against the original debtor, nor the
But, were we to regard the judgment against Gunn and'^ Jones, and the execution, which is certified with the proceedings on the garnishment, as forming a portion of that record, we are still of the opinion, that they fail to show the essentials necessary to the jurisdiction of the court. The judgment against the garnishee fails to show that the action of .the court was based in any respect on that execution; and in proceedings of this character, nothing is to be taken by intendment. Per Ormond, J., in Bates v. P. & M. Bank, supra. It cannot be regarded as evidence of the existence of the jurisdictional fact, for the reason, that it does not correspond with the judgment, which is in favor of James M. Calloway, while the execution is, in legal effect, in the name of different persons, and purports to be on a judgment recovered by them. Even were we to regard it as issued upon the judgment recovered by Calloway in the name of his administrators, the execution, without a revival of the judgment by them, would be void (Stewart v. Nuckles, 15 Ala. 225), and could not, therefore, be regarded as a valid foundation for a right.
It not appearing from the record that an execution had issued on the judgment in favor of the creditor, we are of opinion, that the judgment against the garnishee was void for want of jurisdiction.; and in arriving at this conclusion, we have not considered it necessary to refer particularly to the other portions of the laws of Georgia which the bill of exceptions shows wore in evidence, for the reason, that they do not affect that part of the act of December, 1822, which we have already examined, and which, in the absence of evidence showing its repeal, must be regarded as controlling the case.
As the questions we have considered will probably be decisive of the caso npon another trial, we deem it unnecessary to consider any other'question.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.