116 Ga. 325 | Ga. | 1902
Head instituted an action in the city court of Macon against U. M. Gunn and H. A. Gunn, to recover a judgment on a promissory note, dated May 23, 1893, which on its face jointly and severally hound the defendants to pay to the order of the plaintiff $750, 90 days after date. On August 15,1899, Mrs. H. A. Gunn, one of the defendants, filed her separate answer, denying indebtedness and pleading non est factum. In March, 1900, the other defendant, U. M. Gunn, filed an answer in which, after admitting all of the allegations in the petition, with the exception that he denied in general terms that he was indebted to plaintiff in any sum whatever, he set forth, as matter of defense to the action, that he was acting solely as the agent of his codefendant, Mrs. H. A. Gunn; in negotiating the note sued on, being at that time,' and before, her general agent for the purpose of managing her business interests, with power to negotiate notes, borrow money, buy goods on credit, incur debts, all in her name, and to bind her estate thereby; that he received no benefit whatever from said note,
1. Complaint is made that the trial judge overruled the demurrer to the' amendment which the plaintiff offered to his petition, and allowed the same over defendant’s objection. We are of opinion that the court erred in so ruling. The action, it will be remembered, was brought against two defendants, seeking to recover a judgment on a joint and several note. As a matter of law, the answer filed by U. M. Gunn set up no defense whatever to the action, and his plea should have been demurred to and stricken. Sup
2. Error is assigned, also, to that portion of the charge in which the jury were instructed as to the law of agency; and because the court in that connection charged the jury that if a principal stands
3. The following charge is complained of in the 5th ground of the amendment to the motion: “ If there are two theories in the' judgment of the jury, and are alike reasonably deducible from the evidence, one of which theories would in effect charge upon one of the parties in this case the crime of forgery, the fact that the law presumes every man innocent of a crime is to be weighed by the jury, in determining which of those two theories they will accept. The law presumes every man, every citizen, innocent of a crime charged upon him, until the contrary be established; and therefore the court' charges you in this case that if there be two theories that appear to the jury equally reasonable, equally reasonably deducible from the evidence in the ease, one of which would involve the crime of forgery upon the part of U. M. Gunn, the other of which would not involve the crime of forgery upon his part, that question, and the fact that the law presumes every citizen innocent of a crime is to be weighed by you in determining which of these two theories you will accept, and what verdict you will render in the case.” In our opinion this charge was entirely inapplicable to the case on trial.’ It is true that the law does not presume that a person has committed a crime, and that it presumes every citizen innocent until liis guilt is shown. In the case on trial the law presumes that U. M. Gunn told the truth. It did not presume that Mrs. Gunn perjured herself. Unfortunately, the testimony of both of these witnesses as to the fact of the execution of the note by Mrs. Gunn could not be true; but whether Mrs. Gunn did or did
4. A number of .grounds of thé motion' complain that the court erred in admitting certain evidence of IT. M. Gunn. In the evidence objected to were the statements that the witness as agent, of Mrs. Gunn had a large plantation which he had bought at from $1 to $5 per acre, and had spent from $13 to-$70 dollars an acre-to clear it up and ditch it; how he managed this property; how long he lived with his wife; how he had been robbed by the “ communistic verdicts of juries”; that he had given a $10,000 bond; and “ when I had a bank account I was all right, but I am now a tramp because of that woman, and she lias no more reason, infinitely less reason, to pursue me than Delilah had to ruin Samson or betray him; and I want the jury to know the facts in such a way that they will know their duty.” A knowledge of such facts obtained by the jury in this way, given for the purpose of showing them their duty, would of itself have been amply sufficient to-cause a reversal of the judgment, simply because, without any regard to the truth or justice of the criticisms-thus indulged in, it must be apparent that they c&uld have no connection, even in the remotest degree, with the question at issue — that is, did Mrs,. Gunn sign the note sued on ?
5. The last ground presented for our consideration is, that the court erred in permitting U. M. Gunn to argue the case to the jury
Judgment reversed.