GULFPORT PARTNERS V, L.P., GULFPORT PARTNERS VI, L.P., GULFPORT PARTNERS VII, L.P., GULFPORT PARTNERS VIII, L.P., AND GULFPORT PARTNERS IX, L.P. v. HARRISON COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS AND TAL FLURRY, TAX ASSESSOR FOR HARRISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2016-CA-00062-COA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
05/23/2017
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/18/2015; TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHRISTOPHER LOUIS SCHMIDT; COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT; NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER; TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DENIED APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO TAX COSTS AND FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST; DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART - 05/23/2017
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: JOHN G. CORLEW, KATHY K. SMITH, LYNN CHAIN WALL
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: TIM C. HOLLEMAN, PATRICK TAYLOR GUILD
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
CONSOLIDATED WITH
NO. 2016-CA-00087-COA
BELLEMONT GARDENS, L.P., AND BILOXI GATES, L.P. APPELLANTS v. HARRISON COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS AND TAL FLURRY, TAX ASSESSOR FOR HARRISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI APPELLEES
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/18/2015
TRIAL JUDGE: CHRISTOPHER LOUIS SCHMIDT
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: JOHN G. CORLEW, KATHY K. SMITH, LYNN CHAIN WALL
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: TIM C. HOLLEMAN, PATRICK TAYLOR GUILD
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DENIED APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO TAX COSTS AND FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART - 05/23/2017
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
CONSOLIDATED WITH
NO. 2016-CA-00090-COA
D‘IBERVILLE PARTNERS, L.P., WOOLMARKET PARTNERS, L.P., AND WOOLMARKET PARTNERS II, L.P. APPELLANTS v. HARRISON COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS AND TAL FLURRY, TAX ASSESSOR FOR HARRISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI APPELLEES
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/18/2015
TRIAL JUDGE: CHRISTOPHER LOUIS SCHMIDT
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: JOHN G. CORLEW, KATHY K. SMITH, LYNN CHAIN WALL
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: TIM C. HOLLEMAN, PATRICK TAYLOR GUILD
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DENIED APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO TAX COSTS AND FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART - 05/23/2017
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
CONSOLIDATED WITH
NO. 2016-CA-00091-COA
D‘IBERVILLE PARTNERS, L.P., WOOLMARKET PARTNERS, L.P., AND WOOLMARKET PARTNERS II, L.P. APPELLANTS v. HARRISON COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS AND TAL FLURRY, TAX ASSESSOR FOR HARRISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI APPELLEES
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/18/2015
TRIAL JUDGE: CHRISTOPHER LOUIS SCHMIDT
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: JOHN G. CORLEW, KATHY K. SMITH, LYNN CHAIN WALL
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: TIM C. HOLLEMAN, PATRICK TAYLOR GUILD
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DENIED APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO TAX COSTS AND FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART - 05/23/2017
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE LEE, C.J., BARNES AND GREENLEE, JJ.
¶1. This аppeal arises from four consolidated cases: 2016-CA-00062-COA, 2016-CA-00087-COA, 2016-CA-00090-COA, and 2016-CA-00091-COA.1 In this appeal
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Gulfport Partners appealed its 2011 ad valorem county tаx assessment, as assessed by the Harrison County Tax Collector and approved by the Harrison County Board of Supervisors (Board), to the Harrison County Circuit Court. While the case was pending in the circuit court, the Mississippi Supreme Court hаnded down its decision in Willow Bend Estates LLC v. Humphreys County Board of Supervisors, 166 So. 3d 494 (Miss. 2013), which interpreted the statute governing the determination of the true value of affordable rental housing for purposes of ad valorem taxation. In accordance with the supreme court‘s decision in Willow Bend, all of the parties in the consolidated cases agreed on the amount of the assessment for each property. Accordingly, an agreed final judgment was entered directing the Harrison County Tax Collector to determine the taxes owed based upon the true and assessed values in accordance with the supreme court‘s ruling in Willow Bend and to refund any amounts due to Gulfport Partners based upon the assessment. The agreed order stated “that the court retain[ed] jurisdiction to consider costs and/or interest, if any.”
¶3. Gulfport Partners then filed a “motion to tax costs and prejudgment interest.” The costs requested in the motion included the costs of the bond premiums required to appeal the ad valorem tax assessment and prejudgment interest from the date of overpayment of taxes until the date of the refund. Gulfport Partners cited Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(c), which provides that costs include “the premiums paid for cost of supersedeas bonds or other bonds to preserve rights pending appeal.” The Board argues, and the trial court found, that the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure did not apply to cases before the circuit court. The circuit court denied Gulfport Partners’ motion, holding that there was no statutory authority for the recovery of bond premiums as cоsts. The court also denied Gulfport Partners’ request for prejudgment interest, noting that it failed to make demand for it in its pleadings or cite to any statutory authority allowing for its award. Gulfport Partners appeals the circuit court‘s deniаl of its motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4. The issue on appeal is whether bond premiums are recoverable as a “cost” within the meaning of
DISCUSSION
I. Bond Premiums
¶5.
Any person aggrieved by a decision of the board of supervisors or the municipal authorities of a city, town or village, as to the assessment of taxes, may . . . appeal to thе circuit court of the county, upon giving bond, with sufficient sureties, in double the amount of the matter in dispute, but never less than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00), payable to the state, and conditioned to perform the judgment of the circuit court. . . . If the mattеr be decided in favor of the person who appealed, judgment in his favor shall be certified to the board of supervisors, or the municipal authorities, as the case may be, which shall conform thereto, and shall pay thе costs.
¶6.
¶7. Here, Gulfport Partners, as directed by the statute, properly appealed to the circuit court the decision of the Board approving the county‘s tax assessment. In order to appeal, it consequently incurred the cost of bond premiums by posting the bond required by the statute. It successfully challenged the tax assessments such that it was owed a refund. Undisрutedly, the statute mandates that the Board pay “the costs.” The parties disagree, however, as to what constitutes “the costs” within the meaning of the statute.
¶8. “When presented with a question regarding the application of a statute, [an appellate court] strives to give the statute its effect as intended by the Legislature.” AmFed Nat‘l Ins. v. NTC Transp. Inc., 196 So. 3d 947, 958 (¶39) (Miss. 2016) (citing City of Natchez v. Sullivan, 612 So. 2d 1087, 1089 (Miss. 1992)). Therefore, we first look to the language of the statute. Id. “[I]f the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning of the statute . . . .” Id. (quoting Lawson v. Honeywell Int‘l. Inc., 75 So. 3d 1024, 1027 (¶7) (Miss. 2011)). “Where the [L]egislature has not defined a term within the statutory scheme, we look to the term‘s common and generally accepted meaning.” Moore ex rel. City of Aberdeen v. Byars, 757 So. 2d 243, 248 (¶15) (Miss. 2000) (citing Corry v. State, 710 So. 2d 853, 861 (¶25) (Miss. 1998)). Finally, “[a]ll words and phrases contained in the statutes are used according to their common and ordinary acсeptation and meaning.”
¶9. Here, it is clear from a plain reading of the statute that the appellant is required to post a bond in order to appeal. It is also clear from the statute that where the appellаnt prevails, the Board is required to pay the costs. This Court has previously noted that Mississippi caselaw, with respect to the definition of costs, is “consistent with the general language found in the comment to [Mississippi] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 54(d).” Hubbard v. Delta Sanitation of Miss., 64 So. 3d 547, 564 (¶69) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). In so doing, we have held that “costs represents those official expenses, such as court fees, that a court will assess against a litigant.” Id. (citing M.R.C.P. 54(d) cmt.). Certainly, where the statute requires the appellant to
¶10. Additionally, though the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure specifically govern the procedures of this Court and the Mississippi Supreme Court, we do find Rule 36 to be instructive in the instant сase. Under Rule 36(c), recoverable costs on appeal include “the premiums paid for cost of supersedeas bonds or other bonds to preserve rights pending appeal.” Analogously, the instant case involvеd an appeal––albeit before the circuit court—where the appellant, Gulfport Partners, incurred the cost of bond premiums as required by the statute in order to appeal. Thus, Rule 36(c) provides further support for the interpretation that “the costs” named in
¶11. A plain reading of
II. Prejudgment Interest
¶12. In its motion to tax the costs, Gulfport Partners also requested prejudgment interest on the liquidated amount of overpayment, which was denied by the circuit court. We review the circuit court‘s grant or denial of a request for prejudgment interest under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Indem. Ins. of N. Am. v. Guidant Mut. Ins., 99 So. 3d 142, 156 (¶39) (Miss. 2012). Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
¶13. “The purpose of prejudgment interest is . . . ‘to provide compensation for the detention of money [that is] overduе.‘” Arcadia Farms P‘ship v. Audubon Ins. Co., 77 So. 3d 100, 105 (¶19) (Miss. 2012) (quoting Moeller v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 812 So. 2d 953, 958 (¶11) (Miss. 2002)). “It compensates . . . for the time value of money.” Id. (citing In re Guardianship of Duckett, 991 So. 2d 1165, 1182 (¶41) (Miss. 2008)).
¶14. The supreme court has recognized that
All judgments or decrees founded on any sale or contract shall bear interest at the same rate as the contract evidencing the debt on which the judgment or decree was rendered. All other judgments
or decrees shall bear interest at a per annum rate set by the judge hearing the complaint from a date determined by such judge to be fair but in no event prior to the filing of the complaint.
Id. “This statute does not require judges to award prejudgment interest, but allows the judge to determine the date from which interest will be calculated.” Indemnity, 99 So. 3d at 157 (¶39). The supreme court has also stated the following regarding the award of prejudgment interest:
It is well settled that in Mississippi a trial judge is afforded discretion in deciding whether to award prejudgment interest. Under Mississippi law, prejudgment interest may be allowed in cases where the amount due is liquidated when the claim is originally made or where the denial of a claim is frivolous or in bad faith. No аward of prejudgment interest may rationally be made where the principal amount has not been fixed prior to judgment.
Id. at (¶40). Finally, “the party requesting prejudgment interest is required to make a demand for prejudgment interest in its complaint.” Id. (citing Upchurch Plumbing Inc. v. Greenwood Util. Comm‘n, 964 So. 2d 1100, 1118 (¶45) (Miss. 2007)).
¶15. Here, Gulfport Partners was owed a refund for the overpayment of taxes, which were liquidated when it originally made its claim. So it is undisputed that Harrison County detained money that was overdue so as to justify the purpose for which prejudgment interest is awarded. However, Gulfport Partners failed to make demand—as required—for prejudgment interest in its pleadings. Further,
¶16. THE JUDGMENTS OF THE HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ARE AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED AT ONE-HALF TO THE APPELLANTS AND ONE-HALF TO THE APPELLEES.
IRVING, P.J., FAIR, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. CARLTON, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY GRIFFIS, P.J. ISHEE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
CARLTON, J., DISSENTING:
¶17. I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s opinion. The Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure apply to proceedings in circuit court when the circuit court sits as an appellate court. See Van Meter v. Alford, 774 So. 2d 430, 432 (¶3) (Miss. 2000); Am. Inv‘rs Inc. v. King, 733 So. 2d 830, 832 (¶4) (Miss. 1999); Adams v. Miss. State Oil & Gas Bd., 80 So. 3d 869, 871 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).
GRIFFIS, P.J., JOINS THIS OPINION.