80 So. 340 | Miss. | 1918
delivered the opinion of the court.
W. W. Faulk sued the appellant traction company in the circuit court for damages on account of personal injuries sustained by him. The first count of the declaration alleges that the master failed to furnish him with a reasonably safe place in which to work, and with reasonably safe appliances with which to work, in the scope of his employment. The second count alleges that plaintiff was an inexperienced man in the handling of automobiles and knew nothing about running one or the dangers incident to cranking one; that it was his duty to obey the orders of one Chambers, who was his foreman; that he was injured while attempting to crank a Ford automobile in response to an order to do so from this foreman; that he was inexperienced and did not know of the danger attached to cranking a car; that it was negligence on the part of the defendant to order him to crank the car without warning him of the dangers incident thereto.
“Because Mr. G-orenflo (the general manager) put me with him. Q. He didn’t put you under him? A. He put me to do what he said, I guess, because he was trouble shooter. Q. How do you know you were under Sam’s orders? A. He told me I was. Q. Who told you? A. Sam. I was working under him. Mr. G-orenflo put me under him. Q. Mr. Gorenflo never told you that you were under Sam? A. He put me with him; I didn’t know anything about the trouble work.”
This is practically all of the testimony of the appellee as to Chambers being his superior. The substance of this testimony is simply that he, the appellee, inferred that Chambers was his superior because Chambers had been working in this department for a longer period than appellee and knew more about it, and also that Chambers told appellee he was under him. The general manager, Mr. Gorenflo, testified that these two men assisted each other in this work; that neither had to obey the orders of the other with reference to the work; that they were given their orders about the work at the office; that as a matter of fact appellee was paid more wages than Chambers.
From a judgment in favor of appellee for five hundred dollars, this appeal is prosecuted.
The peremptory instruction asked by appellant should have been given. There was no testimony whatever to show that Chambers was a superior agent of the appellee or had the right to direct or control his services. They were merely fellow servants of equal dignity. It is well settled, that the authority of an agent to bind his principal rests upon the powers conferred upon him by the
This authority of the agent cannot he proven by the mere statement of the agent. Sumrall v. Kitselman Bros., 101 Miss. 783, 58 So. 594,
The assumption of the authority of one servant to control another, and the acquiescence by the second servant to this control, does not render the employer liable in the absence of authority conferred upon the servant by the master. This rule, quoted from White, Personal Injuries, section 222, in the case of McMillan v. Mining Co., 61 W. Va. 531, 57 S. E. 129, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 840, is as follows:
“The mere assumption by an employee of a power to control his fellows,. without a delegation of such power by the employer, will never render the employer liable for the orders of such subordinate; and, if an employee sees fit voluntarily to recognize such self-constituted authority, he assumes the risk of obedience, or should look to such employee for redress.”
It was no part whatever of appellee’s duties to crank or have anything whatever to do with this automobile except to ride in it. In attempting to crank it he was a mere “volunteer,” and the appellant is not responsible for his injury.
Eeversed, and judgment here for appellant.
Reversed.