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Gulfco of Louisiana, Inc. v. Brantley
430 S.W.3d 7
Ark.
2013
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*1 7 prohibition filing access to the courts under pleadings, and Dowell’s additional it Conway must be noted that the facts in this case. asserts that there are in fact limit ed in may circumstances which a court prohibition Cooper had no effect on limit an individual’s access to the court. to the and Dowell’s access court because See, Ct., e.g., Chipps v. U.S. Dist. 882 F.2d pleadings there were no left for them to (3d Cir.1989) (in 72, 73 which the Third disagree. applying file. We Even the lit- of Appeals recognized Circuit Court 7, pleadings eral definition of from Rule groundless “a pattern and vexatious liti Cooper prohibited and Dowell are gation justify will prohibiting an order fur Therefore, accessing the circuit court. we filings ther permission without of the agree Cooper with and Dowell and issue court”); 418, Ligon Stilley, v. 2010 Ark. the writ of certiorari. (where S.W.3d this court discussed Because the circuit court acted in excess prohibition placed Stilley by Oscar jurisdiction plain, of its and committed a the United States District Court for the manifest, clear, gross abuse discre- District Western of Arkansas —which was tion, Cooper and because and Dowell are Eighth later affirmed Circuit Court adequate left without an alternative reme- Appeals filing any complaints —from dy, we hold that relief in the form of a writ parties certain prior ap without appropriate. of certiorari is We issue the court); proval and see Ark. R.Crim. writ of certiorari and direct the Faulkner 37.2(b) (2013) (a P. rule which specifically County Court to rescind its Janu- Circuit prohibits filing of a petition second ary 2013 order. unless the first was denied without preju Finally, although Cooper Dowell dice). request also that the court issue a writ of |nI absolutely agree that access to the | grounds that the circuit incertiorari importance; courts is of utmost simply I jurisdiction court exceeded its and commit- imply do not want to that there is never an manifest, gross ted a clear and abuse of may instance which the court limit ac- ordering discretion in them when proven necessary. cess $21,345 costs, in fees and we do not reach this issue. The imposed conditions January

circuit court in the 2013 order inextricably

are intertwined and cannot be therefore,

parceled individually; out we 2013 Ark. 367 direct the circuit court to rescind the order entirety. LOUISIANA, its OF GULFCO INC. d/b/a Springhill, Tower Loan of denied; prohibition Writ of writ of cer- Louisiana, Appellant granted; tiorari motion to dismiss or mo- v. tion to strike denied. MacArthur BRANTLEY and Pamela

DANIELSON, J., concurs. Brantley, Appellees. DANIELSON, Justice, E. PAUL No. CV-13-135. concurring. Supreme Court of Arkansas. here, agree disposition While I with the 3,Oct. 2013. clarify point I write to not included in Rehearing Denied Nov. regarding the discussion access to the Although court. the facts in the instant support

case did not the circuit court’s *2 percent.

40.20 After deductions for fees insurance, received $1,031.63 in cash. Applying the stated *3 rate, charge interest the finance amounted $811.64, yielding a total indebtedness of $2,392, in payable monthly in- twenty-six stallments of The promissory note $92. evidencing the debt stated that the loan by “personal was secured property.” 17, 2009, On December the Brantleys $20,887.71 obtained another loan of at an Dorado; Lightfoot, John D. El and Rob- annual interest rate of percent. 24.09 Out Tschiemer, Mayflower, appellant. ert for S. sum, of that Gulfco satisfied the first loan Woods, Magnolia, for appellees. Claudell and paid hospital both a bill by owed Brantleys and their delinquent property GOODSON, COURTNEY HUDSON taxes. After deducting those sums and Justice. fees, $17,388.32. in they received $850 | Appellant Louisiana, Inc., Gulfco of charge $18,784.29, With the finance of Springhill, Tower Loan of Louisiana d/b/a $39,672 Brantleys pay were to a total of (Gulfco), appeals the decision of the Co- seventy-two over the course of months at County denying lumbia Circuit Court its per the rate of month. To secure the $551 request to appel- foreclose on the home of loan, Brantleys note for this executed a Brantley. lees Pamela and MaeArthur mortgage on their home in Waldo. Gulfco reversal, argues For Gulfco that the circuit $32,000 appraised the value of the home at in applying usury court erred Arkansas $27,000. quick-sale with a value of law to decline enforcement of the debt 2, 2010, On June Gulfco loaned the instruments that it governed contends are $2,779.82. Brantleys an additional On this by the laws of the State of Louisiana. charged Gulfco an annual interest Gulfco also asserts that the circuit court percent, rate of 35.67 and after deductions erred in concluding required that it was interest, prepaid for fees and the Brant- by be licensed Secretary Arkansas of $2,501.83. leys received Adding the fi- in ruling State and the transactions $1,250.18, charge nance of the total debt were product unconscionable and the of $4,030 amounted to to be satisfied twen- predatory lending practices. We affirm ty-six monthly installments of This $155. the circuit court’s decision. loan was secured a list personal The record reflects that Gulfco is in the property that riding included a lawn mow- extending business of high-risk loans to er, drill, chainsaw, televisions, a a poor customers with ratings. credit It cameras. Louisiana, operates primarily in Mississip- pi, 11, 2011, Brantleys, and Missouri. The re- Brantleys who On March bor- Waldo, Arkansas, $3,345.34 side in obtained four rowed an additional with interest two-year |2period at|s34.32 loans over from Gulfco percent. charged $400.72 Louisiana, fees, at its location in Springhill, the proceeds were used to is near the Arkansas-Louisiana border. retire the June-2010 note. After these First, 13, 2009, May deductions, borrowed Brantleys received cash in $1,580.36 with an annual Including interest rate of hand of the finance $598.71. personal bills pay to took out the first loan to $1,464.66,they obligated

charge delinquent. to become $4,810 months at the that were about twenty-six over fell behind on month. This note was MacArthur said per rate of $185 personal property per as month because payments the same secured loan. work was slow and because Pamela had was the June-2010 his “Dee,” ill. He stated that become made no him about their delin- agent, called July 2011. On after March loans they take out a quency suggested in the Circuit Court Gulfco filed MacArthur said that Dee second loan. styled “No- County pleading Columbia *4 already papers prepared had the when he Sell,” alleg- Intention to of Default and tice that he arrived at the office. He stated Brantleys’ mortgage on the ing that the well and that he read what he did not read stating that a sale was in default and home and could of the loan disclosure statement 19, August the home would occur testified that promissory note. MacArthur of the mort- copy attached a 2011. Gulfco money the loan was used to for second July On to the notice of default. gage buy a pay logging the first note and to Brantley pro filed a se an- Pamela purchased He that he truck. stated by response a filed that was followed swer $1,500 $2,300 for weld- spent truck for and In Brantleys’ attorney. the re- ing buying paying in addition to tires and Brantleys denied the substan- sponse, regard insurance. With to the June-2010 default, allegations of the notice of and tive money that the MacArthur testified usury, un- they asserted the defenses of arrearages up was used to catch illegality, unclean conscionability, estoppel, they loan. He said that December-2009 hands, lending practices, and a predatory money borrowed more in March 2011 to Deceptive violation of the Arkansas Trade MacAr- again bring their loans current. (ADTPA). Practices Act they not have the thur testified that did 11, 2011, August Brantleys filed On money pay they the loans and that were injunction to petition preliminary a for a accepting faced with the choice of either of their home. proposed halt sale losing more loans or their home. petition, they promis- asserted that the unconscionable, sory notes were as Gulfco Brantley that and Pamela testified she advantage sophistica- took of their lack of of their began MacArthur construction mortgage and induced them to their tion they built it a home 2000 and that had knowledge they with that did not home money little at a time when was available. stable, employment. have full-time graduated high Pamela said that she alleged also the interest B that MacAr- average school with a were usurious under charged rates Gulfco high thur had taken remedial classes in Gulfco did not the Arkansas Constitution. county school. Pamela stated that the as- August On response petition. file a to the of their appraised sessor had the value 12, 2011, entered an order the circuit court $51,450. home at She said that she had Brantleys’ request pre- for a granting the heard from friends that Gulfco offered liminary injunction. money | MacArthur easy that she and sand 11, 2012, they a loan because were behind on May sought trial held on 14At they he their household bills. She said that Brantley MacArthur testified that Wilson, that agent, told the loan Demetrius part-time moving company. worked for a for an per sitting she earned week He that he learned about Gulfco said that MacArthur elderly he Pamela woman and through a friend and that us, moving company you for a additional from if need it. part-time worked $3043.48 yards. mowed She said manager.” Spence and sometimes Just ask the stated advised Wilson of her medical they payment she also were one behind on the Pamela stated that Wilson problems. mortgage when the final loan was made a home and about knew that had March and the proceeds were obtaining logging idea of MacArthur’s Further, used to arrearage. she She generate truck as a means to income. testified that Gulfco has several offices testified that she advised Wilson that located near Arkansas border. having making a hard time their testimony, After the conclusion of payments on the first loan and that it was circuit court took the case under advise- mortgaging who suggested Wilson briefs, ment and asked for posthearing truck. purchasing logging house and directing Brantleys’ attorney to submit Pamela said that Wilson mentioned this attorney his brief first to file many idea times in their conversations and brief, response. his brief in In their they finally agreed to another loan Brantleys argued that the law of Arkansas with a on their home. She testi- *5 applied and that the series of loans and having logging fied that the truck did not conduct of Gulfco were unconscionable and problems keeping work out due to the unjust. In response, Gulfco maintained running, high gasoline, truck the cost of that mortgage the loans and were executed logging and a downturn in the business. in in good compliance faith and with Ar- they Pamela that used the said June-2010 kansas law. past-due payment loan to make a on the The court entered an setting order forth previous loan and to household bills. August its decision on 2012. The cir- having prob- She said that she was medical cuit court described what it referred to as lems at the time and could not work and “disturbing pattern lending.” a they going get- that “were in circles” The and court ting deeper in a found that Gulfco made four loans to deeper and hole. Pamela stated that she did not Brantleys despite read loan docu- their lack of stable ments because she employment. and MacArthur were It said that it was no sur- money. broke and in need of prise they were soon behind on their payments. The court noted that subse- Lori Spence, manager, Gulfco’s district quent bring loans were used to the former testified that between the in May first loan current, loans and the court called atten- in and second one December receipt tion to the that indicated that even 2009, appellees were assessed three late money more was available. The circuit charges monthly and had missed two $92 court testimony believed Pamela’s payments. that, acknowledged She when purchase recommended the made, the June-2010 loan appellees was logging truck and that the venture turned payment. had missed the June Spence they out to be one that could not afford. stated that with the December-2009 and |7income loans, It noted that with June-2010 MacArthur’s appellees paying illness, they level and Pamela’s not a month on the note could and $551 cycle break the per addition to month debt. court consid- Ifin June-2010 ered that the fees they charged note. She said that con- for the four $2,322, significant tinued to miss loans was and it deemed garner late charges. the fact charges Introduced into evidence was a that the were deducted receipt appellees end, received February proceeds dated from the loan on the front 18, 2011, stating “[y]ou can thereby reducing money obtain an the amount of 44.1 required by law as Rule increasing foreign

available to the Procedure. Arkansas Rules of Civil It con- of further debt. probability referenced a the court that Gulfeo cerned summarily dispose argument. of this We home, as it indicat- value of the quick-sale circuit court was indeed mindful While the might not be ed that a foreclosure sale would be usurious under loans commercially in a reasonable conducted law,2the court did not decline to Arkansas manner, deficiency in a which would result agreements enforce the based on viola- Brantleys. addi- judgment against Instead, usury tion of Arkansas law. tion, that Gulfeo court observed circuit instru- ruling court’s was that debt states; other that it does business three enforceable because ments were not to do business in Arkan- was not licensed product were unconscionable and sas; would and that the interest rates predatory lending practices. Inasmuch as conclusion, usury law. In violate Arkansas the circuit court did not rule that collectively “the loans agreements the court found that were void because violat- law, lending by foreign predatory usury argument constitute ed Arkansas for reversal. presents not authorized to do business no basis corporation sought and that the contract Arkansas Next, Gulfeo contends that the cir unconscionable and can- to be enforced is in ruling cuit court erred that it was re faith credit. Accord- given-full not be quired register with the Arkansas Sec ingly, contract will not be enforced retary summarily reject of State. We also properly.” brings Arkansas Gulfeo because, argument again, this Gulfeo has circuit court’s order.1 appeal this from the *6 decision. misinterpreted circuit court’s The circuit did not find that Gulfeo court appeal, its on Gulfeo point first As required was to be licensed Arkansas. argues applies that the law of Louisiana to nullify agreements Nor did the court and that the circuit debt instruments registered because Gulfeo is not to do busi by employing usury court erred Arkansas ness in the State of Arkansas. In its agreements. points law to void the It out decision, merely the circuit court com that note that was secured promissory mented on the fact that Gulfeo was an out- by mortgage contains a choice-of-law |flthat business, of-state a fact is undoubt provision stating governed that the note is issue, edly true. with the first As | provisions under the of Louisiana fiaw. argument point provide on this does not Further, Gulfeo maintains that it is a Loui basis on to overturn the which circuit corporation, agreements siana that court’s decision. Louisiana, were executed in and that the Brantleys’ payments directed to Lou We now turn to the final contention that, isiana. It cir contends under these raised Gulfeo issue with appeal. on takes cumstances, validity agreements finding engaged the circuit court’s that it judged must be under Louisiana law. In predatory lending in unconscionable and response, that practices. appellees signed assert Gulfeo It asserts that waived reliance on Louisiana law because the documents and were aware of the in give rely being charged; they it did not notice of its intent to on terest rates lodged cap Initially, appeal in the court 2. The Arkansas Constitution sets a was granted appeals. We Gulfco’s motion to at seventeen interest rates for consumer loans Const, appeal 19, 13(b). transfer the to this court under the percent. § Ark. art. provisions Supreme of Arkansas Court Rule 2(b)(4) (5).& 1— home; to their and that ment. The Arkansas Home agreed Loan Protec- they engage logging to in the busi- applies high-cost loans, wished tion Act home argues parties are ness. which is a loan that is by secured a first provisions may bound contractual lien on the structure that does not exceed they ignorance $150,000, not assert of the document where the borrower ais natural signed. have It contends that a court is person, and where the debt is incurred con- not to rewrite a contract but must primarily the borrower for personal, fami- parties’ it as to reflect the intent. strue ly, purposes. or household Ark.Code Ann. Further, Gulfco maintains that the Brant- 23-53-103(5)(A) § (Repl.2012). The Act leys desperate were not or taken advan- prohibits practices lending such as without tage sought of because it was who out regard repayment due ability. pro- It help pay the first loan to bills that were vides, delinquent. about to become Gulfco also A creditor shall not make a high-cost points Brantleys’ out that credit was home loan unless the creditor reason-

poor did not seek a loan ably believes at the time the loan is any other lending institution. (1) consummated that one or more of the obligors, when considered individually or argument, of its Gulf- support collectively, will be able to make the only co cites to Arkansas There caselaw. scheduled to repay the obli- fore, will apply we law of Arkansas in gation upon based a consideration of deciding this issue. Our regard standards expected income, current and cur- ing unconscionability are as follows. An status, rent obligations, employment act is unconscionable if it affronts the other financial resources other than the justice, decency, sense and reasonable equity borrower’s dwelling Baptist ness. Health v. Murphy, 2010 repayment secures of the loan. Ark. 378 S.W.3d 269. We have stated 23-53-104(1) § assessing that in whether a Ark.Code Ann. particular (Repl.2012). con unconscionable, Any provision tractual violation of the Act is constitutes an *7 totality deceptive practice courts review the of unconscionable or act or the circum under the ADTPA. surrounding § stances the Ark. Ann. negotiation and Code 23- 53-106(a)(l) (Repl.2012). execution of the contract. Jordan v. Dia Co., 142, Equip. Supply mond & 362 Ark. The determination of uncon- (2005). 207 S.W.3d 525 Two important scionability question is mixed of fact and considerations are gross whether there is a Bryant law. State ex rel. v. R A& Inv. inequality power |10between of bargaining Co., 289, (1999). 336 Ark. 985 S.W.2d 299 parties aggrieved the and whether the par trials, In bench the standard of review ty was made comprehended aware of and appeal is whether the circuit court’s provision question. the Id. alsoWe findings clearly are clearly erroneous or observe that another may factor which preponderance the of the evidence. to a finding unconscionability contribute of 419, Rogers, v. Bank 2012 Ark. 424 Benefit is a belief the stronger party that there finding S.W.3d 812. A is clearly erroneous is no reasonable probability that the weak when, although there is to sup evidence fully er will party perform the contract. it, port reviewing court on the entire (Second) § Restatement of Contracts 208. evidence is left with a firm conviction that law, Arkansas’s consumer-protection a mistake has been committed. Primus Servs., Wilburn, expression pub- which is an of this State’s Auto. Fin. Inc. v. 2013 However, policy, lic is consistent with the Restate- Ark. 428 S.W.3d 480. this rates, the Brant- high placed interest de novo. of law questions court reviews Auto., Inc., debt, ever-increasing 2011 Ark. in a of Asbury leys position v. Campbell Therefore, we review S.W.3d all but inevitable that such that it was findings for clear factual the circuit court’s the Brant- up in default. While would end of the law de interpretation error and its more dire with leys’ debt situation became Villines, 2009 Ark. v. novo. Robinson minimal, loan, be- risk was each . 362 S.W.3d 870 mortgage, it was assured of cause with the payment full on the loan. Con- receiving record confirms review of the Our circumstances, lending totality of Gulfco’s opinion sidering court’s circuit Brantleys. The that the evidence practices vis-a-vis the circuit court found a modest Brantleys first obtained pattern repre- an intolerable of revealed household bills that pay Gulfco to conduct on hensible and unconscionable They delinquent. were about to become offended its sense part of Gulfco that per month difficulty making the had $92 justice. cannot decency We con- loan, as neither of them payments on this findings circuit court’s clude that Gulfco, employment. Yet had full-time unconscionability predatory lending employment status knowledge with hold clearly are erroneous. We practices illness, approxi- them and Pamela’s loaned refusing not err in to that the court did $20,000, taking mortgage mately mortgage, as to do so would enforce security. pro- Brantleys’ home as public policy contravene the of this State. to retire the ceeds of this loan were used Accordingly, we affirm its decision. testimony also first loan. The unsecured Affirmed. agent persuaded that Gulfco’s indicated their home. Brantleys to Thereafter, Brantleys had trouble HANNAH, C.J., concurs. making monthly payments $551. fact, Gulfco extended more

Despite this HANNAH, Justice, JIM Chief them, to and with this third credit concurring. an extra required $155 majority’s holding that I concur with the for the per month addition to refusing the circuit court did not err in Predictably, second loan. I separately enforce the contract. write obligations. meet None- could not these I reach that same conclusion on a because

theless, yet made another loan to basis. As the facts cited different receipt |12that in a advertising them after *8 show, at majority clearly the contract issue money more was available. With this public policy violates in Arkansas with re- loan, satisfied, fourth the third note was 11?,predatory usury, and the monthly gard in- Brantleys’ payments and the again. public inter- practices against creased once of Gulfco are power to declare a est. The courts hold shows that the Brant- The evidence thus policy contravening public contract void for pay- their leys capable making were not the interests of the or where it violates beginning. Subsequent from the ments See Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Denver public. Guar. previous off notes loans were made to Roller, Inc., 313 Ark. 854 S.W.2d 312 current. De- bring or to Co., (1993); Realty Sirman v. Sloss inability Brantley’s demonstrated spite (1939). In the Ark. 129 S.W.2d 602 mon- continued to loan them pay, case, the contract present I would declare Each that included built-in fees ey. against public policy void as public interest. 2013 Ark. 372 Randy RUSSELL, Appellant v. RUSSELL, Appellee. Andrea No. CV-13-244. Supreme of Arkansas. Court 3,Oct.

Case Details

Case Name: Gulfco of Louisiana, Inc. v. Brantley
Court Name: Supreme Court of Arkansas
Date Published: Oct 3, 2013
Citation: 430 S.W.3d 7
Docket Number: CV-13-135
Court Abbreviation: Ark.
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