129 Me. 499 | Me. | 1930
This case is before this court on exceptions by the plaintiff to the allowance of a motion for a nonsuit. An automobile of the plaintiff, driven by one of its employees, collided with a car driven by one Leo L. Whelden. Defendant’s brief admits that the accident happened because of the negligence of Whelden.
On just what theory the defendant can be held liable for Whelden’s acts it is difficult to see. Counsel for the plaintiff contend that Whelden was either acting as agent for the defendant in selling the car to his wife, or that the defendant was liable in entrusting the car to Whelden who was an improper person to drive it. ■ •
As to the first contention, the evidence clearly shows that Whelden himself was expecting to make the purchase. To hold that he was acting as agent for the company in persuading his wife to buy the car, not only finds no support in the evidence but contemplates a relationship of the parties which even to the casual observer seems absurd. As to the second claim, it is sufficient to note that Whelden became intoxicated after he left Chapman, but not before. His plan to get his wife’s approval was so highly commendable that Chapman surely had no reason to expect such a sudden change of heart as seems to have taken place. It is admitted that Whelden had no operator’s license. If such a fact has any bearing, it is sufficient to say that there is no evidence that either Chapman or anyone else connected with the defendant knew of it. The motion for a nonsuit was properly granted. Exceptions overruled. George E. Thompson, Clinton C. Stevens, for plaintiff. Gillin & Gillin, for defendant.