The Board of Environmental Protection (Board) and the Town of Greene (Town) appeal from a judgment entered in the Superi- or Court (Kennebec County, Chandler, J.) in favor of Gulf Island Pond Oxygenation Project Partnership (Partnership) on its complaint pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 80C seeking review of a decision of thе Board. The Board and the Town contend that the Board’s denial of the Partnership’s application for a property tax exemption certificate was appropriate because the Partnership failed to meet the statutory criteria for such an exemрtion. See 36 M.R.S.A. §§ 655(1)(N), 656(1)(E) (1990). We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
The Androscoggin River, from Ellis River to the Bath-Brunswick border, is a Class C waterway, classified pursuant to 38 M.R.S.A. § 467(1)(A) (Supp.1993). Beginning at the Gulf Island Pond in Greene, the river does not meet Class C minimum dissolved oxygen requirements (38 M.R.S.A. § 465(4)(B) (Supp.1993)) during the summer months because of oxygen-demanding waste discharged into the river. The Partnership was formed by International Paper, Boise Cascade Corporation, James River Corporation, and Central Maine Power Company. The Partnership created the Gulf Island Pond Oxygenation Project (GIPOP), and located it in Greene above thе Gulf Island Dam on Gulf Island Pond in order to ameliorate the problem of insufficient oxygen; GIPOP injects oxygen into the water in Gulf Island Pond to increase the oxygen level and to cultivate biological organisms that consume oxygen-demanding material, thereby reducing the biochemical oxygen dеmand.
The Partnership applied to the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) to receive personal property, real property, and sales tax exemption certification pursuant to 36 M.R.S.A. §§ 655(1)(N) (personal property), 656(1)(E) (real property), & 1760(29) (1990) (sales). 1 The Commissioner denied any tax exemption certification pursuant to those sections.
*1058 The Partnership appealed the Commissioner’s order to the Superior Court (Alexander; /.), which remanded the case to the Board to hear the Partnership’s appeal from the Commissiоner’s decision. The Board found that the primary purpose of GIPOP was “to treat and reduce the organic wastes in, and being discharged into, Gulf Island Pond.” Accordingly, the Board found that GIPOP was a water pollution control facility within the meaning of section 1760(29), and thus that the Partnership was exempt frоm sales and use tax. The Board, however, concluded that the Partnership did not qualify for property tax exemption pursuant to sections 655(1)(N) and 656(1)(E) because it reasoned that the requirement set out in 36 M.R.S.A. § 656(1)(E), that a water pollution control facility have a capacity to handle at least 4000 gallons of waste per day, could be met only if a facility treated waste before being discharged into the waters of the State. The Board found that GIPOP merely oxygenated water, and therefore did not handle the 4000 gallons of waste per day required by section 656(1)(E)(1) to make the Partnership eligible for exemption. Pursuant to 38 M.R.S.A. § 346 (Supp.1993) and M.R.Civ.P. 80C, the Partnership sought judicial review by the Superior Court.
The Superior Court concluded that the Board construed the exemption language too narrowly when it interpreted the “capacity to handle” requirement as mandating that waste treatment occur prior to discharge, and vacated the decision of the Board. This appeal by the Board and the Town followed.
I.
The Town first contends that the Superior Court erred in remanding this matter to the Board to hear the Partnership’s appeal from the Commissiоner’s decision. It argues that the Board lacks appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the Commissioner denying tax exemption certificates and therefore the Board had no authority to review that decision. Pursuant to 38 M.R.S.A. § 341-D(4) (Supp.1993),
2
the Board has powers to review “licеnse” decisions of the Commissioner. Although section 341-D fails to provide a definition for the term “license,” the Maine Administrative Procedures Act (APA) provides a definition of “license” that includes certificates. 6 M.R.S.A. § 8002(5) (1989). Because no provision in section 341-D expressly contradicts the APA definition, it аpplies to the statute governing the Board’s jurisdictional powers. 5 M.R.S.A. § 8003 (1989). Moreover, the Board routinely reviews the Commissioner’s denial of tax exemption certifications. If there is no rule, statute, or constitutional provision to the contrary, the procedure adopted by an administrative agency generally receives the deferential respect of a reviewing court.
Town of Wiscasset v. Board of Envtl. Protection,
II.
The Board and the Town challenge the Superior Court’s сonclusion that the Board’s construction of the statutory language providing for the exemption was too narrow and urge us to defer to the Board’s determination that the Partnership is not entitled to property tax exemption. On an appeal from an intermediate apрellate review by the Superi- or Court of an administrative decision, we review the agency decision directly for an abuse of discretion, errors of law, or findings not supported by the evidence.
International Paper Co. v. Board of Envtl. Protection,
At issue here is the construction of statutory language providing for personal and real property tax exemption. When construing statutes, we look to the statutory language to discern the real purpose of the legislation.
Id.
Exemptions from taxation are not to be broadly construed nor extended by application to situations not clearly within the scoрe of the exemption language.
Id.
at 600. Statutes providing for tax exemption, however, are entitled to a reasonable inter
*1059
pretation.
Id.
“[T]he rule of strict construction of exemption statutes does not require that the narrowest possible meaning must be given to words descriptive of exemption.”
Eagle Rental, Inc. v. City of Waterville,
In order for a water pollution control facility to qualify for real and personal property tax exemptions pursuant to 36 M.R.S.A. §§ 655(1)(N) and 656(1)(E), the facility must be “installed, acquired or placed in operation for the primary purpose of reducing, controlling or eliminating water pollution ... [.]” Section 656(l)(E)(l)(a);
see Statler Indus., Inc. v. Board of Envtl. Protection,
Section 656(1)(E)(1) imposes an additional requirement, however. In order for a water pollution control facility to qualify as exempt from property tax, it must have a capacity to handle at least 4000 gallons of waste per day. The Board found that GIPOP failed to meet that requirement. The Board and the Town argue that the Board’s factual finding that GIPOP doеs not handle 4000 gallons of waste per day is supported by the evidence and requires that the Board’s denial of exemption from property tax be upheld.
This court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Board, and we must affirm findings of fact by the Board if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Aviation Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection,
An administrative agency’s construction of a statute administered by it is given great deference.
International Paper Co.,
The Board’s narrow construction of the statute is based on the definitions of “waste” in sections 1760(29)(C) and 656(l)(E)(l)(c) (industrial waste), (e) (commercial waste), and (f) (domestic waste), as a substance “capable of polluting” the waters of the state. From that language the Board concludes that the waste that a water pollution control facility must have a “capacity to handlе” is limited to predischarge waste, and that the treatment of at least 4000 gallons of waste per day must occur before the waste is discharged into Maine’s rivers. Our reading of the statute, however, leads us to agree with the Superior Court that the Board’s interpretation of the statute is not supported by either the purpose or the language of the statute.
The purpose of the tax exemptions for water pollution control facilities is to encourage more widespread use of modern waste disposal systems and thus to improve the quality of the state’s water.
International Paper Co.,
The statutory language draws no distinction between water pollution control facilities
*1060
that reduce or eliminate pollution by treating the waste before its discharge into water, and those facilities that treat waste in the water subsequent to its discharge, when the waste is in the water. Nor has judicial interpretation of the statute required waste to be treated prior to discharge.
See, e.g., Ethyl,
III.
Finally, contrary to the Town’s contention, GIPOP’s tax exemption certification must be retroactive to April 1, 1992. In order to qualify for property tax exemption for a particular year, an aрplicant must have received certification by April 1st of that year. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. City of Westbrook, 477 A.2d 269,* 272 (Me.1984). 36 M.R.S.A. § 656(1)(E)(3) (1990) re quires the Commissioner to “issue a determination regarding certification by April 1st for any air or water pollution control facility for which it has received a complete application by December 15th of the preceding year.” Thus, if a successful applicant filed with the Department by December 15th and is eligible for tax exempt status, then the legislature has determined that the applicant should receive certification for the coming year. See Statement of Fact, L.D. 1578 (112th Leg-is.1985).
The record reflects that the application for GIPOP’s tax exemption was received by the Department on December 13, 1991. Because GIPOP was entitled to property tax exemption for its facility, the effective date of the exemption has to be April 1, 1992. To conclude otherwise would frustrate the purpose of the statute and hold an applicant responsible for property tax payments during the appeals process simply because the Commissioner and the Board made erroneous determinations.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
All concurring.
Notes
. 36 M.R.S.A. § 655(1)(N) provides in pertinent part:
The following personal property is exempt from taxation:
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(N) Water pollution control facilities ... as defined in sеction 656, subsection 1, paragraph E.
36 M.R.S.A. § 656 states in pertinent part: . The following real estate is exempt from taxation:
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E. Pollution control facilities.
(1) Water pollution control facilities having a capacity to handle at least 4,000 gallons of waste per day, certified as such by the Commissioner of Environmentаl Protection, and all parts and accessories thereof.
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(a) "Facility” means any disposal system or any treatment works, appliance, equipment, machinery, installation or structures installed, acquired or placed in operation primarily for the purpose of reducing, controlling or eliminating water pollution caused by industrial, commercial or domestic waste.
Section 656 does not define "waste” per se, but the definition of industrial waste is identical to the definition found in section 1760. For the purposes of this statute, the waste discharged from the International Paper, Boise Cascade, and James River mills is industrial waste.
36 M.R.S.A. § 1760 states in pertinent part: No tax on sales, storage or use shaE be coEect-ed upon or in connection with:
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(29) Sales of any water poEution control facEity, certified as such by the Commissioner of Environmental Protection, and any part or accessories thereof, or any materials for the construction, repair, or maintenance of a facEity. As used in this subsection, unless the context otherwise indicates, the foEowing terms have the following meanings.
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B. "FacEity” means any disposal system or any trеatment works, appHance, equipment, machinery, instaEation or structures installed, acquired or placed in operation primarily for the purpose of reducing, controlling or eliminating water poEution caused by industrial or other waste ...[.]
C. “Industrial waste” means any liquid, gaseous or sofid waste substance capable of polluting the waters of the State and resulting from any process, or the development of any process, of industry or manufacture.
. 38 M.R.S.A. § 341-D(4) (Supp.1993) states that the Board has jurisdiction to review "[fjinal license or permit decisions made by the [C]ommis-sioner when a person aggrieved by a decision of the [C]ommissioner appeals that decision to the [B]oard ... [.]"